|
|
| |
| |
|
| | (b) | encourage those who wish to complain to do so through that |
|
| | |
| | (c) | not receive complaints directly unless or until the internal complaints |
|
| | system has been engaged and the complaint has not been resolved |
|
| | within specified time limits. |
|
| | 56 | In relation to complaints— |
|
| | (a) | a recognised regulator must have the power to hear and decide on |
|
| | complaints about breach of the standards code by subscribers; |
|
| | (b) | a recognised regulator must have the power (but not necessarily in all |
|
| | cases, depending on the circumstances, the duty) to hear complaints |
|
| | whoever they come from, whether persons personally or directly |
|
| | affected by the alleged breach, or a representative group affected by |
|
| | the alleged breach, or a third party seeking to ensure accuracy of |
|
| | published information (in which case the views of the party most |
|
| | closely involved should be taken into account); |
|
| | (c) | a recognised regulator must have the power to allow a complaint to be |
|
| | brought prior to commencing legal proceedings, without prejudice to |
|
| | any power of the court to order a stay of the regulator’s action if |
|
| | continuing it would endanger the civil action; |
|
| | (d) | decisions on complaints must be the ultimate responsibility of the |
|
| | Board, advised by complaints handling officials to whom appropriate |
|
| | |
| | (e) | serving editors may not have any role in determining the outcome of |
|
| | individuals’ complaints, nor be members of any Committee advising |
|
| | the Board on complaints and any such Committee must have a |
|
| | composition broadly reflecting that of the main Board, with a majority |
|
| | of people who are independent of the press; and |
|
| | (f) | the mechanism must allow complainants to bring complaints free of |
|
| | |
| | |
| | 57 | The arrangements for subscription to each registered regulator must ensure |
|
| | |
| | (a) | the Board has authority to examine issues on its own initiative; |
|
| | (b) | the Board has sufficient powers, and personnel with the necessary |
|
| | experience and expertise and independence from news publishers, to |
|
| | carry out investigations both into suspected serious or systemic |
|
| | breaches of the Code and failures to comply with directions of the |
|
| | |
| | (c) | subscribers are required to cooperate with any such investigation; and |
|
| | (d) | the investigation process is simple and credible. |
|
| | Breaches of Standards Code |
|
| | 58 | A Board must have both the power and a duty to ensure that all breaches of the |
|
| | Standards Code that is considers are recorded as such and that proper data is |
|
| | kept that records the extent to which complaints have been made and their |
|
| | outcome; and this information must be made available to the public in a way |
|
| | that allows understanding of the compliance record of each subscribing |
|
| | |
| | 59 | In relation to breaches of the Standards Code which a Board finds to have been |
|
| | |
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | (a) | the Board must have the power to direct appropriate remedial action |
|
| | for breach of standards and the publication of corrections and |
|
| | |
| | (b) | the Board must have the power to require publication of a correction |
|
| | and an apology, both in relation to standards breaches affecting |
|
| | individuals or groups of people, and in relation to matters of fact where |
|
| | no single identifiable individual has been affected; |
|
| | (c) | the Board must have the power to direct the nature, extent and |
|
| | |
| | (d) | the Board must have the power to impose appropriate and |
|
| | proportionate sanctions (including financial sanctions up to 1 per cent |
|
| | of turnover, with a maximum of £1 million) on any subscriber found |
|
| | to be responsible for serious or systemic breaches of the Standards |
|
| | Code or governance requirements of the body; and |
|
| | (e) | the Board must not have the power to prevent publication of any |
|
| | material, by anyone, at any time although (in its discretion) it should |
|
| | be able to offer a service of advice to editors of subscribing |
|
| | publications relating to Standards Code compliance which editors, in |
|
| | their discretion, can deploy in civil proceedings arising out of |
|
| | |
| | Matters for consideration by the Board |
|
| | 60 | The Board must demonstrate at the time of certification under paragraph 2(1) |
|
| | that it has the ability and a timetable to consider all the matters set out in |
|
