House of Commons Hansard Debates for 11 Dec 1990

Mr. Ivan Lawrence (Burton) : If the Arab League forms some kind of unit in the Kuwait area following the withdrawal of Saddam Hussein, what reassurance can my right hon. Friend give the Israelis that it will not then turn on Israel and try to destroy it utterly?

Column 841

Mr. Heath : That must be part of the general arrangement, described by both my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Member for Gorton, for dealing with middle eastern questions as a whole. I was pleased to note that, during my discussions in Baghdad, President Saddam Hussein made no direct link between dealing with the Kuwait problem and dealing with Israel and the middle eastern problem. He said, "Of course I want the middle eastern problem as a whole dealt with, and also the Israeli and Palestinian problem" ; but he did not say that any arrangement concerning Kuwait must be linked with the middle east.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that--as my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said--the matter must be pursued. It is impossible to go anywhere in the world today without being told that double standards operate. For instance, nothing has been done about resolution 232, concerning Israel, for the past 30 years. However, we are trying to take action in regard to Kuwait in this instance. No one can deny that that is the position.

The official explanation is that the cold war was going on. I do not believe that that is the real reason--or, at any rate, I do not consider it a justifiable excuse. But it would be ironic if, the cold war having ceased, we then embarked on what could be the most damaging war in history, with the use of chemical and biological weapons and the blowing up of oil wells, which would create the biggest fire in history and damage the whole economy of the western world.

The public should be told the consequences of going to war. That might increase our determination to use means of regaining Kuwait by peaceful methods. The public should be told, remembering that the public in the United States are being told infinitely more than is being said in Britain. They have special correspondents and military spokesmen, and the discussion in the congressional committees is making clear exactly what would be involved in a war. The possible casualty figures have been given openly and full statements have been made about what might happen to oil and the economies of the world. So I hope that the public in Britain will be made aware of what the costs of such a war would be.

From the point of view of securing a settlement, the differences between Kuwait and Iraq must be resolved. That makes it difficult to say that there cannot possibly be any alteration affecting land from the point of view of Iraq and Kuwait because of the question of boundaries. President Saddam asked me, "To which boundary are you insisting I return?" I replied, "I cannot say. If you ask for my personal view, it is the boundary that was settled in 1961-62."

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Tom King) : It is in the resolution.

Mr. Heath : I know, so the question leads us to consider what the boundary was before all this happened. It is alleged that during the eight years of war with Iran the Kuwaitis advanced 60 to 80 km beyond the boundary settled by the British when we moved out in 1961. I do not know whether that is right or wrong, but it is, at any rate, a matter for argument and discussion, and somebody should be doing that. Nobody is at present, and it is not enough merely to say that there can be no change of land.

If the Kuwaitis agreed that the two islands should go to Iraq, would we say that we could not allow that to happen?

Column 842

Of course we would not. So every time we insist that there can be no possible change in land, we are going against item 3--that is, if it were agreed between Kuwait and Iraq.

Similarly, the Arab League could get to work on that. Many of us know that the Arab League is already working on it, although there is criticism in that respect. The question is asked, "Why are the Arabs interfering with what we are doing?" The real answer is that the only lasting settlement of the dispute must come from the Arabs themselves. If we, the Americans and British in particular, try to impose a settlement, it will always be questioned, as the boundaries of the past have been questioned. We should welcome the fact that the Arabs are themselves taking an ever greater interest, even though they have been opposed to Iraq because of its invasion of Kuwait.

Mr. Dalyell : Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that part of the difficulty is the confusion which equates dialogue with appeasement, when dialogue and appeasement are very different matters?

Mr. Heath : The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right, and I am afraid that "appeasement" is used as a weapon against those who want to have what the hon. Gentleman calls dialogue, simply to whip up public feeling. Most of those who use it were not even alive in the 1930s, when it happened, and have never studied what the problems of appeasement were. Those of us who opposed it are aware of it very well--

Mr. Denis Healey (Leeds, East) : Including me.

Mr. Heath : I give full credit to the right hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) because we were both in the same place at the same time opposing it.

