|
|
| |
| |
|
| | the power where appropriate to require remedial action for breach of standards |
|
| | and the publication of corrections and apologies. Although remedies are |
|
| | essentially about correcting the record for individuals, the power to direct a |
|
| | correction and an apology must apply equally in relation to— |
|
| | (a) | individual standards breaches; and |
|
| | (b) | groups of people as defined in criterion 11 where there is no single |
|
| | identifiable individual who has been affected; and |
|
| | (c) | matters of fact where there is no single identifiable individual who has |
|
| | |
| | 16 | In the event of no agreement between a complainant and a subscriber, the |
|
| | power to direct the nature, extent and placement of apologies should lie with |
|
| | |
| | 17 | The Board should not have the power to prevent publication of any material, |
|
| | by anyone, at any time although (in its discretion) it should be able to offer a |
|
| | service of advice to editors of subscribing publications relating to code |
|
| | |
| | 18 | The Board, being an independent self-regulatory body, should have authority |
|
| | to examine issues on its own initiative and have sufficient powers to carry out |
|
| | investigations both into suspected serious or systemic breaches of the code and |
|
| | failures to comply with directions of the Board. Those who subscribe must be |
|
| | required to cooperate with any such investigation. |
|
| | 19 | The Board should have the power to impose appropriate and proportionate |
|
| | sanctions (including but not limited to financial sanctions up to 1% of turnover |
|
| | attributable to the publication concerned with a maximum of £1,000,000) on |
|
| | any subscriber found to be responsible for serious or systemic breaches of the |
|
| | standards code or governance requirements of the body. The Board should |
|
| | have sufficient powers to require appropriate information from subscribers in |
|
| | order to ascertain the turnover that is attributable to a publication irrespective |
|
| | of any particular accounting arrangements of the publication or subscriber. The |
|
| | sanctions that should be available should include power to require publication |
|
| | of corrections, if the breaches relate to accuracy, or apologies if the breaches |
|
| | relate to other provisions of the code. |
|
| | 19A | The Board should establish a ring-fenced enforcement fund, into which |
|
| | receipts from financial sanctions could be paid, for the purpose of funding |
|
| | |
| | 20 | The Board should have both the power and a duty to ensure that all breaches |
|
| | of the standards code that it considers are recorded as such and that proper data |
|
| | is kept that records the extent to which complaints have been made and their |
|
| | outcome; this information should be made available to the public in a way that |
|
| | allows understanding of the compliance record of each title. |
|
| | 21 | The Board should publish an Annual Report identifying— |
|
| | (a) | the body’s subscribers, identifying any significant changes in |
|
| | |
| | |
| | (i) | complaints it has handled, making clear how many of them are |
|
| | |
| | (ii) | articles in respect of which it has considered complaints to be |
|
| | |
| | (iii) | articles in respect of which it has considered complaints to be |
|
| | with merit, and the outcomes reached, |
|
| | | in aggregate for all subscribers and individually in relation to each |
|
| | |
| | (c) | a summary of any investigations carried out and the result of them; |
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | (d) | a report on the adequacy and effectiveness of compliance processes |
|
| | and procedures adopted by subscribers; and |
|
| | (e) | information about the extent to which the arbitration service has been |
|
| | |
| | 22 | The Board should provide an arbitral process for civil legal claims against |
|
| | |
| | (a) | complies with the Arbitration Act 1996 (“the Act”); |
|
| | (b) | provides suitable powers for the arbitrator to ensure the process |
|
| | operates fairly and quickly, and on an inquisitorial basis (so far as |
|
| | |
| | (c) | contains transparent arrangements for claims to be struck out, for |
|
| | legitimate reasons (including on frivolous or vexatious grounds); |
|
| | (d) | directs appropriate pre-publication matters to the courts; |
|
| | (e) | operates under the principle that arbitration should be free for |
|
| | |
| | (f) | ensures that the parties should each bear their own costs, subject to a |
|
| | successful complainant’s costs being recoverable (having regard to |
|
| | section 60 of the Act and any applicable caps on recoverable costs); |
|
| | |
| | (g) | overall, is inexpensive for all parties. |
|
| | 23 | The membership of a regulatory body should be open to all publishers on fair, |
|
| | reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.’. |
|
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
| | To move the following Schedule:— |
|
| | ‘Royal Charter of Recognition Body |
