House of Commons Hansard Debates for 11 Dec 1990

Mr. Hurd : No, no one has ever pretended that.

Mr. Cohen : The Secretary of State for Defence said that "the operation would be short, sharp and quick".--[ Official Report, 4 December 1990 ; Vol. 182, c. 167.]

Mr. Hurd : The existence of the military option is the strongest possible expression of collective security and the strongest possible incentive for Iraq to reverse its aggression. That military option is gaining formidable strength on the ground and in the air and Britain is adding notably to that strength.

The aim is a peaceful solution. The Iraqis see the array that is now building up against them. They know of the authority that is backing that array, which now comes from so many nations and from the United Nations. Now that it has become clear and is no longer blurred, they have a powerful incentive and reason to comply. Let us keep the message clear and not confuse it with secondary issues. The message is a double one--if the aggressor stays in Kuwait, he will be forced out ; if he leaves Kuwait and complies fully with the Security Council resolutions, he will not be attacked.

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There is a peace option. It is in Saddam Hussein's hands. We are working for peace and will go on working for peace, but the doctrine of peace at any price leads not to safety but to danger.

Dr. Dafydd Elis Thomas (Meirionnydd Nant Conwy) rose --

Mr. Hurd : Our policy is clear, firm and reasonable. In commending it to the House, I hope that it will have the backing of all who believe in the possibilities of collective security and a safer world.

4.9 pm

Mr. Gerald Kaufman (Manchester, Gorton) : It is now 19 weeks, more than four months, since the Gulf crisis broke. In the Labour party, we have been guided by two principles during that period. The first is that the House of Commons must regularly have the opportunity to discuss the crisis and the role of the United Kingdom in it. That is why we asked for the recall of the House in September. That is why we have asked for and obtained a series of statements from the Government. That is why we have tabled a series of private notice questions and that is why we asked for today's debate. The debate is being held at the request of the Opposition. We thought that it was especially important that the House should have the opportunity to discuss the situation before we rose for the Christmas recess, bearing in mind the date of 15 January contained in United Nations resolution 678, which was carried by the Security Council the week before last.

Our second principle--of paramount and overriding importance to us--is that the role of the United Nations shall be central to all actions taken to resolve the crisis and that the decisions and policies of the United Nations must at all times be upheld and supported. That is all the policies and all the decisions. That includes the authorisation, in resolution 660, of negotiations between Kuwait and Iraq, following unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait by Iraq, and it includes the insistence, in resolution 660 right through to resolution 678, of complete and unconditional withdrawal by Iraq from Kuwait. It is important to bear it in mind that the international coalition responsible for those resolutions is supported by the League of Arab States.

The League of Arab States made a specific declaration, after the first United nations resolutions were passed, supporting those resolutions calling for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.

Four months after the outbreak of the crisis, it is important to recall how it began. Many right hon. and hon. Members will wish to discuss the issue of force--whether it is right to use it and, if so, at what point and with what justification. It is understandable and right that the House should consider so grave a possibility. Further, it is right to remember that force has already been used in this crisis. Force started this crisis, with the unprovoked military invasion by Iraq of Kuwait, an innocent and peaceful neighbour. There has been killing in Kuwait, as newly returned hostages have confirmed and described. Kuwaiti refugees, whom I met when I visited the Gulf, described to me how babies had been torn from incubators. There has been rape. There has been looting on perhaps an unprecedented scale. When the House, in a sober mood, considers how

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best to respond to the crisis, it is right that we should remember how it began and why the United Nations Security Council responded as it did.

Mr. Geoffrey Dickens (Littleborough and Saddleworth) : The right hon. Gentleman talked about the way in which the conflict began. Does he recall that the Kuwaiti Government lent billions of pounds to Iraq to assist it in its war against Iran and when the Iraqi Government visited Kuwait and asked it to waive those massive loans it would not agree to do so? Saddam Hussein returned to his country, mobilised his army and caused all this death and destruction because he was unwilling to repay a loan. In other words, he welshed on a debt.