We reach the point at which the issues must be thrashed out, and I hope that when Mr. Baker goes to Baghdad and the silly arguments about dates are all settled, he will not simply say, "Saddam, get out". If he does, President Saddam will reply, "Will you kindly leave Baghdad?" There must be discussion--if one does not like to use the word "negotiation"--and he can discuss what are the outstanding problems with Kuwait.

Mr. Hurd rose --

Mr. Tony Marlow (Northampton, North) rose --

Mr. Heath : I am doing my best to be brief.

Mr. Hurd : I am listening to my right hon. Friend with great care. Regarding his point about the United Nations, Secretary-General Mr. Perez de Cuellar went to Amman, met Tariq Aziz and made an attempt, in the exercise of his duty, which was rebuffed. He has since explained to me and others that he would have great difficulty going again, in pursuit of Security Council resolutions, if he were to receive a similar rebuff.

As for the Arabs, my right hon. Friend will have noticed what the Kuwaitis and Saudis have said in the past few days in response to the sort of reports to which my right hon. Friend is referring and with which I dealt. They are not interested--how could they be--in settling for less than the Security Council requirements. They would regard doing so as entirely wrong.

I do not want to lengthen my intervention unnecessarily, but my right hon. Friend said near the beginning of his remarks that President Hussein had told him that he feared that, whatever he did, he would be

Column 843

attacked, even if he pulled back. I hope my right hon. Friend will have noticed what the United States Administration, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and I have said. The message is a double one : if he does not fully comply, he will be forced out, and if he does fully comply, he will not be attacked.

Mr. Heath : I realise that, but I also realise that if I were in Baghdad in his position I would want some assurances. Having seen what has been happening recently, with half a million troops there and with the British pouring in more, I would want a solid assurance that the Americans, having got all those men and all that equipment there and with President Bush wanting to know what to do with them, would not move into Kuwait. Questions remain to be answered. For example, suppose the emir of Kuwait said, "I want all the Americans and British." What undertaking would President Bush and the Prime Minister be prepared to give? Those are all matters that could be discussed, but the essential ingredient of discussion is lacking. It is said that the UN Secretary-General has great difficulty going to Baghdad. I do not understand his difficulty. If one is working for peace, one keeps on working for peace, and the United Nations was set up to secure peace. So I do not see why the Secretary-General should have any difficulty in that respect. I see the Foreign Secretary sighing as I say that. I remember his sighing many years ago. He sighed in Paris over our entry into Europe, and he was wrong about that. Mr. Marlow : My right hon. Friend has a great deal of wisdom and knowledge about the region. Some with less wisdom and knowledge seem rather more gung-ho about the military option. What, in his opinion, would be the reaction of the Israeli defence forces if a war were to start, and what implications does he think that would have for the long-term stability of the region and for British interests there?

Mr. Heath : I can give only a personal opinion. If war occurred, the Israelis would be in overnight. One question about a war is this : if the British, Americans and Israelis use atomic weapons when they find how difficult it is, we shall have chemical and biological weapons thrown from Iraq, and it will go on piling up--

[Interruption.] That is openly discussed in military circles, and it should be discussed here. We should be told just what are the assurances.

On the question of discussions, I have a comment to make that I have made in public but not in the House. I make it because it is of enormous importance in view of attitudes that are struck in some parts of the alliance, to use that phrase, or at United Nations gatherings. I have been recalling what happened over the Cuban missile crisis, the second Cuban crisis. Having in recent weeks had an opportunity of going over the whole scene again with Robert McNamara, who was the American Defence Secretary under President Kennedy, I have concluded that the comparisons are very striking, as are the differences.

Khrushchev was determined to get nuclear weapons into Cuba. That became known. Kennedy was determined to prevent that from happening. Throughout the crisis Kennedy was in contact with Moscow. We still have full diplomatic relations, as have all other countries, with

Column 844

Baghdad. I want to know what is happening between ambassadors and what exchanges are taking place between them.

