House of Commons Hansard Debates for 6 Sep 1990

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conviction that intense pressure must be rigorously sustained against Saddam Hussein and his regime. Iraq's isolation must be complete. That course is supported not only as a way of avoiding or reducing bloodshed but as the best means of securing an acceptable and enduring outcome to the crisis. The widespread and, in our view, entirely correct approach is that sanctions should be given the fullest possible opportunity of working in order to make Saddam Hussein completely fulfil the requirements of the United Nations resolutions.

There is a widespread and deeply held understanding that the support for securing the objectives, and the action needed to secure those objectives, involve a long haul. Strong sanctions can, of course, have a particular effect against the Saddam regime. Iraq has to rely on imports for well over 80 per cent. of its basic materials. It is dependent for well over 95 per cent. of its export earnings upon the sale of oil, 88 per cent. of which flows through just two pipelines, one through Turkey, the other through Saudi Arabia. In pursuit of the United Nations policy, we have to ensure, with the rest of the world community, that, for the duration, Iraq cannot sell anything to anyone, buy anything from anyone or raise credit from anywhere.

That latter point has not, thus far, had the attention that it properly deserves. The fact is that Iraq, because of its oil wealth, is naturally regarded as a good credit risk. Indeed, so good is it that it is conceivable that--if effective action is not taken--Iraq could have access to substantial credit for a year or even more. That financial tap must be completely turned off. There must be no exceptions.

Clearly, the besieging of Iraq has had and will have grave effects on other economies--most especially on its poorer neighbours and on those who have to rely for a significant part of their income on remittances of their citizens who have been working in Iraq and Kuwait. Substantial and speedy aid must be given to such economies, both for the relief of suffering and to ensure that the force of economic circumstances does not impel them into relaxing the embargo. I hope that, even before that form of support is fully installed, Governments will quickly and generously give help to refugees and private citizens will support Oxfam, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development and other aid charities in their efforts in the emergency refugee programmes.

I was gratified to note in what the Prime Minister said this afternoon that additional sums are to be made available. I hope that the matter will be kept continually under review because the prospects of mass starvation and of disease as refugees go to the border must horrify us all.

The need to help the poorer economies cope with the economic effects of the Gulf crisis is clearly an obligation on all the richer countries of the world. Mr. Brady's mission is welcome as a reminder to a variety of economies. I must also say that it is the particular duty of the strongest economies in the world--Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Everyone will naturally understand the increasing pressures in the German economy as unification approaches. Everyone will also appreciate the desire of the Japanese people not to compromise their constitution. But as both countries are most certainly part of the world democratic community, as both have very direct interests in achieving the fulfilment of the United Nations resolutions and as both can take economic action without transgressing their constitutions, that action of support must be taken on a generous scale, and I trust that every

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opportunity will be used by our Government and by other Governments to press that case and to achieve a constructive response. In the course of the weeks since the invasion of Kuwait, the issue of the extent of the mandate under article 51 of the United Nations charter has naturally attracted attention and raised important questions. The Prime Minister addressed herself to that question. Clearly it must be right for us to consider those questions in this Parliament. Even as we do so, there will, in the process of discussion, be absolutely no reassurance for Saddam Hussein. On the contrary, as far as I am concerned, the issue of this aspect of the debate is how his aggression can be dealt with most completely and conclusively. It is success that we are after.

In the public discussion that has taken place thus far on this issue, two opinions have had greatest prominence. Some assert that there is no essential need for a further specific resolution of the Security Council because, they say, the

"inherent right of individual or collective self-defence", specified in article 51 of the UN charter, gives all necessary authority for any future military action. Others say that there can be absolutely no further military action without an additional specific resolution.

I believe that in the current circumstances, it is not wise to approach the matter from either of those two absolutes. Neither by itself fully addresses both the legal and the political issues at stake. It is those political issues which must unavoidably be taken into account by anyone who wants to ensure that the objectives of the United Nations and, I believe, of just about everyone in this House, are fully realised.

Mr. John Butterfill (Bournemouth, West) : I am rather puzzled, the right hon. Gentleman having admitted that he requested the recall of the House, why there is nothing on the Order Paper in his name or in that of his right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman)-- [Interruption.] I put it to him that on the specific point with which he is dealing, he does not wish a vote to take place because he is uncertain that he would get the support of the majority of his hon. Friends -- [Interruption.] --because they would be no more prepared to defy Saddam Hussein than they have been prepared in the past to defy the tyrants in the trade union movement.