Mr. Kaufman : On 7 September I referred to the fact that Iraq had--

Dr. Thomas : On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The hon. Member for Littleborough and Saddleworth (Mr. Dickens) has used an unparliamentary expression about a minority nationality within the United Kingdom.

Mr. Speaker : I do not think that the hon. Member for Littleborough and Saddleworth (Mr. Dickens) accused the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Dr. Thomas) of having welshed on a bet. Nevertheless interventions of that kind are best made in a speech if the hon. Gentleman is called.

Mr. Kaufman : I am not sure to what extent the intervention of the hon. Member for Littleborough and Saddleworth (Mr. Dickens) was necessary since the information that he sought to provide, without the objectionable word he used, was well known to all hon. Members. There were, of course, other reasons for the invasion, including a dispute over oil prices and oil production, access to the Gulf and other matters. It was a complex set of circumstances.

The Security Council has now passed 12 resolutions dealing with the matter. Since the House met in September it has passed seven resolutions and, in addition to resolution 678 carried the week before last, they have included the authorisation of an air blockade to enforce sanctions.

Since the House last debated the issue, there have been two other important developments. First, there was the invitation by President Bush to Saddam Hussein for talks between the United States and Iraq. Despite the problems encountered in fixing suitable dates, we hope that the talks will take place soon. They could play an important part in resolving the crisis. Secondly, last week Iraq, in announcing the unconditional release of all foreign hostages, complied with Security Council resolution 664. That is an important success for the United Nations sanctions policy. Apart from our satisfaction that the inhuman and illegal detention of innocent persons is coming to an end, the Labour party is particularly gratified that, for the first time, Iraq has complied with a Security Council resolution. We now call upon Iraq to comply with the other 11 resolutions and withdraw from Kuwait--all of Kuwait.

There is one simple and obvious way for the crisis to be resolved peacefully and without further bloodshed and loss of innocent lives, and that is for Iraq to reverse its act of aggression and withdraw from the territory that it holds illegally and against every principle of international law.

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Let Iraq withdraw now. If Saddam Hussein does not withdraw speedily, two options remain to secure his compliance with the United Nations resolutions--the use of force and the use of sanctions. I put them in that order not to imply a preference for force but simply because I wish to put to the House in a considered way what the Labour party has said about each of the options.

There is no doubt that at any time since 2 August article 51 of the United Nations charter could have been invoked to trigger the use of force. Article 51 says :

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The applicability of article 51 to the crisis was specifically endorsed in Security Council resolution 661, which was passed on 6 August. That was the resolution which imposed economic sanctions. It included an affirmation on what it called

"the inherent right of individual or collective self defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with article 51 of the Charter."

There can be no doubt about that. Since 2 August, it has been open to Kuwait to request friendly countries to liberate its territory by force under article 51.

Mr. Edward Heath (Old Bexley and Sidcup) : The matter is not quite as straightforward as the right hon. Gentleman suggests. If he rereads article 51 carefully, he will see that the individual right rests until the United Nations itself takes over. That means that no individual right to the use of force is left after the United Nations takes over. The use of force by the United Nations has to be put forward by the Security Council and not by individual states.

Mr. Kaufman : In a moment, I shall come to why I do not support the use of article 51. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) would have been correct if the United Nations Security Council had not passed resolution 661. Resolution 660, which was passed on 2 August, was the straightforward resolution on the day of the invasion which called for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally. One would have assumed that, under the part of article 51 to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred, the right of invoking article 51 was then subsumed by the decision of the United Nations in resolution 661 to take sanctions action. That would have been my assumption and that is why I regard it as significant and remarkable that, while the United Nations took that action in resolution 661, it also reaffirmed in that resolution

"the inherent right of individual or collective self defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait, in accordance with article 51 of the charter."

The Security Council said that, despite the part of article 51 that the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup has quite properly quoted, article 51 remained as a resource to Kuwait should it wish it.