Kennedy was constantly in contact with Khrushchev, and warning him. Finally, he said, "I am going to surround Cuba with my warships and it will be cut off. If your ships bringing in nuclear weapons try to break through, we shall fire across their bows and if they persist we shall sink them." Khrushchev said, "Why am I being prevented from sending nuclear weapons to Cuba? You say it is because they are a danger to you, but your nuclear weapons in Turkey are a danger to me and they are just as close, so why are you taking this attitude?" To that Kennedy replied, "Very well, I am not going to do a deal". He was quite clear about that. He said, "You cannot bring nuclear weapons into Cuba, but you can keep ordinary forces there." They are still there and have been since that day. The only person who did not know about them was President Carter because nobody ever told him. That was why he got his wires crossed with Brezhnev, who was very surprised, which upset the period up to 1980.

Mr. Healey : The right hon. Gentleman will also be aware that, without making it part of the deal, President Kennedy took American nuclear weapons out of Turkey.

Mr. Heath : I was just coming to that. President Kennedy said, "I am not going to do a deal, but I will tell you confidentially that the nuclear weapons we have in Turkey are out of date, so I am removing them." The American Secretary of Defence moved them from Turkey to Italy, summoned every television group and cameraman he could find and had the nuclear weapons openly destroyed. He said, "There you are--we brought them away only to destroy them." The result was that when the ships were coming up to Cuba there was a terrible moment of anxiety while everyone was sitting round the table in the White House with nothing more to say or do, just waiting. Then the ships turned about and went back and the nuclear weapons were never delivered.

I do not know how the Foreign Secretary would describe that. Is that appeasement? Is it a deal? Is it unjustified discussion and negotiations, or what? The plain fact is that it stopped a third world war. Surely we can use our imagination in the same way as Kennedy did. I do not want the Foreign Secretary to negotiate ; I just want him to indicate. I want President Bush to say, "I shall do such and such." That is how we shall solve the crisis. I wish the Secretary of State for Defence would not look quite so puzzled--I can go over again all the details for the whole operation with him. The essential thing is not to get into a position of rigidity, but to realise that finding a peaceful solution, although not easy, is possible and the price of not finding one is immensely high and could be unsustainable.

Mr. George Walden (Buckingham) : I do not think that many people in the House, if any, are against the concept of talking, but does my right hon. Friend agree that there would be no prospect of discussions with Iraq if the allies had not shown themselves willing to use military force in the last resort? I suspect that the hostages would not have been released if the allies had not shown themselves willing to resort to military force. It is a sad paradox, but I believe that we have done the right thing.

Column 845

Mr. Heath : I am grateful to my hon. Friend, but he should recall the quotation I gave from my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence who said that we were there to defend Saudi Arabia, which is quite right.

Mr. Tom King : On 6 September.

Mr. Heath : Yes. President Saddam Hussein saw that, and for that reason he would not attack Saudi Arabia. There may be differences of opinion as to whether he would have done so in any case--that is a different discussion. Of course, I agree entirely that having the force there prevented him from attacking Saudi Arabia. As for the hostages, Saddam Hussein has realised--some of us tried to press him as hard as we could about it--that keeping them served no purpose. I said to Saddam Hussein, "I must tell you frankly that the British Prime Minister"--the then Prime Minister--"will not be deterred from bombing your strategic points because you have got British there--not in the least. President Bush will not be deterred either." Therefore, all that Saddam Hussein is doing is denying the United Nations one of its points and it serves no useful purpose to Iraq or anyone else. I am glad that that message has gone home, he has accepted it and all the hostages are coming back here.

I was glad for the way in which the Foreign Secretary welcomed that move and I hope that we can now concentrate on paragraph 3, which has been so ignored by President Bush and those who are taking the lead. We must work hard to find a peaceful solution. I do not believe that it is impossible.

5.16 pm

Mr. Michael Foot (Blaenau Gwent) : I am very glad to follow the speech of the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath). I am sure that the House and the country will have listened with great care to what he said. When he went on his visit to Baghdad he was strongly criticised in some quarters, but I think that it was a most courageous action on his part ; he helped to break the deadlock surrounding the hostages and showed how we might approach other matters. The right hon. Gentleman emphasised the desirability of pursuing diplomacy while other United Nations actions continue, with which I also agree. However, I must emphasise that there are some matters on which I disagree with him profoundly.

