House of Commons Hansard Debates for 19 Dec 1990

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differential effects and the motive of the messenger. The key point is surely the extent to which such considerations should affect our policy in the Gulf. My hon. Friend concluded that, in the worst scenario, the effect could be so devastating that, in effect, war could in no circumstances be contemplated. That, however, could be an equally dangerous conclusion.

One clear effect of allowing ourselves to be blackmailed by the direct or indirect threats of Saddam Hussein would be an effective paralysis of policy, not only in this crisis but in relation to any other aggressor with the capacity to create ecological devastation, through threats to the oil fields and wells of the kind that Saddam Hussein is making, or the capacity of a nuclear reactor, for example. If, as a result of threats and blackmail, Saddam Hussein succeeds in producing a paralysis in policy, what is to stop him using those same threats to advance one step further into Saudi Arabia or one of the Gulf sheikhdoms? That would render the United Nations impotent in the face of aggression and strangle at birth the potential enhanced role for that world organisation.

King Hussein has broadcast one of Saddam Hussein's threats, but in the course of the conflict Saddam has made a multiplicity of threats and he can continue to do so. At the start of the crisis on 2 August, he dispatched what he called volunteers into Kuwait, but nothing further has been heard about them. Could not similar "volunteers" be sent into Jordan in the knowledge that that would trigger an immediate response from Israel? Some of the ballistic missiles available in Saddam Hussein's armoury could be fired at Israel, which would trigger a great conflagration in which Iraq, being at the centre of it, would be the first country to be devastated. Such issues should be considered when seeking to evaluate the threat made by Saddam Hussein and set out by King Hussein in his November speech when he called on the expertise of some of his scientists. We must take the issues raised in the debate seriously. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow may consider himself, alas, to be the Cassandra of the conflict. Certainly, we must be aware of the worst scenario and its potential consequences. The military option has been underscored by Security Council resolution 678. On 11 December my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) stressed in the House that although we seek, above all, a peaceful solution, if in the end the only way to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait is by force, then force will have to be used. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow was right to remind us of the possible and awful consequences of war. Above all, we must be firmly behind the United Nations. We must also be aware that if the crisis proceeds further, the responsibility for that will lie squarely at the door of Saddam Hussein as a result of his initial aggression on 2 August.

12.17 am

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Douglas Hogg) : Before dealing with the speech of the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), I should say that I am in total agreement with what has just been said from the Opposition Front Bench by the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson). I agreed with him about the ecological consequences and the uncertainties that must surround any assessment of them,

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and particularly about the need to support Security Council resolution 678 and all those which proceeded it. On this matter, the Opposition and Government Front Benches are as one.

The purpose of the speech of the hon. Member for Linlithgow was to make the essential point that war is a beastly, bloody and unpredictable business. He went on to say that the damage to life and property would be great. His contention was that in such circumstances the military option should not be pursued. Within that general argument, he made a specific argument--that war in the middle east in the present circumstances gives rise to such a risk of ecological disaster that in no circumstances should the use of force be contemplated.

In response to the hon. Gentleman's argument on the ecological consequences of war, I hope that he will forgive me if I make this observation. If I wished to advance an argument of principle against the use of force, I would choose to rely primarily on the certainty of death and injury to those involved in the conflict rather on the uncertainties which underpin the hon. Gentleman's argument and which, in any event, seem to be of a different and lesser order of magnitude when contrasted with the loss of life and the physical injury that may be the outcome of a war in the Gulf.

Mr. Dalyell : There may be a great chasm between us. The Minister's speaks, no doubt sincerely, with the experience of 20 years as a lawyer. I speak with 20 or more years' experience of spending a great deal of my time working on scientific subjects and producing a column for the New Scientist, with all that that entails. We may have different ways of looking at the world.

Mr. Hogg : I hope not. I am saying that what is of critical importance in a matter such as this is the prospect of death and injury. To my way of thinking, it is odd to argue a case against war in terms of oil spillage, carbon dioxide emissions and global warming. That is not an obvious way to conduct an argument. The argument should focus on such critical issues as human life, the right to freedom, the need to resist armed aggression, and the maintenance of the authority of the United Nations.

Before I go further into detail, I inform the hon. Member for Linlithgow that not only, for the reasons that I mentioned, do I find that he conducts his argument at an inappropriate level but I believe that he is making himself an instrument of Saddam Hussein's policy. The hon. Gentleman concludes from Saddam Hussein's threat to detonate a series of oil wells that there is no practical action that we can take to reverse the act of blackmail and agression that has taken place. To express such a view encourages Saddam Hussein in his truculence and intransigence and thereby diminishes the prospect of peace.

