House of Commons Hansard Debates for 19 Jun 1990

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which proliferation has not been stopped but continues apace. The secret of the weapon is out of the bottle. More and more countries will develop it and some are exploring other means such as chemical warfare. It is essential to the safety of our country that we maintain the minimum credible deterrent, which is Trident. We may also have to think of a responsibility to Europe as a whole for the maintenance of deterrence, and I hope that we shall work in close co-operation with our French friends who also have a nuclear force. That is not to suggest--I shall come to this in a moment--any separation from our American allies, who are cardinal in the defence structure ahead. Thinking in purely European terms, however, we must accept that we have our own deterrent for our own national defence. We may need Anglo-French co-operation for the defence of Europe and a European-American deterrent for the safety of the world.

As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State pointed out yesterday, the threat of Soviet aggression is receding, but there are still half a million Soviet troops in the heart of Europe. As my right hon. Friend pointed out, the Soviets are still producing modern weapons on a large scale and they are still supporting their surrogates in Afghanistan, Angola and, even now, in Ethiopia--with weapons and with moral support. Even if the Soviets withdrew into the Slav heartlands, abandoning the non-Slav republics, they would still represent a formidable military force.

We have won the war, but we have still to win the peace. Threats can arise quickly. Even Sir Winston Churchill did not fully appreciate the German danger until 1936--only three years before the war started. Modern weapons and trained men cannot be improvised. That is a lesson that we learned even in days when training and production were easier--in 1914 and 1939.

What should be our peace aims? International disarmament must be agreed before we can disarm, but it must also be achieved. We want to see the Soviet withdrawal from the heart of Europe. That will take time. We want to see a European defence structure in place that will include the united Germany. We want to see a long-term American commitment to the security of Europe. All those things will take time. Therefore, the peace dividend of which we speak and which we seek--my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement issued a small interim dividend last night--will take time. What is most necessary is a change in our overall attitude to the strategic problem. For 40 years we related our defence requirement to the Soviet threat. We shall now have to relate it to our responsibilities. When we were the heart of the Commonwealth, we built and maintained a vast Navy- -until the 1930s, it was the largest in the world--to meet any contingency and to meet any particular threat. Now the Commonwealth is no longer the centre of our destiny and Europe has taken its place.

Europe has world-wide interests--in Africa and in the middle east, and in oil and minerals. I shall not detain the House by expanding on the Islamic threat which has been filling our Sunday newspapers beyond saying that interested hon. Members should read again chapter 50 of Gibbon's "The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" and see how quickly threats can develop. Europe must now face the issue of defence and produce a collective European structure enabling us to protect the vast economic and financial interests that we are putting together in the European Community. Not to do so would

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be irresponsible. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and his colleagues will have to discuss the form that that security will take with their counterparts on the continent. I do not wish to go into detail, but our all-volunteer forces are particularly suited to out-of-area operations.

At present NATO is the only game in town, and we are quite right to insist on all-German membership of NATO. However, we must look ahead and recognise --it is the Government's business to deal with matters day by day, but it is our business to look ahead--that NATO has its weaknesses. It does not include France and Spain, which are members of the alliance but not of the military structure. We cannot defend Europe without France, or indefinitely maintain communications with the United States without Spain. There is the problem of German public opinion. Today the majority seem to favour membership of NATO, but the official opposition in Germany is rather divided on the issue.

There is also the problem that NATO has geographical limitations which, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister suggested, do not really apply to the future world to which we are looking. Also, America is not part of the European Community. While I trust that we shall always stand together, the Americans may not always see eye to eye with us, as they have not always done in the past. There is a need to build a European defence structure. At the risk of repetition, I remind the House that I have always believed that the Western European Union might provide such a framework. After all, the Western European Union is the foundation of the European Community--much more than the treaty of Rome.

Had Britain not committed itself to provide armed forces--ground and air-- on the continent of Europe, the French Parliament would never have voted and approved the rearmament of Germany, and I am not at all sure whether the German Parliament would approve rearming Germany either.

The WEU is the matrix of the European Community. Everything that has followed, such as the treaty of Rome, has come afterwards. That is important for a special reason. I hope that, in the long term, we can develop a European patriotism, but that is some way off. However, the presence of British and French forces in other countries in Europe, including Germany, will be fundamental to the security of Europe. The Germans could not demand the withdrawal of French and British forces from Germany without repudiating the European Community. That does not mean that we cannot diminish or reduce forces there, but equally I see no reason why we should not have German forces in France, Britain or Spain. We must combine defence if we are to make a reality of the European community.

