House of Commons Hansard Debates for 19 Dec 1990

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sub-sea valves. Occidental and Texaco, the two companies most affected by the Piper Alpha tragedy, made that decision, and many others have followed suit. The Government have yet to introduce the regulations that were promised to me in August 1988. Therefore, I should like the Minister to tell us where we are on that important issue.

The Minister has made a significant and full statement about the requests made by a number of oil companies for exemption from the regulations that require the top-side valves to be relocated before the end of the year. I accept that there has been a thorough investigation, but must ask why it is that these applications were made, and we have had a response from the Minister so late in the day. This is a crucial issue. Location of sub-sea values is a technical issue, and I do not pretend to understand it fully, but I am aware of the problems of location and of the fact that responsibility for location and inspection of location were highlighted by the Burgoyne committee as far back as 1981. There appears to have been no action since. Paragraph 5.64 of the report makes specific reference to the grey area of the pipeline. We saw the predictions in that report unfortunately and tragically fulfilled in what happened to Piper Alpha.

That tragedy happened on the night of 6 July and the early morning of 7 July 1988, and now, at the end of 1990, a large number of oil companies, are still asking for exemptions. It is noticeable that this includes the largest of the oil companies. In particular, Shell has received exemption for 14 of the sub-sea valves in the Brent system. As one of the largest operators, it has one of the largest problems, so it is difficult to understand why so many exemptions have been granted in that field. Shell has had the same amount of time as every other operator in the North sea to install the valves. Is there something about the Brent field that requires that number of exemptions to be granted?

I should like some explanation of what the Minister means by "restrictive conditions". He has described three areas where there will be more restrictions and these seem to be sensible moves when the sub-sea valves are not to be installed immediately. However, we need to know what implication that has for the overall safety of the platform. What consideration has been given to that?

What time scale will apply to the exemptions? When are the sub-sea valves to be finally installed? It is not good enough to leave our work force out there in the North sea, albeit with these new restrictions, without the essential safety of the removal of the valves to a safe location on the platform. This is particularly so when we know that the platforms involved- -the Forties, the Brent system, Thistle, Murchison and Balmoral--are among the oldest in the North sea. Consequently, they have the highest risk.

In any debate on North sea safety, the Piper Alpha tragedy overshadows every aspect of our discussions. Many tributes have been paid to Lord Cullen for the clarity of his report, the detail of it and the precision that he applied. I believe that the report will often be referred to by generations to come as a model for the way in which such issues should be addressed. I hope that it will not need to be referred to too often. Lord Cullen brought to his task all the best qualities of the Scottish lawyer. The Scottish legal system is based on principle, not on precise rules. Lord Cullen sought--I believe that he achieved his objective--to apply principles and to explain and set out the principles which should apply to safety in the North

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sea. The report has been welcomed by all. Given the fraught nature of the industry, especially in the context of industrial relations, it is a tribute to Lord Cullen that he was able to produce a report to which everyone was able to agree.

Crucial issues arise from the report, not the least of which is the transfer of responsibility from the Department of Energy to the Health and Safety Executive. Lord Cullen was emphatic that there were major difficulties in the Department of Energy, one of which was resourcing. There was a failure to apply the mind--I blame the political mind--to ensure that North sea safety was properly policed. There was a lack of real political direction. It is clear that the safety inspectorate was the Cinderella of the Department. The efforts of the Department rapidly to increase salaries and to appoint a new safety director before the Cullen report were cynical moves. But enough of that carping criticism. We must look forward. The question of blame lies in the past. Lord Cullen has reported on that and his words are clear. We must ensure that the Piper Alpha tragedy does not recur. There must be an adequate system of supervision. Everyone must know exactly what his or her task is. Responsibility must be allocated fairly.

There is still no precise detail about when the complete transfer of responsibility will take place. Several possible dates have been suggested, the most likely of which seems to be 1 April 1991. There is an urgent need for the Government to define precisely where responsibility for safety lies in the interim period of transfer from the Department of Energy to the Health and Safety Executive. Many of Lord Cullen's recommendations require urgent action by the industry. The representatives of oil companies whom I meet regularly have told me that they wish to proceed quickly to implement the

recommendations. I have firm evidence to substantiate that from my contact with them.