Mr. Kinnock : Because of the noise, I did not hear much of what the hon. Gentleman said in that intervention, but I do not think that I missed anything. I do not know what form of leadership in life in general he is used to, but I must tell him that if there is a Division tomorrow on the motion before the House, I shall most certainly be voting for the Adjournment. I have made that clear all along and there is absolutely no reason for me to change my view. If the hon. Gentleman will listen to the further development of my case, who knows, he may not only be in the same lobby as I, but be there for the same reasons as I shall be there.

I was drawing the attention of the House to what I believe are essential political considerations. The first political consideration of great significance is that the forceful action of the world community, as the Prime Minister said, has resulted from the unprecedented agreement in the Security Council of the United Nations. I do not think that anyone underestimates either the

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powerful effect or the great possibilities arising from that. The idea of a new world order is shifting from the realms of idealism into the realms of realism.

But it must be said that if military action were taken when sanctions had been in force for only a matter of weeks or months, or when there had been no further provocation, or when there had been no further effort to achieve agreement to a mandate to attack, either in the Security Council or in the military staff committee, that military action could shatter the consensus that has been built. The new concept of international security would be jeopardised when it was scarcely more than a prototype. The prospects for gaining a new "security structure", which Secretary James Baker has advocated with strong and compelling conviction in his testimony before the Congressional Committee this week, would be greatly dimmed. In the Soviet Union and China, those forces that are most resistant to co-operation would gleefully enjoy and fully exploit the breakdown, to the disadvantage of leaderships that have come this far in the wake of the cold war. I believe that those crucial considerations and understood in the United States and here and among other countries. I believe that the scale of the risk of political and other losses is recognised.

I do not believe that those considerations forbid all possibility of a strike being made at some time. There are, without question, other pressures present in these conditions, and it would be foolish to ignore them. Even the patent desire of the American leaders to achieve peaceful resolution could not and should not give us a false sense of security, especially in conditions of such speed of movement and considerable danger.

All I do say is that, as we are the first generation ever to have been presented with what Secretary Baker has called the

"opportunity to solidify the ground rules of the new order", of

"enduring peace that is global in its scope",

we had better appreciate the potential for progress in full. We had therefore better think very hard and politically before risking that potential on the basis of even the most distinguished and technically correct legal advice about the extent of article 51.

Saddam Hussein throughout his life--since, we understand, his youngest days as a party functionary, before he discovered or invented a uniform to put on--has been a terrible force for destruction. He must be defeated, but everything possible must be done to try to ensure that in the course of defeating him we do not allow him to be the cause of destroying the beginnings of a new and better world order.

The second political consideration relates to the implications in the region--the middle east and the Gulf area--of taking further military action without further United Nations authority. The fact that legitimacy, the standing of international law, is, in itself, not just a legal issue but an important political one, must not be neglected. With regard to the legalities, it is clear that military action under article 51 is lawful if the now exiled but "legitimate" Government of Kuwait call for it.

Such action is lawful if Saddam Hussein launches further military aggression against any state or armed

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forces. It is lawful if, at some time, the United Nations judges that the action taken thus far has been "inadequate" for the purpose of fulfilling its resolutions, in which case military action under article 42 of the charter could be taken, either by reference to the Security Council or the military staff committee, or both. Those who say that there cannot be a public declaration of the possibility of a strike do not take into full account the reason for the existence of the military staff committee. Given the military realities, if it were acceptable that a strike took place against an aggressive enemy, the process would be much more likely to go through the MSC than the Security Council.

The lawful opportunities are without contention. In addition, there are those who say that, on the basis of legal advice, it could be successfully- -"technically" is the word the Prime Minister has used--argued that the fact that armed attack has already taken place enables those who have come to the aid of Kuwait to undertake armed attack themselves whenever they deem it necessary. I ask those who hold that view--I know that many hold it sincerely, as a result of their professional experience of the law, and are taken seriously--to consider their position further. I ask them to recognise that, for the purpose not just of getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait, but, vitally, of ensuring durable security, it may not be enough to be able to argue, on the basis of legal advice, that a mandate already exists for an attack.

Such legal advice that an inherent right of self defence exists may well be convincing to a Government, Parliament, a court of law or a newspaper in a democracy. It may be possible for calm consideration to take place and the pros and cons of interpretation to be put. That is one, among many, of the immense advantages of democracy by comparison with any other form of government. However, it is not only such bodies of opinion and judgment that have to be convinced in the current conditions. That is not a semantic point or a nicety, but a fact which, realistically, could determine the nature of the outcome of the crisis.

The outcome that we seek--I think that this is a widespread ambition--and the outcome that is necessary for security in the Gulf and stability in the world, cannot be limited only to the liberation of Kuwait, the freeing of the hostages and the removal of Saddam Hussein's ability to mount further military aggression. The outcome that is necessary extends to completely depriving Saddam Hussein of any extra status or any gain to his reputation in the eyes of other Arabs, including those who, for reasons we understand, have long imbibed distrust of the western powers and those who associate with us.