I want now to explain to the House why, even so, we in the Labour party have not believed in the invocation of article 51 in any case. When she was Prime Minister, the

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right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) several times cited article 51 as a justification for the use of force, and the Foreign Secretary did so many times. However, throughout the crisis, we in the Labour party have repeatedly stated our concern about the use of force under article 51. The Foreign Secretary can confirm that, in my conversations with him, I have repeatedly warned against using article 51 as a justification for force.

My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition repeated the warning in his speech to the House on6 September. On the following day, I said :

"It is not enough to be able to argue a technical case under article 51 If the international consensus is broken as a result of action that key permanent members of the Security Council either cannot support or actively oppose, not only will there be no effective United Nations machinery available to police a settlement, but there will not be a settlement to police."

In my speech to the Labour party conference in October, I quoted a declaration by the Trades Union Congress. It said :

"It would be damaging to the UN and to the interests of working people caught up in the crisis if resort was made to unilateral military action. It is essential therefore, if the UN is to fully develop its role and enhance its authority that it should have the full backing of government and that they act consistently in upholding the Charter."

On 7 September, I said :

"We"--

that is, the Labour party--

"believe that any further operations found necessary should be clearly and unequivocally authorised by the United Nations."--[ Official Report, 7 September 1990 ; Vol. 177, c. 892-93.] That has been the Labour party's position throughout.

On a naval blockade, the Government at first said that article 51 was sufficient authority and justification. I, on behalf of the Labour party, called for a Security Council resolution, and one was in due course passed. On an air blockade, the Government at first said that article 51 was sufficient authority and justification. I, on behalf of the Labour party, called for a Security Council resolution, and one was in due course passed.

I know that the House will accept that I do not cite those examples in any way to score points. [Interruption.] It is foolish for Conservative Members to scoff when I am trying to put a serious argument on these matters, but I am afraid it is typical of the small minority of silly Conservative Members.

I cite those points to illustrate and emphasise that, at all stages of the crisis, the Labour party has insisted on clear and unequivocal United Nations authority for any action taken. Of course, on the gravest form of action--the use of force to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait-- we have been especially firm. In the House on6 September, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, said : "if military action were taken when sanctions had been in force for only a matter of weeks or months, or when there had been no further provocation, or when there had been no further effort to achieve agreement to a mandate to attack, either in the Security Council or in the military staff committee, that military action could shatter the consensus that has been built."--[ Official Report, 6 September 1990 ; Vol. 177, c. 747.]

That is the argument that my right hon. Friend put to the House when we debated this matter. It was on that basis that, in October, the Labour party conference

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overwhelmingly carried a statement that declared that the United Kingdom Government's decision to send British forces to the region was "necessary and justified". It may be noted that, at our conference, even a resolution that was rejected as being too limiting on the scope of action by the United Nations, and therefore defeated by 4,862,000 to 625,000 votes, nevertheless called on the British Government not to commit forces to international operations against Iraq

"unless they have explicit authorisation under a resolution passed by the Security Council."

I have since restated our clear position on a number of occasions. I said that

"there should be clear United Nations authority if force was to be invoked and that that authority must be obvious not simply to legalists invoking article 51 of the United Nations charter, but to the judgment of the world community".--[ Official Report, 24 October 1990 ; Vol. 178, c. 337.]

On 8 November, during the debate on the Queen's Speech, I stated : "We"--

that is, the Labour party--

"are extremely keen that United Nations authority should be available for any action that is taken, if action by force should be taken."--[ Official Report , 8 November 1990 ; Vol. 180, c. 160.] Even at that stage the Government still publicly regarded article 51 as sufficient, but, the next day, following the visit to London by Mr. James Baker, the United States Secretary of State, the United Kingdom Government finally accepted that a Security Council resolution was necessary to authorise the use of force. That resolution was carried on 29 November, and, in accordance with the stand that my party has taken throughout the crisis, I told the House that that resolution fulfilled the stipulations that we had repeatedly laid down since 2 August.

Mr. Donald Thompson (Calder Valley) : I ask the right hon. Member a question that is asked in other places : "Is that the verdict of you all?"