I do not for one moment suggest that that is the intended consequence of the hon. Gentleman's remarks, but I believe that it is the inevitable consequence. At no stage during the hon. Gentleman's extended speech--I make no criticism of the fact that it was long--and at no stage during his speech in our recent debate on the Gulf, which I have read carefully, did he suggest any clear way of ensuring the reversal of the act of aggression. The hon. Gentleman suggested that his right hon. Friend for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) should go to Baghdad, but that is

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unlikely to achieve the objective that both the Opposition Front Bench and the Government Front Bench agree is our primary objective. I will comment upon the ecological arguments advanced by the hon. Gentleman, but first I wish to put them into what seems to me to be the proper perspective so that we can judge the weight that we wish to attach to the hon. Gentleman's objections and to the political facts.

We need to be clear about the nature of Saddam Hussein's conduct. Saddam Hussein's conduct is aggression of the most obvious and brutal kind. He invaded Kuwait--his neighbour and a sovereign state with which he had been in negotiations and in respect of which he had given assurances of non- aggression. In the process of that invasion, he killed a large number of people. Once the invasion was complete, he embarked on a systematic policy of murder, pillage and, it now seems, torture. He also seized and held many thousands of non-combatant western hostages. With the release of those hostages, he has complied only with the first of three conditions imposed on him by the Security Council.

We must focus on compliance with the other two conditions--complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January and the restoration of that country's lawful Government. Resolution 678 empowers the international community, of which we are part, to use all necessary means to secure compliance with the previous resolutions and, most particularly, to ensure that Iraq leaves Kuwait unconditionally and completely by 15 January. The phrase "all necessary means" obviously embraces the use of force, but the resolution is not itself a call to arms or a timetable for military action. It provides an opportunity for Saddam Hussein to go--and go peacefully--and that he must do, for our sakes and his.

Everyone in the House agrees that because war is such a bloody and beastly business, and because its consequences are so unpredictable, we must do all that in conscience we can do to avert a war. Therefore, as people have said elsewhere, it is right to go that extra mile to achieve peace. We are strongly behind the suggestion made by President Bush that he should have the opportunity--himself and through emmissaries--to put the facts clearly to Saddam Hussein and his Foreign Minister. It is absolutely essential that the Iraqi president should know exactly where he stands. There can and will be no concession on the requirements of the Security Council. No partial solution is possible. There is no linkage with other issues. That is the view of the Security Council, of the United States, of the United Kingdom, of the Arab states which have mobilised their forces in the middle east, and of the European Community.

How are we seeking to achieve that political objective? We are doing so by sanctions, and by the deployment of forces--so far, entirely peacefully. The only person who has used force is Saddam Hussein. The only people who have died have been killed by Saddam Hussein. That is the plain fact that the House must recognise. We must ask ourselves, in conscience, whether sanctions are likely to succeed. That they are causing hardship in Iraq is certain, but is it a level of hardship such as to bring about a reversal of policy or, differently put, to cause the destabilisation of Saddam Hussein's regime? My own belief is that it is not. We cannot forget that the people of Iraq suffered eight years of pointless and brutal war, again promoted by Saddam Hussein, yet did not throw that man out.

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Therefore, my judgment is that sanctions alone will not bring about a complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

Mr. Dalyell : If that was the whole story, how comes it that, with the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, we exported the most formidable arms consignment to Saddam Hussein? If we thought during all those years that he was so terrible, what on earth were we doing exporting arms to him? The answer is clear. Many people did not want Saddam Hussein to be beaten by the mullahs and ayatollahs. Furthermore, if what the Minister said is all self-evident truth, why are the British Government, with their European partners in Rome, so reluctant to see Tariq Aziz?

Mr. Hogg : The hon. Gentleman is doing less credit than he should to his argument. There has been a long-standing prohibition on arms sales to Iraq.

As for the hon. Gentleman's second question as to why we and other countries in the Community have not sent emissaries to Baghdad, it seems right that there should be a single, clear voice expressing the significance of resolution 678 and the previous resolutions, and it seems right that the country which is to shoulder the greatest part of the military burden should provide that voice.

Mr. Nellist : Is my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) not absolutely right in that, in the 1980s, Iraq was the middle eastern country favoured by the western nations? During the Iran-Iraq war, America provided $2.5 billion of food aid and $5 billion of trade credit. In October 1989, one of the Minister's colleagues--now the Secretary of State for Health--told the House that the Government recognised that Iraq had bombed and killed thousands of Kurdish people. Ten days later, however, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry increased British trade credits to Iraq by £400 million. Finally, during the 1970s and 1980s, France sold $25 billion worth of arms to Iraq.