We should all like to be able to help to achieve conditions in which the judgment made by many Arab people was different. But we have to recognise the current reality that the potential consequences of taking action that does not have complete and unarguable United Nations authority include further turmoil, terrorism, an increase in nationalism and fundamentalism, and possibly the destabilising of strategic allies. These are the reasons why it is important strategically, and not because of an intractable dispute between both sides of the House over the precise legalities, that everything possible is done to ensure that, if further military action is necesssary, it should be taken under the full authority of the United Nations.

The only existing but recent precedent must encourage consideration of that view. In the weeks following the

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invasion of Kuwait the Labour party, through my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), repeatedly said that the powers of naval interdiction necessary to enforce a maritime blockade of Iraq would best be exercised through a specific resolution of the Security Council. The view was advanced by others, both in the Government and elsewhere, that it could be argued with sufficient legal authority that there was an adequate resolution already in place.

On reflection, the Government wisely decided, to their credit, that an explicit resolution would give greater legitimacy and force to any necessary naval intervention. They rightly co-operated in securing resolution 665. That resolution was adopted on 25 August. Only two days later, on 27 August, Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi tanker skippers to submit to the naval blockade. As I said earlier, the case that we make on appropriate United Nations authority is related not to any abstraction but directly to the effectiveness of action against the aggressor, Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Bowen Wells (Hertford and Stortford) : Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the strengthening of United Nations authority in the way in which we are proceeding offers Saddam Hussein an advantage if he were to comply with the United Nations resolutions? The United Nations, so strengthened, could begin to settle some of the other middle eastern disputes, especially that with Israel, which are long outstanding. It would be in Saddam Hussein's interests as well to reinforce United Nations peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Kinnock : That is a good point, tellingly made. It is one which we hope will have a wider impact, and it is interesting that in the House there is an even more general understanding of the validity of the argument that the hon. Member for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Wells) advances that there was only a few weeks ago. That atmosphere and that sense of strength of the international community are rightly being encouraged in the current circumstances.

Mr. Nigel Spearing (Newham, South) : My right hon. Friend is making an extremely powerful case for a new world political order for the 21st century after the east-west conflicts have been removed. Does he recall that the Prime Minister tells us consistently and persistently about the failure of appeasement before the second world war? Does the right hon. Lady recall that there was also a great failure in political collective security, which is what my right hon. Friend is advocating?

Mr. Kinnock : I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that intervention. I think that everybody understands, including the Prime Minister--I mean no disrepect to the right hon. Lady, but the period to which my hon. Friend has referred was a formative one for her, as it would have been for anyone of that age at that time--that in thinking-- [Interruption.] It is extraordinary that we still cannot refer to a woman's age, even in this place, without getting a laugh. At the same time we can say anything that we like about a man's age. Is not that strange?

The Prime Minister has drawn strongly on her abomination of appeasement-- rightly, in my view--and her understanding of the failure of international resolve in the League of Nations before the second world war. As circumstances change, she may be among those who are

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more than ready to subscribe strength to the idea of an effective, workable and enforceable international order. I believe that the right hon. Lady can be sufficently forward looking to make that position common between both sides of the House as it is patently of such good sense in terms of the welfare of this country, every other country and all generations.

I am anxious to move on, as I do not want to take up the time of the House when so many hon. Members wish to speak. Many approaches have been postulated in the debate about the directions of policy and action that need to be followed in the conditions arising after the resolution of the immediate crisis. At this juncture, I simply say that, whatever happens after the immediate objectives of the United Nations resolutions have been achieved, it should be founded on the basic fact that the current crisis is a direct result of the invasion of Kuwait and of the wider threat posed to the region by Iraq. Consequently, our dual interrelated purposes must be to accomplish the clearance from Kuwait and to secure the dissolution of that threat.

It is essential, therefore, that, after the primary objectives of the United Nations resolutions have been attained, there must be, first, a complete and sustained embargo imposed both on arms sales and on the provision of arms manufacturing equipment to Iraq. Secondly, Iraq's chemical weapons and its chemical weapon manufacturing capacity must be destroyed. Thirdly, provision must be made for the thorough and continual monitoring of the nuclear plant and weapons-making capability of Iraq. Fourthly--this is not an exhaustive list--Iraq must make reparations, especially to the poor countries that have been further impoverished by its aggression. I realise that there are those who, even though they want the United Nations objectives to be achieved, say that embargoes, weapon and plant destruction, and international monitoring and reparations are steps too far. To them I say that the nature and the scale of the actions to be taken following the achievement of the immediate UN objectives must relate to the nature and the scale not only of the proven aggression, but of the actual and potential threat in the region. Action to respond to and to prevent the extension of the aggression was and is justified. Action to prevent the continuation of the regional threat is also justified.

