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7.49 pmMr. A. E. P. Duffy (Sheffield, Attercliffe) : The transformation of East-West relations presents opportunities for the 1990s, but whether this decade will witness such a momentous shift depends upon a multitude of factors. The critical and most unpredictable one is the evolution of policy in the Soviet Union. Before I touch on that, I wish to pose other questions which, I submit, need to form the framework of our debate tonight. What role will our Alliance continue to play? What can we now expect of the Warsaw treaty organisation? To what degree is the framework operated in Vienna for the CFE--negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe-- still valid? What is our concept of a future Europe and, in particular of a future Germany?
First, as democratic values overcome the legacy of Yalta in Europe, does NATO still have a role or has the Alliance already accomplished its mission? Although article V, the "core" of the North Atlantic treaty, commits the parties to regard an attack on one as an attack that involves every other member, the raison d'etre of the western Alliance does not depend on an existing, identifiable military threat. Article II of the North Atlantic treaty clearly speaks of non-military roles, by obliging the parties to
"contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well -being".
Is not that a valid political role, which some hon. Members were questioning earlier?
NATO will remain necessary and desirable for well into the future. Its basic purpose of defending and furthering western values endures, as does its permanent worth as the only forum in which the 16 like-minded north American and European democracies can discuss political and economic as well as military dimensions of security policy.
Secondly, one of the ironies of the times is that, just when the WTO is being increasingly described as militarily and politically less important to its member states, a discussion is growing about the stabilising role of the Warsaw pact. Although the traditional Soviet objective of dissolving both alliances has not been formally abandoned, during his historic 19 December 1989 visit to NATO headquarters in Belgium, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated :
"We believe the Warsaw Treaty and NATO at this crucial stage in the European process can play an important stabilising role in stabilising Europe."
I agree that the future of the two alliances in Europe must remain a matter for speculation. As we have head tonight, the CSCE is increasingly cited as a model for the Europe of the future, with each Government engaged in a broad range of discussions as independent nations. At present, NATO and the WTO, as well as the neutral and non-aligned countries, negotiate as three caucuses in CSCE. However, assuming that in the future the CSCE framework will evolve into a Europe without opposing alliances, does any hon. Member present believe that that would prove more stable than the current situation? Would the absence of alliance structures, perhaps not aggravate irridentist and nationalist tendencies and make future Sarajevo cataclysms more likely? We must take the
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longest view. How does this justify abandoning any notion of geopolitical balance as the various permutations of Europe 2000 are contemplated?Thirdly, the briefings that I have been fortunate enough to receive from CFE delegations in Vienna, as recently as December, left me in no doubt that a conventional arms limitation agreement is possible some time in 1990 and if we could get aircraft off the table, we could get agreement by this summer, as the Minister knows. A number of important issues remain to be resolved. None are considered insuperable. There is ample good will on both sides, but more push from the other side. However, it is only the complexities that deter our side.
One eastern representative remarked :
"whatever happens politically in Europe, even if the alliances disappear, the military potentials remain".
A treaty and, we hope, further treaties that formally reduce and constrain those forces are vital necessities.
The precise budgetary consequences of eventual conventional arms cuts--the peace dividend which excites all of us--must as yet remain unclear. In a first-phase CFE agreement, we could expect cuts for NATO of only between 10 and 15 per cent., and then only in certain weapons categories. It is likely that the benefits accruing will be offset by the cost of destroying and verifying treaty compliance--and that has not been considered sufficiently by hon. Members. Finally, what is our concept for a future Europe and, in particular for a future Germany? How will both countries interact on the evolution of policy on the Soviet Union?
In my present role as president of the North Atlantic Assembly, I presided over three days of talks last week in Brussels with the NATO Secretary General, Dr. Worner, with his council of NATO ambassadors and with a delegation from the Supreme Soviet, led by Ambassador Valentin Falin--the former ambassador in Bonn for seven years and currently chairman of the international committee of the Central Committee, a close adviser to Mr. Gorbachev, and the very Russian who is experienced in western Europe and European politics. He was accompanied by Marshal Akromeyev, of whom we have all read and perhaps some of us have met, as well as General Lobov, Chief of Staff of the Warsaw treaty organisation, whom I have met three times in the past year. There were also joint meetings with those newly elected Soviet parliamentarians and a representative body of senior NATO parliamentarians, including right hon. and hon. Members of the House.