Mr. Hogg : To what is the hon. Gentleman directing his remarks? The facts speak for themselves. Twice in a decade Iraq has launched a brutal and unprovoked attack on its neighbour. First, it attacked Iran and there was a bloody eight-year war, in which more than a million people died. Secondly, on 2 August, it launched an unprovoked attack on a small country, occupied it and murdered its citizens. Those are the facts with which we have to deal. Exploring history 20 years back does not touch on that issue.

Mr. Nellist : What about two years ago?

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Mr. Hogg : To what is the hon. Gentleman referring?

Mr. Nellist : I refer to the statement made by the right hon. Member for Bristol, West (Mr. Waldegrave) when he was a Foreign Office Minister. He said two years ago that the Government officially condemned the Iraqi bombing of the Kurds, when 10,000 people died in Halabja. Ten days later, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry rewarded the same Saddam Hussein, who we are now told is such a bad bloke, by extending to him £400 million worth of trade credits. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow and I are merely showing that two years ago this man was a friend of the Government.

Mr. Hogg : The hon. Gentleman makes my point for me. Saddam Hussein is a brutal man. By reminding the House of his attack, using gas, on his own people in Kurdistan, the hon. Gentleman makes that point crystal clear. It can be seen again in Hussein's conduct in Kuwait. Many hon. Members will have read the Amnesty report ; all hon. Members will have read the summary of it. We must face the fact that the people of Kuwait are being subjected to a systematic campaign of murder and pillage. Iraq is in the process of eradicating Kuwait as a state, of brutalising its people and of incorporating that country into its own. That is a sin against international order and morality. We cannot stand back idly and say that there is nothing that we can do because of the ecological consequences.

The debate has been long and I must bring it to a close. There is no doubt that war is unpredictable or that grave damage will be caused. Some of that damage will be to property, perhaps to the oil fields. There may be emissions, dark clouds and other horrors of that sort. We do not know their extent because the assumptions are unknowable and the consequences unverifiable. The imponderables are too great. Which way will the wind blow? We do not know.

All we can say is that war is beastly, and that beastliness must be judged against the political requirements of resisting aggression and supporting the collective authority of the United Nations. On this point, I entirely agree with the hon. Member for Swansea, East. We cannot stand back and declare that these things are too beastly, horrible and difficult and so we shall do nothing. If that were our policy we should certainly revert to a form of international anarchy.

Mr. Dalyell : I do not want to be committed to a policy when we do not know where it leads--

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker) : Order. Mr. Brazier.

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Volunteer Forces (Pay and Compensation)

12.37 am

Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury) : I am most grateful for this opportunity to deal with an issue related to that which the House has just debated. The House has been reminded that, as we approach Christmas, we may also be approaching the prospect of war in the middle east. That is an especially sombre prospect for people serving in our armed forces in the middle east, for those on their way there and for their families. But I have every confidence that they will do their duty, if they have to, in the best possible fashion. My hon. Friend the Minister knows that, in the short time I have been in the House, I have taken an interest in the terms and conditions of service of our regular armed forces. Tonight, however, I should like to focus on our volunteer reservists, of whom I understand up to 1,500--possibly more--may be required for service in the Gulf. I want to focus more specifically on remuneration and compensation for members of the volunteer reserves who may become casualties as a result of service in the Gulf or of ordinary training. There is an overlap, because some of the people called up for the Gulf may go elsewhere to take the place of Regulars. The problem is an old injustice that goes back many years and is best illustrated by describing two incidents that occurred during my service in the Territorial Army. Fourteen years ago, the members of my platoon were climbing from the back of a four-tonner in Norfolk. It was a bright, moonlit night and the vehicle was parked on a broad piece of open road and showing lights, as the rules required. A drunk came driving down the road with his car headlights off and drove straight into the men climbing from the vehicle. He knocked three of them over and forced three more into a knot under the back of the vehicle. One man was crushed against the vehicle and suffered multiple injuries to his legs.

As a result of those leg injuries, that soldier was away from his civilian employment for nearly a year. His employer was a responsible company and said that it would like to make up the difference between the money that he received as a private from the Territorial Army and his civilian pay. He was training for a professional job, and there was a substantial difference between the two rates of pay. When we tried to arrange that, we found that the Ministry of Defence policy, which has remained the same under successive Governments, is that, in such cases, any money that a soldier receives from civilian employment is deducted pound for pound from his Ministry of Defence remuneration. Therefore, that man received no money from the Ministry of Defence during the time that he was away from work.