Since the crisis broke, there have been two most serious perils or precipices from which the world might fall. The first was the precipice of allowing the aggression to succeed or be tolerated, and for all the protests of the United Nations to rank with those protests made against Hitler's invasions in the 1930s. We in the Labour party took the strong view that we must not permit that ; we have a strong tradition of supporting the United Nations. The leader of my party, my right hon. Friend the Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnock), and my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) have strongly sustained that tradition throughout, which has been essential to try to prevent a dangerous situation from becoming more dangerous.

It would be absurd for anyone to suppose that the second peril did not exist. It involved what might happen if we were plunged into war. Some of my hon. Friends, and the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup a

Column 846

moment ago, have emphasised those dangers. They were right to do so because in such a crisis it is right to spell out the appalling and horrific possibilities ahead of us.

In a sense, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup is correct in saying that in some respects the alternative and the dangers involved have been more fully spelt out in the United States than in this country. It is right that we should take note of them. Perhaps the most forthright and all -encompassing statement on the subject was made by Mr. Brzezinski who, according to previous estimates on such matters, is certainly not a wet. He said : "A war is likely to split the international consensus that currently exists, the United States is likely to become estranged from many of its European allies, and it is almost certain to become the object of widespread Arab hostility. Indeed, once started, the war may prove not all that easy to terminate, given the inflammable character of Middle Eastern politics. It could be costly in blood and financially devastating.

This prospect is all the more tragic because the United States would thereby be deprived of the fruits of its hard-earned victory in the Cold War."

Mr. Brzezinski continued that the region would be "profoundly disturbed" by war. He said :

"I fear that if we overplay our hand, it is we who will lose the flexibility."

He added that

"to speak of Saddam Hussein as a Hitler is to trivialise Hitler and to elevate Saddam."

The House, the country and the world should take note of that warning. The evidence so far is that the countries in the Security Council have taken the warning seriously, and I hope that they will continue to do so. A few wild voices were raised at the beginning of the crisis urging a sudden strike against Iraq to settle the issue, but all those voices have been stilled and the action was not taken. The Government can claim some credit for that. The full weight of the opinion of this House was thrown against any such development. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Gorton stressed again today, we have thrown the weight of our party, our country and the House against that alternative.

So far, then, we have fallen over neither precipice. Now we must consider carefully how to proceed. My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) referred to previous cases of the United Nations' failure to carry out its resolutions. He suggested that such failures in the middle east or in Cyprus mean that we have no authority or effective power to invoke the United Nations to settle this question--

Mr. Benn indicated dissent.

Mr. Foot : That, at any rate, was how I construed his intervention. I am glad if he does not take that view, which would strengthen the arguments against the authority of the United Nations.

The Labour party has no need to be apologetic about these matters. On several occasions, Conservative Governments have refused to support the United Nations charter ; indeed, they have acted in flagrant defiance of the charter, as they did in 1956. I do not say that our record is spotless, but it is a good deal better than that of Conservative Governments. We have done our best to try to sustain the charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Benn : Will my right hon. Friend clarify whether he believes that UN resolution 678 would authorise the use of nuclear weapons against Iraq, under the phrase "all other

Column 847

means"? The Commander-in-Chief of the American forces has said that nuclear weapons might be used in some circumstances. Would my right hon. Friend support that?

Mr. Foot : Certainly not. The resolution does not mean that--it refers to all appropriate means. I shall come later to how the danger of nuclear weapons being used in the middle east might be averted. That will involve upholding the authority of the United Nations, not casting it away.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield and others have suggested that the United Nations lacks the moral authority to apply its doctrines because of our failure to apply the resolutions to the middle east. That is a gospel of despair. The argument should be put the other way around. If we can succeed in making the authority of the United Nations effective in this crisis, the chances of its being effective later in other areas are enormously improved.