I stress that I am not suggesting for a moment that we separate from our friends in the United States. I wish to see a global alliance of Europe and the United States. I stress the word "global". In this country, we still tend to think of the Americans as the policemen of the world, but they no longer see themselves in that light. There are enormous claims on their resources, and their resources are not quite what they were. If we want to hold them in Europe and if we want to maintain their commitment, we shall have to give as well as get. Mr. Attlee and his Government understood that point very well--that is why he sent substantial forces to fight in Korea, side by side with the Americans when he thought that the destiny of the

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Commonwealth was at issue. Today the issue is not the destiny of the Commonwealth, but the destiny of Europe. If we want American safeguards for Europe we should be prepared to help them outside Europe--outside the NATO area, perhaps in Africa, the middle east or even in the Pacific.

Mr. Tony Banks : I have much sympathy with what the right hon. Gentleman is saying. Will he give more details about his concept of Europe? He referred to an alliance between Europe and the United States, but how extended into the present east of Europe is the Europe about which the right hon. Gentleman is talking? For example, would it eventually include the Soviet Union as well?

Mr. Amery : I shall refer to the hon. Gentleman's last point in a moment. Of course, the European Community is the foundation of what I am talking about, but then there are those who seek association with it--for example, the European Free Trade Association countries. Then, I hope, the emerging democracies of eastern Europe will also join with us, and they should be encouraged to seek membership of the Council of Europe.

The hon. Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Banks) asked about the Soviet Union. We are dealing here with a vast entity. The Soviet Union or Russia-- I am not sure what name we give it today--stretches to the Pacific and to the borders of China. This is a different world and its future is wrapped in mystery, as is the future of China. I do not think that I should try to define in detail--it would be foolish to do so--what our relationship with it should be. However, I am sure that if we want a good relationship, we must first build a European structure and a global alliance with the United States.

5.18 pm

Mr. A. E. P. Duffy (Sheffield, Attercliffe) : Hon. Members will have listened to the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) with great interest. He brings a tremendous breadth of experience to such debates. As the right hon. Gentleman was developing his last point about the new security structures in which Europe will enjoy parity with the United States, I found myself wondering whether the framework is not already present in the Atlantic alliance. The right hon. Gentleman inferred that there is an onus on Europe to develop a pillar and to take on obligations that will perhaps considerably relieve the United States. That is certainly an objective to which I warm, but it can be achieved only if we retain NATO. Despite the current developments in eastern Europe, we should regard NATO as being simply in a mid-life crisis and we should now be exploring how to achieve a renewal of life for it.

Mr. Amery : I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's understanding of what I said. The alliance is, of course, fundamental, but the question is whether the existing structure is what we need or whether it should be reformed in various ways to include France and Spain or perhaps to go outside the current area. That is what I was trying to suggest.

Mr. Duffy : I am in entire sympathy with the right hon. Gentleman and, possibly, almost in agreement with him.

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Many of the factors that have determined western security policy over the past 45 years are, as we know, undergoing fundamental change. The collapse of communist rule in eastern Europe has weakened many of the longstanding assumptions about the order of European security. The Warsaw pact, as an effective military alliance, is already fading into the past. Some people in the west have even expressed doubts about NATO's continued usefulness.

The Soviet threat may be non-existent, but Soviet military power remains. Thus, prudence should be the rule of the alliance's reaction to events in eastern Europe. The dissolution of the Soviet empire is one thing, but the dissolution of the Soviet Union is another. What if glasnost or openness continues to encourage dissent, protest, turmoil and disruption much faster than perestroika or restructuring can cure the practical, political, economic, ethnic and sectarian problems that Mr. Gorbachev faces? What if centrifugal forces spin out of control? If Mr. Gorbachev fails, who will control the Soviet Union's still awesome military power, and those military weapons, and to what purpose?

The need for NATO's continued existence is now accepted not only by its members, but by the new eastern European Governments, as I know from personal contact and from visits to all of them, including the Soviet Union. Indeed, even the Soviet political leadership appears to realise that its security is closely bound up with a cohesive western security system.

It was most interesting a week ago today to listen to the Prime Minister's statement about her visit to the Soviet Union and her account of her meeting with Defence Minister Yazov and the chiefs of staff. A year ago I sat in on a North Atlantic Assembly delegation--which, incidentally, I led- -which included not only hon. Members of all parties, but three United States senators and leading parliamentarians from all the member nations. It became a stormy meeting, especially when at least one of Marshal Yazov's generals, quite out of turn and to the obvious embarrassment of the Defence Minister, insisted on shouting at one of the United States senators. Following that two and a half hour meeting, the speculation over lunch was how long that general would have lasted had any of us been in Marshal Yazov's position as Defence Minister. That shows just how far things have changed in just one year in the Soviet Union alone. Some of us are in regular contact with the Soviet Union and can otherwise receive reports--we can all read about what is happening there--and we know that tremendous changes are taking place, some of them perhaps unnervingly fast.

