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take into account the need to improve the quality of our reserve forces. The Territorial Army has served us well for the past 40 years. It has a great role in the future.

8.33 pm

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow) : I wish at the outset to thank the private office of the Minister of State for the Armed Forces for handling a particularly tragic constituency case.

My speech will be about the accountability of the security services, and it will be partly about the proposition that, if sexual abuse of boys in care is known to the state and to the British military, it is simply unacceptable to do nothing about it and to allow it to go on. In my view, the situation is somewhat worse than the security services smearing politicians.

I watched, as did a number of colleagues, on the night of 1 June a BBC programme in which a former Army intelligence officer at Lisburn, a captain, passed on information about the scandal at Kincora to a senior MI5 officer, Mr. Ian Cameron, at HQ Northern Ireland in 1975, only to be told in the strongest possible terms to desist from further investigation into alleged sexual assaults on children in the home. Do Minister accept that view of events that will have been brought to their attention?

Furthermore, the captain also purported to point out that, when he was interviewed by the Terry inquiry in 1982, he gave the police officers carrying out the investigation details of the information that he had passed on to MI5 seven years earlier. Not a word about the captain's knowledge of the scandal appears in the information supplied to Parliament by the Terry report, and it is clear that all details of MI5 and intelligence information about the affairs were deliberately suppressed by the authorities to avoid the inevitable parliamentary demands for a proper judicial inquiry into what had taken place.

A number of important questions that should be answered have been put to the Prime Minister.

First, why did MI5 order this captain to stop his investigation into what has now been established as one of the most notorious cases of child sex abuse in Britain in recent years?

Secondly, did either Detective Superintendent Caskey of the RUC or Detective Superintendent Harrison of the Sussex police inform Sir John Hermon and/or Sir George Terry that MI5 was refusing to answer their questions about Army intelligence knowledge of Kincora? Thirdly, did Sir John Hermon or Sir George Terry inform the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland that MI5 was failing to answer questions put by the police officers carrying out the inquiry?

Fourthly, if the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland was informed about the obstruction, what steps did he take to ensure MI5's co-operation and why did he give in Parliament such fulsome praise to Sir George Terry's inquiry?

Fifthly, bearing in mind that the Terry inquiry was set up by the Government, why did no Minister intervene and insist that MI5 assist the police in the matter?

Sixthly, when Parliament was being repeatedly misled by the conclusions of the Terry report over Army intelligence knowledge of the scandal, why did none of


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those who knew about MI5's refusal to co- operate with the inquiry bother to bring that to the attention of the House of Commons? Sixthly--[ Hon. Members-- : "Seventhly."] I should have said seventhly--what is the earliest known recorded date of a reference made to Clockwork Orange in Ministry of Defence files? If Conservative Members are sceptical, I remind them that my contribution to the last Army debate on 8 June, according to Hansard, prompted the Ministry of Defence eventually to give more details of what actually happened in the case of Colin Wallace.

Eighthly, what became of the copy of Clockwork Orange which was typed by Miss Penny Sadler at Army HQ Northern Ireland and which Colin Wallace gave to Lieutenant-Colonel Jeremy Railton on leaving Northern Ireland in February 1975?

Ninthly, who authorised Miss Sadler to undertake work on the Clockwork Orange project? Tenthly, in the light of public statements allegedly made by some of those who took part in the raid by members of the Army information services on Aldergrove airport, will the Secretary of State reconsider his earlier statement on this matter and say whether captured IRA weapons and explosives were carried by those who took part in the raid and whether a bomb was planted on that occasion in the Ulster Defence Regiment headquaters in Antrim? Following the receipt of documents from the file which Mr. Colin Wallace sent to the Prime Minister on 1 November 1984, was the Director of Army Security, Major General Garrett, consulted about their contents and about the role of Mr. Wallace at HQ Northern Ireland? Bearing in mind the fact that the documents written by Mr. Peter Broderick and the Institution of Professional Civil Servants and enclosed with the file which Colin Wallace sent to the Prime Minister on 1 November 1984 clearly contradicted Government statements to Parliament during that period, what steps were taken by the Ministry of Defence to establish the reasons for the obvious conflict between those accounts and the Government's version of the same events?