Those meetings were the first between NATO and the WTO at military and parliamentary levels. They illustrated the extent and depth of Soviet misperceptions about our alliance. Marshal Akromeyev told me that, until five years ago, he was convinced that we would invade eastern Europe. If such misperceptions can be held by Marshal Akromeyev, Ambassador Falin and General Lobov what are ordinary Russian people thinking about us? Akromeyev has still to be persuaded that even now NATO is not an offensive Alliance. Lobov still believes that it is Alliance policy to preserve the wealth of the West and to keep the USSR poor.
There was a pervading feeling on the part of the Soviet delegation that they will be excluded, not so much from settlement as from an evolving European house. Incidentally, they want a US presence. They were explicit
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that German unification should not adversely affect US security. Ambassador Falin--although I do not believe that he is necessarily representative--is opposed to unification. He believes that Moscow maintains latent rights in East Germany, and that the German Democratic Republic must carry out its duties to the Warsaw pact, even after the March elections. He reiterated last week in Brussels, in a radio interview, that a united Germany could not carry on being part of NATO. He dwelt on the wartime destruction. There is not time for me now for me to go into the details that he gave, especially of destruction in Byelorussia. It was much more severe than German wartime damage and, he put it forward as an important factor in continuing Soviet economic difficulties.There were no specifics from the Russians as to settlement, but repeated expressions of fear about German unification. They are not alone. Some of Germany's European neighbours, as I meet them in the NATO parliamentary network--as do other hon. Members, all the time--consider the prospect of a powerful united German state with more unease then hope. None is questioning German unity, but how is it to be secured? Nor do they question the two-plus-four framework agreed last week in Ottawa, but they are looking for firm safeguards as well as reassurance to the USSR.
7.59 pm
Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion) : I must confess that I do not share the nostalgia for stability felt by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy). I never thought that I would live long enough to see the liberation of eastern Europe, but I thank God that I have ; and, if a good deal of instability is part of the price, let us pay it.
We have just come through what was, in effect, a third world war : but for nuclear weapons, the cold war would have led to a holocaust. While we should not claim too much credit for that, I would point out that it was the determination of the West to make it clear to the Soviets that their policy of expansion was a no-win policy that created the Gorbachev regime : Gorbachev is, in that sense, the son of Reagan.
I am not at all dismayed by the prospective union of Germany. The Nazi phenomenon came from the appalling inflation of the 1920s and the consequences of the world recession of the 1930s. There is nothing like that on the horizon yet, but we must face--and, from what I have heard this evening, I am sure that we are prepared to do so--the fact that the union of Germany, and Austria's approching membership of the European Community, will mean a preponderance of German-speaking people in the Community. We had all better brush up our German pretty quickly.
How is this to be faced? There are two schools of thought. The thinking in Brussels and Paris, followed to some extent in Bonn, is that we should try to anchor Germany in the European Community by making it more federal. I see the force of that argument, but I do not believe that it would work. I do not think that it is possible to tie down a growing, organic popular development with rules and institutions. What did an Irish patriot say?-- "You cannot set limits to the march of a nation." But I do agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) : if Britain is fully involved, some counterpoise will be provided for the preponderant German element.
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Whatever view we may have about federalism or non-federalism, I do not see the House of Commons that I have served for nearly 40 years accepting a tight federation. How, then, do we cope with the problem? A tremendous responsibility rests with the French and the Germans. If they want to develop a system that we cannot join, they can of course inflict on us an economic and financial Dunkirk ; but in that event, the French will find themselves, geopolitically, back in Vichy. If they want to choose that route, it is open to them.On the other hand, we too have a great responsibility, because a Europe united without us could be a Europe united against us. We must also make a big effort to bridge the gap between the Paris thinking and our own--on, among other things, economic and momentary union--and I believe that that can be done. The Almighty, in his infinite wisdom, did not see fit to make Frenchmen in the image of Englishmen. We may regret that, but it is a fact and we must live with it. We shall all have to make a considerable effort.
