House of Commons Hansard Debates for 21 Feb 1991

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Douglas Hogg) : I beg to move, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof :

having overwhelmingly supported the despatch of British forces to the Gulf, welcomes the affirmation by the Government that the aims of British military action are to secure the implementation of the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions.'.

You have asked us to be brief, Mr. Speaker, and I shall seek to be so.

I propose, in the course of my speech, to touch on four issues : the causes of the conflict ; the objectives of the coalition ; how the conflict can be ended ; and what needs to be done when it is concluded.

The conflict began on 2 August last year when, after weeks of intimidation and despite negotiations arranged by fellow Arab countries, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. To the very eve of the invasion Saddam Hussein was promising fellow Arab leaders that he did not intend to use force. That was a lie.

The attack on Kuwait, a small sovereign state, militarily weak, no threat to him and Islamic in character, was wholly unprovoked. His pretence that he invaded Kuwait in order to free Palestine is a lie. He used force in order to promote his own policies in precisely the same way as he used force against Iran in 1980 and against the Kurds in 1988.

Iraqi forces have plundered Kuwait. Two thirds of the indigenous population has been displaced. The country has been looted. Many of its citizens have been murdered. As the Amnesty report makes plain, Iraqi forces have systematically employed brutality and torture as an instrument of policy. This is the nature of the regime and these are the causes of the conflict. It is not possible to conceive of a clearer act of aggression.

Mr. Kenneth Hind (Lancashire, West) : The hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Sillars) talked about the Iraqi people removing Saddam Hussein. My hon. and learned Friend has just given us a chapter on the behaviour of Iraqi troops in Kuwait. We know, from the massive breaches of human rights in Iraq--the torture, the removal of political opponents and their death at the hands of the security forces--that there is neither the will nor the people to lead any attempt to remove Saddam Hussein in the way that the hon. Gentleman suggested.

Mr. Hogg : We shall see. The destruction that Saddam Hussein has brought upon his people may prompt them to remove him, and to do so soon.

Ms. Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood) : Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Hogg : I shall press on for a little while.

As regards our objectives, the reaction of the international community to this act of Iraqi aggression

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was swift and resolute. Twelve resolutions have been passed by the Security Council, either unanimously or by overwhelming majorities. Some 30 countries have now committed themselves in support of the United Nations, either to enforce the embargo or to defend Saudi Arabia or to liberate Kuwait. Within this coalition are to be found 11 Muslim states, most notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. This is an international operation, an exercise in collective security which is taking place under the authority of the United Nations. Our objectives are clear : the full and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of the legitimate Government of that country and the restoration of peace and security in the region. Iraq must also accept the authority of the Security Council and its decisions. We have no other objectives.

I have told the House what our objectives are. Now let me tell the House what we do not intend : we do not intend to occupy Iraq ; we do not intend to change its borders ; and we do not wish the destruction of its economy. While we would not grieve if Saddam Hussein were induced to stand aside, or otherwise ceased to be the leader of Iraq, it is no part of our purpose to change the Iraqi system of government or to select its leader for it. Moreover, while part of our legitimate campaign to expel Iraq from Kuwait will involve the dealing of heavy and telling blows, both against Iraqi troops in Kuwait and against legitimate military targets and facilities in Iraq which support Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, the destruction of the Iraqi army is not itself a war aim. That may happen in the course of the campaign, but it is not in itself a specific war objective.

Mr. Hugh Dykes (Harrow, East) : I am sure that my hon. and learned Friend's extremely wise words will be welcomed throughout the House, with the emphasis that he puts on war aims. Will he confirm that that means there are no plans to occupy Basra, except in the course of pursuing the war, if, sadly, a land war has to start, and that there is no long-term American objective of taking Basra, as has been rumoured? Also, will he confirm that the Security Council will be in regular and frequent session, monitoring the progress of these unfortunate matters as they develop?

Mr. Hogg : As I said, occupying Iraq is not our objective--and Basra is part of Iraq--save in the process of expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait. What is true of this country is true of other countries within the coalition.