|
| | |
| | | The following requirements are the recognition criteria for the Scheme of |
|
| | Recognition established under Article 4 of, and Schedule 2 to, any Charter— |
|
| | 1 | An independent self-regulatory body should be governed by an independent |
|
| | Board. In order to ensure the independence of the body, the Chair and members |
|
| | of the Board must be appointed in a genuinely open, transparent and |
|
| | independent way, without any influence from industry or government. For the |
|
| | avoidance of doubt, the industry’s activities in establishing a self-regulatory |
|
| | body, and its participation in making appointments to the Board in accordance |
|
| | with criteria 2 to 5; or its financing of the self-regulatory body shall not |
|
| | constitute influence by the industry in breach of this criterion. |
|
| | 2 | The Chair of the Board (who is subject to the restrictions of criterion 5(d), (e) |
|
| | and (f)) can only be appointed if nominated by an appointment panel. The |
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | selection of that panel must itself be conducted in an appropriately independent |
|
| | way and must, itself, be independent of the industry and of government. |
|
| | |
| | (a) | should be appointed in an independent, fair and open way; |
|
| | (b) | should contain a substantial majority of members who are |
|
| | demonstrably independent of the press; |
|
| | (c) | should include at least one person with a current understanding and |
|
| | |
| | (d) | should include no more than one current editor of a publication that |
|
| | could be a member of the body. |
|
| | 4 | The nomination process for the appointment of the Board should also be an |
|
| | independent process, and the composition of the Board should include people |
|
| | with relevant expertise. The appointment panel may only nominate as many |
|
| | people as there are vacancies on the Board (including the Chair), and the Board |
|
| | shall accept all nominations. The requirement for independence means that |
|
| | there should be no serving editors on the Board. |
|
| | 5 | The members of the Board should be appointed only following nomination by |
|
| | the same appointment panel that nominates the Chair, together with the Chair |
|
| | (once appointed), and should— |
|
| | (a) | be nominated by a process which is fair and open; |
|
| | (b) | comprise a majority of people who are independent of the press; |
|
| | (c) | include a sufficient number of people with experience of the industry |
|
| | who may include former editors and senior or academic journalists; |
|
| | (d) | not include any serving editor; |
|
| | (e) | not include any serving member of the House of Commons, the |
|
| | Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the National |
|
| | Assembly for Wales, the European Parliament or the House of Lords |
|
| | (but only if, in the case of the House of Lords, the member holds or has |
|
| | held within the previous five years an official affiliation with a |
|
| | political party) or a Minister of the Crown, a Scottish Minister, a |
|
| | Northern Ireland Executive Minister or a Welsh Government |
|
| | |
| | (f) | in the view of the appointment panel, be a person who can act fairly |
|
| | and impartially in the decision-making of the Board. |
|
| | 6 | Funding for the system should be settled in agreement between the industry |
|
| | and the Board, taking into account the cost of fulfilling the obligations of the |
|
| | regulator and the commercial pressures on the industry. There should be an |
|
| | indicative budget which the Board certifies is adequate for the purpose. |
|
| | Funding settlements should cover a four or five year period and should be |
|
| | negotiated well in advance. |
|
| | 7 | The standards code, which is the responsibility of the Code Committee, must |
|
| | be approved by the Board or remitted to the Code Committee with reasons. The |
|
| | Code Committee will be appointed by the Board, in accordance with best |
|
| | practices for public appointments, and comprised of equal proportions of |
|
| | independent members, journalists and serving editors. There will be a biennial |
|
| | public consultation by the Code Committee, the results of which must be |
|
| | considered openly with the Board. |
|
| | 8 | The code must take into account the importance of freedom of speech, the |
|
| | interests of the public (including but not limited to the public interest in |
|
| | detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety, protecting public health |
|
| | and safety and preventing the public from being seriously misled), the need for |
|
| | journalists to protect confidential sources of information, and the rights of |
|
| | individuals. Specifically, it must cover standards of— |
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | (a) | conduct, especially in relation to the treatment of other people in the |
|
| | process of obtaining material; |
|
| | (b) | appropriate respect for privacy where there is no sufficient public |