It will not be vindictiveness--it will be a basic requirement of justice, order and security. It will not be an unwarranted intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign country--it will be the legitimate exercise of preventive power by an international community which has suffered, and could again experience, the results of the most unwarranted form of intervention--the armed invasion and occupation of one country by another.

The fate of Saddam Hussein may well--indeed, is most likely to--be affected by the implementation of such reprisals for his actions. There are many who would understandably include his downfall among their list of publicly stated objectives. I think that it would be far better for them to understand that, however much we long for the ending of tyranny, we cannot include that among our motives in the case of Iraq, as that would amount to a determination to impose a form of government on what is an offending but, nonetheless, sovereign country.

Saddam Hussein may well retain his position in his country in the wake of this crisis. However, he cannot be allowed to retain his power to jeopardise the region. The

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crisis has been inflicted upon the world by the ambition and aggression of Saddam Hussein. No one will be unaffected by the economic effects of what the Iraqi dictator has done. Millions of people in his country and elsewhere are experiencing and will experience great misery because of his actions. Some, including refugee children, have already died and thousands have lost their liberty. The world must now impose its will upon Saddam Hussein. His defeat must be a victory for the international community. I know that I, my party and, I am sure, the great majority of the British people want to assist in achieving that victory.

3.49 pm

Mr. Edward Heath (Old Bexley and Sidcup) : It is natural, at a time of crisis, that the country as well as Members of the House should wish to see the House united in its view. I do not today, or tomorrow, see any difficulty about that.

The view that has been expressed in the House and in the country about the invasion of Kuwait is unanimous. The outstanding characteristic of the crisis is that it has been handled by, and is under the control of, the United Nations. That is something which has not happened for many years.

We may therefore forgive those who are somewhat sceptical or cynical at that event when they look back over the past decade and see the number of occasions when matters equally serious have occurred in which no leadership has been given by the United States or by Europe.

As a result, we see a situation in which the President of Iraq may well have made a false judgment about the invasion of Kuwait. If his attack on Iran produced no very great reaction from the western world, and if his use of poison gas in his own country and elsewhere produced no very great reaction, why should the occupation of a small country such as Kuwait produce any great reaction? The fact that it has produced a world reaction- -as I say, under the control of the United Nations--cannot fail to make an impact, not only on the President of Iraq, but also on his generals and his supporters in his own country.

We therefore come to the question stated by the Leader of the Opposition to be at the heart of the matter--the use of articles 51 and 42. There is nothing new about that. There was argument about that at various legal levels, right up to the highest, at the time of the Suez crisis and there were those who always had doubts about some of the legal recommendations.

My point of view today is that for practical purposes we can agree. I do not see why we should differ on legal questions of this kind. As I have said, the characteristic is that this is under the control of the United Nations and, for practical purposes, it is there that we wish it to remain and where it must remain. For those practical purposes, therefore, the United Nations must be the governing force. One must look at the practical questions. If, for example, Saddam Hussein were tonight to launch an attack on Saudi Arabia or on any other part of the Gulf, the response must be militarily immediate. There can be no question about it. We would be absolutely justified, with the Americans and our allies, in taking that action. What is more, I hope that we would, as far as we possibly could

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in a month, be prepared to take it. Let us not think for a moment that it would be very agreeable or that the results would be other than bloody, because they would be, from many points of view, but that surely is unanswerable as a position.

On the other hand, if there is no direct attack by the President of Iraq on any country, and he remains in his stationary position while sanctions go on, it is difficult to imagine a position in which we would launch a deliberate attack without at least having the authority of the United Nations. That seems to me, from the practical point of view, to be a perfectly clear situation and there is no need for the House to divide itself on that question when we are dealing with such practical matters.

With regard to the other issues, I would ask that the Government, who have acted speedily and efficiently with America and her allies, should be cautious--as, perhaps, should the Leader of the Opposition, too--about the commitments that they make at this stage.

One of the advantages of the House meeting a month after the start of this episode rather than when it began is that it is able to view the matter in better proportions and in perspective. No one can tell what the solution to the crisis will be. If Governments and Oppositions over-commit themselves, the possibility of reaching a solution that will be acceptable will be greatly diminished. I ask for caution in that respect.