It is sometimes said that only in recent weeks has there been unity between the Soviet Union, the other great powers and ourselves on these matters, but when resolution 242, on the occupied territories, was passed in 1967--I had some interest in the matter because my brother moved the resolution-- the United States, the Soviet Union and the Israeli Government of the time backed it, and many Arab Governments have gradually come around to supporting it too. If we can achieve a successful and peaceful outcome to the Kuwait dispute, the chances of reapplying that resolution soon afterwards will be greatly enhanced, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Gorton has said several times.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield mentioned Cyprus, as he has every right to do. Many people there have complained strongly, asking what right we have to take action in Kuwait if we do not take note of the resolutions passed for their defence, but the same Cyprus Government who have asked that question support the stance of the Labour party on the Gulf because they have vision and sense enough to know that if we can obtain a settlement of the Kuwait dispute on the proper basis of decisions taken under the United Nations charter the chances of returning to deal with the Cyprus dispute will be greatly enhanced.

A little while ago, before this crisis arose, many people thought that the world might have a better chance in the 1990s. That chance still prevails, but the essential requirement for its success is that United Nations authority be established and sustained. I agree entirely with all who say that such cases must be carefully considered, but in some circumstances this means carrying out only one part of the charter--not only by applying sanctions, but by giving the United Nations military support under the charter.

I am almost the only hon. Member who was here when the charter was voted upon in the Parliament of 1945. I went to San Francisco as a journalist and saw what happened, and I was proud that the Labour party that I supported, and its leader Clem Attlee, played a foremost part in shaping that charter and learning from the experience of the 1930s.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield has been wrongly accused of being guilty of some Hoare-Laval plan. That was plainly false, but there was such a thing as that plan. It was a breach of the elementary system of collective security that we then had. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) fought a

Column 848

Conservative candidate in Oxford at the time, who I gather still exists in the shape of Lord Hailsham, who has an ambivalent view on these matters. Faced with the breach of international law involved in the raid on Libya, Lord Hailsham was the sole person in the universe to say that the action was in accordance with international law. I think that he was recalling his old appeasement days when he said that.

The whole thrust of the post-war period has, in any case, been to build a more collective and effective United Nations which would seek always to use sanctions. We must still use them and we have every possibility of succeeding thereby. The chances of their proving effective in this case are more hopeful than ever before. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East has said in past debates, we should persist in applying sanctions, which are much more effective than resorting to war. The influence of this House and of speeches such as that by the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup can be used in that direction whenever there are dangers of people thinking in other terms.

The prize is very great. There have been differing accounts of how people have fared in conversations with Saddam Hussein. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup gave his account and no doubt my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield will give his. As a long-standing socialist, I was proud to see that it looks as though the interview that had the best effect on President Hussein was the one with Willy Brandt. The account of that interview was given in The Observer on Sunday. It states :

"Brandt told him : Your survival, Mr. President, and the survival of your country depend on genuine concessions not linked to a deal with the West or anyone else.'

He added : All you can still hope for is a gradual change in Western public opinion, but you will achieve that only by releasing all hostages and withdrawing unconditionally from Kuwait. Time is not on your side in spite of President Bush's internal problems'." Then the report describes the Iraqi president's reaction to the way in which Willy Brandt had stated the case. I am sure that Willy Brandt would not claim that it was only his conversation which had an effect but that it was also the background of events. At the same time as the apparatus, the panoply and the power of the United Nations are mobilised, it is important to mobilise intelligent methods of diplomacy. That underlines what was said by the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup. Obviously, it was intelligent of Willy Brandt to go to Baghdad and speak in those terms.

In the 1990s, the United Nations can come into its own more than ever before. We owe a vote of thanks to Willy Brandt, who has played a bigger part than anyone else in securing the unification of Germany and peaceful developments. At the same time as we propose the strengthening of the United Nations charter, we should invite Germany to take its proper place as a member of the Security Council. It could play an important part.

Mr. Walden : Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Foot : I shall not give way to the hon. Gentleman because I am coming to the end of my speech.

As my hon. Friends have said, the possibilities are enormous. I know how passionately and strongly my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield feels on this, and he has stated his case with his usual skill and determination. However, a vote against the Government's

Column 849

policies would be a vote not against the Government but against the United Nations policies on these matters, and such a vote could damage the cause of making the United Nations charter work peacefully and successfully in solving this dispute.