Why were Mr. Peter Broderick, Mr. Michael Taylor and Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Railton not interviewed by the authorities as a result of the information contained in the file which Mr. Colin Wallace sent to the Prime Minister on 1 November 1984? Following the discovery of documents relating to Mr. Wallace's case in 1989, why was Mr. Peter Broderick not consulted by the MOD as to Mr. Wallace's allegations and the nature of his employment in the information policy unit at Army HQ Northern Ireland? What is the earliest known recorded date when the Kincora boys home was mentioned in MOD files?

In the light of the Minister of State's statement to the House on 30 January, will the Secretary of State comment on the contents of the letter from Brigadier Rous, Director of Army Public Relations, to Mr. Robert Parker of Channel 4 on 23 July 1987 regarding Colin Wallace? On what date did Mr. Peter Broderick write to Major-General Peter Leng asking for the release of information for use in the Clockwork Orange project?

To which Government Departments was Mr. Wallace's document entitled "Political and Security Implications Regarding the Disclosure of Security Classified Information to Assist in the Investigation of the Allegations Relating to the Kincora Boys Hostel, Belfast" circulated between 1984 and 1989? What criteria were used when separating papers relating to Mr. Wallace's case


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between the office of the Permanent Under- Secretary and the Deputy Under-Secretary, CM? Was the information policy unit at Army HQ Lisburn responsible for planning and implementing psychological operations in Northern Ireland and, if so, who authorised the setting up of its terms of reference?

Bearing in mind the repeated assurances given to Parliament by Ministers, that over the years there have been the "most thorough inquiries" into the allegations, did such inquiries actually take place? If thorough inquiries did not take place, then either Ministers were misled by their advisers into believing that they did, or Ministers knew that such inquiries did not take place and deliberately misinformed the House. On the other hand, if thorough inquiries did take place, one must conclude that either the full facts of the matter were discovered and deliberately withheld by officials from Ministers, who then unwittingly misled Parliament, or Ministers were given the correct facts but deliberately withheld the correct information from the House. It is clear that a number of senior staff who were employed at the MoD when Ministers were giving misleading answers to Parliament had direct personal knowledge of the events in question. Did none of those individuals bring the correct facts to the attention of the Government and, if not, why not? 8.44 pm

Mr. Michael Colvin (Romsey and Waterside) : It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell). If any hon. Member deserves to be called tenacious, it is the hon. Gentleman. No one is more fitted to that description and it is important to have the hon. Gentleman on one's side, as I found to my pleasure when he supported me during the passage of my Computer Misuse Bill. I thank him for that support, but, of course, I cannot take up any of the points that he made today in his typical way.

The debate takes place in a new, unexpected and welcome political situation. We are no longer eyeball to eyeball with our potential enemies across the iron curtain. The cold war may not have been very pleasant but at least it was a stable situation and now in a defence sense we are operating in an unstable situation. In these uncertain times, we need stronger and not weaker defences and strong and resolute leadership.

Hon. Members have spoken about the peace dividend. Surely that arises as a result of the strength investment. If we cut that investment too much, we will put at jeopardy the peace dividend. We are operating in a very different defence scenario. The Warsaw pact force is redundant because it is an unworkable organisation. It used to mobilise in two days, but that now takes two months. The whole idea of massive armoured and infantry assaults across Europe is ludicrous. In the Soviet bloc, morale in the armed forces has gone and I understand that draft dodging is as high as 10 per cent. The peace that we are enjoying is brittle ; we should not jump to the conclusion that all is sweetness and light. There are some hard and reactionary men in the Kremlin, and if things go wrong with perestroika they could be back in charge. There is no doubt that, as the Soviet economy collapses, there is a considerable likelihood of Soviet


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withdrawals from central Europe, although I have no idea what the Soviet Union would do with the millions who would be unemployed as a result of such demobilisation.

The President of the United States is under considerable pressure to deal with his twin deficits of budget and trade, and he will also be tempted to withdraw. If the need then arises to reoccupy central Europe, we should bear in mind what I have described as the two Georgias comparison. To deploy troops from Georgia in the USSR to Berlin takes 15 days but to deploy troops from Georgia in the United States to Berlin takes 90 days and they have to cross the Atlantic ocean. We should consider that when we are talking about withdrawals by either side.