As regards the circumstances in which the conflict can be brought to an end, our purpose is to secure compliance with the Security Council resolutions. What the international community requires and has a right to expect is an unequivocal commitment by Iraq to withdraw its forces fully and unconditionally from Kuwait. When the Iraqi Government are ready to comply with the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council, they should say so unambiguously and match their words with decisive and irreversible proof. There needs to be clear evidence of withdrawal, and there must be repatriation of allied prisoners of war. As yet, there has been no such statement, there is no such proof and we have seen no such evidence. Accordingly, hostilities will continue.

Mr. Giles Radice (Durham, North) : What is the Government's reaction to Saddam Hussein's speech this afternoon, which a number of us have been watching on CNN, including, I suspect, President Bush?

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Mr. Hogg : I have not seen the speech, although I have heard reports of it. It would be premature to come to a firm conclusion, but, regretfully, it did not sound like the speech of a man who was about to comply unconditionally and irrevocably with the resolutions of the Security Council.

I now turn to the proposals put forward by the Soviet Government. On Monday evening my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister received a personal message from President Gorbachev. In it, Mr. Gorbachev set out the proposals which he had already put to the Iraqis and which he hoped might form the basis of a ceasefire.

The message was delivered and received in confidence and its full contents have not yet been publicised.

The Soviet Government have given the Iraqis yet another opportunity to comply with the requirements of the United Nations. We welcome that fact. What we now expect from Iraq is a response which fulfils those requirements. When we see that the United Nations Security Council resolutions are to be fulfilled, there can be an end to this conflict. This afternoon's launch of two Scud missiles to Saudi Arabia was not the message that we were looking for.

Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow) : In the Minister's judgment, is the view of the United Nations, in whose name this is supposedly being done, taken into account? Is any effect being made to ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations what he thinks before decisive action is taken?

Mr. Hogg : There is no supposedly about it. We are taking action under the authority of resolution 678 of the Security Council. We are acting under the authority of the United Nations and pursuant to the wishes of the Security Council.

Sir Alan Glyn (Windsor and Maidenhead) : Does that include the destruction of chemical materials and possible atomic weapons in Iraq before the completion of the peace agreement?

Mr. Hogg : A great deal of damage has already been done to Iraq's chemical, and potential biological and nuclear warfare capacity, delaying its ability to produce such weaponry for a long lime to come.

Although we will not trespass beyond the terms of the Security Council resolutions, we do not propose to derogate from them. We are not seeking the humiliation of Iraq, but nor are we interested in face-saving formulas designed to remove Saddam Hussein from the hook on which he has impaled himself.

We will not allow the Iraqis to play for time. We will not put at risk the lives of our forces. We are determined to ensure an early return of British and allied prisoners of war. Iraq knows how to end this conflict : by a complete and unconditional compliance with the decisions of the United Nations. As Saddam Hussein was well aware, his proposals of 15 February did not meet that requirement.

Mr. Tony Benn (Chesterfield) : For three days now the War Cabinet has been in possession of the Soviet proposals, but has not yet disclosed them to the House or the public. As the War Cabinet has had an opportunity to study those proposals, it would be very helpful if the Minister could tell us whether the Government believe

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that, if Saddam Hussein accepted them in their entirety, the requirements that the Minister has set out would be satisfied.

Mr. Hogg : Welcome though they are, the Russian proposals do not ensure full compliance with the Security Council resolutions ; nor do they ensure that Saddam Hussein will accept the authority of the Security Council.

When the conflict is over, there will be much to be done

Mr. Benn : Will the Minister give way?

Mr. Hogg : No. I have already given way to the right hon. Gentleman.