It is important to remember that the foundation of the European Community is not the treaty of Rome, but the reconciliation of France and Germany. That came about in 1955. When the French Assembly had refused to accept the idea of German rearmament, Anthony Eden gave an undertaking to commit a British Army corps and a tactical air force on the continent indefinitely. That was a generous and a dangerous commitment. On that basis, the French accepted German rearmament, and the Germans themselves agreed to rearm. The treaty of Rome elaborated on that foundation in economic terms. I am sorry that we did not have more of a hand in framing that treaty, but that is neither here nor there.
We are putting together massive interests, economic and financial, in the European Community. So far, they have been protected by NATO. I agree with many hon. Members who have said this evening that the Warsaw pact is finished, but I am not at all sure that NATO in its present form can continue when there is no Warsaw pact. What we really need is a European defence system. I believe that the Western European Union--which we set up in 1955, and which formed the basis and condition of the Franco-German reconciliation--provides us with the necessary structure. France and Spain are not in NATO--the command structure--but they are members of the WEU. We have a minimum deterrent capability, British and French. Here, surely, is the machinery through which we could provide a system for the defence of the interests that we are putting together.
For most of my life, I have seen British Governments respond to European initiatives--the Schuman plan, the European Defence Community and the treaty of Rome--sometimes negatively and sometimes positively. Here is an opportunity for us to take the initiative, and to tell our friends on the continent that the WEU is the nucleus of a European security system that could form the European pillar of an alliance with the United States. Nor should it exclude the grander design supported by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, involving both the United States and the Soviet Union in the ultimate security of this part of the world. It could be the basic building block for such a design--and a fallback if things go wrong.
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8.6 pmMr. Peter Shore (Bethnal Green and Stepney) : I share the view expressed by the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) of the magnitude of the events that we are debating, and also his special concern about the implications for the liberation of eastern Europe--and the near-collapse of the Warsaw pact--for the problem of a united or reunited Germany. We shall face a great power in our own western Europe.
Like others, I do not think that we are faced with any real threat to European security from Germany. Anyone who has had any dealings with West German politicians will, I think, agree that there is no doubting that their democratic credentials are good and solid ; nor do I doubt that people have learnt the lessons of history. It would, however, be unrealistic for us simply to say that a united Germany poses no problems for us, or that others who suffered more terribly than we during the second world war are not still very anxious about a resurgence of German power. As others have said, west Germany is already the dominant economic power in western Europe and a united Germany will greatly reinforce that power.
We must guard against the contingency of future adverse change. We should always bear in mind the lesson of history--that, sooner or later, an expression of economic power will correspond with that of political and military power. The key question is how we guard against the fears and contingencies not of today, but perhaps of tomorrow and the years ahead.
Two approaches to the problem are already highly visible. The first is the drive towards West European federalism, or as near to it as its supporters can get, in order, they hope, to bring German power under collective west European control. The second approach is to develop proposals for new pan- European security arrangements and frontier guarantees which would safeguard the European nations from any future assertions of German military power.
The case for a federalist approach was set out with great candour in an article in The Times last week written jointly by former President Giscard d'Estaing and former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. As they put it, German reunification must be
"part of a strategy of establishing a federal union of the member states of the European Community. Such a federation would entail not only economic and monetary union but also the integration of foreign policies, and ultimately military and security policies, in which France and Germany will have a special role to exercise jointly." That is the destiny for western Europe that the authors of the Schumann plan and the Rome treaty long ago envisaged, and which their disciples have never ceased to advocate. It underlines much of the thinking behind the Single European Act and, even more, the current proposals for economic and monetary union.