The industry requires prompt technical discussions with the regulatory body to define and agree the detailed interpretation of the report and, of course, its consequences. There are specific examples to show that delay would be inexcusable. The first is the preparation of a safety case for each installation. That is the most far-reaching of Lord Cullen's recommendations. It will lead to the provision of a complete dossier to demonstrate that the operator has identified the major hazards of the installation and has provided appropriate controls, that the operator has provided in each installation a temporary safe refuge for personnel in the event of a major emergency and means of evacuation, escape and rescue, and that the operator's safety management system is adequate to ensure the safe design and operation of the installation.

There is an urgent need for the Government to provide expert advice to operators on the detailed scope, format and timetable for the safety case. I hope that the Minister will give us some idea of who will do this and when it will be done.

Another consideration is acceptance standards for risk of death offshore. Lord Cullen's fifth main recommendation concerns setting acceptance standards for overall risk of death or injury to personnel on an installation. Standards are also to be set for the endurance of the

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temporary safe refuge during major emergencies. Initially, these standards are to be set by the regulatory body. They will be the most important standards to be set. They will determine ultimately the risks of accidents or death to offshore workers. They form the cornerstone of any safety case, as all the elements of the safety case, taken together, must satisfy the overall acceptance standards. Those standards must be determined quickly, because without them work on the safety cases for new and existing installations cannot be taken very far. It is also important that the process for setting those standards be open to discussion and scrutiny by all parties with a legitimate interest, including operators and offshore workers and their representatives. Who is responsible for setting those standards? What process will be followed? What is the timetable for conclusion?

There is also a question about the resources for the Health and Safety Executive. We understand that the executive and the Treasury are discussing the matter. It is determining what its budget is likely to be, and clearly it has a long and uphill struggle with the Treasury to achieve an adequate budget. The system that prevails in the Department of Energy, which led to inadequate supervision and to criticism by Lord Cullen, cannot continue. The HSE must be adequately resourced. I hope that the Treasury's starting point in its discussions with the HSE will not be the miserly payment made to the HSE each year for the Department's expenditure on safety. As was shown in an answer to a parliamentary question of mine just over a year ago, that amounted to £500,000 a year. It is clear that the safety system envisaged by Lord Cullen cannot be provided for that sort of money. It is important that the Department of Energy, and the Secretary of State in particular, put their full weight behind the HSE's arguments.

Recommendation 22 says that the regulatory body should review its procedures for consultation with representatives of employers and of offshore employees in preparing new guidance notes on safety offshore. Lord Cullen made it clear that he fully recognised the value of involving those who work offshore in the new safety regime. We expect that the Health and Safety Commission, as a tripartite body overseeing the HSE, will share that view and ensure that proper mechanisms for consultation are developed. It is not sufficient only to involve the work force through existing installation safety committees. Many of the new guidance notes will affect the design of new installations and will cover complex technical and engineering matters.

The only effective means of representation for offshore workers on such matters is through the trade unions, and I shall say more about that later. They have the resources to commission studies and to present findings to the HSE. All the trade unions involved with the HSE onshore have developed technical departments that can give advice to work forces. Certainly, offshore that advice will be crucial and fundamental. Large sections of the offshore work force wish to be represented by their trade unions in the new safety regime, yet employers have stubbornly resisted that change.

Anyone seriously interested in achieving high safety standards recognises that the genuine and informed participation of the work force is essential. The more enlightened companies offshore recognise that that applies not only to safety, but to overall quality and the success of the whole enterprise. Is it not time that the Government

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took on board that message and encouraged employers to be more co-operative towards trade union representation offshore?

Mr. Tim Devlin (Stockton, South) : How might that be achieved? Many of my constituents work in the offshore industry, and their experience is that safety officers are often NRB-ed--that is, not required back--when they are sent on leave. Anyone involved in that sort of representation frequently ends up without a job.

Mr. Doran : I am surprised to have the hon. Gentleman on my side. We have been hammering away about that issue for years. I am being careful not to criticise the industry too much because I know that progress is being made. I shall be happy to discuss with the hon. Gentleman any examples of discrimination that have been reported to him. I am pleased that he has been able to add to the views that have been expressed to me by my constituents who work offshore, but who are consistently denied representation by the Government and the oil companies. Clearly, the independence of the health and safety representative and the health and safety committee is crucial. Employers onshore have learnt that an independent committee can enhance and improve safety as long as they are prepared to trust their work forces. That clearly is not the position offshore at the moment.

Many oil companies refuse to trust their work forces and to allow them to participate through their trade unions. The companies will pay the price in poor productivity and high operating costs, of which there are many examples in the North sea. The areas with the lowest productivity and the highest operating costs have the worst industrial relations.