|
| | interest justification for breach; and |
|
| | (c) | accuracy, and the need to avoid misrepresentation. |
|
| | 8A | A self-regulatory body should provide advice to the public in relation to issues |
|
| | concerning the press and the standards code, along with a service to warn the |
|
| | press, and other relevant parties such as broadcasters and press photographers, |
|
| | when an individual has made it clear that they do not welcome press intrusion. |
|
| | 8B | A self-regulatory body should make it clear that subscribers will be held |
|
| | strictly accountable under the standards code for any material that they |
|
| | publish, including photographs, however sourced. This criterion does not |
|
| | include advertising content. |
|
| | 8C | A self-regulatory body should provide non-binding guidance on the |
|
| | interpretation of the public interest that justifies what would otherwise |
|
| | constitute a breach of the standards code. This must be framed in the context |
|
| | of the different provisions of the code relating to the public interest. |
|
| | 8D | A self-regulatory body should establish a whistleblowing hot-line for those |
|
| | who feel that they are being asked to do things which are contrary to the |
|
| | |
| | 9 | The Board should require, of those who subscribe, appropriate internal |
|
| | governance processes (for dealing with complaints and compliance with the |
|
| | standards code), transparency on what governance processes they have in |
|
| | place, and notice of any failures in compliance, together with details of steps |
|
| | taken to deal with failures in compliance. |
|
| | 10 | The Board should require all those who subscribe to have an adequate and |
|
| | speedy complaint handling mechanism; it should encourage those who wish to |
|
| | complain to do so through that mechanism and should not receive complaints |
|
| | directly unless or until the internal complaints system has been engaged |
|
| | without the complaint being resolved in an appropriate time. |
|
| | 11 | The Board should have the power to hear and decide on complaints about |
|
| | breach of the standards code by those who subscribe. The Board will need to |
|
| | have the discretion not to look into complaints if they feel that the complaint |
|
| | is without justification, is an attempt to argue a point of opinion rather than a |
|
| | standards code breach, or is simply an attempt to lobby. The Board should have |
|
| | the power (but not necessarily the duty) to hear complaints— |
|
| | (a) | from anyone personally and directly affected by the alleged breach of |
|
| | |
| | (b) | where there is an alleged breach of the code and there is public interest |
|
| | in the Board giving consideration to the complaint from a |
|
| | representative group affected by the alleged breach; or |
|
| | (c) | from a third party seeking to ensure accuracy of published |
|
| | |
| | | In the case of third party complaints the views of the party most closely |
|
| | involved should be taken into account. |
|
| | 12 | Decisions on complaints should be the ultimate responsibility of the Board, |
|
| | advised by complaints handling officials to whom appropriate delegations may |
|
| | |
| | 12A | The Board should be prepared to allow a complaint to be brought prior to legal |
|
| | proceedings being commenced. Challenges to that approach (and applications |
|
| | to stay) can be decided on the merits. |
|
| | 13 | Serving editors should not be members of any Committee advising the Board |
|
| | on complaints and should not play any role in determining the outcome of an |
|
| | individual complaint. Any such Committee should have a composition broadly |
|
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | reflecting that of the main Board, with a majority of people who are |
|
| | independent of the press. |
|
| | 14 | It should continue to be the case that complainants are able to bring complaints |
|
| | |
| | 15 | In relation to complaints, where a negotiated outcome between a complainant |
|
| | and a subscriber (pursuant to criterion 10) has failed, the Board should have |
|
| | the power to direct appropriate remedial action for breach of standards and the |
|
| | publication of corrections and apologies. Although remedies are essentially |
|
| | about correcting the record for individuals, the power to require a correction |
|
| | and an apology must apply equally in relation to— |
|
| | (a) | individual standards breaches; and |
|
| | (b) | groups of people as defined in criterion 11 where there is no single |
|
| | identifiable individual who has been affected; and |
|
| | (c) | matters of fact where there is no single identifiable individual who has |
|
| | |
| | 16 | In the event of no agreement between a complainant and a subscriber (pursuant |
|
| | to criterion 10), the power to direct the nature, extent and placement of |
|
| | corrections and apologies should lie with the Board. |
|
| | 17 | The Board should not have the power to prevent publication of any material, |
|