Those who hold that view--they include the President of the European Commission, Mr. Delors, President Mitterrand, Chancellor Kohl, Prime Minister Andreotti and, as we heard again this afternoon, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath)--can be expected to press for it with all their energy, in the preparations for the intergovernmental conference and in the conference itself, agreed at the last European summit and scheduled for later this year. I believe that that is the wrong solution. The closer and faster the economic integration of Europe, with German
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economic performance far outstripping that of her European Community partners, and long in advance of any serious attempt to achieve economic convergence, the more certain it is that in such a union German economic power will increase and the rest of western Europe will become part of a German economic zone. It is an illusion for France to believe that it can be the partner, even a junior partner, in such a union. Nevertheless, that concept chimes with the whole thrust of current European Community policy--the rush for economic and monetary union, the transfer of power from the nation states to the Brussels Commission and the European Parliament, the total integration of the European economies.A corollary of that drive for union is the moratorium on enlarging the existing membership of the European Community. That will keep out Austria. It will certainly keep out the countries of eastern Europe, other than East Germany. When the right hon. Member for Pavilion spoke during the debate on the Loyal Address on 24 November 1989, he said :
"We must ensure that in achieving a good measure of integration in the Community, we do not build an economic Berlin wall to keep others out."-- [ Official Report , 24 November 1989 ; Vol. 162, c. 381.] I oppose the drive towards union because I want a wider Europe which will put a permanent end to the post-war division of our continent. I also oppose it because I believe that it would place the economic interests of our own country in great jeopardy. Political union in a federal or quasi-federal Europe is simply not acceptable to the majority of our citizens.
The alternative and, I believe, far more effective approach is twofold. The first task is to widen the collective security arrangements that have served us so well in post-war Europe. We can all applaud the present process of multilateral disarmament, under which huge, asymmetrical and verified cuts are being made in the Soviet Union's previously overweening conventional military power. However, the maintenance of the American commitment to Europe and the retention of NATO, in which not only has Soviet power been deterred but German power enmeshed, will be necessary for many years to come, and so, in a greatly modified form, will be Soviet guarantees for some of her neighbours in eastern Europe.
What we need to do now is to find a way to extend collective security across what used to be the iron curtain--a system that involves the Soviet Union and its east European neighbours, along with the NATO countries, in joint guarantees of existing European frontiers--except where peaceful and non-coercive changes may be agreed and the underwriting of those frontiers by collective security arrangements. That should certainly be on the agenda of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe meetings this summer. It may be that new arrangements can be grafted on to the existing Helsinki accords ; it may be that a new pan-European and also a North American security conference is necessary. However, it is collective, Europewide guarantees about force levels, frontiers and mutual and collective assistance for which we should aim. The second prong of such an approach is directed at the countries of Eastern Europe. We should encourage the earliest possible association with, and full membership of
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the European Community, of all European countries who wish to join. If that is to happen, we must recognise that it cannot be achieved if the present thrust towards political and economic union in Western Europe is sustained. In the Times article, Giscard and Helmut Schmidt put the central question :"Is Europe seeking a single market with monetary stability in which all member states retain sovereign powers, or is it seeking a federation to which member states allot joint powers?"
The answer should be yes, yes, and yes again to the retention of our sovereignty, and no, no, and no again to a federation of member states.
I end with an analogy suggested to me by President Gorbachev's reference to a common European home and Mr. Delor's recent reference to his vision of a European village. To me, the common European home that we should seek to construct is a very large apartment block with flats of varying sizes--
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker) : Order. The right hon. Gentleman has gone beyond his time. Mr. John Maples.
8.16 pm
Mr. John Maples (Lewisham, West) : I am unable to share the enthusiasm of the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) for constructing, through a system of conferences and the use of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe and border guarantees, the security that we need in a new Europe. It seemed to me to be all too redolent of the conferences at Locarno and Lugano and the League of Nations, all of which were full of guarantees and good will but which did little to protect us from the most awful war that mankind has ever experienced. We need to construct something that is much sounder than that.