As I have said, there will be much to be done : the reconstruction of Kuwait, the establishment of a durable and effective security structure for the Gulf states, a renewal of the efforts to promote a settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem, and the setting up of a more effective arms control regime in the area. All those issues are urgent and important, but I shall confine myself on this occasion to the questions of Gulf security and the Arab-Israeli settlement. We are willing to play a part in underpinning the arrangements that the Gulf states and other regional powers may devise, but the concepts, the proposals and the principal effort must come from within the region. We will respond if that is what is required by our Arab friends, but our commitment will inevitably be modest. It could take the form of a naval presence, training or joint exercises. What we could not consider is the stationing of British ground troops in the area, or a return to the pre-1971 east-of-Suez role. That would not be in the long- term interests of the region.

Saddam Hussein's attempt to link his invasion of Kuwait with the fate of the Palestinians was a lie, and was widely recognised as such ; indeed, Saddam's aggression has made the search for a durable solution yet more difficult. Once the conflict is concluded, however, we need to return with yet greater vigour to our efforts to resolve the wider issues within the midle east. There are two principles on which we should stand : first, the right of Palestinians to determine their own political future ; and, secondly, the right of Israel to live within secure and accepted frontiers. In the absence of a settlement, the middle east will remain unstable. We therefore have a duty to solve this problem, and an interest in doing so.

Let me deal now with the issue before the House. We applaud the despatch of British forces to the Gulf. We acknowledge their courage, skill and dedication to duty. We assert the importance of their task. We declare that they act under the authority of the United Nations, and to sustain that authority. It is for those reasons that they are there, and upon the achievement of which they will return. 4.54 pm

Mr. George Robertson (Hamilton) : After this afternoon's broadcast by President Saddam Hussein, this must be a sombre day in the House and throughout the world. The position is not clear but, as the Minister has said, it does not sound promising. Of course, we must wait for an authoritative version of the speech, and we must also wait to see what message Mr. Tariq Aziz takes with him to Moscow tonight. We must hope that Saddam Hussein will

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see sense even at this late hour, but if Saddam's message constitutes a rejection of the Soviet peace plan and he does not intend to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally, any decision to start a land assault will have been made not by the allies but by Saddam Hussein himself.

Mr. Alex Salmond (Banff and Buchan) : Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Robertson : Not at this early stage--I must get on with my speech.

Today's debate is about war aims. The country will surely be asking, "Are not the war aims of the 28 nations in the coalition perfectly clear, and are they not enshrined precisely and concisely in all 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions under which the liberation of Kuwait is authorised?".

Thousands of British troops--constituents of all of us--are in the deserts of Saudi Arabia. Many are from Scotland, reflecting the Scottish domination of the professional army of which this country is so proud. They are ready to risk their lives to get Saddam Hussein's army out of the land that it has annexed and to restore a legitimate Government to Kuwait, a sovereign country which has been eliminated and brutalised by Iraq since2 August last year. Those British troops demand, deserve and will receive the continuing support of their Parliament and their fellow countrymen and women. They are far from us and from their families, and they face a powerful and well- armed opposing force which cannot and should not be underestimated. Let us be clear and unanimous on one point. From the beginning, ever since the invasion of Kuwait, the war has been the responsibility of one person and one person alone--the one person who, as the hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Sillars) pointed out, could have stopped the conflict, bombing and destruction on both sides at any time of his choice in the past six months. Saddam Hussein started the war on 2 August when he invaded Kuwait. With his rejection of every peace plan that was presented before the United Nations deadline of 15 January, he personally continued that war and the misery that it inflicted on his people and the people of Kuwait. The hon. Member for Govan, whose professional background gives him great insight into the affairs of the region, said in a perceptive article in The Scotsman on12 January :

"I may of course be wrong and perhaps Saddam's extravagant rhetoric is for real and he will not budge for anything. If so then the use of early force is inevitable, because if Saddam is still in Kuwait after Ramadan he will never be removed."

On 28 January, the hon. Gentleman wrote in the same paper : "Whatever one may think about the use of sanctions or whether a final compromise offer should have been made to him, we cannot ignore the stark evidence that Saddam Hussein calmly chose the path of war."

Time and again, he has rejected every opening given to him. Until last Friday there was not the slightest inkling that Saddam cared anything for an end to the punishment of his people, and even as we speak in this debate there is still no evidence that last Friday's signal was anything more than a device to avoid some possible extension of the conflict.