The country pays the price in lost oil production. Offshore workers may pay the highest price of all because of poor safety. Oil companies risk their capital ; oil workers risk their lives. That is becoming a cliche , but it is true. Piper Alpha, Brent Spar and all the other incidents show that, as well as the many unreported deaths offshore.

There have been significant developments in industrial relations during the past few days. During the past two years there have been some serious offshore disputes, and there is a real threat of industrial problems again next year. At the root is the genuine sense of frustration felt by the work force as a result of its working conditions. The oil companies tend not to trust their employees--at least the majority do not. They tend to operate a system which militates against communication and the development of skills and identification with a particular workplace.

Almost two thirds of employees offshore are employed through the user contracting system. There is no continuity of employment. The expression NRB is common in my office. If a man's card is stamped NRB he is not required back because he is a trouble-maker or a safety representative who asked the wrong questions. That is the history of the North sea and it is a problem which needs to be dealt with. I am pleased that the oil companies seem to be coming round to recognising that, but there is still a long way to go.

It is worth mentioning the offshore industry liaison committee, an unofficial body that has been established in my constituency in Aberdeen and seeks to represent the work force offshore.

Mr. Devlin : I thought that it was in Newcastle.

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Mr. Doran : It is in Glasgow, Newcastle, Hull and Great Yarmouth, but its main base is in Aberdeen. It has established other bases round the country because of the migrant work force which moves to Aberdeen from those places.

The people who formed the OLC recognised that the major problems for the work force offshore were not being met by the trade unions. It is appropriate here to recognise that the trade unions have not always represented their members quite as they should have done, mainly because of the difficulties of representing a mobile work force. Men move from rig to rig and from platform to platform at short notice, employed by a company based onshore, but working offshore. They work for a number of different oil companies, many of which employ the same contractors. Therefore, it is difficult to represent the work force and the OLC has filled the vacuum. It has been behind the industrial action during the past two years. It is significant to record the amount of support from offshore workers that the OLC has enjoyed. Several thousand workers responded by taking industrial action--not by any means the whole work force, but certainly a significant proportion of it, and enough to cause real difficulties during the past two summers. The oil companies have been forced to respond by looking at their working practices, not only because of Lord Cullen's report, which makes extremely important recommendations, but because of the success of the action carried out by the OLC. It is clear, too, that the official trade unions now recognise the difficulties involved, and are working hard to improve the position of their members offshore.

I am pleased at reports today that the employer's body--the Offshore Contractors Council--has offered to enter into discussions with the trade unions. There is not total satisfaction with the offer, because it seems fairly restricted, but at least it is a beginning. Discussions will take place with the unions about a possible agreement covering certain categories of offshore workers. The trade union movement will certainly be seeking other agreements, to ensure some regulation of offshore employment and worker protection, and that terms and conditions of employment are standardised and improved. The oil companies offer very satisfactory terms and conditions to their own work forces, but they are, in the main, denied to the workers who are employed by contractors--even though they may be doing the same work side by side with oil workers. There is often a huge disparity between them, and that adds to the frustration.

Mr. Devlin : The hon. Gentleman has a wide knowledge of the industry near his constituency, but there are enormous discrepancies between the conditions on some of the older North sea platforms and those on the newer ones. When I visited the Brent field in the summer, I noted that the accommodation ships moored alongside the Brent were used because the accommodation available on the Brent itself is rather poor. Workers prefer the conditions on the more comfortable Swedish and Finnish accommodation ships. All platforms should be brought up to the standards of the best.

I and my constituents welcome the Cullen report's recommendation that responsibility for safety and for safety inspection should be taken out of the hands of the Department, which has not fulfilled its obligations in that respect very well, and be put into the hands of the Health and Safety Executive. Many would like the same

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conditions to prevail in the North sea as prevail on land, where an independent inspectorate is available to conduct surprise visits and to examine conditions on behalf of the work force. That is what we all want, and we should welcome such a development.

Mr. Doran : Again, I welcome the hon. Gentleman's agreement with the position that I have often stated. I am pleased that we are finally having an effect, which is enhanced in the case of the hon. Gentleman because of his experience of offshore workers in his constituency.

Some companies are finally making progress. When I visited the Ninian field last year, I met its safety committee and had discussions with the work force. It was clear that the operating company, Chevron, has made a serious attempt to integrate its work force. It employs contractors, as does everyone else, but when it changes contractors, it tries to ensure that the work force remains stable. Chevron has reduced the barriers between its employees and those of contractors, so that everyone who works on the Ninian platform feels that he works for Chevron, no matter who pays his wages.