I face the prospect of a united Europe with a mixture of joy and apprehension. We all rejoice that eastern Europe is finally free of the shackles of its imperial masters. However, I am apprehensive about tearing up a security system that has brought peace to Europe for 45 years. That peace was brought about by the division of Europe into two hostile camps. At times there has been tension, and sometimes there has been danger. Nevertheless, that division has worked. It succeeded in suppressing many of the nationality and border problems that had been at the heart of European history for a long time and that are now re-emerging.
The challenge that we face is to replace a system that has guaranteed us that security and not to allow the problems that are re-emerging--the problems of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century--to engulf us again. All those problems are still there--boundaries, nationalities, ethnic minorities, above all, a greater Germany and just exactly what that means and what its position will be in Europe.
Events have unfolded incredibly fast, but in some ways things are more certain now than they were three months ago. It now seems to be fairly clear that democratic states are emerging in Hungary, Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. There is obviously some danger of rather greater problems in Romania and Yugoslavia.
It now seems certain that there will be a united Germany. Three months ago it did not seem at all clear that the United States and the Soviet Union would agree to that, but now it is perfectly clear that they will. We
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should welcome that as it is something we have sought for a long time, but we have to focus on the fears and problems in western Europe and in the Soviet Union. If anybody has suffered from overweening German power in the past, it has been the countries of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.We do not yet know what the Soviet Union needs for its own security. We do not really know what the future of the Soviet Union and its empire within the boundaries of the USSR will be. We cannot ignore the danger that the Soviet Union may revert to what it was before. I doubt that it will present the same military threat, but there is certainly a possibility that the liberalising that has taken place under President Gorbachev will stop.
It seems fairly certain that eastern Europe will have to go through a simply dreadful period of economic reconstruction. Some of its economies have been practically destroyed, and almost all of them are in a terrible mess. If we are to help to sustain democracy in those countries, which is one of the keys to the future peace and stability of Europe, and prevent them from reverting to nationalism, dictatorship and narrow interests, it is extremely important to promote the free enterprise economy and the economic development of those countries in which West Germany and the EEC will have to play the foremost role.
I do not want to strike a churlish note in all the optimism that today's debate has generated, but I have some misgivings over German unification. The problem of Germany in Europe has caused wars in Europe three times in the past 120 years. Although the democratic credentials of our German friends are every bit as good as the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) has said, they must take into account our legitimate concerns in formulating their own stands for unification and the Europe in which that unified Germany will play a part. It looks as though Germany will unify within the West, perhaps firmly anchored into the NATO Alliance, as that is what Chancellor Kohl says that he wants.
However, I am concerned--and I shall be interested to hear the view of my hon. Friend the Minister--that if the Soviet Union and East Germany hold out for a neutral Germany and the German elections get closer and the SPD and Mr. Lafontein say that that would be a reasonable price to pay for German reunification, we shall then be faced with a very different problem which no one who has spoken in the debate has yet addressed--the serious possibility of a neutral Germany floating around in the middle of Europe.
We have vital interests at stake. They are definitely shared by France and most of the other countries in the EC, and I believe they are also shared by the United States, the Soviet Union and most of the countries in eastern Europe.
We should set ourselves a couple of signposts. Obviously there are many objectives that we should try to achieve. The establishment in eastern Europe of democratic states on their existing boundaries seems to be a crucial condition for the way in which eastern Europe develops. The united Germany that emerges from the present discussions must agree to that. East and West Germany have separately signed treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia agreeing their borders. There is some doubt over the legality of those treaties and how they
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might bind a unified Germany, but clearly they have to be brought into the process of unification so that everybody is committed to the existing boundaries.Although my hon. Friend the Member for Wycombe (Mr. Whitney) said that democracies do not go to war with each other--and there is a large element of truth in that--several dictators have been elected and, in past conflagrations in Europe, dictatorships have emerged out of democracies. Although democracy is a necessary condition, it is not sufficient. We need to develop some institutional arrangements which tie together the cultural, political and economic interests of all the countries of Europe.