I welcome the Government's review of the defence structure in their options for change. As some hon. Members have said, it is not a full-scale defence review. It is far too early for that, because the situation is too fluid. I support the priorities of the Secretary of State for Defence, among which is the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent, because that is our best insurance as it has been for the last 40 years of peace. I also support the adoption of policies that give greater flexibility and mobility.

When he addressed the Select Committee on Defence, the Secretary of State acknowledged that some thinning out of forward forces and great emphasis on rapid reinforcement and flexibility were necessary. He laid particular stress on getting better equipment for more flexible mobile forces in the 1990s and he concluded his evidence to the Select Committee by saying :

"One of the most urgent requirements now is for a new force of battlefield helicopters,".

I should like to speak about helicopters. I echo what my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare (Mr. Wiggin) said when he drew attention to the undertaking by the then Secretary of State for Defence my right hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) on 9 April three years ago when he announced an order for 25 support utility helicopters, the Anglo-Italian EH101 made by Westland and Augusta. The EH101 comes in two versions--the maritime version and the battlefield version. This being an Army debate, I shall deal with the battlefield version. The Secretary of State, when he made his announcement to the House, acknowledged that, in terms of the numbers deployed in Europe, Britain compares badly with both the French and the Germans, as it does with the Americans. When British troops are being moved about the theatre, we rely heavily on the United States to lift them.

The tactical support helicopter, the EH101, will be able to carry out various missions. It will be able to transport men and materials, and that includes light vehicles carried either internally or externally, to and from and within the battlefield. Artillery pieces can also be underslung. It can act as a mobile command post. It can be used as a platform for electronic warfare or airborne early warning. It is used for logistic purposes with either internal or underslung loads, and it has a self- ferrying capability, its range being 1,115 nautical miles. It is an extremely flexible aircraft and can be powered by a wide variety of Rolls- Royce engines--variations of the RTM 322. The EH101 is available to the British armed forces in four different variations, which shows its design flexibility. Over the past year, there has been much debate about the pros and cons of the EH101 as a support helicopter


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and the Black Hawk. The former has been criticised for being too large to operate successfully in the hostile environment expected in general war in central Europe. However, the rapidly changing situation in that area should cause the detractors of the EH101 to think again. This aircraft has a greater range than the Black Hawk. It can ferry itself to an operational deployment zone. Given the limited manpower ceiling of aircrew and maintenance staff, a force of EH101s will carry three times as many troops as a similar number of Black Hawks. The tasks for the mobile forces are likely to take place in a less hostile environment than those that were expected in central Europe, so the larger and less hardened EH101 should be much more effective than the Black Hawk and better in terms of cost-effectiveness.

For all those reasons, the EH101 is the right choice for the defence forces, but that raises the question of who will fly them. I know that there has been considerable debate as to whether this should be a task for the Royal Air Force or for the Army Air Corps or even for the Royal Corps of Transport, which is equally capable of carrying it out. That debate should be reopened because as we, I hope, start deploying more helicopters, we shall have to boost the strength of the Army Air Corps and run down the role of the RAF. In that task, we want to see them flying British-Italian aircraft rather than American Chinooks.

Several hon. Members have referred to the need for newly defined roles for our Army units. I was interested in what my hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, West (Sir J. Spicer) said about an air mobile division. I am conscious that, with my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Sir P. Goodhart) here as well, this debate has been enlivened by the Parachute Regiment lobby. Guardsmen have also been known to hurl themselves out of aircraft on the ends of parachutes. My hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Browne) and I have both indulged in the pastime. Within the air mobile division that has been suggested, there could be a special role for the Foot Guards as part of a rapid deployment corps, perhaps one that is helicopter-borne and specially trained for that purpose.

I hope that there is no thought in the Minister's mind that specialist ceremonial troops should be stationed in London, because that would be a disaster. If troops were stationed in central London, it would be much better to train them for helicopter operations so that they could fly from central London to training zones and back again. This makes a great deal of sense. There is a good case for a territorial unit within the Brigade of Guards, and if there was one, I should join it.