Mr. Kaufman : The Labour party has a firm policy, carried overwhelmingly by our party conference, and everybody who cites conference decisions must accept that policy.

A resolution authorising the use of force--Security Council resolution 678- -has been carried. The question we have to consider is whether that resolution, and therefore that use of force, should be invoked. War is a dreadful option. No one should imagine for a moment that a war to liberate Kuwait could be painless--the clean, surgical strike calmly referred to by those whose lives would not be at risk in such a conflict. When I went to the Gulf, I visited our service men there. I met and conversed with many from my area, including the son of a constituent. If there is a war, and if there are casualties, those casualties will not, for me, be abstract. I shall see before me the eager faces of the young men whom I met.

It is possible that a war could be speedy and relatively free of casualties, but no one should launch a war on that assumption. Any launching of war should always be on the worst case assumption. A few weeks ago, I had a discussion on this very matter with Yitzhak Rabin, the former Prime Minister of Israel, who was chief of staff at the time of the six-day war. He pointed out that, although that conflict is known as the six-day war, when it was launched, the Israelis had no idea how long it would last,

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how many people would be killed or what the outcome might be. As Mr. Rabin said to me, "It is easy to go into a war. It is less easy to know how you will come out of it."

The overwhelming preference of the Labour party, which I am sure is the overwhelming preference of the House and of the country, is for a resolution of this crisis by the use of sanctions to force the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. I put this view in the House nearly two months ago, when I asked the Foreign Secretary to

"confirm that it is our objective that sanctions should achieve the liberation of Kuwait, with force an option to be invoked by the international community only if there is clear evidence over a sufficient period that sanctions cannot achieve that United Nations objective"--

Sir David Steel (Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale) : Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Kaufman : I will not, if the right hon. Gentleman will forgive me, because I have a careful argument that I should like to pursue. The Foreign Secretary told me in reply that I had

"stated exactly the position that we all take."--[ Official Report, 24 October 1990 ; Vol. 178, c. 337-38.]

Resolution 678, passed on 29 November, authorised the use of force, or necessary means, to uphold and implement the Security Council resolution unless

"Iraq on or before January 15 1991 fully implements"

the United Nations resolution. The insertion of a date in that resolution took place at the insistence of the Soviet Union as a condition of that country's support of the resolution. The date was chosen by the Soviet Union. The United States, which sponsored the resolution, did not want a date inserted into it. However, international consensus was required and both a date and any date were part of the process of achieving that consensus. Last week, on 4 December, the spokesman of President Gorbachev, Mr. Vitaly Ignatenko, said :

"The time to implement this resolution is available. The goodwill period is quite sufficient. We emphasise that the resolutions are not ultimatums. It's a last chance to look at what they have done and find a way out".

Stipulation of the date does not necessarily trigger the use of force on or immediately after that date. We in the Labour party repeat our position that the option of force should be invoked only after the maximum time has been given for sanctions to work-- Sir Jim Spicer (Dorset, West) rose--

Mr. Kaufman : Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to continue.

We should not be hemmed in by the date of 15 January. We should not be boxed in by the compulsion of the desert timetable and the effects of the weather on the ability to wage war. If a longer haul is judged likely to achieve the effect of sanctions, we should not rely on other considerations to reject the longer haul.

Important considerations must be borne in mind. How long can the international consensus on sanctions hold together? Clearly the impact of sanctions must not be allowed to fray, or their credibility will not survive and they will cease to be an effective option. How long will Saddam Hussein believe that the United Nations is determined to oust him from Kuwait if the option of force is not invoked and if sanctions remain the only instrument for ousting him? Those are the vital questions which must be answered, and whether to use force and, if so, when will depend on getting those answers right.

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I repeat that it is the overwhelming wish of the Labour party to use sanctions rather than force to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, but he must be ousted from Kuwait unconditionally, as the United Nations resolution states, and from all Kuwait. In this House and at our conference, the Labour party has made it clear that if, in the end, the only way to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait is by force, force will have to be used.