We need to do that in the interests of ensuring the survivial of democracy, suppressing some of the nation state rivalries which between 1800 and 1945 gave rise to so much trouble, and trying to make those boundary disputes and nationality disputes caused by groups of one ethnic community living in another country less important. I do not believe that it is time to return to the old balance of power idea advocated by Peregrine Worsthorne in his article in The Sunday Telegraph. That would be extremely dangerous. It requires great subtlety to work for even 30 years and usually results in armed conflict.
The institution that is in place and clearly available to perform that function is the EC, on which we should build our hopes and the future construction of Europe. its first task would be to ensure the incorporation of East Germany into the Community and to start making arrangements with other eastern European countries and gradually bring them in, in less than 10 years in some cases, although perhaps countries such as Romania will take rather longer.
While I should be happy to move some way towards what the French and the President of the Commission are suggesting, I should also be happy to slow the process a little if it would lead to the broadening of the Community. If we want to construct a Europe in which the rivalries that have led to conflict in the past are diminished, we have to construct a broader Europe in which all those countries are involved. A united Germany might well dominate a Community of 12, but it would be rather more difficult to dominate a Community of 16 or 20.
To sum up, I am overjoyed at the prospect of a Europe emerging from 45 years of cold war, but somewhat worried about some of the minor disputes and problems of the past that have been in the deep freeze during that time. President Gorbachev has set us the challenge of creating a common European home, and that that has to involve a framework for containing a united Germany and for suppressing some of the border and nationality problems. The two key ingredients are making sure that democratic countries arise in eastern Europe and broadening the EEC. If we do that, we have considerable prospects for turning to great positive effect the wonderful opportunity with which we are faced. If we fail to do it, at some time in the future we may be faced with repeating some of the awful episodes of the past 150 years of European history.
8.26 pm
Rev. Martin Smyth (Belfast, South) : I am happy to follow the hon. Member for Lewisham, West (Mr. Maples) and share his joy at the positive movement in Europe, having experienced it at first hand last March in
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Hungary and having revisited Berlin and Leipzig last month. The changes there are bound to cause delight to anyone who prizes freedom and the movement of people.The right hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell) referred to Balfour saying that it was not a question of history repeating itself, but of historians repeating the past. That is one of the dangers we face at the moment. In that context I have more sympathy with what the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) said about the EEC. It has been regularly claimed in Europe and in the House that hope lies in a united Europe. Historians call the period of a united Europe the dark ages and I am a shade concerned that we might be returning to that period of history.
I was interested in the comments of the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery), who said that the Almighty had made Englishmen and Frenchmen different. He reminded me of the story of the English business man who claimed that he was a self-made man and relieved the Almighty of an awful responsibility.
We have a tendency to lecture others and although I am delighted that Members of Parliament and members of the Inter-Parliamentary Union have been using the agency of the IPU to share with the emerging forces in Europe some of our concepts, we have to do that with sensitivity. They have reached this stage in their development without a great deal of help from us. While they may not have much experience of the working of parliamentary government as we understand it, they have kept the torch of freedom alight in dark ages in the past 40 years. Now they are moving towards a new era. It is good that we share that with them.
I understand, and note with some thanks, that the Government are providing advice on local government structures to the emerging east European democracies. I fully support that, but, coming from Northern Ireland, I must say that the Government have little to boast about, when a significant part of this nation does not have a true local government structure and when the structure for Northern Ireland legislation is akin to old-syle Stalinism. We have left ourselves open to certain accusations.
With Jim Nicholson, a former Member of this House who is now a Member of the European Parliament, I visited and had discussions with many of the smaller emerging political parties in East Germany. We owe them some help, but I regret that blocs within European Parliament have voted against giving them financial help. It is all very well to say that we as individuals can help, but they need more help than that to deal with their state structures. I hope that hon. Members will use their influence and help them with their political campaigning.
The rush to encourage democracy and to dismantle dictatorships must not endanger already established democracies. I noted the comments that were made tonight about disarmament, but the arguments for massive cuts in conventional forces are premature and send a strong signal to the generals who still command divisions of tanks and missiles in the East.