I have said nothing about attack helicopters, which are the subject of another debate. We have the utility Lynx with strapped-on armaments, which is far from satisfactory. We should have a tailormade battlefield helicopter. The urgent requirement is for greater mobility ; that is why my hon. Friend the Minister must tell the House when decisions will be made about supplying the Army with the mobility and flexibility that it requires, and would have if more helicopters were ordered. The Government have acknowledged this. The Secretary of State has already said that he will order 25 utility versions of the EH101. We should like to hear confirmation of that order, and we should like to hear what additional helicopters the Government intend to order so that the Army can fulfil its new operational roles.


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8.56 pm

Dr. Norman A. Godman (Greenock and Port Glasgow) : I apologise to the hon. Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates). He kindly gave way to me during his speech. It was remiss of me to intervene, given that, as the Chairman of the Select Committee, he had to make an important contribution to the debate in only 10 minutes.

The hon. and learned Member for Colchester, North (Sir A. Buck) referred to certain military establishments in Colchester. I did my national service in the Royal Military Police and he brought back memories of that establishment and of another, based in Shepton Mallet. However, now is not the time to talk about such institutions.

As a young military policeman based in Germany, not far from the border, I found that even the most riotous Saturday night involving certain Scottish regiments did not face me with anything like the dangers that our young soldiers now face in Ulster and elsewhere. As a Member of Parliament representing the lower Clyde, I have almost a front-line seat on developments in Northern Ireland. Many Scottish soldiers serve with regiments that go across there for tours of duty.

In the days before I entered the House, I always thought that it was a mistake to send Scottish regiments to the Province, because of the intimate historical relationship between the Province and Scotland. The dangers faced by those magnificently brave young men were brought home to me plainly on 9 April this year, when four young men from the Ulster Defence Regiment were so savagely murdered. One was the son of Mr. and Mrs. Bradley of Port Glasgow--Lance-Corporal John Bradley--who, because of that vicious and dastardly attack, has left a young widow in Belfast with two young children, one of whom was only three months old when his father was so brutally murdered. That may explain why I asked about the counselling and welfare provisions offered by the armed forces to the widows of soldiers who have been murdered in such a brutal and cowardly way.

One Bill gives us an opportunity to discuss those welfare provisions for soldiers' families--the Armed Forces Bill. I believe such Bills are a quinquennial event in the house, which last passed an Armed Forces Bill in 1986. Will we be debating an Armed Forces Services Bill early next year? If so, as experienced hon. Members know, a Select Committee will be set up. I had the honour to be on the Select Committee on the Armed Forces in 1986, and I found it useful to cross-examine senior military personnel about the provision of welfare facilities for soldiers.

Let me draw the Minister's attention to the excellent report produced by the Select Committee on Defence : I am concerned about some constituency matters. I refer the Minister to paragraph 74, on page XXV of the report, which refers to

"the completion of certain physical improvements"

to the Royal Ordnance factory at Bishopton. Given that the Ministry of Defence police have been pulled out of Bishopton and that there is to be a civilian defence force, is the Minister satisfied with the recent developments at Royal Ordnance Bishopton? The chief constable of the Strathclyde police has said that he could provide a quick armed response if Bishopton was attacked in any way.

In paragraphs 74 and 75, the Select Committee said that it shared the anxiety of local people and others, including


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the Defence Police Federation spokesman, about standards of security at RO Bishopton. In paragraph 75, the Select Committee report said :

"there is still some anxiety, which we share, about an apparent lowering of the standards of security arrangements for guarding a site where ready-to- use explosives are stored,."

We are told by various pundits in the media that the IRA has a large store of Semtex. A goodly number of my constituents are employed at RO Bishopton.

In the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, West and Inverclyde (Mr. Graham), I feel that it is right and proper for me to demand an assurance from the Minister that the changeover at the Royal Ordnance factory from a Ministry of Defence police to a civilian guard will not in any way infringe the security of our constituents who work there, or the security of the communities in and around that plant. Paragraph 75 recommends that the number and quality of the forces deployed at Bishopton must be closely monitored. Which institutions will monitor the guarding of that plant?