Mr. Salmond : The Minister described the Soviet proposal as inadequate in some unspecified way. I

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understand that the Leader of the Opposition has had a briefing from the Soviet ambassador. Can the hon. Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) tell us whether, in the view of the Labour party, the Soviet proposal is adequate and a basis for settlement?

Mr. Robertson : My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made it clear yesterday that, from what he knows and has been told of the outline of the Soviet proposal, in general it contains points that we would support ; but my right hon. Friend made it clear on one specific issue, as we have done since the beginning of the war, where there is some doubt about what the Soviet proposal actually says, that we will support a ceasefire only if there is a genuine, complete and immediate implementation of unconditional withdrawal. As I shall go on to say, we believe that the Soviet peace plan offered an opportunity to break the inflexibility, which might well have prevented a further extension of the conflict.

However, for the sake of the wider peace of the world, we must hope beyond hope that even in these few hours President Gorbachev's brave and imaginative initiative may appeal to the Iraqis. Saddam Hussein now knows what he is up against. He knows that he cannot win, and he must by now realise that he must unconditionally leave Kuwait before there can be any ceasefire. He must also know, because he has been told often enough, that by withdrawing he can avoid the assault that will follow any new decision on his part to "choose the path of war". He must also be convinced that if he withdraws and complies there will be no question of an outside threat to himself or the dismantling of his Government or state.

Our troops out there in the desert also know that by a deliberate policy of minimising any civilian casualties in Iraq they perhaps prolonged the conflict and undoubtedly added to their own risks, but it was an essential part of showing that our standards are in marked contrast with those of Saddam, with his indiscriminate and random Scud attacks on populated civilian areas in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Our troops know what they are fighting for and can be clear that the objectives of the whole military exercise are to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and restore that country's own Government in line with all the United Nations resolutions.

We are absolutely clear in the Labour party about this. On 21 January, my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said : "The war aims of liberating Kuwait from occupation and restoring the legitimate Government are precise and limited, and rightly so." He went on to say that they

"do not relate to the dismembering of Iraq or include the death of a dictator."--[ Official Report, 21 January 1991 ; Vol. 184, c. 33.]

On Tuesday this week the Minister of State, the hon. and learned Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg), made it clear that

"Saddam's removal is in no sense a war aim",

and he has been precise and explicit this afternoon as well. I would like also to quote General Schwarzkopf, whose words at a press conference yesterday are reported as follows in The Guardian today :

"But when asked if he would consider his military mission successful if Iraq withdrew unconditionally from Kuwait, even though Hussein might remain in power with part of his military intact, he replied Absolutely. The President has said all along that we weren't out to destroy the country of Iraq, we weren't out to destroy the army of Iraq'."

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That is the commander of the American forces in the area and the leader of the alliance of 28 nations.

Those words seem to me explicitly to remove any ambiguity that may have existed. The Minister and the general were right to reiterate those truths and they were also correct to underline the strict and sensible limitations on what the alliance is in the Gulf to do.

Ms. Short : I agree with the hon. Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) that what the Minister of State said today is welcome. Does the hon. Gentleman agree with me that when I asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether that part of the United Nations resolution which talks about destroying international peace and security in the area might authorise the attempt to destroy the Iraqi regime, its war machine and so on, he said that it might well, but that what he has said today is a very welcome change and shift back from that?

Mr. Robertson : I am not certain whether it is a change or not, but this debate was called specifically to consider the war aims. I believe that what the Minister has said in such precise terms removes any ambiguity that others may have indicated and that General Schwarzkopf, speaking on behalf of the American forces, has also said something which will reassure those who may have believed until now that there was some ambiguity.