NATO's role--current and future--transcends merely countering the Soviet threat. In the Gorbachev or post-Gorbachev era, NATO still has four major missions : to prevent world peace from being endangered by a renewal of Europe's civil wars ; to establish structures that will ensure the efficacy of the CFE agreements ; to establish two-pillar institutions that will permit the NATO Governments to procure affordable armaments while equitably and efficiently sharing both the benefits and the burdens of NATO's defences ; and--this next point recalls the profound observations of the right hon. Member for Pavilion--to resume building the Atlantic community that President John F. Kennedy and others foresaw nearly three decades ago. Those four goals of defence, stability, arms control and the building of new, positive security and

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political structures, should provide a large enough agenda for anyone seeking a renewed and meaningful political role for the North Atlantic alliance.

In a press conference in Paris on 29 March, the Foreign Secretary referred to the creation of

"policies, doctrines and structures of the new NATO".

I am sure that all hon. Members will agree that, in doctrinal terms, there is clearly a need to reinterpret the strategies of flexible response and forward defence. It is not enough for hon. Members, including some of my hon. Friends, simply to dismiss those strategies as irrelevant because of the changes that are now taking place. Not a bit--the changes do not mean that those issues need not be addressed, because they do. The strategies must certainly be changed, but they must first be reinterpreted. Perhaps the crux of the matter before the House is that, until we have done that, what restructuring of our armed forces can any of us seriously consider?

The change in warning time is the only significant fundamental change that has occurred in so far as it affects tonight's debate. Given that change in warning time, I have no doubt that flexible response, which is quite capable of evolutionary change, as well as forward defence, which is essentially a mobile defence and is also capable of change, will be modified. Thinking of central Europe alone, we must remember that we still have flanks--and some of us have always regarded them as the most vulnerable sectors. As I said, flexible response, forward defence and the size of NATO will all have to be modified.

I am equally confident that "first use" and the role and future of short- range nuclear forces are under current consideration. I am sorry that the Secretary of State is no longer in his place because I should have liked to have been a little more specific, but his colleagues know that MC114/3, which is General John Galvin's basic doctrine and terms of reference, can be adjusted in its essential "force-generation" role, such as mobilisation and deployment, and similar dynamics.

In her speech to NATO Foreign Ministers in Scotland two weeks ago, the Prime Minister rightly dwelt on those strategy questions when she asked :

"Does forward defence in the central region still make sense in these circumstances? Or should we think more in terms of defence in depth and greater reliance on mobility, flexibility and reserves?" She said that it would be prudent for NATO countries to retain a capacity to carry out multiple roles, with more flexible and versatile forces. The House will probably agree with the Prime Minister's thinking on that, yet we look in vain for answers to those questions in the pages of the annual defence White Paper. Although we understand why they are not there, only those answers will ultimately determine the size and shape of Britain's armed services, and not merely the forces that we station in Europe.

Last night's announcement about a reduced Tornado programme was inevitable, was it not, given the unexpected rise in inflation which has brought about a real value cut of about 3 per cent., and continues a trend that began in 1985?

The Government denied for some time that they were engaged in a fundamental defence review. Then it became known that the Prime Minister was chairing a full-scale Cabinet investigation into scope for defence cuts, entitled "Options for Change". The obvious remit for the inquiry is to determine the main general changes which are evident and which the Government expect for the United

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Kingdom armed forces in this area of diminishing threat. The assessment will be in terms of, first, roles and resources priorities ; secondly, procurement patterns ; thirdly, recruitment, retention and training of soldiers ; and, fourthly, additional tasks such as those which may arise out of verification agreed through CFE. The inquiry poses other questions of a largely strategic nature that must be addressed first by not only the Ministry of Defence, but hon. Members who are present, if they wish to understand what recommended changes may eventually be announced from the Government Front Bench, we hope before the recess. Assuming that a CFE agreement is signed this year, how soon, for example, should a second round of negotiations begin? Or are events in eastern Europe making the Vienna negotiations irrelevant? What type of framework of participation should attend CFE 2 and what should be the agenda? Has the collapse of communism in eastern Europe, with the attendant reduction in Soviet forces and the impending unification of Germany, cast any doubt in Ministry of Defence planning circles about the continued military and political efficacy of forward defence as a NATO defence imperative? What are the minimum operating requirements of forward defence?

Is the Ministry of Defence doing serious analytical work on alternative defence concepts for NATO, premised on defence dominance and a structural inability to attack on the part of both alliances? If so, what are the implications for future national defence procurement programmes, such as the multiple-launch rocket system? Are follow-on forces attack concepts still valid? For how long will they be valid? What will be the future determinants to guide such concepts? Will the CFE1 accord make a military integrated structure more or less important? Will the integration include United States forces? How can French forces be included? Should the NATO command structure be changed, and in what direction? Is Lance modernisation dead? What role do short-range nuclear forces play in operational terms?