A similar incident occurred three months ago in the home service unit in which I now serve. One of my best and keenest soldiers, a man in his early 40s who had been out of the TA for some 10 years, decided to rejoin, with the rank of private. He fell on an assault course and broke his arm and will be off work for approximately six months. He had reached quite a senior supervisory level in his civilian employment, but for reasons of safety his job required him to have the effective use of both arms. His employer was willing to pay half his normal salary while he was sick, but because that is slightly more than his pay as a private, he receives no money from the Ministry of Defence.

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With the Gulf crisis looming larger and many hundreds of Territorials required in the Gulf, it is essential for this matter to be reviewed. A few days ago, I quoted to my noble Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces a letter which sets out three basic questions summarising the problem. My hon. Friend the Minister has told me that he has seen that letter. My first question is general and asks whether this system could be urgently reviewed so that injustices can be righted. I understand that there are only a few dozen cases each year and if so, it should not be expensive to put the matter right for all time.

Secondly, there is the more immediate question of what will happen in the meantime to Territorials who find themselves in the position that I have described as a result of having volunteered or been called up for service in the Gulf. For example, let us examine the case of one of my constituents who is self-employed, has therefore a high income and mortgage commitments and so on. He fully recognises that, while he is serving in the Gulf, he will have to accept some cut in income. If he returns from the Gulf with severe injuries and is unable to work for nine months, and if one of his regular contractors is willing to help him out with a payment because of a long-term contract, will the money be deducted pound for pound from his Ministry of Defence salary?

Will this unjust system apply to Gulf casualties, or, indeed, to people who suffer training accidents while filling the place of a regular soldier who is in the Gulf?

My third question is : what would be the position of a Territorial soldier who, rather than merely being off work for a while as a result of an injury, becomes disabled, is severely wounded, perhaps has his leg blown off or is made blind? It is important that we should be able to reassure anyone in that position.

I ask my hon. Friend to bear in mind two categories of people when he considers these questions. The first are those who volunteered before the order was signed. It is important, given the terms and conditions that have been extended by the sensible system that my right hon. Friend has introduced--getting the Order in Council signed, but then asking for volunteers and calling them up--that the guarantees given to such people are extended to those who volunteered before the order was signed. The other category are those who may be injured when filling in elsewhere, although they are not casualties in the Gulf.

I do not want to labour this point late at night. This is not a packed House, and I know that my hon. Friend the Minister is sympathetic, as, I am sure, are all hon. Members who are present. However, it is an important issue. First, it is disturbing for Territorials who are considering service in the Gulf not to know where they stand on these matters. As recently as last Saturday, I was approached by a constituent, who is a nurse in the TA, and who is concerned about this. She is anxious to do her duty, she is worried about the possibility of casualties in the Gulf, and she wants to do her bit out there to help them. She wants to know what her position will be should she volunteer to go out there and become a casualty herself. She is happy to face that risk, but she wants to do so on a equitable financial basis.

I hinted at the second reason at the beginning of my speech. It is the longer-term fact that we are anxious, with "Options for Change", to get maximum value for money out of our armed forces, and this must mean a greater burden falling on the TA. One of the triumphs of the

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Ministry of Defence over the past three or four years has been the successful setting up of the National Employer Liaison Committee, and I pay tribute to the work of Tommy MacPherson and his team. It must be obvious that this is exactly the kind of issue that can only cause friction between employers, who see the Minister of Defence as being unreasonable--it is not just this Government, for the anomaly has existed for a long time--when, if they are willing to put money into the pot, the Minister then removes it.

If we want to make a success of the TA, the small sum of money involved is worth expending, to remove this source of friction for both the soldier and his civilian employer. As it happens, the soldier involved in the incident that I described, who is now recovering from his broken arm, is an exceptionally good soldier. Perhaps as a small compensation for his injury, Corporal Chatterton has been picked out for promotion, and he has bent over backwards to say nothing against the Army or the unit. Nevertheless, it is not right that his fellow soldiers should see him suffering considerable financial hardship because of his injury.

I end where I began : with the possible onset of war in the Gulf, it is important that this small but irritating and worrying anomaly should be ironed out. Territorials who go to the Gulf should not feel that they have an enormous advantage over the Regular Army but it is important that, if there is a great difference between their pay in the TA and their pay in civilian life--perhaps because they have a junior position in the TA and a senior in civilian life--and they are willing to go there and their employers are willing to help out, they will not be penalised financially if they become casualties. I end with my three questions in reverse order. First, what is the position of the TA soldier or his naval or Air Force counterpart, who becomes permanently disabled? Secondly, what is his position if he becomes a casualty and is off work? Finally, will my hon. Friend urgently review this matter for the long term, so that this anomaly can be straightened out?