Mr. Mates : The Ministry of Defence.

Dr. Godman : The hon. Gentleman has answered the question, but for the public record I should still like an answer from the Minister. Will it be the Ministry of Defence, will it be the Strathclyde police or will they work in tandem? What form will the monitoring take? Of course, there may be security reasons that prevent the Minister from providing answers. However, on behalf of my constituents employed at Bishopton and the communities in Renfrewshire, I seek an assurance that the Minister is confident that there will not be a lowering of the quality of the guard provided at that plant. Those are important considerations for the people of Renfrewshire, and I look forward to the Minister's response.

9.6 pm

Mr. Derek Conway (Shrewsbury and Atcham) : I shall curtail my speech in the hope that other hon. Members may have an opportunity to contribute, even at this late hour.

I must tell my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench that I very much endorse the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates) about the effect of the community charge on the regular forces. There are some anomalies that could be easily addressed without great cost to the public.

My hon. Friend the Minister listed some of the victims of the IRA this year, not only civilians, but members of the armed forces. They were mostly soft targets, which we know is the cowardly way in which the IRA operates. Perhaps we expect little else of it. However, I hope that, especially on the mainland, we expect slightly more of some of our television producers. Should anyone be listening, I say to Yorkshire Television that its recent actions have given a great deal of encouragement to the forces of terrorism. Would that those television producers, either BBC or ITV, gave as much attention to the impact of terrorism on those widowed and left fatherless as they do to the terrorists. That would be a different story.

The review is taking place against the background of great changes, and that has been commented on by hon. Members from both sides of the House. It was a little churlish of the Opposition, especially the hon. Members


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for Rhondda (Mr. Rogers) and for Newham, North-West (Mr. Banks), to be so sarcastic about the role of the Government's policies in the events that have so radically changed the map of Europe.

I believe that, once the bosses of the Kremlin realised that NATO forces, especially in the United Kingdom, would not roll over quietly, that brought about the great changes that Mr. Gorbachev managed to instigate. I have not the slightest doubt that military history will show that the decision to deploy cruise--with considerable objection from the Opposition--against the deployment of SS20s by the Soviet Union was fundamental in bringing about that realisation. I am not sure about the purpose of these debates, other than perhaps to fire the odd warning shot across the bows of departmental Ministers. In that sense, there have been many warnings during the debate that any decision to cut dramatically what press reports suggest may be as much as 40 per cent. of our infantry battalions will not go without challenge in the Conservative party. I am sure that my colleagues will not present us with any ultimatum or fast plan and that there will be considerable consultation about any movement.

We must realise the need for an army in Britain, and the debate must be about its size and the location of its units. Military presence and, indeed, military experience is good for the nation. Units with widespread community and civic life play a good part on behalf of the Regular Army. My criticism of past policies has been the determination to centralise so much of military training and take the armed forces away from the community.

I regularly plug the Territorial Army hobby horse, and it has been encouraging in this debate to see how many colleagues have mentioned the need for increased Territorial Army activity. Taking up 3.5 per cent. of the Army's budget as it does, it clearly does not require a huge expenditure, but the Government receive a great deal in return and so does the Territorial Army. Not only do those taking part have the opportunity for personal development and to acquire team skills ; they also have the challenge of physical activity and a variety of training, particularly the use of helicopters and other things which, in civilian life, would not be open to them. What saddens me is that adventure training is still not classified and officially sanctioned, so it is difficult to organise. Future training for the Territorial Army and the Regular Army may have to concentrate on personal skills and challenges.

I hope to see a great expansion of the Territorial Army. I still believe that the Swiss conscription period of 14 days per annum is an ideal way of giving the general young population an experience of military life. The hon. Member for Rhondda rather mocked the idea of people having experience of military service, but young people aged between 16 and 24 in Britain are not yet ready for middle age, mortgage and children, and God help the nation if they are. An experience of military life would do them the world of good and would be greatly welcomed.

The Army epitomises loyalty, comradeship and effectiveness, and I hope that our Government will not throw that away.