I refer to the situation in Kuwait in 1961, which my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister also mentioned. As Lord Privy Seal at the Foreign Office, I was responsible for negotiating Kuwait's independence. We always had a private understanding that, if there were to be any serious threat from Iraq, which was the only likely quarter, we would be in a position immediately to reinforce Kuwait because we were still in Bahrain, Aden and Cyprus and could quickly take action. That was always understood. Therefore, when, in the summer of 1961, the Iraqis started massing forces along the Kuwaiti border, we, in close conjunction with the Emir, took immediate action. The result was that the Iraqis withdrew. However, that was not a permanent solution, in Kuwait's view or in ours.

The permanent solution was found by the Arab League--by the Arab countries themselves getting together and saying, "We must have a means of guaranteeing the security of Kuwait as well as that of other countries, and then we can ask the British to withdraw." Having reached such an agreement, the Arab League asked us to withdraw, and we did so. That was part of the understanding in respect of Kuwait's independence.

I ask that we be careful in making absolute commitments, because on this occasion it is possible that Arab countries themselves will work out a solution to the security of their own region. That will not be easy, but it has been done on previous occasions. I refer to the disputes between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. They were sorted out, as were the disputes between the emirates, and between Bahrain and Qatar. They have been sorted out in the past two decades, and I hope that it will be possible for the Arab countries themselves to find a permanent solution to their stability and security.

There is no doubt that that is what King Hussein of Jordan and many others want. I believe that such a development would be welcomed by the Saudi Government, who have themselves made plain--in a speech by the Saudi defence minister last weekend--that

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they do not want to see an attack being made on Iraq unless those concerned are forced into taking such action because of an attack by Iraq itself.

I was glad that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister raised the question of Israel and the Palestinians, because in my view it will not be possible to reach permanent stability and security in the middle east unless the question of the Palestinians and of Israel is first settled. I was pleased that the American Secretary of State said so himself in his speech to the congressional committee. He was quite clear and plain about the matter.

If the Americans are now prepared to use all their power and influence to make Israel observe the United Nations resolutions--and resolution 242 in particular--in the same way that we are saying that the resolutions concerning Iraq must be observed--that marks a major change in American policy, which can contribute to the peace and stability that both the American President and Secretary of State have said they want to see in the middle east. Again, it will not be easy to achieve that, but it is an essential part of the solution. There are those who say that the two should not be connected--it is perfectly understandable that Israel is among them- -but that does not alter the fact that many of the stresses and strains in the middle east are connected with the question of Israel and the Palestinians. Therefore, I strongly support the Government's action and I strongly urge them now to continue--as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in her broadcast on Sunday--operating sanctions. My right hon. Friend said herself that it will take some time to make them as effective as possible

The one proviso that I have concerns Jordan. I personally feel that King Hussein has been badly treated by the American President and by some western countries. He is in no way responsible for the situation or for the crisis, yet his people and country are suffering above all at this particular time. It is not enough to say, "We'll give you some money." Jordan desperately needs food and equipment, but above all it needs an organisation to deal with refugees going into the country. It is not sufficient for us to say, "Well, the Red Cross can help or this or that organisation can do it."

The present situation demands two things. First, a major airlift is needed, which should be centrally organised and ceaseless, like the airlift we organised to Berlin, so that we can get all these people out--incidentally, we could try to increase our staff in Baghdad to help the excellent ambassador there. Secondly, we need to deal with the hundreds of thousands of refugees in Jordan and to get them satisfactorily dispersed. That will mean dealing with a large number of countries. Many refugees come from Indonesia, from other Arab countries and some are from Europe. It is a major operation to arrange their dispersal and it will not be met by contributions to individual charitable bodies but requires a centrally, and highly organised, operation of aircraft and personnel. I hope that the British Government will give a lead to bring that about.

4 pm

Mr. Paddy Ashdown (Yeovil) : It always seems to be my lot to have to follow the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) in debates on events such as this. It is a difficult task, because he says so much with which I profoundly agree. I do not think that there was a word in

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his speech with which I would find fault. I hope that the Prime Minister will have listened carefully to the right hon. Gentleman's words about calling on the Government to provide a lead on the issue of refugees.

Having requested the recall of Parliament for the past two or three weeks, my colleagues and I are naturally delighted to have the opportunity to debate this important crisis. Anyone who has listened to the previous three speeches will recognise that this is a serious debate and that, so far, speeches have dealt with the issue with great seriousness and concern. I have a great deal to say which echoes the tone and much of the content of those speeches. The invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein was a brutal and tyrannous act which contravenes international law, threatens the stability of the Middle East and poses a potent and immediate threat to the peace of the world. My party joins all the other parties in the House in expressing an implacable determination to ensure that Saddam Hussein is defeated in this aggression. The Prime Minister is right : there can be no compromises on the terms of the United Nations resolutions that Hussein's troops must unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait, that Kuwait must be returned to its legitimate Government and that foreign hostages must all be freed.