Several Hon. Members rose--

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker) : I remind the House that nearly 40 right hon. and hon. Members wish to take part in the debate. I ask for brief speeches.

5.32 pm

Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion) : The right hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr. Foot) robustly defended the importance of standing up for collective security. He rightly praised Mr. Brandt's initiative and that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) in visiting Baghdad. I do not wish to criticise either of those statesmen for doing so.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup called for dialogue, but my impression is that dialogue is going on all the time. The Iraqi Foreign Minister goes to the Gulf, Oman and Yemen and there are visits to Algiers. What could be more in the way of dialogue than President Bush's invitation to Tariq Aziz and of Mr. Baker's proposed visit to Baghdad? We are not avoiding dialogue. So far we have avoided negotiations, but there are many opportunities for people to talk, and they are doing so.

In this last debate on the matter before the recess, it is important to weigh up the realities. The Arabian peninsula has the biggest deployment of military force ever seen in thousands of years. Some 500,000 Iraqis are dug in in and around Kuwait. The Iraqi army was not much good in its offensives against Iran, and those who start a war should get to first base. The Iraqi army never did that. However, it is good at defence. With the late Member for Inverness--Colonel Maclean--I went to look at the Iraqi army about five years ago and was impressed by its morale and capability. Opposed to that army is an alliance of 500,000 men led by the United States, and that includes the flower of the American army, the legendary airborne divisions, the marine corps, I think five naval aircraft carrier battle groups and an armada of the most modern aircraft, including the stealth aircraft. The resolution of this juxtaposition hangs on the question which way will it fall? Will it fall to war or to a withdrawal of Saddam Hussein? I doubt whether there is a middle way.

The consequences of a war are totally unpredictable but are bound to be tragic. It may lead to the break-up of Iraq from which some would gain advantage, but that would be a big step in the development of the middle east. If Saddam Hussein withdraws, he will be left intact. Could we live with that? I suppose we could because we lived with the Soviet Union in eastern Europe for 40 years and no doubt we could contain Saddam Hussein if we had to.

We must draw one clear conclusion from the situation. The kingdom of Saudi Arabia has no doubt effectively undertaken its duty of guarding the holy places of Islam. However, neither King Fahd nor the other rulers in the peninisula are remotely capable of defending its oil resources.

Column 850

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said that oil is only one of the factors with which we are concerned. That is correct, but it is an important factor, not in terms of company profits or anything like that but because the whole industrial world depends on the free flow of oil. In addition, some of the biggest sufferers from the present sanctions policy are third world countries which need oil at a reasonable price. This treasure house for Japan, Europe, the United States and the third world must be defended. That means that its security must be underpinned by forces from outside the area. There will have to be, as there presently are in the peninsula, naval and air forces, stockpiles of weapons and ground forces to protect the installations. Who will do that? The United States has given the lead and we must earnestly encourage it to continue to defend the area, whether it be by mopping up the consequences of war or by containing Saddam Hussein if he withdraws intact.

I also argue that it is the duty of Europe to help the United States. I was glad to hear what my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said yesterday in Berlin about the Western European Union. Our German friends must be persuaded that they have a duty as the leading power in Europe to contribute to the collective security of what is as much in Germany's interests as in those of America and Britain. The same is true of the Japanese, who must be persuaded in due course to weigh in in one way or another.

What will be the local response to my proposals? This is an area of great sensitivity. I suppose that the patriarch Abraham was born in what is now Kuwait--so he would have been a Kuwaiti if he had lived in the modern world. The great Muslim religion also originated in what is now Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are proud people, but I think that they have learnt from the experience of Kuwait. They recognise that they were better off when they were protected by a system such as the one that they had in the past. They cannot effectively protect themselves.