12.49 am

Dr. John Reid (Motherwell, North) : The hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) delivered his speech with admirable brevity and succinctness. He having demonstrated that self-discipline, I would not dream of making a longer speech. I shall not, however, apologise for intervening in the debate because of the lateness of the hour. It may be 12.49 am here and we may be up late, but there are members of our forces in the Gulf who will be up all night tonight and all night tomorrow night. At 4 am, as it is in the Gulf, they would regard it as less than their due if we were to be apologetic for debating such an important issue at this hour.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Canterbury on raising the matter of the pay and compensation of our volunteer forces. His interest in and knowledge of such matters is well known. I heard testimony of that yet again this evening, when I had the privilege to host a dinner for the second battalion of the Parachute Regiment. The name which came up for mention was that of the hon. Gentleman. It was possible to bring together some old comrades in arms before the debate began.

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I recall that the hon. Member for Canterbury participated in a debate on the Armed Forces Bill on 21 November, which was the first debate in which I spoke from the Opposition Dispatch Box. Like us all, the hon. Gentleman gets the occasional fact wrong, but that does not detract from his considerable expertise and knowledge.

The hon. Gentleman said that he was taking up a narrow or small point. That may be true, but only in the sense that the tip of an iceberg is a narrow or small point. It represents a much larger issue that lies beneath the surface, which is the view that we take of those who volunteer to serve in our armed forces. During a week when events have underlined once again the importance to Britain of its volunteer forces, it is fitting and proper that we should be concerned about the conditions in which they operate and the protection they are afforded by the state.

The issue which the hon. Gentleman has raised is a valid one : why, when people volunteer their services to their country, should they face the prospect of physical discomfort and financial disadvantage? The present position, perhaps by anomaly rather than design, is nothing more or less than a penalty on patriotism. As the hon. Gentleman said, it is possible for a volunteer to give up a highly paid position to serve in the forces. If he is subsequently injured or incapacitated, he can--this has happened to many such people--suffer prolonged financial loss and, in some instances, financial hardship. That is the result of an anomaly in the regulations. Surely that cannot be right. I am glad that the hon. Gentleman suggested that he believes that the Government have some sympathy for his argument. I look forward to the Minister's reply.

I urge the Government to give the matter urgent consideration. I hope that the Minister will, if possible, give specific answers to the three specific questions asked by the hon. Member for Canterbury. For the purpose of brevity, I shall speak only in general terms, but I shall advance three reasons to support my argument, unlike the two outlined by the hon. Gentleman.

First, his case stands on its merits. There is an injustice and, as I have said, a penalty on patriotism, when a man or woman is penalised financially in addition to any injury that he or she may sustain as a result of volunteering to serve in the forces of the Crown.

Secondly, the anomaly requires urgent consideration. At this moment, the Government are urging volunteers to enlist in view of the Gulf crisis. Earlier in the week, they attempted to ease the recruitment of specialist volunteers--many of those people, because of the specialist nature of their jobs, are in highly paid positions in civilian life--by guaranteeing job security. Even on the most cynical approach, the question of recruitment requires immediate attention. The existence of such an anomaly can hardly be conducive to volunteer recruitment during the Gulf crisis.

There is a deeper and more worthy consideration. It would surely be unthinkable that in the awful event of, God forbid, hostilities breaking out in the Gulf, some of those who volunteer and who may be injured might face financial penalties in addition to any personal injury.

I believe that a longer-term consideration is also involved. The outcome of "Options for Change" is still unknown, but one thing is certain--whatever happens, there will be a heavier and increasing dependence on reserve forces. Incidentally, that is something that the

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Labour party has advocated for a number of years. It is therefore essential that barriers to volunteer recruitment, such as that anomaly, are finally swept away.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Canterbury. He and I, and, I hope, the Minister, are tonight speaking of volunteers for our reserve forces, who rarely ask what their country can do for them. Indeed, sometimes they do not even ask what they can do for their country. They just know it instinctively, and they do it. It is fitting that, in the present circumstances, we should ask tonight what we can do for them.

12.56 am

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement (Mr. Kenneth Carlisle) : It is a great pleasure to reply to this short debate. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) on raising the matter. We all know of his close interest in matters relating to the terms and conditions of service for members of the armed forces. As a member of the Territorial Army, he is exceptionally well qualified to debate this issue, and he did so with knowledge and sincerity.