Mr. David Lambie (Cunninghame, South) : My right hon. Friend will have heard the Foreign Secretary's reply to a question asked earlier by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) about whether the Government believe that they now have the power to initiate a war without reference back to either the United Nations or the British House of Commons. Will my right hon. Friend explain the position of the official Opposition on this point?

Mr. Kaufman : We take a very clear view, which I shall continue to amplify before I sit down, which is that, in the end, the will of the United Nations must prevail. That is the key criterion : the will of the United Nations must prevail, preferably without the use of force, but in resolution 678 the United Nations has now authorised the use of force. We hope that it will not be used, but it is there with the United Nations' authority to be used.

There are two reasons why we in the Labour party take the view that Saddam Hussein cannot be allowed to remain in Kuwait and why we say that unequivocally. First, if Iraq were allowed to retain Kuwait despite the clearly and repeatedly expressed determination of the United Nations that he should get out, he would, quite simply, have won. He would know that he had defied the international community with impunity.

An Iraq that had swallowed Kuwait and got away with it would be an Iraq that bestrode the middle east. It would be an Iraq with the power already to wage chemical and biological warfare and with nothing to stop it from acquiring nuclear weapons. A triumphant Iraq which, having got away with one act of aggression and taken control of 20 per cent. of the world's oil, might at some stage feel free to move further into Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. It might feel free to absorb Jordan and it might confront Israel.

I hate the idea of a war to free Kuwait. I hate even more the possibility of a wider middle east conflagration that could involve the use of nuclear weapons, the consequences and implications of which would be incalculable.

The second reason why Iraq cannot be allowed to remain in Kuwait is that if it did so, that would shatter the United Nations. I have been asked repeatedly throughout the crisis whether we in the Labour party support the Conservative Government on this issue. I have repeatedly replied that that is not the right question. The right question is, "Do we in the Labour party support the United Nations?" The answer, in accordance with our party constitution, is that we do, absolutely and unequivocally. The right question is, "Do the British Conservative Government support the United Nations?" Repeatedly we in the Labour party have pressed the Government to support the United Nations and act only through it.

I said in the House on 7 September that the Labour party would not give the Government a blank cheque. We

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have not given them a blank cheque. We have pressed them both publicly and privately to act only in accordance with clear and unequivocal United Nations' authority. That is the test by which we have judged the Government's actions, and by which we shall continue to judge their actions.

It is utterly essential that the will of the United Nations should prevail on the matter of Iraq and Kuwait.

Mr. Lambie : What about the House of Commons?

Mr. Kaufman : I respect my hon. Friend's view. I know that he has sincere pacifist principles. Anyone in the Labour party must always respect those principles. But we in the Labour party have a commitment to the United Nations, and that commitment must prevail.

Mr. Benn : Is it my right hon. Friend's view that the Government should commit British forces to action without the explicit consent of the House of Commons? The Democrats and many others in the United States Congress are demanding that their consent should be obtained.

Mr. Kaufman : The constitutional position in the United States is, of course, different from the position here. The Congress is part of the Government and it believes that its consent is required. There is a dispute between the executive and the legislature on that point. I have said many times, and I said at the beginning of my speech today, that the Labour party has continually brought the matter before the House. As the 15 January deadline is only a day after the return of the House from the Christmas recess, we specifically asked that the House should debate the matter before the Christmas recess. Regardless of any constitutional niceties, we believed that the House should have the right to debate this issue.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) used the word "decided". If it is a matter of deciding, and if deciding deals with his misgivings, he can be sure that there is a majority on the Conservative Benches--regardless of the view on the Opposition Benches--for such a decision. My right hon. Friend said at the Labour party conference that if we did not vote in the way in which he wished us to vote we would give a mandate for war. The Labour party did not vote in the way in which he wished us to vote.

Mr. Benn : May I point out to my right hon. Friend that I did not speak at the Labour party conference?

Mr. Kaufman : I do not know whether my right hon. Friend could have reversed a vote of 600,000 to 4,800,000, although I know that his eloquence is considerable.