The company has sought to ensure also that the benefits of its new contracts with agency companies filter through to the work force. That should be done throughout the North sea. I know that the same practice operates in Conoco fields. Those are two of the better offshore companies.

The larger companies have larger problems. I am aware that both BP and Shell recently introduced new systems that should in the longer term, and perhaps in the medium term, improve the lot of offshore workers. Shell and BP decided to go for longer-term contracts and have sought to ensure that they filter through to the work force, so that there will be some continuity of employment. Of course, they have got to try to do what companies such as Chevron have done, and to break down the barriers, so that there is not the animosity and frustration and the contracting work force becomes part of a team and achieves the highest productivity for the industry and the company. Everyone will benefit from that, and there is an enhanced benefit to safety, which is what everyone wants to achieve.

It has always been my view--it is not a novel idea--that one cannot have bad industrial relations and good safety. Until the problems are dealt with properly by the companies involved, there will continue to be poor safety standards in the North sea. I am pleased to see, and I commend, companies such as BP and Shell, which are finally beginning to deal with this problem.

We have had other good news on the industrial relations scene today. One of the unfortunate consequences of the dispute in the summer was that Shell created a blacklist of employees who they were not prepared to have working on their platforms. Recently, I met the chairman of Shell, and the managing director of Shell Exploration and Production and I am pleased to say that, yesterday, the company announced that it would remove the blacklist with effect from 1 January--as I understand it, without qualification. I like to think that I and my hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) had some influence upon Shell's decision--we hope so. In our discussions with the chairman of Shell and the managing director of the exploration company, we heard about Shell's efforts to resolve the difficulties. There was

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not much disagreement between us, and I hope that they will be able to secure their objectives of removing the barriers in the North sea, breaking down the distinctions between company employees and contracted employees and improving safety.

The removal of the blacklist is a crucial step, and I hope that the trade unions will respond to it and that Shell will discuss properly with the offshore trade unions the way ahead. There is a way ahead, but it involves discussions on all sides.

I was involved with the Piper Alpha families' association, which attempted to convene a conference at which the entire industry would be represented in one way or another. The Minister gave me valuable support in arranging that conference, and we hoped that the oil industry and the contractors would be able to come along and discuss, in private, with the trade unions and other interested

parties--including the Health and Safety Executive and the Department of Energy representatives, the trade unions, and the families association--the issues which face the industry, how Lord Cullen's recommendations could be implemented and the problems posed by the industrial dispute.

The oil companies, through the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association, found that they could not attend that conference. I regret that because they missed an opportunity to show the public--who in my part of the world are extremely concerned about the problem of offshore safety-- that they care, too. They stuck behind the barriers that they created during the industrial dispute, when they said that the dispute did not have anything to do with them, but was for the contractors, as the legal employers of the men involved. They said that they had no influence, but that is not the case. They pull the strings in the North sea and have influence. It is the oil companies which need to deal with the problems. I bitterly regret that UKOOA and the Offshore Contractors Council did not feel able to join in a discussion, which had no higher objective than to get people into the same room to discuss this crucial issue.

With the removal of the blacklist, and the possible offer of talks with the trade unions, there is room for progress. I listened carefully to what the hon. Member for Ryedale said. Before the Piper Alpha tragedy it was unlikely that we would have heard a Conservative Member make the contribution which he made, or the interventions by the hon. Member for Stockton, South (Mr. Devlin).

The worries about safety go across party divides and the divides within the industry. It is incombent on everyone in the industry to deal with the problem and to break down the barriers. That is a message to both sides-- the trade unions and the industry--to get together and talk.

In the discussions that I had with the Minister since he took office, I have been impressed by the serious way in which he has dealt with the issues, and how he has already begun to deal with the niggling problems that have beset us. For example, the hon. Member for Ryedale mentioned the need for inspectors to be able to get on to helicopters at short notice and carry out snap inspections. Labour Members have argued for that for a long time, without success, and I was pleased to read recently that the Minister had issued instructions for it to happen.

Such difficulties can be resolved if we address them with an open mind. Lord Cullen has enabled us to do so, and I hope that we can now make progress.