| | |
| | 61 | The Board must demonstrate at the time of— |
|
| | (a) | a review under paragraph 2(5)(a) that it has considered the matters set |
|
| | out in paragraph 57 since certification; and |
|
| | (b) | a review under paragraph 2(5)(b) that is has considered the matters set |
|
| | out in paragraph 57 since the previous review. |
|
| | 62 | The matters to be considered by the Board are— |
|
| | (a) | the publication of compliance reports by papers in their own pages, |
|
| | and requiring papers to have named senior individuals with |
|
| | responsibility for compliance; |
|
| | (b) | the establishment of a kite-mark scheme; |
|
| | (c) | the holding of an early review of the Standards Code; |
|
| | (d) | Standards Code amendments giving the recognised regulator the |
|
| | power to intervene in cases of allegedly discriminatory reports, having |
|
| | regard to the need to protect freedom of speech and the need to reflect |
|
| | the purpose of equalities legislation; |
|
| | (e) | the need to be explicit in its work that where public-interest |
|
| | justification will be used, there should be a record of factors weighing |
|
| | for and against publication, and of conclusions reached; |
|
| | (f) | the provision of an advisory service to editors in relation to public- |
|
| | |
| | (g) | encouragement of its subscribers to be transparent with stories’ |
|
| | sources by providing information to help readers assess reliability of |
|
| | the information provided, such as links to studies and poll results and |
|
| | the names of photographers, subject to the condition that such |
|
| | transparency does not undermine the protection of confidential |
|
| | |
| | (h) | a requirement for there to be a conscience clause in journalists’ |
|
| | |
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | |
| | 63 | The Board must publish an Annual Report identifying— |
|
| | (a) | the body’s subscribers, identifying any significant changes in |
|
| | |
| | (b) | the number of complaints it has handled and the outcomes reached, |
|
| | both in aggregate for all subscribers and individually in relation to |
|
| | |
| | (c) | a summary of any investigations carried out and their results; |
|
| | (d) | a report on the adequacy and effectiveness of compliance processes |
|
| | and procedures adopted by each subscriber; |
|
| | (e) | information about the extent to which the arbitration service has been |
|
| | |
| | (f) | information relating to its financial arrangements in the exercise of its |
|
| | functions and any changes to its financial arrangements. |
|
| | |
| | 64 | The Board must provide an arbitration service, for resolving publication |
|
| | proceedings by arbitration which has rules which provides for a fair, quick and |
|
| | inexpensive process, which is inquisitorial and free for complainants to use |
|
| | (save for a power to make an adverse order for the costs of the arbitrator if |
|
| | proceedings are frivolous or vexatious) and which has rules that— |
|
| | (a) | allow complainants to recover their costs from persons subscribing to |
|
| | the service, in circumstances where procedural fairness or access to |
|
| | |
| | (b) | give the arbitrator the powers in section 48(3) to (5) of the Arbitration |
|
| | |
| | (c) | allow either party to appeal to the High Court on a point of law in |
|
| | accordance with section 69 of the Arbitration Act 1996; |
|
| | (d) | allow the arbitrator to hold hearings where necessary or dispense with |
|
| | them where not necessary; and |
|
| | (e) | provide for frivolous or vexatious claims to be struck out at an early |
|
| | |
| | |
| | 65 | The Board must establish a ring-fenced enforcement fund into which receipts |
|
| | from financial sanctions are paid, for the purpose of funding investigations. |
|
| | |
| | 66 | The Board must have the duty to provide advice to the public in relation to |
|
| | issues concerning its subscribers and the Code. |
|
| | |
| | 67 | The Board must have the duty to provide a service to warn its subscribers, and |
|
| | other relevant parties such as broadcasters and press photographers, when an |
|
| | individual has made it clear that they do not welcome press intrusion. |
|
| | |
| | 68 | The Board must have the duty to cooperate with any other recognised regulator |
|
| | and must put in place procedures to enable such co-operation.’. |
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | Royal Charters: requirements for Parliamentary approval |
|
| |
| |
| |
| | |
| To move the following Clause:— |
|
| | ‘Where a body is established by Royal Charter after 18 March 2013 with |