Without awaiting the findings of the "Options for Change" inquiry, the Government should take four steps. First, they should reassure the services and engage them as much as possible in the inquiry. They should not be kept at arm's length, as it is believed that the Government are doing now. They should be involved in the inquiry at a professional level. Secondly, the Government should point out that reductions in the central European theatre cannot be equated with cuts in major strategic programmes. The European fighter aircraft, the Apache attack helicopter for the Army and the Navy's continuing need for surface warships are all requirements that cannot easily be ditched because, if ditched, they cannot easily be revived. Thirdly, for all Mr. Gorbachev's perestroika, the Soviet Union added substantially to its armed strength last year. It added 1,700 tanks, 400 ballistic missiles, 600 fighters and 10 submarines. As I said, all that has changed so far is that the short-warning threat has been removed. Soviet forces may be becoming smaller but they are almost certainly becoming better.

Fourthly, the Government should admit the limitations of the peace dividend, given the public expectation, and they should scrupulously avoid seeking to make electoral capital out of it. Fifthly, NATO should retain its present membership and remain primarily a security organisations, although it should undertake an increased political role. It will be essential for stability in Europe that

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Germany remains a full member of NATO and that the alliance continues to be transatlantic based. But NATO will need to adapt, taking on new roles to reflect changing circumstances. Examples of such roles may include the lengthy and complicated implementation of CFE reductions and accompanying verification measures, the adaptation of our strategy and operational concepts to accommodate a unified Germany, and consultations on the management of east-west relations, the future arms control agenda and the possible future role for CSCE.

The alliance will also be compelled to consider security questions out of area, for example, in the middle east where missile proliferation continues. I agree with the right hon. Member for Pavilion who, in his closing words, said that the alliance will almost certainly have to pay increased attention to the worldwide management of peace.

5.35 pm

Mr. Keith Speed (Ashford) : I congratulate the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy) on his speech. I agreed with almost every word, as I did with the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery). They both made thoughtful speeches, to which I hope the Minister listened carefully.

This debate is timely because we all hope that fundamental reassessments of our defence plans and priorities are taking place. But even this week events in Romania, IRA terrorism on the continent and in the United Kingdom, and Colonel Gaddafi's speech about nuclear weapons in Libya remind us that the world is still an uncertain and dangerous place. The security of our nation and, indeed, of the west demands substantial resources to safeguard it.

I hope that the review of the armed forces taking place in the Ministry of Defence and about which we have heard so much will have a long hard look at reshaping the forces for the changing threats that lie ahead. Undoubtedly, that will mean increased emphasis on some sections of the armed forces and reduced emphasis on others. I hope that that will be in keeping with the radically changing position in central and eastern Europe.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Pavilion and my hon. Friend the Member for Hampstead and Highgate (Sir G. Finsberg) have referred to the European security structure. The Western European Union could play an emphasised and substantial role in the developments that lie ahead. The Council of Europe could also play a role, embracing as it does 23 countries stretching from Turkey to Iceland and Finland to Spain, with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland as observer states. No doubt other countries from eastern Europe will join those countries as observers. Unlike the CSCE, both the Council of Europe and the Western European Union have parliamentary accountability. I hope that we do not create new and expensive bureaucratic bodies and structures but will adapt existing structures that are accountable to our domestic Parliaments throughout Europe and are more cost effective.

Looking ahead to possible threats to our national security, we must accept that there are still many problems in the Soviet Union. The threat may be much reduced, but no one--the hon. Member for Attercliffe referred to this- -can be sure that if there were a total economic

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breakdown, or if Mr. Gorbachev's position were undermined, there would not be strong military action by the generals or others. When countries go through a revolution, whether economic, political or ethnic--the Soviet Union is undergoing all three--disturbing and strange reactions can take place.

Yesterday, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State reminded us that the Soviet Union still has substantial superiority in arms and that the CFE treaty has not yet been signed. Arms production continues. The hon. Member for Attercliffe reminded us that there has been substantial production of weapons in the past 12 months. Any unilateral disarmament in anticipation of CFE and the other arms treaties would be a dangerous gamble.

It is important to consider the threat out of areas, notably in the middle east. It may come from Islamic fundamentalism, but may also appear in many other parts of the world--not least the blackmail that could be exercised by some third world countries which have nuclear weapons or the capacity to make them. We must also remember the threat posed by domestic and international terrorism--no country, airline or people is immune from that.