9.11 pm

Mr. Paul Flynn (Newport, West) : On the Saturday evening of the last bank holiday weekend, there was an intrusion by the Army into my constituency which was


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unwelcome, unexpected and frightening. The Rogerstone power station, which has closed down, was attacked in what is believed to have been an Army exercise. There was no warning to the police, who were confused by what was going on, and there was no warning to the Member of Parliament. It was frightening because helicopters were used, with searchlights coming down from the sky illuminating a wide area. Thunderflashes were used and there was the sound of machine-gun fire. At least one claim is coming in for a car which was damaged by a thunderflash that went astray.

As there was no warning in the area, when complaints were made and inquiries were made of me and the police, nobody could provide an answer. However, there appears to have been some information at police headquarters which was not available in Newport. As one would expect, rumours spread that there was an IRA attack and, most persistently and widespread, that there was a gunman on the loose, as has happened, sadly, in many other places. The people of Newport are sensible and they realise that the special services have to exercise and in circumstances that are as realistic as possible, but the question remains whether that was wise.

May we have some assurance from the Minister that, since every exercise is artificial to some degree, it would not noticeably affect the value of the exercise if full warnings were given to the local population? Will he also tell us that never again will there be the combination of hazards that took place at Rogerstone that night, where helicopters were left hovering for prolonged periods between two hills at night at low altitude?

I have been in contact with the Minister's office and there is an apologetic tone coming from there. I understand that the Minister has been abroad and has not managed to respond fully so far. But the people of Newport are considerably angered that the exercise took place under such deplorable circumstances and we look for assurances that there will be no repetition in Gwent or elsewhere.

9.14 pm

Sir Alan Glyn (Windsor and Maidenhead) : I am sorry to hear of the events described by the hon. Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn). I am sure that adequate warnings will be given in future.

I endorse fully my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State's views expressed on page 5 and all that goes with that. I also congratulate my hon. Friend the Minister of State who endorsed my right hon. Friend's policy. We sat back as NATO and the Warsaw pact faced one another, and thought that everything was all right--but suddenly things changed. The Warsaw pact is disintegrating, and we are left with NATO. It is important that we should build and strengthen it, because we never know what will happen, and adjust our forces with that in mind. However, we cannot do so immediately, because we do not know how far Gorbachev's changes will go. Nor do we know what precisely will be the outcome of his recent talks in America. We are left with a situation that is so fluid that it is almost more dangerous than when NATO and the Warsaw pact were facing one another. Anything might happen at any time. I am sure that all right hon. and hon.


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Members recognise that the situation today is not more secure but more uncertain--but given strength of will, we shall succeed. The Bush negotiations were welcome, but difficult, because they changed the composition of nuclear forces. Again, we shall have to plan for the consequences. We need a highly mobile force, making use--as my hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, West said--of helicopters, and to adopt a completely new attitude to our forces in Europe. I was particularly glad that the Minister of State paid tribute to the British Army, the Ulster Defence Regiment and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, as they render marvellous service in the most difficult circumstances.

One of the most important issues we must confront is that of the Territorial Army, which may not have the strength currently that was once anticipated. It is important to recruit more men and women into the TA, which takes on even greater importance if there are to be cuts elsewhere. In an emergency, members of the Territorial Army and reserves can always be called up.

It is important that TA members should be accorded proper treatment, be respected by members of the Regular Army and become almost a part of it. Employers should, where possible, be compelled to allow their staff to take leave for the purpose of giving TA service. I understand that 820 employers currently co-operate, but they are mainly large firms. More should be trained, to serve side by side with the Regular Army. They should also be given proper equipment. As my hon. Friend the Member for Beckenham (Sir P. Goodhart) said, an incentive should be provided to join the TA. If there is a problem of recruitment, I am sure that it can be overcome.

We must bear in mind always the fact that the scene can still alter. Gorbachev could fall and there could be changes in the Soviet Government. Our nuclear deterrent remains absolutely essential and must be retained not only to ensure peace in Europe but to serve as a deterrent against countries that are themselves developing nuclear weapons. We must retain our nuclear deterrent, whether we like it or not.

Whatever happens, it is the duty of this Government, and of any future Government, to ensure that the defence of this country is adequate and sufficient.