I speak as a child of the early 1930s. I remember the high hopes for the League of Nations, which was set up after the first world war. Disarmament left the nation open to blackmail and attack. I remember the blood that had to be shed to restore freedom and democracy to only half of
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Europe. We have heard speeches from senior Members of the House who served at that time, but I should like to give a brief quotation from an elderly constituent--a man in his 80s--who served with the merchant marine on the Archangel convoys during the second world war. Dealing with what he believes is needed at this time, he says :"Highly skilled statesmanship is required ; the political rush to disarm requires extreme caution, in case this nation is placed in the position that we have been through before of fighting by force of arms, to restore Europe's soul and sanity."
I regret the report from Romania, which was referred to by the hon. Member for Glasgow, Hillhead (Mr. Galloway), on the tragedy of HIV-infected children and emerging anti-semitic views. The Europe of the future will need strong moral principles and ethical structures based on a Judean- Christian ethic. If anyone has departed from that in the past, that is to their shame and we should not repeat their folly.
8.33 pm
Mr. Jim Lester (Broxtowe) : Hon. Members who have been involved in the changing world since 1984 feel it a privilege to have been even a minor part of that process. I was lucky enough to be a member of the Select Committee which invited Mr. Gorbachev here in 1984. One has followed the unfolding process with enormous joy and it has reached the point where we can now debate East-West relations in a different context. The change in East-West relations is not simply a matter for continental Europe, on which most of the debate has concentrated. It goes wider and covers the regions and regional conflicts. I should like to mention the concern of many hon. Members about the short term in the Soviet Union. Much has been said about Mr. Gorbachev's ability to rethink the Soviet Union's position and all that that has meant in the logjam of international relationships. Hon. Members who have visited the Soviet Union more recently than I have will recognise that the next three to 12 months will be critical to public opinion in the Soviet Union.
It behoves us to think deeply about what we can do not only to help Mr. Gorbachev and to ensure his survival but to help the Russian people to recognise the courageous step that he has taken. The liberalisation that he has brought about must show some results if people are to continue to follow. One of the saddest aspects at present, perhaps because of the way in which it has been done, is that ordinary people have yet to see the effect of perestroika. A Soviet delegation recently visited the House. I asked what we can do to help. The message was, "We do not want anything special--we want normal loans." When I asked what else we could do to help, they said "Nothing." Yet one felt that that was the official position rather than the true position. The Germans, as I pointed out to my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath), did not ask what they could do to help--they did something. They provided an enormous amount of food and consumer goods and made the loan arrangements to facilitate that. Those goods will be in the shops shortly.
I hope that Britain will follow that lead and not wait and ask, "What can we do to help? What committees can we set up? How can we help to reinforce your democracy?" I hope that we shall perform some short, sharp tangible act so that people in the Soviet Union will say, "Gosh--
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perestroika has started to work ; we have friends in Britain, Germany and Europe." We must back that process of tremendous traumatic change, which many of us recognise will take 10 or 20 years to bear fruit.I support the view that the dynamo for change has been the European Community. When the Select Committee visited eastern European countries, everyone said, "We recognise that this dynamic Community is part of the world economy and we want to be a part of it." The European Community was the magnet that was drawing them. We cannot afford to slow that process for 10 or 15 years while they develop their economies.
None of us knows which will be the good or bad economies or what traumas they will go through. We should extend the hand of friendship and ensure that they can become associates. We should not deny them the impact, dynamo and creation of the wider Community, which has the wealth to support that process. We can then have a Europe of concentric circles which will draw in countries as they are ready to join.