An important responsibility is the protection of our national vital resources and trade routes, and the protection of our trading partners in different parts of the world and of those few Commonwealth countries for which we still have external defence responsibilities. We must also protect the minerals and oil in our exclusive economic zone. Those important matters should be taken into account when considering the future. I hope that the Government and their advisers are considering the radical reshaping of our forces which will be necessary to meet those threats and responsibilities. Let me put my two-penn'orth in the crystal ball. It is inevitable that there will be a substantial reduction in troops and aircraft on the central front of Germany. I also hope that the support facilities will be reduced as they are extremely expensive to our defence budget and our balance of payments. Undoubtedly the cut in the Tornado order is not the happiest thing for the aircraft industry or many others, but it is the forerunner of other necessary cuts. I envisage that the older jets such as Phantom and Jaguar will be phased out while the Tornado continues in operation. Many tanks will also be decommissioned in central Germany--they will go anyway as a result of the CFE agreement. America, France, Germany, Italy and Britain will require fewer tanks and it is a pity that we cannot get our act together to develop a NATO tank. Fewer tanks will mean that the unit cost of each one, be it Challenger 2 or Leopard 2, will increase. If we had a uniform tank, the production costs could be shared among the countries and cost could be kept down. But that is not possible as chauvinism reigns supreme in that regard.

There must be a more European approach to the troops who will remain on the continent and I hope that we shall have some multinational forces. I foresee a German, Belgian, United Kingdom force operating at a divisional level in northern Germany. I know that there are problems with language, communications equipment and interoperability, but the Franco-German brigade, which was launched in Stuttgart, has shown us the opportunities available as well as the problems. I was privileged to attend the inauguration of that brigade a year ago. At a higher divisional level there is great scope for economy, but in the first instance the real advantages of such a multinational

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force would be political, not least following the unification of Germany. We should latch ourselves properly on to Europe, albeit at a lower level than at present.

The hon. Member for Attercliffe referred to the need for greater flexibility and manoeuvrability in our forces ; that is paramount. I was greatly impressed by the French Force d'Action Rapide, whose key element is its manoeuvrability as it has light armoured vehicles, helicopters and air mobility. It is nearly 60,000 strong so we are not talking about a lightweight unit. We must follow those lines and create self-contained logistical support. The 24 Air Mobile Brigade at Catterick is a good foundation on which to build. That brigade, together with light infantry forces, should be expanded to give us the flexibility in Europe that we need. In that way our armed forces in Europe would have the added advantage, in common with the Force d'Action Rapide, of being used out of area at short notice. With fewer troops stationed in a changed Europe and with the CFE treaty in force, there will be less need for resources to be committed to reinforcement and re-supply from north America. It is still important to retain that capability--not least to act as a deterrent to any adventure that might start in eastern Europe. The demand for fewer resources will, I believe, lead to fewer frigates being necessary. If the Soviet navy starts to reduce its forces as a result of economics rather than treaties, I envisage that our SSN hunter-killer submarines could be reduced in due course. That would not, of course, affect our strategic deterrent in the Trident force. Maritime operations could be expanded in one significant area--a maritime equivalent of the Force d'Action Rapide. The Royal Marines should have an amphibious capability that can be used in an outside area. That means that we must reach a decision on landing platform docks Fearless and Intrepid. In 1986, I was a member of the Defence Select Committee and I was told that a decision would be reached within the following 12 months, but still no decision has been made. In that regard we should operate with the Dutch with whom the Royal Marines already work on the northern flank. They have common requirements for similar ships and they, too, have had to defer a decision because of resources. For heaven's sake, we should get our act together. The Hague and London are separated by a 40-minute flight. We should plan something together on a European basis so that we have maritime and amphibious flexibility. It is desperately needed and we have an excellent foundation on which to build with Whiskey company and the Royal Marine Commandos.

In the next few years, the Army, Air Force and Royal Navy will be subject to meaningful reductions in their capabilities. Eventually that will save money and foreign exchange, but it will take a great deal of time. In the meantime, we must expand certain areas, such as intelligence. I make no apology for mentioning intelligence as the Intelligence Corps is based in my constituency. Its anti-terrorism role in Northern Ireland and throughout the world is magnificent. The men and women wearing the green lanyard of the Intelligence Corps have a key part to play in the future.

I agree with the hon. Member for Attercliffe that once the CFE agreement and other treaties are in place an important function will be verification. I hope that that will be carried out by European satellite and by teams working on the ground. We should work with our European and north American partners. An important

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component of that will be airborne early warning, and I believe that the AWACS will be fairly busy in the next few years, although perhaps their role will be different from that originally envisaged. In the future a great deal could be done for our reserve forces once the regular forces are reduced and redeployed. The reserves would provide a cost-effective way in which the Army, Navy and Air Force could retain their latent capability should we get something wrong. Investment in our reserve forces will mean that at home and in Europe we have the capability quickly to expand our regular forces. We must ensure that the reserve forces are well trained and use similar equipment, aircraft, ships, fighters, vehicles or artillery to their regular counterparts.