That lesson has been learnt not only by the Government but by the people. After all, the people there enjoy the highest standard of living of, I suppose, any area in the world. No taxation, welfare, housing--everything is given to them. All the menial and technical, difficult jobs are done by expatriates. Therefore, I do not think that we have a problem with regard to public opinion locally. The area is almost uninhabited. If one adds up the populations of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, it is difficult to find 1 million men of fighting age in the whole assembly. All the facilities required for some sort of middle eastern defence organisation are there, already created by the oil companies-- harbours, oilfields and the means of communication. There may be some resentment among other Arabs not in the peninsula. My right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup talked about an Arab solution. We should be a bit careful about that. An Arab solution has always been to some extent an attempt by the poor Arabs to take over the wealth of the rich Arabs, and that is not necessarily in the interests of the industrial world, or the third world outside the middle east.

There has been talk of an international conference, and the whole problem of the Palestinian issue has naturally arisen again. But nobody can imagine for a moment that when President Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait he was doing so in the interests of the Palestinian people. That

Column 851

would be stretching it a little too far. But if there is to be an international conference, it is essential that there should be an element of stability in the middle east to guarantee any agreements that are reached.

Therefore, I come back to what I said a moment or two ago. We will need to have a middle eastern defence organisation, its command and control to be left to negotiation, in which the leaders of the peninsula will be underpinned and supported certainly by western Europe and the United States and, I hope, in the longer run, by Japan.

I do not believe that any agreement will be reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis unless there is a United States presence in the middle east to guarantee and to uphold any agreement that is reached. Otherwise, these things will either not occur, or, if they do occur, will disintegrate.

I do not believe that the French and the Germans would have been reconciled if we had not had NATO. It was under the umbrella of the American presence that the French went back on their Assembly's decision to oppose German rearmament. They then came to terms and became friends with their erstwhile German opponents. The same will be true of the Israelis. If they are to reach agreement, they will have to make concessions and they will not make concessions unless the agreements can be guaranteed by their longstanding friends, the United States.

But there is perhaps a wider significance in the idea of a middle eastern defence organisation. There has been a lot of talk about a new order. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and the right hon. Member for Blaenau Gwent have also spoken about it. But there will be other crises. Kuwait will not be the only one.

The social and economic turmoil in Africa and elsewhere in Asia is likely to lead to other military confrontations, perhaps not as serious as this one, perhaps ultimately more serious. Any economic solution that we may devise may need some military backing. The World bank report on Africa seems to point in the same direction. With the erosion of the threat of Soviet imperialism, it will become more difficult for the United States, in the eyes of its domestic public opinion and locally, to maintain the forces that it maintains today on the continent of Europe around Japan. Some redistribution will be necessary, but geopolitically the Arabian peninsula would seem to be the most suitable and valuable place on which to base a strategic reserve for the new order that we hope will come to be.

There is, of course, great and natural anxiety about the consequences of the breakdown of the GATT talks and the industrial world breaking into three major blocs. There is a risk and a danger of that, but strong forces are also working the other way. The multinational companies will want to bring the three blocs together and oil is the cement which makes it difficult for them to separate. We in the House are right to see the dangers of the situation in which we live, but I urge right hon. and hon. Members not to lose sight of the opportunities. If anyone had said six months ago, looking at the difficult situation in the middle east, that 500,000 American troops would be sitting there, he would not have been believed. Well, they are there now. How do we make use of them? How do we guide them? How do we work with the Americans to try to bring about solutions not only of the local problems of the middle east but of the wider problems outside?

Column 852

5.45 pm

Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East) : With other hon. Members, I recently visited the United Kingdom forces in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in accordance with the arrangements made for us by the Ministry of Defence. I was struck by two things. The first was the extraordinary maturity and professionalism of the young men and women of all three services. I came back confirmed in the belief that they should not be exploited and that they should not lightly be exposed to the risk of injury or death that the military option would necessarily involve. I was also struck by the sense of responsibility of senior officers, who seemed to display a realistic awareness of the difficulties of a military solution and of the potentially fearful consequences.