9.21 pm

Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury) : I am most grateful to the Front- Bench spokesmen for reducing their time and I shall allow a couple of minutes for the hon. Member for Dumbarton (Mr. McFall). The changes that have taken place in eastern Europe have been referred to again and again. I remind the House of the old adage that military planners must base their calculations not on intentions but on capabilities. The dissolution of the Soviet Union's allies in the Warsaw pact, while considerably affecting ground forces in Europe and changing warning times from days to weeks, has had no significant effect on nuclear forces and precious little on naval and air forces. A tremendous imbalance still exists between the Soviet Union as a single power and the combined forces of NATO.

For that reason, even if President Gorbachev's position were unassailable, if there were no political unrest in the Soviet Union, and if we were convinced that perestroika is absolutely set fair, we should still be cautious. I know that


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there are enthusiasts for defence roles for the European Community and the Western European Union in the House, as we hear them mentioned from time to time, but it is important that we remember that the only structure which offers the co-ordinated political framework, intelligence framework and command structure necessary for deterrence is still NATO.

I find it worrying that last weekend President Gorbachev was unable to endorse President Bush's simple statement that membership of NATO by a combined Germany should be a matter for the Germans. It is worrying that President Gorbachev should find it necessary to say that if Germany chose to stay in NATO it could have a profound effect on the progress of conventional arms reduction talks and, by implication, on the Soviet Union's willingness to withdraw from East Germany. I do not speak critically of President Gorbachev ; it is a sad reflection on the continuing reality of power in the Soviet Union that it is not possible for the present leader to dismantle the Soviet military structure and posture as quickly as he might like. Other hon. Members have referred to potential problems in the third world and I shall not reiterate what they said, except the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wealden (Sir G. Johnson Smith)--that if we should ever become involved in one of the many trouble spots in the third world, where vital western interests as well as world peace could be threatened, we have to remember that those countries, to a large extent, have both heavy and sophisticated weapons. The idea that a handful of small lightly-armed forces can whiz off and sort them out simply belongs to 30 years ago.

Our Regular Army has a profoundly different structure from armies in the rest of the major countries in European NATO because it is an all-volunteer Army. Even Labour Front-Bench spokesmen have conceded that that makes it difficult to compare our spending patterns to those in the other NATO countries, where there is an enormous contribution in kind by using conscript soldiers, whereas we have to offer competitive rates of pay. For that reason we already have by far the smallest Army of any major European NATO country. I read in this morning's Daily Telegraph that we may be contemplating substantially reducing numbers of troops--by as much as 40 per cent. Quite apart from the overall wisdom of that, and I would certainly be cautious about making cuts of that size, even if there were a successful outcome to the Vienna talks--which seems to be in question at the moment--we must recognise that it would still be an expensive Army, because we have chosen to go down the volunteer and professional route. That has paid off in a number of ways, not least of which is the conduct of our soldiers in Ulster, which is something that none of our European allies could have matched.

We have gone down an expensive route, and it is no good trying to persuade ourselves that we can get our armed forces on the cheap while our regular forces are all professional. My second point about the Regular Army is that the concomitant of that and the reason why it is expensive is that, if one wants to continue to retain and attract young men and women of calibre into those professional forces, one has to be willing to offer them a standard of living comparable to that in civilian life. We


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have done well on the salary side and I am not critical of the level of salaries in the armed forces. However, I must be critical of some of the fringe areas, which are important and I will concentrate on three in particular.

I have frequently mentioned house purchase. I will quote one paragraph from the continuous attitude survey of high fliers at the junior division of the staff college. The paragraph says : "The area causing by far the greatest degree of dissatisfaction, however, was assistance with house purchase, where some 84.9 per cent. of respondents expressed some dissatisfaction, with 58.8 per cent. reporting they were very' dissatisfied."

Secondly, I do not have time to go into the complexity of the question of wives' careers. We have improved the number of wives with jobs in the Army, but they are overwhelmingly low-grade jobs. I suggest to Ministers that there is a cheap solution to that--by setting up integrated business centres with decent telecommunications facilities in our major bases in which wives with professions could rent spaces. There is already an organisation in my constituency which very effectively runs a complete City money-broking operation from a village 70 miles from the City.