The Prime Minister has said that the Government's aims in this crisis are, similarly, those and only those laid out in the United Nations resolutions. In that, they are also fully supported by hon. Members on these Benches. The Government also receive and have received our unequivocal support for the actions that they took with the United States and others to respond to Saudi Arabia's request for help, by sending troops to join the multinational forces five weeks ago today. In our view, the swift and decisive action taken then by Britain the United States and others to put deterrent forces in place to prevent further aggression by Saddam Hussein was necessary and right.

The fact that that action was later backed up by a United Nations resolution, which expressed international condemnation of Hussein and gave effect to the means by which sanctions should be enforced, has greatly strengthened the hands of those who now oppose Saddam Hussein and has given hope to those people who believe, as we do, in an enhanced role in the future for the United Nations in preserving world peace.

The Government are entitled to feel satisfaction with their handling of the first military phase of this crisis. We are now in the second, political phase. We have to win this phase as comprehensively as we won the military phase, because it is only by building the strongest international consensus now that we shall establish the strength to ensure that sanctions can be made to bite later.

I especially congratulate the Foreign Secretary on his recent visit to the Gulf, and on the care with which he has been concerned at all times to build up maximum international support for our position. He has remained calm and measured : the voice of reason on all occasions. He appears to understand the vital importance of this attitude in the more difficult political phase of the crisis. He has also been well aware that, however welcome, the close co-operation between this country and the United States, which has been necessary during this crisis, Britain's best interests are as a European power acting primarily in concert with our European partners in the long term.

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I urge the Prime Minister to resist any temptation that she may feel to argue that this crisis is a reason for resurrecting a nostalgic illusion of a special relationship with the United States at the expense of fulfilling our destiny in a closely integrated Europe. In the political phase of this crisis, it is vital that we strengthen international-- [Interruption.]

Mr. Speaker : Order. I ask the House to give the right hon. Member a fair hearing.

Mr. Ashdown : In this phase of the crisis, it is vital that we not only strengthen international consensus to provide a foundation for the actions that will be necessary over the next few months, but that we also effectively deny Saddam Hussein his most potent propaganda weapon. The world must know that this is not just a United States/British action. In our attitudes, we have perhaps done too little to stress the international nature of our operation. Frankly, we could be doing much more to emphasise the Arab components in the multinational force. It must be made clear that, if Saddam Hussein attacks, he will be fighting fellow Arabs as well as the western forces.

I hope that no one will underestimate the courage that many Arab states have shown in standing up to Saddam Hussein, often at great cost to themselves. In the west, we should demonstrate that we are sensitive to the views of moderate Arab states and especially to their concerns about the future of the holy places.

The United Nations has rightly chosen sanctions as the weapon to defeat Saddam Hussein. We are told, and the Prime Minister has just repeated it, that that is Government policy and United States policy. That is all very well, but sanctions must be given a chance to work. The Prime Minister has said that that may take a few months. Mr. Jim Baker, the United States Secretary of State, made it clear on Tuesday that it would take a considerable time, and that is what he asked of the American people. We must also provide a considerable time to allow sanctions to work. I doubt if they will really start to bite until perhaps the end of this year at the earliest, and will probably not develop their full effect until some time after that, but I repeat that they must be given the chance and the time to work. I think that it is right for us to contemplate what action we should take to fulfil the terms of the UN resolutions if sanctions do not work. As all three of the previous speakers have already said, that is the nub and heart of today's debate, bringing us full face with the issue of whether and in what circumstances force ought to be used.

First, I agree with the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup--that, if any further aggression is initiated by Saddam Hussein, it should be clear that the multinational forces will feel free immediately to respond against him with the full measure of our military capability in the area. If such a response to Hussein's further aggression should open a military possibility of freeing Kuwait, well and good--the Government can be sure of the support of my party in any such action--but what about the use of force initiated by the multinational forces if sanctions in the end are seen to fail? Those who are not prepared to countenance the use of force in such circumstances must be prepared to countenance the possibility that Saddam Hussein will be

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allowed to hang on to the ill-gotten gains of his tyranny--and that is unacceptable to my hon. Friends. We accept, then, that the use of force may have to be an ultimate option, but it must be just that--the last option.

I have heard talk about pre-emptive strikes and surgical wars. I have learnt from bitter personal experience that when the armchair theorists and the Whitehall generals start talking of a surgical war, it is time to start running for cover. A war is never surgical for those who have to fight it-- except in very specific terms, which I am sure are not encompassed in that phrase. It may just be possible to fight a contained war in the south Atlantic, but it is not possible elsewhere in the world, and I believe that it is specifically not possible in the middle east.