|
| | functions relating to the carrying on of an industry, no recommendation may be |
|
| | made to Her Majesty in Council to amend the Body’s Charter or dissolve the body |
|
| | unless any requirements included in the Charter on the date it is granted for |
|
| | Parliament to approve the amendment or dissolution have been met.’. |
|
| | Royal Charter of recognition body |
|
| |
| | |
| To move the following Clause:— |
|
| | ‘The Royal Charter of a body established with the purpose of carrying on |
|
| | activities relating to the recognition of independent regulators of relevant |
|
| | publishers must be in the form set out in the Schedule.’.’. |
|
| |
| | |
| To move the following Schedule:— |
|
| | ‘Royal Charter of Recognition body recognition criteria |
|
| | | The following requirements are the recognition criteria for the Scheme of |
|
| | Recognition established under Article 4 of, and Schedule 2 to, this Charter. |
|
| | 1 | An independent self-regulatory body should be governed by an independent |
|
| | Board. In order to ensure the independence of the body, the Chair and members |
|
| | of the Board must be appointed in a genuinely open, transparent and |
|
| | independent way, without any influence from industry or Government. For the |
|
| | avoidance of doubt, the industry’s activities in establishing a self-regulatory |
|
| | body, and its participation in making appointments to the Board in accordance |
|
| | with criteria 2 to 5, or in financing the self-regulatory body shall not constitute |
|
| | influence by the industry in breach of this criterion. |
|
| | 2 | The Chair of the Board (who is subject to the restrictions of criterion 5(d), (e) |
|
| | and (f)) can only be appointed if nominated by an appointment panel. The |
|
| | selection of that panel must itself be conducted in an appropriately independent |
|
| | way and must, itself, be independent of the industry and of Government. |
|
| | |
| | (a) | should be appointed in an independent, fair and open way; |
|
| | (b) | should contain a substantial majority of members who are |
|
| | demonstrably independent of the press; |
|
| | (c) | should include at least one person with a current understanding and |
|
| | experience of the press; and |
|
| | (d) | should include no more than one current editor of a publication that |
|
| | could be a member of the body. |
|
| | 4 | The nomination process for the appointment of the Board should also be an |
|
| | independent process, and the composition of the Board should include people |
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | with relevant expertise. The appointment panel may only nominate as many |
|
| | people as there are vacancies on the Board (including the Chair), and the Board |
|
| | shall accept all nominations. The requirement for independence means that |
|
| | there should be no serving editors on the Board. |
|
| | 5 | The members of the Board should be appointed only following nomination by |
|
| | the same appointment panel that nominates the Chair, together with the Chair |
|
| | (once appointed), and should— |
|
| | (a) | be nominated by a process which is fair and open; |
|
| | (b) | comprise a majority of people who are independent of the press; |
|
| | (c) | include a sufficient number of people with experience of the industry |
|
| | who may include former editors and senior or academic journalists; |
|
| | (d) | not include any serving editor; |
|
| | (e) | not include any serving member of the House of Commons, the |
|
| | Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the National |
|
| | Assembly for Wales, the European Parliament or the House of Lords |
|
| | (but only if, in the case of the House of Lords, the member holds or has |
|
| | held within the previous 5 years an official affiliation with a political |
|
| | party) or a Minister of the Crown, a Scottish Minister, a Northern |
|
| | Ireland Executive Minister or a Welsh Government Minister; and |
|
| | (f) | in the view of the appointment panel, and having regard to any |
|
| | publicly stated position of the individual concerned, be a person who |
|
| | can manifestly act fairly and impartially in the decision-making of the |
|
| | |
| | 6 | Funding for the system should be settled in agreement between the industry |
|
| | and the Board, taking into account the cost of fulfilling the obligations of the |
|
| | regulator and the commercial pressures on the industry. There should be an |
|
| | indicative budget which the Board certifies is adequate for the purpose. |
|
| | Funding settlements should cover a four or five year period and should be |