I am deeply concerned about the Horn of Africa, which was often regarded as an area of Soviet influence. The Horn of Africa committee met constantly to discuss the Soviet Union controlling the Gulf. Three countries are in a state of traumatic turmoil. We have heard about the human misery in Romania, but it does not compare with what is happening in Sudan, Ethiopia or Somalia. There are refugees from Ethiopia in Sudan, refugees from Sudan in Ethiopia, refugees from Ethiopia in Somalia, and Somalian refugees in southern Ethiopia. The formidable trauma of starvation is threatening Tigray and Eritrea. The takeover of the port of Massawa--the one port from which food can be obtained--is a cause of tremendous concern. When the public become aware of the turmoil in those countries, they will ask what we are doing to help.
One of the benefits of East-West relations is that we can work together on such problems. The Soviet Union and eastern European countries, which have had programmes in Ethiopia, and western countries, including ourselves, can work together to try to bring an end to the conflict in those countries. I ask my hon. Friend to do something about the Horn of Africa with the same urgency that we acted on Cambodia and the boat people. There should be a special meeting of the United Nations Security Council about the Horn of Africa before the position gets worse.
Vietnam is seen as part of the Soviet economy, because many Vietnamese work in the Soviet Union. That is one way in which Vietnam has tried to balance its books. Again we have seen a change in emphasis at the recent conference of the Association of South East Asian Nations. It was interesting to note that the conference asked that an Economics Minister rather than a Foreign Office Minister should attend its next conference, because ASEAN is a developing economic unit. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister would be delighted not to have to go so far.
We should encourage Vietnam to be part of the economic element of ASEAN, free of Soviet influence. We have a vital interest, because the Under- Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Warwickshire, North (Mr. Maude), has just come back from Vietnam where he was trying to solve the problem of migration. We need to be statesmanlike ; we have an opportunity to make statesmanlike gestures by increasing the aid programme and stopping sanctions
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against Vietnam so that it can leave the eastern influence and become part of its natural community in south-east Asia.I was very much taken by what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said at the beginning of his speech about building bridges and motorways into central and eastern Europe. If we are doing that, surely we should do no less for the outlying regions.
8.42 pm
Mr. Roy Hughes (Newport, East) : Over the past 40 years, we have grown accustomed to the division between East and West. It has been symbolised by the economic divide, so to speak, between capitalism and Communism. The same applies to the military sphere. The NATO Alliance has been lined up against the Warsaw pact. In the past few months, it is as if the whole edifice has been collapsing around us. Politicians and military leaders are busy contemplating the new framework.
The reunification of the two Germanys looms large. Some hon. Members, like the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath), welcome it ; others have doubts and anxieties stemming from their experiences in the second world war. Certainly a reunited Germany will be a mighty colossus in the heart of Europe. For the present there is no military threat, as has been pointed out in the debate, but that is no guarantee for the future.
More immediately, the threat from Germany is essentially economic. The Federal Republic already has a strong economy. It can boast a £50 billion balance of payments surplus, against our £20 billion deficit. The countries of eastern Europe which are emerging from Communist rule are seen as part of its natural markets. There will have to be massive investment by the Federal Republic in East Germany. There will also have to be massive investment in eastern Europe. Japan is gearing up to invest part of its huge surplus of capital resources in that area. France traditionally has close links with Romania. Where does that leave Britain? I am thinking particularly of the more impoverished areas, such as the north of England, Scotland and Wales.
To be parochial for a moment, in Wales we have had massive closures in our traditional industries, coal and steel. We have had to look to overseas countries for new jobs. Japan has invested widely in Wales. So has West Germany, as is symbolised by the major Bosch plant in south Wales. With the dramatic developments in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, will the investment which is badly needed in Britain dry up?
We all realise too that it is not only Britain which may suffer. The hon. Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Lester) has referred to the Third world. It could be adversely affected because money invested in eastern Europe will not be invested in the Third world or in Britain.
My main purpose in intervening in the debate is to point out that last week the hon. Member for Rochford (Dr. Clark) and I, on behalf of the Inter- Parliamentary Union, went on a fact-finding mission to Bulgaria. The first thought that strikes one in Bulgaria is that the hostility to Soviet Russia discernible in other eastern European countries does not exist. There are historic reasons for that ; on two occasions Russia has liberated Bulgaria, once from the Turks and later, at the end of the
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