I welcome the speech of the hon. Member for Motherwell, North (Dr. Reid) who made some excellent points. He also paid tribute to my hon. Friend.

I wish first to make some general points about terms and conditions in the armed forces, because that will help to place the particular points raised by my hon. Friend in a wider context. As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State told the House on 17 December, in order to provide job protection, arrangements have been made, and legal powers taken, formally to call out all those who volunteer to serve under the Reserve Forces Act 1980. We very much hope to meet our requirements for reservists with individuals who express willingness to serve, and that makes it essential that all those who volunteer should have their jobs protected.

Members of the reserve forces are, following call-out, paid the same rates of pay as members of the regular forces, including a full X factor. In addition, they will be entitled to appropriate regular allowances such as separation allowance and local overseas allowance where appropriate. As the House is aware, the Government gave an undertaking that service personnel would not suffer financially as a result of being sent to the Gulf.

It seemed, therefore, only right and proper that action should also be taken to protect the financial position of members of the reserves who are called out as a result of operations in the Gulf. As my hon. Friend said, in some cases, they will be highly qualified people who receive high levels of remuneration for their work in civil life. Members of the reserves will have arranged their financial commitments, such as mortgage repayments, in the not unreasonable expectation that their earnings would be fairly constant. We therefore concluded that it would not be right for them or their families to suffer in consequence of their decision to volunteer to serve alongside the Regulars.

We are therefore making available a supplement of up to 20 per cent. of service pay, and more in special cases, which will be paid to those members of the Reserves who are called up, in order to make up any difference between their civilian earnings and their military pay which their employers do not make up voluntarily.

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The figure of 20 per cent. was designed to protect the great majority of members from any financial loss as a result of being called up, without going so far as to give an entirely open-ended commitment. But, as I have already said, in exceptional cases we are prepared to consider a higher supplement. [Interruption.] I am sure that the hon. Member for Motherwell, North would like to hear my reply, if the hon. Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) would allow him. It is difficult for me to reply courteously to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury.

I hope that the House will agree that this scheme is designed to provide a generous degree of income protection for all members of the reserve forces who are supporting the Regulars during the current crisis in the Gulf.

The service pay of the Territorial Army volunteers embodied in the Regular Army for service in the Gulf would not be prejudiced if they continued to receive money from their civilian employers. In those circumstances, however, they would be ineligible for the special pay supplement, which relates to the loss of civilian pay. That would also be the case for those volunteers who continue to receive full rates of service pay while recuperating from injuries.

My hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury has raised a number of issues relating to members of the volunteer forces injured on active service or in training. I shall, in the time available, deal with them as fully as I can.

Members of the reserve forces who are injured in training--as in the case that my hon. Friend mentioned of training in Norfolk--may be paid a disablement allowance at military pay rates during periods of total incapacity when they are unable to pursue their normal civilian employment as a consequence of their injury.

The allowance is paid in respect of loss of earnings, and lasts until the total incapacity ceases, or up to a maximum of 26 weeks from the date of injury. The rate of the allowance is equal to the military salary for the rank held by the member at the time of the injury, abated, as my hon. Friend said, by any sickness benefit received from the Department of Social Security, statutory sick pay received from his civilian employers and sick pay from public funds. Benefits such as company sick pay are also deducted, because otherwise an individual could be better off sick than working. Should they remain totally incapacitated after six months, or in the event that total incapacity ceases before the expiry of the six-month period but there is a residual disability, they may claim a residual disability award. Arrangements are made for medical examination in order to assess the extent of the disability. An assessment of 20 per cent. disability or greater provides a weekly pension, while an assessment of lower disability leads to a lump sum payment.

If it is necessary for a member to be medically discharged because of an injury which the Ministry of Defence has accepted as attributable to service, the Department of Social Security is asked to take over the case from the date of discharge. If the DSS decides that the disability is of sufficient severity to warrant the award of a war pension, the Ministry of Defence will award an additional pension under the attributable benefits for reservists scheme. That additional pension will be made at a higher or lower rate depending on whether or not the member loses his civilian job as a result of the injury. If the member loses

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his civilian job, it will be abated, according to a prescribed formula, in respect of pension benefits received from his civilian employer, but no account will be taken of benefits from personal insurance.

The disablement allowance that I described is designed to compensate for loss of earnings, but I accept that there is an element of rough justice in the system. Some individuals will gain, whilst those with larger civilian salaries will lose if their employers do not continue to pay them in full. However, I assure my hon. Friend that I understand his particular concern over abatement, which he expressed with great force, and my noble Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, who has particular responsibility for such matters, will review the rules as far as that is concerned.