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10.45 pm

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Colin Moynihan) : Let me begin by replying to a point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South (Mr. Doran) about the conference and the response to it of the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association. As he knows, I too was sad that a full house was not possible on that occasion. I note that the conference has been postponed : let me say through the hon. Gentleman-- given his involvement with the organisers--that I very much hope that this is a postponement and not a cancellation, and that it can be reconvened shortly. I hope that UKOOA will respond positively ; certainly I shall, if diaries and the business of the House permit it.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway). We have had occasion to differ on a number of sporting issues in recent years, but I agreed with everything that he said in his speech tonight, which was sensitive and clearly the result of a good deal of detailed analysis and preparation. It was helpful of him to give us our first opportunity to debate the Cullen report in detail.

My hon. Friend rightly paid tribute to all who work in the offshore oil and gas industry. Let me echo those admirable sentiments : I entirely share the esteem in which he holds those people, who often work in very difficult conditions. Let me also place on record my support and respect for our inspectorate, which is composed of men of the highest calibre.

I am glad that mention has been made of Tony Barrell, who has transferred from the Health and Safety Executive. I welcome that move : Tony Barrell has shown tremendous dedication and enthusiasm since the first day. I have had so many meetings with him although he has been in post for only just over a week--that I cannot recall them all in numerical terms, but I can report that he has great expertise, and is willing to learn a good deal about the offshore industry and to steer his team into the 1990s. I know that he will respond positively to any advice and suggestions from hon. Members, whatever their political persuasion. He will proceed with an inspectorate that is professional, well qualified, committed and energetic in the pursuit of safety and excellence.

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South (Mr. Devlin)--I am sorry that he is not present ; I never like criticising hon. Members, especially Conservative Members, when they are not present to hear that criticism, but he was here for only a short time--will pause to reflect. I deeply regretted his innuendo about criticism of the inspectorate. Certainly Lord Cullen criticised the system in which it was operating, but he never suggested that that same inspectorate should not form the core of the new inspectorate which will look into the safety problems confronting the offshore industry in the 1990s. I wish its members well : they have been under the glare of publicity in recent months, and they deserve our full support.

I know that hon. Members on both sides of the House are at one about the importance of what my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South called surprise visits. Although the inspectorate undertakes many surprise visits, it is always difficult, because places have to be booked on helicopters.

We cannot just walk in, as we do onshore. A classic example of that occurred last weekend. At very short notice, two of my inspectors went out to Cormorant Alpha

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and Brent Charlie to assess a number of concerns about topside valves and derogation. They went out with me on a number of recent visits, again at short notice and on one occasion with only a day's notice. I fully support spot visits ; they are important. However, I can give an undertaking that they are already very much in place. I echo what was said by my hon. Friend about the need for a balance to be struck between prescription and operator responsibility for safety management. It will always be a subject for debate, but I agree that Lord Cullen addressed the point sensitively. The operator must be responsible for safety on every platform. That is critical to future safety inspections. An effective audit system to be set up by each operator is equally important. The inspectorate will assess the type of assessment that will be required for safety management. That was not their prime responsibility under the old system.

I can give an undertaking to my hon. Friend that prompt and effective implementation of Lord Cullen's recommendations remain a priority for my Department. I give an undertaking to the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South that we shall devote all our energies to ensuring that adequate resources are provided. It has often been difficult to emply as many inspectors as we wanted to employ, despite a 23 per cent. increase in pay this year for inspectors. It is often difficult to persuade qualified men at the top of their profession to work for the inspectorate, not least when some of the operators seek diligently to employ the same people. We must ensure that the inspectorate is both well staffed and well paid.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for providing us with an early opportunity to debate Lord Cullen's report. The praise that has been accorded to it is fully merited. It is a most impressive report. Apart from being painstaking, thorough and conscientious, it is also a most penetrating report. As someone who approaches the subject without specialised knowledge, it seems to me little short of astonishing that so much can be deduced about what happened in the disaster in the absence of nearly all the physical evidence and despite the loss of the personal testimony of so many of those who were there. Lord Cullen marshalled the evidence in a masterly fashion. His conclusions demand corresponding respect.

The report is no less impressive in its shaping of recommendations for the future, a fact that is reflected in its immediate and unqualified acceptance by the Government. Before I deal with a number of specific points that have arisen in the debate, may I deal with my hon. Friend's reference to the Government's consistency of approach towards offshore safety?