| | by anyone, at any time although (in its discretion) it should be able to offer a |
|
| | service of advice to editors of subscribing publications relating to code |
|
| | |
| | 18 | The Board, being an independent self-regulatory body, should have authority |
|
| | to examine issues on its own initiative and have sufficient powers to carry out |
|
| | investigations both into suspected serious or systemic breaches of the code and |
|
| | failures to comply with directions of the Board. The investigations process |
|
| | must be simple and credible, and those who subscribe must be required to |
|
| | cooperate with any such investigation. |
|
| | 19 | The Board should have the power to impose appropriate and proportionate |
|
| | sanctions (including but not limited to financial sanctions up to 1 per cent of |
|
| | turnover attributable to the publication concerned with a maximum of |
|
| | £1,000,000) on any subscriber found to be responsible for serious or systemic |
|
| | breaches of the standards code or governance requirements of the body. The |
|
| | Board should have sufficient powers to require appropriate information from |
|
| | subscribers in order to ascertain the turnover that is attributable to a publication |
|
| | irrespective of any particular accounting arrangements of the publication or |
|
| | subscriber. The sanctions that should be available should include power to |
|
| | require publication of corrections, if the breaches relate to accuracy, or |
|
| | apologies if the breaches relate to other provisions of the code. |
|
| | 19A | The Board should establish a ring-fenced enforcement fund, into which |
|
| | receipts from financial sanctions could be paid, for the purpose of funding |
|
| | |
| | 20 | The Board should have both the power and a duty to ensure that all breaches |
|
| | of the standards code that it considers are recorded as such and that proper data |
|
| | is kept that records the extent to which complaints have been made and their |
|
| | outcome; this information should be made available to the public in a way that |
|
| | allows understanding of the compliance record of each title. |
|
| | 21 | The Board should publish an Annual Report identifying— |
|
| | (a) | the body’s subscribers, identifying any significant changes in |
|
| | |
| | |
| | (i) | complaints it has handled, making clear how many of them are |
|
| | |
|
|
| |
| |
|
| | (ii) | articles in respect of which it has considered complaints to be |
|
| | |
| | (iii) | articles in respect of which it has considered complaints to be |
|
| | with merit, and the outcomes reached, in aggregate for all |
|
| | subscribers and individually in relation to each subscriber; |
|
| | (c) | a summary of any investigations carried out and the result of them; |
|
| | (d) | a report on the adequacy and effectiveness of compliance processes |
|
| | and procedures adopted by subscribers; and |
|
| | (e) | information about the extent to which the arbitration service has been |
|
| | |
| | 22 | The Board should provide an arbitral process for civil legal claims against |
|
| | |
| | (a) | complies with the Arbitration Act 1996 (“the Act”); |
|
| | (b) | provides suitable powers for the arbitrator to ensure the process |
|
| | operates fairly and quickly, and on an inquisitorial basis (so far as |
|
| | |
| | (c) | contains transparent arrangements for claims to be struck out, for |
|
| | legitimate reasons (including on frivolous or vexatious grounds); |
|
| | (d) | directs appropriate pre-publication matters to the courts; |
|
| | (e) | operates under the principle that arbitration should be free for |
|
| | |
| | (f) | ensures that the parties should each bear their own costs, subject to a |
|
| | successful complainant’s costs being recoverable (having regard to |
|
| | section 60 of the Act and any applicable caps on recoverable costs); |
|
| | |
| | (g) | overall, is inexpensive for all parties. |
|
| | 23 | The membership of a regulatory body should be open to all publishers on fair, |
|
| | reasonable and non-discriminatory terms, including making membership |
|
| | potentially available on different terms for different types of publisher. |
|
| | (b) In addition to the matters set out above, the Board of the Recognition Panel shall grant |
|
| | recognition to a Regulator if the Board is satisfied that the Regulator meets the recognition |
|
| | criteria and that the Regulator meets the criteria of effectiveness, fairness and objectivity |
|
| | of standards, independence and transparency of enforcement and compliance, credible |
|
| | powers and remedies, reliable funding and effective accountability.’. |
|
| |
| New Clauses standing in the name of a Minister of the Crown and relating |
|
| |
| | Restraint orders and legal aid |
|
| |
| | |
| To move the following Clause:— |
|
| | ‘(1) | Section 41 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (confiscation in England and |
|
| | Wales: restraint orders) is amended in accordance with subsections (2) to (6). |
|
| | (2) | After subsection (2) insert— |
|
|