If there is a war, I believe that it will have unimaginable and incalculable consequences. We shall place in jeopardy not just the lives of many thousands of human beings, but our chance for stability in the middle east in the long term and, possibly, our hopes for a new world order as well. Force, therefore, must be the last option and when it is used, it must be used on behalf of the community of nations as a whole.

Mr. Dalyell : The right hon. Gentleman has military experience. Has he any clear idea--I ask this simply as a question--what the rules of engagement will be for someone holding the kind of rank that he held, who may have to make a vital decision in a very short time? Is there any clarity about those rules?

Mr. Ashdown : I know that the hon. Gentleman has a special interest in rules of engagement. Let me tell him, as one who was at the other end of the decision by the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup to send the troops into Kuwait in 1961--I was among the first troops to land there-- that I was perfectly clear about what my rules of engagement were : if someone attacked me, I would respond immediately. That seems to be so self- evident that we scarcely need a House of Commons debate to discuss it.

As I have said, if there is a war the consequences will be incalculable. That is why I say that war must be the last resort, and must be undertaken on behalf of the community of nations as a whole. Measured force of last resort, supported by moderate Arab nations, by the European Community and by the Soviet Union, is one thing ; a rash Anglo-American military adventure, undertaken unilaterally, would be another. I believe that the Government would find it extremely difficult to carry public opinion in this country--and international opinion abroad--if they were to embark on such an adventure without the backing of the United Nations.

UN support is not of itself the main issue, although a UN Security Council resolution would be the most effective outward and visible sign that the world community shares a common resolve. To shatter that resolve through impatience would be foolish, and even a successful military outcome could nevertheless represent a serious political failure.

Let me say this to the Government : our joint cause, the defeat of Saddam Hussein, stands its best chance if the Foreign Secretary continues to build a common resolve for future action, rather than threatening unilateral action on whatever basis. Let me make it clear that I do not say that we should avoid unilateralism because this is safer ; I say that we should preserve international co-operation

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and support because it makes us stronger. The unanimous, worldwide condemnation of Hussein, and the international support that we have for our actions, should be our greatest weapon in his defeat, and it would be an act of folly to sacrifice such a priceless asset. It is by ensuring that our actions remain the expression of the voice of the international community that we also provide the greatest degree of safety of our hostages. Saddam Hussein must be made to know that, for his treatment of our hostages, he will be held to account not just by Britain but by the entire world community. We must also recognise--as the Prime Minister suggested in a very welcome statement--that the middle east will never be the same again after this is over. I do not believe that the resolution of this problem can be achieved except in the context of the resolution of other middle east problems. Jim Baker, the American Secretary of State, implied as much when he spoke earlier this week. The fulfilment of UN resolutions in one area will be bound to give rise to legitimate demands that they be fulfilled in others too. We are not fighting for a re- establishment of the status quo in the middle east ; rather, we should be aiming to establish a new structure for peace and stability in the region. The west may have a role in helping to bring such a structure into being, but our guiding principle must be that we leave the settlement of regional affairs to the nations in the region concerned.

I cannot end without touching on the plight of the refugees now haplessly caught in the demilitarised zone on the Jordan-Iraq border. These are the innocent flotsam and jetsam of this terrible crisis : they are as much the children of Hussein's tyranny as are our children. It would be terrible if, in fleeing death from the tyranny of Hussein, any one of them found death in the desert because of our neglect. The Prime Minister has announced a welcome extra £2 million. Let me say to her that, as this country has led in the process of preserving peace and security in Saudi Arabia, I hope that we shall now lead in preserving the lives of those in the desert. I hope that the Prime Minister will pick up the suggestion made by the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, and that we shall send a massive airlift out there now to provide rescue for those unfortunate people.

The outcome of this crisis will decide five things. It will decide the freedom of Kuwait, the future of Saddam Hussein, the long-term stability of the middle east, the means by which we provide for world peace in the future and how Britain will play its role in that effort. My hon. Friends and I believe that the most powerful weapon with which to free Kuwait, defeat Hussein, establish stability in the middle east and give the United Nations the role for which we all hope in the future is international action. If the Government act to ensure that Britain continues to play its part within that international framework, they will continue to receive our full support.

4.19 pm

Mr. David Howell (Guildford) : The speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister was both clear and fine--it fitted perfectly this sombre occasion ; her leadership is one which we all recognise and admire. So, too, was the speech of the Leader of the Opposition. He spoke well. Although there may be some difference of emphasis, I see in practice no difference between the two Front Benches in

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their approach to this crisis. Both speeches suggested clearly what the objectives were, and are, of the world powers in this affair. In recent weeks it has been suggested in the media that the objectives of the world powers and of the allies are blurred, but in all the world crises that I can think of the objective has never been clearer than in this one. It is as defined in resolution 660 : the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from the state of Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate Government. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said, there can be no negotiation about that, because there is nothing to negotiate. That should be the limited and measured, but very clear and unquestioned, aim of all our efforts and endeavours and of all the material and financial resources mobilised worldwide--not just by the west, not just by the Americans--to force Saddam Hussein to shed his spoils and retreat to where he stood on 1 August.