We are clear that the United Nations is being tested by this crisis. Twelve Security Council resolutions have been carried--the strongest series of resolutions ever carried by the Security Council. The resolutions authorised sanctions, blockade and force. If they are not complied with, the Security Council will have been seen to be nothing but an empty and futile talking shop. There will be no point in the Security Council passing any more resolutions on anything. There will be no point in its having any more meetings on anything. There will be no point in the Security Council even existing. Chaos will rule the world.

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Yet if the Security Council prevails and its authority is demonstrated as never before, instead of world chaos there will be the basis and precedent for world order. The United Nations will begin to acquire authority to deal with other vexed issues such as the western Sahara, Kashmir and Palestine. If the Security Council fails on Kuwait, there will be no hope of compelling an intractable Israeli Government to respond to the aspirations of the Palestinian people for self -determination. However, if the Security Council succeeds on Kuwait a precedent will have been set for the western Sahara, Kashmir and the Palestinians.

We in the Labour party have long joined with the four permanent members of the Security Council, the Israeli Labour party, the League of Arab States and the Palestine Liberation Organisation in calling for an international conference to deal with all the issues in the middle east. It could achieve peace treaties between Israel and Syria and Jordan and Lebanon, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, Palestinian self- determination with built-in guarantees for the security of Israel and all other participating countries, and provision to find a decent solution to the ordeal of the Palestinian refugees. It could rid the middle east of nuclear and chemical weapons and prevent any other nations from acquiring a nuclear or chemical capability. It could work for an international code of practice to limit and control arms sales in the region. Not only to solve the Kuwait issue but for the even more crucial reasons that I have listed, I am adamant that the United Nations must succeed in the objectives that it has set itself on Kuwait.

There is no need for a vote tonight. If there is a vote, I shall vote in the No Lobby. For 11 years I have worked in the House against this Conservative Government and I shall not rest until they are defeated in a general election. I shall not vote in the No Lobby because I have any appetite for voting in the same Lobby as the Government. But I shall vote in that Lobby without hesitation because I want to send a signal to Saddam Hussein that the Labour party is unequivocal in its support of the United Nations, that we do not pick and choose between the articles of the charter or between Security Council resolutions, that we accept the entire charter, that we uphold all the resolutions and that we shall not yield or rest in our determination that order shall rule in the world and that that order shall be based on the authority of the United Nations Organisation. 4.47 pm

Mr. Edward Heath (Old Bexley and Sidcup) : I thank my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary for both the tone and content of his speech, which were welcome. I hope that when my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence replies to the debate he will be able to deliver his speech in the same way.

I wish to finish the discussion that I had across the Floor of the House with the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman). I accept entirely that he wants United Nations action. But I still disagree with his interpretation of article 51. If he looks again at resolution 661, he will see that it does not say that the right exists in place of or as an alternative to article 51. It says that the right is in accordance with article 51. It reiterates the present position in resolution 660. I say that only

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because on a future occasion it may be of even greater importance that action should not be taken by an individual power.

I was glad to hear my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary's words about the hostages who are now returning to England in large numbers. I shall make just one point about that, drawn from the experience that we have had since a considerable number of hostages returned with me a few weeks ago. There is a major problem of adjustment to the conditions of ordinary life. That is, perhaps, true of those who were with me because most were ill, some dying, and others were very old and infirm ; but I suspect that it is even more true of those who have been in hiding in Kuwait, as well as those who have been in Iraq, experiencing reasonable conditions but denied their freedom.

I hope that the Government will do everything possible to arrange for a service to be provided for those people. It would probably be best if the means for them to contact counsellors were set out in a leaflet which could be given to them on the planes, or when they arrive at Heathrow or Gatwick. It will then be up to them to seek advice, but I know that many counsellors up and down the country would be only too willing to help them through what is bound to be a difficult four, six or eight-week period after their arrival. Before I deal with the basic issues, let me say a word about Jordan. When my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary spoke about the countries close to Iraq, he did not mention Jordan : no doubt that was not a deliberate omission from the long list that he gave. Jordan has suffered more than any other country--apart from Kuwait--as a result of the Iraqi move, and it is still suffering. According to the latest figure that I have been given, it has dealt with 808,000 refugees who have passed through it, excluding Jordanians themselves.