I am sure that my hon. Friend's views will be welcome to him in that review, but the Ministry of Defence cannot take into account every shade of disparity in civilian incomes or make exact reimbursement of lost earnings.

Mr. Brazier : I am most grateful to my hon. Friend. He has fully satisfied me on two points, and kindly said that our noble Friend will review the third. The problem is that, because it is a pound-for-pound abatement, the employer--if he is to help the man at all--must help by more than the amount that the MOD would pay him, in which case the MOD makes no contribution. That is perceived as extremely unfair.

Mr. Carlisle : My noble Friend will take that point into account. I naturally hope that employers will support the volunteer forces by granting special leave for training, and sick pay, when necessary. By doing so, they will make a significant contribution to the country's defences. Many already help in that way. In return, they can gain considerable benefits from the valuable training that their employees receive.

The position of members of the volunteer forces who are embodied into the regular forces for active service is quite different. If they are injured, they will either be kept on full pay until they are restored to full health, or they will be medically discharged--in which case, they will be eligible for attributable benefits from the Ministry of Defence. In addition, they will be eligible for benefits under the war pension scheme administered by the DSS. In other words, they will be treated in the same way as members of the regular forces of the same rank, and with the same degree of disability. I believe that the provisions made in those circumstances are not ungenerous. My noble Friend the Under-Secretary will write to my hon. Friend as soon as he can.

In conclusion, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend's efforts in this area, and I assure him that we want to make our arrangements as fair as possible. I hope that he will take comfort from the review of the abatement rules by my noble Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces. I will draw the attention of my noble Friend to what my hon. Friend has said tonight, with his usual zest and robust clarity, and I hope that any points that I have not dealt with can be covered in correspondence with him.

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Intergovernmental Conferences

1.9 am

Mr. William Cash (Stafford) : About five or six years ago, I became increasingly concerned about the momentum towards what I described in an article in The Times as "creeping federalism". Then, I would have regarded our present situation as almost impossible, as far more progress towards federalism has been made in the relatively short time since I began raising these matters on the Floor of the House than even I anticipated.

In Lewis Carroll's "Through the Looking Glass", when Alice says, "But you can't believe things which are impossible," the Queen of Hearts replies, "Nonsense. You just haven't had enough practice. I often believe six different impossible things before breakfast." Impossible things are happening, and it is certainly true to say that one of the aspects of the direction that we are taking that I find difficult to understand is the reason for the next step. I have repeatedly said that I voted for the Single European Act. Although I put down an amendment that nothing in the Act should go against the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, nonetheless I believe that there were, and are, benefits to be derived from that Act as it was enacted.

However, at a number of meetings with people who know a great deal about this issue, I have had great difficulty in extracting from them--or from any recently produced documents--a reason why we should move to the next steps. It is a source of considerable curiosity to me that, whenever one poses that question, one does not get an answer.

There were good reasons for the establishment of the European Community. In 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community pooled steel and coal for the purposes of rationalisation, but also to prevent a repetition of the second world war. There have been thoroughly understandable and well-explained developments in the European Community since then. However, with the ending of the cold war, the picture has changed significantly.

As I have said on a number of occasions, it is fundamental that we consider what is relevant to the 1990s, and not what was thought to be relevant to the 1950s. Also fundamental questions arise out of the developments that are now taking place. I shall summarise those by saying that they turn on the question of consent and accountability. As I have put it on previous occasions, "Who governs?" And it is not just who governs, but how they govern.

For centuries the House has evolved towards democracy. We had sovereignty in the king and crown, and the divine right of kings until the 17th century. Through the centuries we moved towards a greater emphasis upon consent by the people, and accountability went with it. I am worried that the present proposals for the future of the Community mean that we are envolving away from consent and accountability. The other day, the Bank of England released the statutes for the proposed central bank to me. It is quite clear that hon. Members have a different approach towards government, accountability and consent than others in the Community.

I also believe that we may have got ourselves into difficulties as a result of our traditions--for which we should not apologise, because hard experience over many

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centuries has taught us that our practical and pragmatic approach pays off ; nevertheless, the view that if we pass an Act in the House of Commons we shall be able to change it is no longer so valid as it was before the passing of the European Communities Act 1972. Policy options closed following the agreement that majority voting should be allowed, particularly since the Single European Act.