There has been much talk about the peace dividend, but it is right not to raise public expectation. All parties in the House have a responsibility to that end. The dividend will come in due course, but only as a result of imaginative changes in our defence programmes and procedures and as a result of the continuation of the enormous changes in central and eastern Europe.

Welcome and dramatic though those changes are, they have happened basically for three reasons. The first, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Pavilion pointed out, has been the nuclear deterrent since 1945. Secondly, our free and democratic system, while by no means perfect, is infinitely better than Marxist socialism, which is crumbling all over eastern Europe. Thirdly, the alliance under NATO has stood firm through thick and thin and, as part of that alliance, the continuing connection between north America and Europe is, was and always will be absolutely critical.

5.50 pm

Mr. John Cartwright (Woolwich) : It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Ashford (Mr. Speed), who brings great expertise to the debate. I particularly support what he said about the role of the Western European Union and the Council of Europe in the changing European scene.

Those who have had the opportunity of talking to members of the newly elected Parliaments in the eastern European countries feel that they are facing problems about which they have no experience and that they desperately need the strength of western European parliamentary democracy around them. They need to feel that they are not being left on their own. The Council of Europe can do an important job in providing such solidarity for those newly emerging democracies. I strongly support those who say that decisions about the future of Britain's armed forces must be set within the NATO framework. We should resist any temptation to hark back to some great imperialist past. We are a European nation, we are part of the European Community and we are part of the Atlantic alliance. That must shape our military planning.

That implies that I do not accept the argument that the dramatic collapse of the Warsaw treaty organisation means that NATO can be allowed to slide into an ineffective position or somehow be subsumed into an all-embracing CSCE process.

NATO is not the mirror image of the Warsaw pact. NATO was set up as a voluntary association of free nations sharing the same democratic values. The Warsaw treaty organisation, by contrast, was established to serve

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Soviet interests. Its membership was not voluntary but was of a conscript nature. It is salutary to remember that the only time the Warsaw pact fired shots in anger was against its own members in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

There is a powerful case for a new security framework covering the whole of Europe and involving the United States and the USSR. It is needed to reassure those who are concerned about the new balance of power on the continent of Europe. It will be needed to deal with the risk of regional, ethnic or nationalist unrest spilling over into more serious conflicts.

I accept that the CSCE process provides the best framework for developing that sort of new security system, but that is likely to take a considerable time to establish and to become effective and credible. It would be foolish for us to talk of its replacing NATO, even in the longer term.

There is a difference between a system of common security and a system of common defence. Common security necessarily brings together states with different and sometimes conflicting interests. Consider the examples of the League of Nations and the United Nations. It is not always easy in such situations to establish the unified political will that is needed to deal with difficult problems.

Common defence, on the other hand, brings together free nations with shared interests which they combine together to protect. Most of us would accept that NATO has been the most successful such alliance in modern history, and it will be needed for the foreseeable future, even within an institutionalised CSCE framework.

NATO must change to take account of the totally different Europe that is now emerging. I see it as a two-stage process. First, we must make short- term adjustments to take account of the present period of change, which we hope is merely a transition to a more stable situation. During that transitional stage we do not want to take unnecessary risks. We should not gamble with our security, but we can start planning for the second stage in the process. We can start a more thorough and radical review of NATO's military strategy which will be needed if all the changes that we hope for become reality. It is possible that by the mid-1990s we shall have seen the end of the Warsaw treaty organisation as a military alliance. We might also have seen the total withdrawal of Soviet forces from eastern Europe and the full implementation at least of the first CFE agreement. By then we may be seeing a continuing democratic process in political and economic reform in the nations of eastern Europe.

If we achieve those objectives, we shall need a different sort of NATO with a different strategy. That process of change will, we hope, start at the July summit meeting. It will lead to major changes--of style, objective and strategy--but certain fundamental elements must remain in the new NATO strategy.

First, for as far ahead as we can see, we shall need the presence of a militarily significant number of United States and Canadian forces on the continent of Europe, though at much lower levels than the numbers present today. Secondly, we shall need a united Germany as a full member of NATO with, of course, special arrangements being made for the territory of the GDR. Thirdly, NATO must retain a deterrent force based on an appropriate mix

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of conventional and nuclear weapons. Fourthly, we need to retain a fully integrated military structure. Fifthly, and in many ways most importantly, we must maintain the original founding principle that an attack on one member of the alliance is an attack on all. NATO has always been a defensive alliance. It has been there to prevent aggression. The challenge to NATO now is to demonstrate that we can prepare to do more than just prevent war. We must show that NATO can be just as determined in building the peace. That underlines the point made frequently in the debate that NATO must now develop a more political stance, rather than being a purely military alliance. In fact, NATO has never been just a military alliance. At the time of the 1949 treaty, even in those early days emphasis was being laid on political and economic co-operation between the members of the alliance. While it is difficult to envisage any of the regional problems in Europe with which we are concerned demanding a NATO military response, it is easy to see the need for a concerted NATO political response to the uncertainties of the new Europe. Although responsibility for the economic problems of the newly emerging eastern European nations will fall primarily on the EEC, there is a north American dimension in assisting those nations and solving those problems, and NATO is the main vehicle for the involvement of the United States and Canada in Europe.