Shortly after the Conservative administration came to power 11 years ago, they received the report of a committee set up by the previous Labour Government. It was the first independent review of offshore safety since the tribunal of inquiry into the Sea Gem disaster in 1968. The principal recommendation of the majority of the committee's members was that responsibility for the regulation of offshore safety should be unified in the hands of the Department of Energy. The trade union representatives on the committee, however, disagreed, and recorded their preference for that responsibility to be given to the Health and Safety Executive.

The Government moved promptly and respnded to the main recommendation. After careful consideration, the action taken, as explained by the then Minister of State, took account of some of the concerns expressed by the

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trade union members in their note of dissent. They had expressed concern that the Health and Safety Commission should not lose its involvement in offshore safety. The solution that was adopted enlarged the commission's involvement. It was enabled to advise the Secretary of State on all his responsibilities for offshore safety. The Government therefore acted promptly, taking full account of the independent advice that was given and, as far as practicable, of other concerns that were raised. Ten years later, we have once again received independent advice on the organisation of safety. Our response has been as prompt and comprehensive as on the earlier occasion.

However, the Government did not wait for the result of the inquiry before taking action. We moved swiftly to ensure that any early lessons that could be drawn from the destruction of Piper Alpha were disseminated as soon as possible. Even before the Department's technical investigation into the cause of the accident was completed, its director of safety wrote to all offshore operators pointing out the safety significance of emergency shut- down valves on oil and gas pipelines and asking for an immediate review by operators of their existing pipelines.

When the technical investigation was complete, the director of safety again wrote to all offshore operators asking them to pay particular attention to several other areas of operator safety systems and procedures when evaluating the technical report. Now that Lord Cullen's report has been published, the Government have wasted no time in putting in hand the necessary arrangements to implement its recommendations.

On the day that the report was published, the Department's director of safety wrote once again to the industry asking it to undertake, without delay, the necessary action to implement those of Lord Cullen's recommendations that were capable of being implemented immediately. The Government are working urgently to progress the detailed work required to implement the rest of the recommendations. I should like to enlarge a little on the information I gave earlier in an intervention on emergency shut-down valves. I am pleased to say that operators have, in general, made good progress and to date, as I said, more than 134 valves have been successfully fitted. I expect a number of others to be completed by the end of the year--for example, on the far north liquids and gas gathering system --FLAG. It is likely to be January before that system comes back on because of gassing up the system, which is a technical and lengthy procedure. We have urged that work should be done on the fitting of those valves.

I have received a number of applications for temporary exemptions to the regulations to allow a longer period for the necessary work to be completed. These applications have been rigorously scrutinised by my inspectors, and in 25 cases I have agreed to temporary exemptions for the minimum time necessary, subject to additional safety restrictions to maintain acceptably safe operations during the period.

In some cases, I believe that work can safely continue during winter conditions, and the extension is for periods of three to six weeks only. In other cases, I support the view of my inspectors that work involving, for example, over-side working cannot safely be done in winter

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conditions. Where my inspectors have accepted this point as relevant, I have agreed to exemptions of up to three months. In no case have I agreed to an exemption exceeding three months. I then had to decide whether operations should accordingly cease on 31 December, and the whole Brent system be shut down. Unless a mode of operation could be devised that was at least as safe as that required by the regulations, shut-down would have been the only course. I am glad to tell the House and those who will continue to be in employment in the next three months--the men on the platforms concerned--that my inspectors have established with the company that there is a mode of operation which meets this stringent safety standard. It involves, in particular, operating the system in what is known as dead crude mode--that is, that the natural gas liquids that are normally carried through the system will not be carried. With the other conditions imposed, that means that operations of the system after 31 December will be at least as safe as they would have been had the valve work been fully completed. Indeed, in some cases it will be more so.

The hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), through the columns of the New Scientist, of which I have become an assiduous reader in recent months, kindly paid tribute to the detail and analysis of the Department on safety and, if I recall rightly, on the emergency shut-down valves and the action to be taken to enhance safety. In the past week, an enormous amount has been put in by my inspectors and me. When I was not happy with the proposals they submitted, I asked them to discuss again with Shell at great length, and with particular reference to the Brent system, the new, tough and expensive conditions for the operators. Those conditions must be implemented if a derogation from the regulations passed by the House is to be given.

Five conditions must be met. First, the pipeline shall not be operated unless the true vapour pressure exerted by the substances within the pipeline is less than 2.07 bar absolute. Measurements shall be taken of the substances in the pipeline at intervals, no longer than 24 hours apart, and the measurements shall demonstrate that the TVP of the substances is below the pressure stated--the dead crude mode.