The 1971 White Paper--"The United Kingdom and the European Communities"-- was really addressing the question of sovereignty, along with the concepts of consent and accountability and the democracy that is tied up with those concepts. Although some may think that we have agreed to proposals over the past 25 years, those proposals were within a clearly defined parameter. Paragraph 29 states : "We shall have full opportunity to make our views heard and our influence felt in the councils of the Community. The Community is no federation of provinces or counties. It constitutes a Community of great and established nations, each with its own personality and traditions. The practical working of the Community accordingly reflects the reality that sovereign Governments are represented round the table. On a question where a Government considers that vital national interests are involved, it is established that the decision should be unanimous. Like any other treaty, the Treaty of Rome commits its signatories to support agreed aims ; but the commitment represents the voluntary undertaking of a sovereign state to observe policies which it has helped to form. There is no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty ; what is proposed is a sharing and an enlargement of individual national sovereignties in the general interest."

Paragraph 30 states :

"All the countries concerned recognise that an attempt to impose"-- I stress the word "impose"--

"a majority view in a case where one or more members considered their vital interests to be at stake would imperil the very fabric of the Community."

That could not have been put more clearly.

It could be argued that time has moved on, that we could draw a veil over all that, and that it really does not matter very much any more ; I feel, however, that it probably mattes more than ever now, given the proposals that have been emanating from the Commission about economic and monetary union and political union, and the activities of our friends and colleagues in Europe regarding those matters.

The question of consent to the next step--whether or not it is imposed, and whether or not we are asked to agree to it--goes to the heart of the nature of democracy in this country, our system of government and the kind of Parliament that we have here. I understand that the Government suggested some weeks ago that a public statement would be made, perhaps in the form of a White Paper, and that that may still be in the pipeline. I hope that it is. The consent that will allow the House to continue to deliver the democratic accountability that it has delivered for so long is dependent on whether those who are asked to make the decisions are themselves fully informed, and whether the electorate are fully aware of what is being done in their name.

In recent opinion polls on Europe, only a few weeks ago people were asked whether they wanted more powers to be transferred from national Parliaments to European Community institutions. Sixty-nine per cent. said no. They were also asked whether they were in favour of a European central bank. Sixty- nine per cent. said yes. There is enormous confusion about Europe.

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When my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Surrey, East (Sir G. Howe) was Leader of the House, I asked for a White Paper. It is no secret that I made the same request to the Foreign Secretary and to my right hon. Friend the Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher). In a Bow group pamphlet that I published some months ago entitled, "The Democratic Way to European Unity : Arguments against Federalism", I argued that it was essential that there should be full and thorough public debate of these issues, not only in this country but in all the member states of the European Community.

I am particularly glad that, when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made his statement yesterday, he referred to the fact, as the presidency conclusion showed, that these matters would have to be discussed and considered before any decision could be reached. For that reason, the outcome of the Rome summit was much better. The objective was no longer being pursued on the basis of threats, but on the basis of discussion.

I do not regard the actions of my right hon. Friend the Member for Finchley as having been in any way misconceived. I do not believe that the present Prime Minister or any of those who have played a prominent part in matters relating to Europe during recent months could have agreed to the fixing of a certain date without a programme having been put before them.

We must be properly informed. The European Commission published its proposals for treaty amendment on 21 October. I am disturbed that it took so long for that information to be made available and that I found it necessary to exert such reasonable pressure as I thought necessary to obtain, a week ago last Thursday, the bank statutes from the Bank of England. I now know that a draft treaty on economic and monetary union has been prepared by the Commission. Reference is made to it in the presidency conclusions which, I believe, contain other material that people ought to know about if they are to form a proper view about what is being done.

For many centuries we have entered into treaties and alliances. There is no mystery or magic about the fact that, for more than 400 years, we have entered into treaties and alliances with our colleagues, and sometimes with our adversaries, in Europe. Therefore, I regard the treaties as a perfectly natural development. However, they are being, and have been, rolled into a legal order, which is quite a different thing. As we move on to the next phase, the mixture of politics and law within that legal framework is giving rise to considerable difficulties.

The House has been primarily concerned with the raising of revenues, the disposal of expenditure, grievance, redress of grievance and supply. The proposals for a central bank go to the heart of democracy and consent. The choice by the electorate--the ordinary men and women of this country--of what economic and social priorities they wish is being taken away from them.

For example, the central bank would be created as a matter of primary European law, which would specifically prohibit either the bank or the Bank of England from taking political instructions from any Government. It would sit in secret, would vote by majority voting and would formulate the monetary policy of the Community, including key interest rates and supply and reserves. The board of the bank would be empowered to give instructions to the national central banks, and its council would have the exclusive right to authorise the issuing of notes within the Community--the only notes to have legal

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