NATO will play a more political role in terms of the arms control negotiations which we wish to see continuing and in the verification of that network of treaties which will guarantee the stability and security that we want to achieve at much lower levels of military forces.

In looking at the implications of all this change for the size and shape of Britain's own forces, it is clear that the first step to be taken is to determine what our forces are for, and whether the objectives are for NATO or purely national. Final decisions on that first question cannot be taken until we know the outcome of the NATO review.

However, it is clear that there is a wide measure of agreement in the House about certain general principles which will shape the sort of forces that we shall have in the next couple of decades. We are generally agreed that we want smaller forces which are more mobile and flexible, and capable of swift reaction, rather than large-scale stationed forces capable of fighting old-fashioned wars.

We also recognise that, for the first time in 200 years or so, the bulk of those forces are likely to be stationed in the United Kingdom. The conventional forces in Europe talks and the the implications of German reunification will inevitably reduce the size of our forces stationed in Germany. With regard to our out-of-area commitments, Hong Kong will be gone by 1997 and it is hard to see commitments such as Belize and the Falklands being maintained even at their present reduced levels. We must face the fact that the bulk of our forces will be stationed in this country.

It is easy to produce scenarios of unrest in various parts of Europe leading to local or regional conflicts, but it is hard to imagine that any of those favoured scenarios will inevitably involve the deployment of United Kingdom forces. It is unlikely, for example, that British forces will be deployed in a peace-keeping role between the Armenians and the Azeris, and the unlikelihood of British troops being needed on the continent of Europe will be a major factor in our force planning.

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It is also becoming much more accepted that in the new environment it will be even more difficult to attract the sort of high quality recruits we shall need into much smaller forces with a more limited career structure. The Secretary of State is therefore absolutely correct to argue that, whatever the peace dividend may be, some part of it must be ploughed back into improving the conditions of our armed forces and the quality of life of our service men and women. If we are to have highly qualified, well trained and well equipped armed forces, with well motivated service men and women, we must accept that we cannot achieve that on the cheap.

I also challenge the assumption that we can depend on reservists to fill the gaps in our professional forces. The new environment will make it as difficult to attract reservists as regular service men. The fact that the Territorial Army is already 15,000 short of its 1990 target of 91,000 illustrates that. The Select Committee report states that 80 per cent. of regular army reservists attended no training in the last nine months of 1989. In an environment in which security is no longer at such a high premium, it will be as difficult to attract people into the reserves as into the regular forces. I agree with those who have said in the debate that, despite all the changes in the Soviet Union, the USSR will retain a massive nuclear arsenal as far ahead as we can see. Even if the Soviet Union were to break up, which is a strong possibility, the Russian federation would presumably have the benefit of those nuclear weapons. Some of us are no more attracted by the possibility of Russian nationalism than by the threat of Soviet communism. In this uncertain and dangerous world, it is simply prudent common sense for Britain to retain a minimum nuclear deterrent which is effective and credible. It is therefore absolutely essential for us to retain the concept of four Trident submarines. We can reduce the number of missiles per submarine and vary the number of warheads per missile to take account of future progress in nuclear arms control, but it is absolutely essential to maintain four submarines. I welcome the prospect of a negotiated removal of land-based, short-range nuclear weapons and nuclear artillery. However, I accept the case for retaining a limited number of sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. I believe that the tactical air-to-surface missile is the most effective system for that role. Therefore, it makes sense to deploy a limited number of those systems on NATO aircraft based in Europe.

Since 1984, the Soviet Union has deployed a growing number of AS15 long- range air-launched cruise missiles, which have a range of between 1,600 and 3,000 km and carry a 250 kilotonne warhead. When such systems exist, it seems ridiculous for NATO not to maintain the ability to deploy a similar, less threatening system of its own. I also accept the point that has been made several times in this debate about the risk of nuclear proliferation and the number of third world nations obtaining, or trying to obtain, a nuclear and chemical weapons capability allied to ballistic missiles. In that dangerous situation, it is not credible to reply simply on strategic nuclear weapons. We must have a number of sub-strategic systems to take account of such a threat.

In conclusion, I think that we all accept that we face an extraordinary opportunity. As the Minister of State for the Armed Forces said, the propects opening up before us were unthinkable even a year ago. We must grasp the

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chance that we are now being given and think imaginatively. I strongly endorse the words of the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, in his evidence to the Senate foreign relations committee on 12 June. He said :

"We want to build a peace defined not just by the absence of war from the Baltic to the Adriatic, but by a community of democratic values that extends from the Atlantic to the Urals."