Secondly, the pipeline shall not be operated unless the pressure is less than that percentage of the pipeline maximum allowable operating pressure as declared in accordance with regulation 6(3)(a) of the Submarine Pipelines Safety Regulations (SI 1982) No. 1513. To the layman, that means that the pipelines shall be operated at reduced pressures. The reduced acceptable operating pressure should be at least 15 per cent. and in some cases up to 55 per cent. That will have a significant impact on the balance sheet of the operators. Although every pipeline has a maximum allowable operating pressure, the pipelines should not be operated unless those pressures are less than the percentage of the pipeline operating pressure as declared in accordance with the regulations.

The third condition is that apparatus or equipment for the testing, inspecting or maintaining of the pipeline shall not be introduced or recovered from the pipeline, unless such introduction or recovery is essential to maintain the safe operation of the pipeline. We are talking, in other words, about pigging. The problem with pigging is that

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there is a potential safety hazard in the opening and closing of pipelines and pressure valves. That is why it is important to apply this condition.

Fourthly, work involving the use of naked flames, or the generation of sparks shall not be carried out in the vicinity of the pipeline between the existing emergency shut-down valve and the proposed new location of the ESD valve unless that work is essential to maintain or enhance the safety of the installation to which the pipeline is connected. There are clear restrictions on hot works.

The fifth condition ensures that the pipeline shall not be operated unless the pipeline between the existing ESD valve and the proposed new location of the ESD valve is visually inspected at intervals, no longer than three hours apart, for signs of leakage or damage and for any activities which might present a hazard to the pipeline. Initially, I was in favour of a shorter interval between inspections, but if there was a visual inspection every hour, it would take the best part of half an hour to get down from one of the large platforms to undertake that inspection. We believe that the three-hour provision--albeit a rigorous condition to be placed on the operators--is the shortest time interval between such visual inspections.

Mr. Doran : We know that the Brent system has had serious problems. I recollect that the expected production from the system was about 200,000 barrels a day. That production level has not been achieved since at least May 1989. The last time I checked, current production was around 1,700 barrels a day. Does Shell anticipate any increase in that production or is that the production level on which the exemption was given?

Mr. Moynihan : I do not have the precise figures for the expected production from all the various platforms in the North sea. If memory serves me a right, there is no anticipated increase in production. However, the reduced levels of production were largely due to maintenance work and down-time work required for safety purposes. Those factors represent a spike on the production graphs, but I shall happily give the hon. Gentleman the proposed production profile for that system.

I have agreed to exemptions only where the operator has satisfied me that he has made all appropriate plans and all necessary efforts to achieve the 31 December deadline and that his inability to achieve it is due to factors beyond his control. In various cases, for example, they include the failure of suppliers to meet deadlines. But where, on the basis of information supplied, I am not satisfied that the conditions have been met. I have refused to grant an exemption. I must report to the House that there are four such cases. There are three valves on the Texaco Tartan platform and a valve on the Beryl Alpha platform operated by Mobil. That is on the basis of information that I have received to date.

I inform the House--in response to an intervention by the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South--that the reason why we have come to the House with details at this stage is that we feel that it is right and proper that the House should be informed. However, we emphasise that it was the decision of the House that the exemptions could be applied for until 31 December. Effectively, what I have given the hon. Gentleman is a full progress report. It would be technically possible--although we do not anticipate it- -for an operator to come forward with

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further proposals up to the 31 December deadline, as agreed in the regulations. It is possible, for example, that we might receive further information from Texaco. That is why I emphasise that my position tonight is based on information that I have received.

Mr. Doran : What would be the implications if permission for the four valves were refused? Would all operations on the platforms be shut down?

Mr. Moynihan : That is absolutely right. The operations on those platforms will be shut down until that work is undertaken. Equally, for the 18 valves on which work needs to be done--eight on the FLAG system, two on Morecambe, two on Sun Oil on Balmoral, four Shell gas valves on the FLAG system, and two further Morecambe gas valves we have said that production cannot start on any of the platforms until the valves are in place. I hope that the hon. Gentleman realises that that is a tough programme and a tough response by Government to make operators give top priority to safety. It will cost the operators money, but we believe that that money needs to be spent because safety must be first and foremost in the minds of the public, workers in the North sea and--as the hon. Gentleman said from a sedentary position--of everyone involved.