Last week Brigadier Cordingley appeared to have caused some disquiet by the candour that he displayed when talking about the potential for casualties. I do not share the view that he should be the subject of criticism or concern. It is right that we should all understand the magnitude of the military task and the potential consequences if the military option falls to be exercised. If the military option was to be credible when troops were first deployed, it had to be of such a nature as to put pressure on Saddam Hussein. That continues to be my judgment of the best way in which to proceed, but the events of the past few days cannot be ignored. The United States has agreed to face-to-face talks and has accepted the possibility of a middle east peace conference. In those circumstances, it is idle to pretend that the political climate has not changed. I remain of the view that the military option must be kept credible, because anything which detracts from that credibility may suggest a weakness of resolve that Saddam Hussein would be quick to exploit ; but the maintenance of a credible military option is not an alternative to a peaceful solution--it is a necessary component of it. Only the knowledge that the military option is available and may be used as a last resort is likely to compel Saddam Hussein to take seriously any measures which are designed to achieve a peaceful solution. To tell him that the military option was no longer realistically available would be to encourage him to procrastinate. So long as there is a reasonable prospect of a peaceful solution, the military option should not be used. I do not mean a remote or speculative prospect of a peaceful solution, but a realistic one. Resolution 678, which includes the deadline to which reference has already been made, is permissive, not mandatory. The date of 15 January should not be seen as heralding hostilities, but as permitting them if no peaceful solution involving the implementation of all the United Nations resolutions can be achieved. Efforts at peaceful negotiation should continue up to 15 January and beyond, provided that there are reasonable prospects of success. That must necessarily be a matter of judgment, day by day.

The release of the hostages and the United States' change of attitude have enhanced the prospects for successful negotiations, but it must be made clear in those negotiations that a solution cannot be bought at the expense of the territory of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein must be under no illusions. The United Nations resolutions must be implemented fully--and that means the evacuation of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the restoration of that country's Government. Once it becomes clear that a full-scale withdrawal is under way,

Column 853

Kuwait's legitimate Government can enter into negotiations with Iraq if they choose--indeed, the United Nations resolutions expressly encourage that--but that must be for Kuwait, albeit with assistance and encouragement. Our task is to ensure that the United Nations' resolutions are fully implemented. Anything less would be seen as a reward for Saddam Hussein's aggression and would undoubtedly diminish the United Nations' new-found authority.

The international community's initial disapproval was marked by the imposition of sanctions. There have been some reports from Baghdad, mainly anecdotal, about their effectiveness. It is essential that we have much more analytical evidence as to whether sanctions are having any effect and, if so, how deeply they are biting and how long it will be until they cause such serious disruption as might influence Baghdad to change its policy. If we are to understand the effectiveness of those sanctions, we need more than the anecdotal evidence which is all that we have had so far. Detailed economic analysis of the consequences of the sanctions ought to be easily available.

Dr. Norman A. Godman (Greenock and Port Glasgow) : The Finnish ambassador to the Security Council, speaking as chair of the sanctions committee, informed me in the course of a discussion two and a half weeks ago in New York that sanctions were working and proving an effective weapon against Saddam Hussein. It is clear, however, that those sanctions will take time to cripple Iraq.

Mr. Campbell : I accept what the hon. Gentleman says, but he may agree that he has provided only anecdotal evidence about the extent to which sanctions have been effective. One is entitled to seek clear evidence. Any decision about the use of the military option should be made only in the light of the best possible information available. If the information was that within a matter of weeks the sanctions would prove so effective as to bring down Saddam Hussein or create circumstances in which his policy would necessarily require modification, that would be a compelling argument against exercising the military option. The decision to use the military option must be taken against the fullest possible information--and that, so far, is not available to us.

Our actions in the next few weeks will have as much to do with the long term as with the short term. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs was, in his usual courteous way, sceptical of my suggestion in the House on the eve of his departure to the United Nations, to the effect that we should address the long term now, and that long-term peace initiatives ought to be under consideration. Since then, there has been a change of heart by the United States, and I hope that that will persuade the right hon. Gentleman, if not entirely to dissipate his scepticism, then at least to dilute it to some extent. I hope, too, that he will respond favourably to the notion that we should consider the long-term prospects in parallel with, and not separately or distinct from, the short term.

It is essential to ensure that a long-term initiative for peace in the middle east is seen not as a prize won forcibly by Iraqi aggression. As the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) said, Saddam Hussein did not have the interests of the Palestinians at heart when he invaded Kuwait--nor, I imagine, do the Kuwaitis think

Next Section

Home Page