Thirdly, education is also a complicated subject in an organisation in which families are moving all the time. It is unfair that tax is charged on boarding school allowances for those who send their children to boarding school to give them a continuous education. The standards in service schools are also starting to slip badly behind their civilian counterparts.

We must be careful about NMS--the new management strategy. It is yielding dividends in the civilian area and in some of the support areas, but in applying it to operational units, we must never forget that the task of a fighting unit is to prepare for war. That can never be fully encapsulated in the objectives that one produces in management strategies in civilian life. It is important that we do not become so carried away in trying to achieve accountability down the line that we convert leadership into bureaucracy.

I am proud to be a serving officer in the Home Service Force unit of the Territorial Army, which is affiliated to 10 Para. However, we must be cautious in what we can expect from the Territorial Army. There are many excellent units in the Territorial Army and I like to think that I belong to one of them. However, the bulk of the Territorial Army suffers from the same problem that Churchill's diaries identified in 1940. It is seriously short of adequate grade officers and non-commissioned officers.

That problem brings about the secondary problem--that there is too much turnover in the lower ranks because they become bored where there is a lack of leadership. The problem is best tackled through the effective employers' initiative which the Government have started. My own unit, 10 Para, sponsored Exercise Executive Stretch two weeks ago. We will reverse the trend by convincing employers that the Territorial Army is a worthwhile enterprise and not by pouring money into pay and allowances.

We must be realistic about the Territorial Army. It is a splendid organisation with an important role to play. I endorse the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Dorset, West (Sir J. Spicer) on a better role for airborne forces in the Territorial Army, because airborne units tend to be well recruited. However, we must remember that there is a limit to how much we can use the territorial


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forces. The Israelis discovered to their cost that one cannot keep mobilising civilian reserve forces in the face of an enemy mobilisation. Eventually, pressure from employers will force a Territorial Army to demobilise. I stress again that this is not the time to be lowering our guard.

9.28 pm

Mr. John McFall (Dumbarton) : I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for the opportunity for a two-minute peroration. I shall concentrate solely on the report on the physical security of military installations by the Select Committee on Defence. We undertook the report as a result of events at Mill Hill and Deal. We said in the report that, with the passage of time, the threat has not been reduced. That is even more relevant today than when we commenced our report.

The Minister mentioned Deal in his opening remarks and made one or two comments that are not on public record at present. My information is that the report on Deal went to the Secretary of State for Defence on 8 December 1989. That report has been lying on the desk of the Secretary of State for Defence for more than six months. When are we going to get the report and when can we discuss it? The report must be produced quickly. I should like the Minister to refer to that matter.

The Select Committee examined many aspects of security. We concluded that the buck stops at the Ministry of Defence and on the Secretary of State's desk. During a public examination, a question about policy was put to a senior Ministry of Defence official. We were informed that it was ministerial policy to introduce privatisation and contracting. When he was pressed on that point, the senior civil servant said that Ministers who are told by officials that their policies are not working very well are inclined to doubt the enthusiasm of the officials for the policy. In other words, the messenger is shot.

Our enthusiasm is doubted because the policy is not working and because it is based on cost cutting. A policy that is based on saving money endangers lives. With private security firms, the usual vetting procedures and scrutiny are not available. Ministers must answer that. The buck stops with Ministers. Let the Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement answer why, in the face of advice, he is going ahead with cost cutting and providing a lower level of security than before. Cost cutting endangers lives. That is the most poignant message in the report by the Select Committee on Defence.

9.30 pm

Mr. Roland Boyes (Houghton and Washington) : This debate is extremely important, for it may be the only chance to have a public airing of major questions about the future of the Army before the Secretary of State puts his signature at the bottom of the secret review of defence policy that has been going on in Whitehall for some months now.

Last week, in an extraordinary interview on the BBC "Today" programme with the Minister of State for Defence Procurement, we heard how the options being considered in the defence review were "very, very secret" so there could be no public debate until Defence Ministers had decided what the options were. That is a contemptuous attitude. The changes that are under way in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have overwhelming implications for British foreign and defence policy.


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