|
| | negotiated well in advance. |
|
| | 7 | The standards code must ultimately be the responsibility of the Board, and be |
|
| | written by code committee comprising both independent members of the board |
|
| | and serving editors but on which editors should not have a decisive part to play. |
|
| | The Code Committee must conduct an annual public consultation on changes |
|
| | |
| | 8 | The code must take into account the importance of freedom of speech, the |
|
| | interests of the public (including but not limited to the public interest in |
|
| | detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety, protecting public health |
|
| | and safety and preventing the public from being seriously misled), the need for |
|
| | journalists to protect confidential sources of information, and the rights of |
|
| | individuals. Specifically, it must cover standards of— |
|
| | (a) | conduct, especially in relation to the treatment of other people in the |
|
| | process of obtaining material; |
|
| | (b) | appropriate respect for privacy where there is no sufficient public |
|
| | interest justification for breach; and |
|
| | (c) | accuracy, and the need to avoid misrepresentation. |
|
| | 8A | A self-regulatory body should provide advice to the public in relation to issues |
|
| | concerning the press and the standards code, along with a service to warn the |
|
| | press, and other relevant parties such as broadcasters and press photographers, |
|
| | when an individual has made it clear that they do not welcome press intrusion. |
|
| | 8B | A self-regulatory body should make it clear that subscribers will be held |
|
| | strictly accountable under the standards code for any material that they |
|
| | publish, including photographs, however sourced. This criterion does not |
|
| | include advertising content. |
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | 8C | A self-regulatory body should provide non-binding guidance on the |
|
| | interpretation of the public interest that justifies what would otherwise |
|
| | constitute a breach of the standards code. This must be framed in the context |
|
| | of the different provisions of the code relating to the public interest. |
|
| | 8D | A self-regulatory body should establish a whistleblowing hotline for those who |
|
| | feel that they are being asked to do things which are contrary to the standards |
|
| | |
| | 9 | The Board should require, of those who subscribe, appropriate internal |
|
| | governance processes (for dealing with complaints and compliance with the |
|
| | standards code), transparency on what governance processes they have in |
|
| | place, and notice of any failures in compliance, together with details of steps |
|
| | taken to deal with failures in compliance. |
|
| | 10 | The Board should require all those who subscribe to have an adequate and |
|
| | speedy complaint handling mechanism; it should encourage those who wish to |
|
| | complain to do so through that mechanism and should not receive complaints |
|
| | directly unless or until the internal complaints system has been engaged |
|
| | without the complaint being resolved in an appropriate time. |
|
| | 11 | The Board should have the power to hear and decide on complaints about |
|
| | breach of the standards code by those who subscribe. The Board will need to |
|
| | have the discretion not to look into complaints if they feel that the complaint |
|
| | is without justification, is an attempt to argue a point of opinion rather than a |
|
| | standards code breach, or is simply an attempt to lobby. The Board should have |
|
| | the power (but not necessarily the duty) to hear complaints— |
|
| | (a) | from anyone personally and directly affected by the alleged breach of |
|
| | |
| | (b) | where there is an alleged breach of the code and there is public interest |
|
| | in the Board giving consideration to the complaint from a |
|
| | representative group affected by the alleged breach, or |
|
| | (c) | from a third party seeking to ensure accuracy of published |
|
| | |
| | | In the case of third party complaints the views of the party most closely |
|
| | involved should be taken into account. |
|
| | 12 | Decisions on complaints should be the ultimate responsibility of the Board, |
|
| | advised by complaints handling officials to whom appropriate delegations may |
|
| | |
| | 12A | The Board should be prepared to allow a complaint to be brought prior to legal |
|
| | proceedings being commenced. Challenges to that approach (and applications |
|
| | to stay) can be decided on the merits. |
|