Should one go beyond that, as many would like, and insist on the overthrow of this monstrous man? My belief is that as far as the immediate United Nations objective is concerned, it is wrong to think in terms of higher and further missions and goals. Both my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition confirmed that belief.

We may not like this most unpleasant man. He has the most repulsive habits. He is evil ; he takes hostages ; he is cruel ; he has waded to power through a sea of blood. He has, if I may make a personal reflection, the rather unfortunate habit, when he makes a Cabinet reshuffle, of shooting or strangling the outgoing Ministers. He is not, of course, the only despot in the world who does that, so that in itself would be no reason for the United Nations or the world powers invading his country. We must keep clear the immediate aim that was laid down by the United Nations. The nations of the earth came together and defined that clear aim. That is what has to be achieved.

Ahead lie matters for consideration. It is not too soon for the House to turn its mind to considering the issues raised by my right hon. Friend concerning the new security structure for the Gulf and the middle east. How do we cope with the chemical weapons capacity, and perhaps the emerging nuclear capacity, even of a defeated Iraq--even of an Iraq without Saddam Hussein but with some new gang or despot in Baghdad? There will be nobody except a despot in that area. These issues will be raised in setting up the new security structure. They were the kind of issues to which Mr. Secretary Baker turned his mind in his constructive and valuable comments to Congress yesterday and the day before.

They open up the opportunity to confer again on and address the other problems of the middle east, of which the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) has constantly reminded us. These issues existed before the invasion of Kuwait and they will exist long after that issue has been resolved. The problems of the west bank and of the Palestinians in Israel will have to be addressed in the future, but I counsel against confusing those essential problems, which will have to be resolved, with the immediate and limited task set by the nations of the earth, through the United Nations, of getting the Iraqi dictator out of Kuwait.

Mr. Bob Cryer (Bradford, South) : On the question of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, is it not important that the Government should express their strong and

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continuing support of the United Nations nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the implementation of all its articles, including article 6, which means that the nuclear powers must themselves set an example by diminishing and removing their dependence on nuclear weapons?

Mr. Howell : Certainly the diminishing of nuclear weapons and the pursuit of disarmament and weapons control has been a major objective of western Governments, with some success. The hon. Gentleman is quite right to say that, after the present crisis is over, the new security order ought to be one that mobilises renewed

pressure--possibly with the backing of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council--to insist on even more rigorous control not only of nuclear weapons but of the filthy and revolting chemical weapons--the so -called poor man's nuclear weapons--that are present in the middle east and threaten not only the middle east but all of us. These are matters to which we shall have to turn our minds in intense detail in the weeks and months ahead. At the moment, however, it is a question of uniting totally around the single objective of getting this man out of Kuwait.

The second point that I want to make is simple. Again, it was emphasised in the clear speech of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister. This is not now, nor has it been from day one--the beginning of all this--anything other than an international effort. It has been the aim of Arab propaganda, and of many of those with a deep and instinctive bias against the United States--saying that whatever it does is wrong--to depict the whole exercise as either an American, or an American-British, or an American-British- Zionist imperialist operation which is not supported by the wider international world. I believe that what is taking place is not just an American effort--although undoubtedly the Americans have had to shoulder the logistical burden and probably will have to continue to do so--and not just a western effort.

We have seen the Soviet Union, after a slightly shaky start-- understandably, because it is in a very weak state--beginning to give increasingly clear support for the task set out and the methods needed to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. We have seen the Arab nations themselves first combine together and secondly call strongly for the support of the western allies in both defending Saudi Arabia and in due course driving Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

President Mubarak--one should not underestimate the difficulties that such a man faces, due to domestic internal pressures--has put possibly his life, certainly his political life, on the line. He, King Fahd and the other emirs, who, in a sense, are no more or less democratic in their positions than the despot in Baghdad--although he talks about it in other terms--have put their political lives on the line. They must see--and rightly would feel totally betrayed if they did not see--the fulfilment of the United Nations mission, with America and Britain playing their part in achieving that ambition. This is a totally international effort. Those who feel that they cannot send logistical support should be pressed, as they are being pressed--rightly so, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said--to make massive resource contributions. As the Leader of the Opposition reminded us, that most definitely includes the Japanese and the

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