The United Nations estimates the cost to Jordan as some $60 million, but Jordan has been given only $4 million to help to cover that cost. Survival is therefore a major problem for Jordan. It has been calculated--again, by the International Monetary Fund--that, if the crisis continues for the rest of the year, Jordan will lose over 55 per cent. of its gross domestic product this year.

We must ask how long Jordan can last out in such circumstances, and what we can do to enable it to survive economically. King Hussein has been a friend of ours for many years, and has supported us often in the middle east--as, indeed, we have supported him--but, in the present circumstances, it is difficult to see how, without immediate action, Jordan can survive. I am afraid that there are those, particularly in the United States, who say, "Do what we tell you, and then we shall see whether we can help." In my view, that is not diplomacy : it is not the way in which to treat a friend who is in great difficulty. The right way is to try to understand his position--in this instance, a unique position in relation to Iraq--and then say, "In what way can we help? We will do so as speedily as possible." I hope that the Government will be able to deal with this matter speedily, because it is urgent.

Let me now turn to the main issues in what is a very sober debate. Having recently travelled in Europe, the middle east and the far east, and across the United States, I have returned to hear noises that make this--in part of the House--the most bellicose unit in the world. I shall not allow that to dismay me ; I think that we must deal with the situation as we find it, here and in the middle east.

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Resolution 660 was the first to be passed by the United Nations, and governs all its other resolutions, which are there to amplify it. It contains three short paragraphs. The first

"condemns the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait".

The second

"demands that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August 1990" ;

The third

"calls upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin immediately intensive negotiations for the resolution of their differences and supports all efforts in this regard, and especially those of the League of Arab States".

The important point is that paragraphs 2 and 3 both use the word "immediately" ; they are therefore together. It is remarkable that, in all the speeches made by President Bush, Mr. Baker and the Front-Bench spokesmen in the House, paragraph 3 has never been mentioned, although it is just as important as paragraph 2. If paragraph 3 is to be carried through in the same way as paragraph 2, there must be discussions with Baghdad as well as with the Kuwaiti Government in exile--the emir and his relations--about how they are to resolve their differences. I should have thought that in the first place this was a matter for the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but, from all the inquiries that I have made, I gather that he seems to have been put into a straitjacket, so other means must be found. There is an urgent need for members of our Government to play a part in arrangements for paragraph 3 to be dealt with at the same time as paragraph 2.

The former Prime Minister said that there is nothing to discuss, but there is an immense amount to discuss--for instance, the question of unconditional withdrawal. I said to President Saddam Hussein--having dealt first with the hostages--that there should be an immediate withdrawal, to which he replied, "If I withdraw, what undertaking will you give me that the Americans or the British will not move into Kuwait and then be in a better position to wage war against me than they are at present?" I said, "I can give you no undertaking ; I have no status." My answer is, however, that the Arab League itself must form a buffer round Kuwait, and, if necessary, to the north of Kuwait, to guarantee that the forces now in Saudi Arabia do not attempt to go into Kuwait and put themselves into a better tactical and strategic position.

My view was reinforced by what the Secretary of State for Defence said on 7 September :

"What I am saying in respect of His Royal Highness Prince Sultan, the Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia, is the position. We are not there to attack Kuwait or Iraq. We are there to defend Saudi Arabia and to ensure that the United Nations embargo is effectively implemented."-- [Official Report, 7 September 1990 ; Vol. 177, c. 842.]

That is why we are there, and that must be borne in mind when we are discussing the whole question of what military action will be taken. As far as I know, that is still the position : we are there to defend Saudi Arabia, and to ensure that the United Nations shipping and air embargo and the sanctions are implemented.

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