| | 13 | Serving editors should not be members of any Committee advising the Board |
|
| | on complaints and should not play any role in determining the outcome of an |
|
| | individual complaint. Any such Committee should have a composition broadly |
|
| | reflecting that of the main Board, with a majority of people who are |
|
| | independent of the press. |
|
| | 14 | It should continue to be the case that complainants are able to bring complaints |
|
| | |
| | 15 | In relation to complaints, where a negotiated outcome between a complainant |
|
| | and a subscriber (pursuant to criterion 10) has failed, the Board should have |
|
| | the power where appropriate to require remedial action for breach of standards |
|
| | and the publication of corrections and apologies. Although remedies are |
|
| | essentially about correcting the record for individuals, the power to direct a |
|
| | correction and an apology must apply equally in relation to— |
|
| | (a) | individual standards breaches; and |
|
| | (b) | groups of people as defined in criterion 11 where there is no single |
|
| | identifiable individual who has been affected; and |
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | (c) | matters of fact where there is no single identifiable individual who has |
|
| | |
| | 16 | In the event of no agreement between a complainant and a subscriber, the |
|
| | power to direct the nature, extent and placement of apologies should lie with |
|
| | |
| | 17 | The Board should not have the power to prevent publication of any material, |
|
| | by anyone, at any time although (in its discretion) it should be able to offer a |
|
| | service of advice to editors of subscribing publications relating to code |
|
| | |
| | 18 | The Board, being an independent self-regulatory body, should have authority |
|
| | to examine issues on its own initiative and have sufficient powers to carry out |
|
| | investigations both into suspected serious or systemic breaches of the code and |
|
| | failures to comply with directions of the Board. Those who subscribe must be |
|
| | required to cooperate with any such investigation. |
|
| | 19 | The Board should have the power to impose appropriate and proportionate |
|
| | sanctions (including but not limited to financial sanctions up to 1% of turnover |
|
| | attributable to the publication concerned with a maximum of £1,000,000) on |
|
| | any subscriber found to be responsible for serious or systemic breaches of the |
|
| | standards code or governance requirements of the body. The Board should |
|
| | have sufficient powers to require appropriate information from subscribers in |
|
| | order to ascertain the turnover that is attributable to a publication irrespective |
|
| | of any particular accounting arrangements of the publication or subscriber. The |
|
| | sanctions that should be available should include power to require publication |
|
| | of corrections, if the breaches relate to accuracy, or apologies if the breaches |
|
| | relate to other provisions of the code. |
|
| | 19A | The Board should establish a ring-fenced enforcement fund, into which |
|
| | receipts from financial sanctions could be paid, for the purpose of funding |
|
| | |
| | 20 | The Board should have both the power and a duty to ensure that all breaches |
|
| | of the standards code that it considers are recorded as such and that proper data |
|
| | is kept that records the extent to which complaints have been made and their |
|
| | outcome; this information should be made available to the public in a way that |
|
| | allows understanding of the compliance record of each title. |
|
| | 21 | The Board should publish an Annual Report identifying— |
|
| | (a) | the body’s subscribers, identifying any significant changes in |
|
| | |
| | |
| | (i) | complaints it has handled, making clear how many of them are |
|
| | |
| | (ii) | articles in respect of which it has considered complaints to be |
|
| | |
| | (iii) | articles in respect of which it has considered complaints to be |
|
| | with merit, and the outcomes reached, |
|
| | | in aggregate for all subscribers and individually in relation to each |
|
| | |
| | (c) | a summary of any investigations carried out and the result of them; |
|
| | (d) | a report on the adequacy and effectiveness of compliance processes |
|
| | and procedures adopted by subscribers; and |
|
| | (e) | information about the extent to which the arbitration service has been |
|
| | |
| | 22 | The Board should provide an arbitral process for civil legal claims against |
|
| | |
| | (a) | complies with the Arbitration Act 1996 (“the Act”); |
|
|