I have not had the opportunity to go as far as I would like on safety, but I shall pick up some of the points made in the last three minutes of the debate. The Government have accepted Lord Cullen's recommendation that sub- sea isolation systems need to be assessed on an individual basis as part of the safety case for each installation. We accept the argument that that need should be assessed in the light of the overall risk assessment, and we accept Lord Cullen's conclusions on that matter.

The regulations for the safety cases will, of course, be brought forward with all proper speed. Until responsibility is moved to the Health and Safety Executive, it lies firmly with the Department of Energy. We shall continue to have ministerial responsibility for offshore safety. An announcement will be made as soon as possible about the date and nature of the move.

Again, I give an undertaking to the House that we shall not hold back in making the change, but it is right and proper that discussions progress between the safety division and the HSE to ensure that a swift and effective move is made without undue haste. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway) said, the decision to make the move was taken on balance by Lord Cullen. The move should not reduce the importance of placing safety first and giving it proper consideration. We must assess often detailed divisions of responsibility between my Department and the safety officers who to date have worked within my Department.

Again I welcome the announcement made by Shell. To echo the point made by the hon. Member for Aberdeen, South, we welcome Shell's announcement in the past 48 hours that it intends to lift the bar on approximately 500 contract workers who sat in during the offshore dispute last summer and refused to go ashore when asked to do so by their offshore installation managers during the dispute. I also welcome the fact that Shell has announced plans to protect safety representatives from victimisation. In future, any matter involving an alleged breach of discipline on the part of a safety representative will be dealt with by senior Shell onshore management.

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I hope that, in considering these matters, the House will continue to recognise that Lord Cullen's report should be seen not as the closing of a chapter but rather as the beginning of a new approach which will place safety on a far better footing in every installation in the North Sea. We understand the strength of feeling that lies behind many of the concerns that hon. Members have voiced. We are convinced that prompt, comprehensive and effective implementation of Lord Cullen's report will represent real progress towards meeting those concerns and towards showing that they have been met. The Government are committed to securing prompt, comprehensive and effective implementation.

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The Gulf

11.10 pm

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow) : I have the impression that, so horrendous is the prospect of a protracted or, indeed, any war in the Gulf, the House of Commons has anaesthetised its collective mind about it.

I am one of a dwindling number of hon. Members who have been here since the time of Harold Macmillan, but I have never been more uptight about any issue than I am about a Gulf war--in particular, the ecological consequences of the military option, which are the subject of this debate.

I am plain frightened for my country and for millions in the Arab world and the so-called third world.

I am more concerned about this matter than I have been about anything in my life. The issue could be the survival of humanity. I am not given to flights of fancy or to exaggeration. As the Minister answering the previous debate said, for 24 years, I have been a weekly columnist for New Scientist.

I think that we are in danger, to use the title of John Tusa's programme, of sleepwalking to war. Some extremely alert and effective Members of this House seem to be under the impression that what would happen would be a glorified pub brawl. I fear that the reality would be very different ; it could be Passchendaele in the sands. For 21 months, I wore the emblem of the Desert Rats. I was tank crew. My heart goes out to those who, 40 years later, are tank crew in what used to be the Scots Greys--now the Scots Dragoon Guards--and the other armoured regiments, who are having to deal not only with the sand but with the dust of the desert and what that can do to the instrumentation of tanks.

A number of hon. Members have talked about "liberating Kuwait". I am not sure that it would not be more accurate to say that the option is not liberating Kuwait but "obliterating Kuwait." Any land military attempt to "free" Kuwait could result in the kind of fighting that was experienced at Guadalcanal and the Solomon Islands or at Iwo Jima. Iraq's would be a battle-hardened army. The present crisis is totally different from the Falklands and the Argentine conscripts. We are talking about people who have been through a decade of extremely tough war.

I shall be personal for a moment in a way that I am not normally personal, least of all about myself. I was brought up as young child by a grandmother who was broken, and broken-hearted, because my grandfather was one of those lucky enough to come back from Gallipoli, but was never the same again. My grandmother and grandfather made Edward Grey, Asquith's Foreign Secretary, my mother's godfather, so I have been interested in his books. We could be lurching into another war such as the first world war, and I have been re- reading the diaries of Grey who, reflecting on the first world war, said : "Let us examine the first of our considerations as dominant in my mind in the last week of July 1914. This was that a great European war would be a catastrophe on an unprecedented scale, and that this would be so obvious to all the Great Powers that when on an edge of the abyss they would call a halt and recoil from it."

He continued :

"The first half of this impression unfortunately admits of no qualification now. We know the full tale of the loss of life,

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