That should be NATO's objective, in which Britain must play its full part.

6.7 pm

Mr. Julian Critchley (Aldershot) : The hon. Member for Woolwich (Mr. Cartwright) and I once wrote a book together. He provided the jargon and I provided the jokes. Sadly, it did not sell and was not made into a film. It might have helped to swell the profits of Mr. Robert Maxwell. It might be said that the spectre of being remaindered at Waterloo station looms over the hon. Gentleman and me.

The Government are undertaking the first defence review since the halcyon days of the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey)-- [Interruption.] That was a different defence review, to which I shall return later. This one is called "Options for Change". It has been fathered by the Minister of State for Defence Procurement. Its midwives meet regularly, under the eye of Mr. Richard Mottram, and we must wish their labours well. I wrote a profile of the Minister of State for Defence Procurement that should have appeared in last Sunday's edition of the Observer. In fact, it is going into next Sunday's edition of the Observer. There are no secrets between the Minister of State and me.

For the past 40 years Britain has done far more than its fair share in defence terms. We should now cut back, but only in a way that enhances our influence, especially in Europe, and helps to contribute to our joint security.

I fear that some of my hon. Friends may find it hard to come to terms with the absence of an enemy. For the first time since the 1860s, Britain lacks an external enemy. The Soviet Union seems to be reverting to Mother Russia- -I hope not to imperial Russia. The Warsaw pact lies in ruins. The French and Germans are more than our allies ; they are our partners. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism threatens the stability of the near and middle east, but it is not, as such, an enemy of this country. We have little to fear from the Argentinians over the Falklands and, thank God, nothing whatever to fear from Iceland. Unless we go about the world looking for trouble, we should enjoy a long period of real peace.

We must resist the temptation to return to the priorities of the Victorian age. I suspect that there are some members of our great party who might wish to return to those priorities. Europe should not go to the bottom of the list and the prospect of some adventure across the seas be raised to the top. What out-of-area--that is, out of Europe--responsibilities we have we share with our European and American allies. We should not reduce the Rhine Army so far and so fast as to limit our influence in the European Community. Our status in Europe has been largely determined by the size of our military contribution--certainly not by our rhetoric--to the common defence. Many Americans will now go home and a too sizeable reduction in the Rhine Army on our part might leave France and Germany as the major actors on the European scene.

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Military and political consequences flow from a European priority in defence matters. The first is that it is necessary to keep on the continent of Europe at least a division--a cadre that can easily be reinforced from this country. The second military consequence of the European priority is that the use of nuclear weapons against any targets in Europe, east or west, will be unthinkable.

The political consequences flow from these two military consequences. Should we consider a United Kingdom contribution to a European army? I should like to think so, but the agnosticism of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in all matters pertaining to European unity will remain for some time at least a stumbling block--but a European army, the dream of the 1950s, will be on the agenda in the 1990s.

Lastly, what are the implications for nuclear weapons? Adequate deterrence against the Soviet Union or Russia can be maintained by sea and air- launched cruise missiles. We should hold on to our strategic nuclear national force and build a fourth Trident submarine. But whether or not shorter-range missiles are stationed in Germany must depend on the wishes of the Germans themselves. We must accept whatever decision they reach. We must not lecture our allies from the sidelines.

As we debate on this second day of the defence estimates, the rotary clubs of the low countries are carefully re-enacting the battle of Waterloo. We would not wish the Ministry of Defence--the only building in London designed by Albert Speer--to be shrouded in the smoke of conflict, and we must not permit the Minister of State for Defence Procurement to meet his Waterloo.

6.13 pm

Mr. Tony Banks (Newham, North-West) : I am overwhelmed at being called now, Mr. Speaker, because I am so used to seeing the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Critchley) on panel programmes that I fully expected my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell) to be called next. It is a pleasure to hear the hon. Gentleman because he makes telling points that are always worth re-reading, and I am sure that I shall be re-reading them in newspaper articles in the coming weeks.

Yesterday the Secretary of State--echoed today by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces--sneered at the debate going on in the Labour party about defence policy. I found that depressing but predictable, coming as it did from the authoritarian Conservative party. Robust, open debate is not something for which Tories care very much. Why should not the Labour party have a robust open debate in what has been left of democracy in this country by the right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher)? Yet when we hold such debates we get sneers and cheap party-political jibes from Conservative Members.

There is also a debate of sorts going on in the Government, based largely on rumours, leaks and innuendos. Ministers go off into their corners and give briefings to their favourite journalists. The Observer headline on Sunday ran :

"Service chiefs in storm over defence cuts".

The same page carried an admirable picture of the Minister of State for Defence Procurement. I have no

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