It is right that we should consider the war aims because they are intimately connected with the aims of peace. The peace and stability referred to in resolution 678, which must be the overwhelming objective after Iraq leaves, will be accomplished by the way in which the war is conducted and concluded. There is concern that the liberation of Kuwait will none the less create a martyr and lead to the birth of Saddam Hussein as an Arab hero, even a posthumous one, especially if the masses in the Arab countries who are in the coalition choose to follow his message rather than that of the United Nations. It is therefore crucial that we in this unique coalition win the political campaign as well as the military one. So, in being precise about the aims of the war, we can and must be precise about the aims of peace. That is why the aims of the war and of the peace lie in all the Security Council resolutions and not just in resolution 660.

On the motion and amendment before the House, the Labour party believes that there need not be a vote this evening. Before the House we have a motion and an amendment, both framed in words which seem to say exactly the same thing. One would have to be a forensic scientist--perhaps a political forensic scientist--to spot the differences. So why are we being forced to choose? Could there not have been some common resolution which would have united the objectives of both sides of the House?

Mr. Livingstone : We are going to have a vote, whatever happens, George.

Mr. Robertson : I have no doubt that my hon. Friend the Member for Brent, East (Mr. Livingstone) would have voted whatever the resolution was and I fear that he would have been on the losing side whatever the resolution was as well.

I add, in a spirit of no acrimony at all, that I frankly cannot understand why the Scottish National party insists in the final line of the motion that the end to the present conflict is compatible only with resolution 660 and not

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with all 12 of the United Nations resolutions on Kuwait. Labour Members believe that all the resolutions matter, not only for the war but for a just and securely based peace when it is all over. We therefore believe that in those circumstances a perhaps unnecessary distinction is being drawn in the motion which seems to derive from a difference between the Government and the SNP. We shall therefore adhere to our usual policy in minority party debates and stay out of the argument and out of the Lobbies.

Mr. Benn : Two questions will be before the House : whether or not to accept or vote for the SNP motion--which many, including myself, cannot accept--and a Government amendment preceded by a speech from the Minister who has rejected the Soviet proposal as unacceptable. Yet the hopes of the world and of those who wish to avoid a land war hinge on the possibility that Saddam Hussein will accept it. I hope that my hon. Friend will not invite us to assent to the Government's view that the Soviet proposal is unacceptable.

Those are the issues that will be before us.

Mr. Robertson : My right hon. Friend was perhaps listening to the radio rather than to what I said. I said that we would stay out of the argument and stay out of the Lobbies. We support neither the SNP motion nor the Government amendment. My right hon. Friend has been a Member of the House a great deal longer than I have. He knows that speeches are not the same as motions and that we are being asked to vote on a motion dealing with aims and objectives.

The Gulf war has been a wholly avoidable conflict. It was, and still is, the creation of a brutal repressive dictator who, not for the first time, is willing to see his poor benighted people further persecuted for the sake of his own futile megalomaniac territorial ambitions.

The issue before us is of some importance because out of the war, with all the dreadful problems that it has created, has come one major benefit. It is that the role of the United Nations has been exercised, as we always hoped that it would and never expected that it could, and that the United Nations is pivotal to the construction of the peace that must come hereafter. All parties in the House agree that the aims of the war lie precisely in the authority given from the United Nations. If we are to learn from all that has happened, it is essential that the aims of the peace must also lie in the United Nations. In that way alone, the outcome of the peace can be as certain as the outcome of the war.

5.10 pm

Sir Dennis Walters (Westbury) : The obvious joy and relief shown by Iraqi people when it looked as though Saddam Hussein had agreed to withdraw from Kuwait indicated better than anything what their true feelings are. They have already paid a heavy price for Saddam Hussein's indefensible adventurism and we all hope that their suffering, and that of the people of Kuwait who have been subjected to appalling torment since August, will soon be ended. From what we have just heard, however, it would appear that Saddam Hussein is determined to make the ending of the war even bloodier than its beginning.

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It was never likely that the Gulf war would end either bloodlessly or in a matter of days. Saddam Hussein's determination to hang on to Kuwait made war inevitable and war is never surgical or painless. The danger of the war escalating in other directions seems to have receded and Saddam's missiles over Israel have so far not achieved their primary objective. More than anything else, what rockets over Tel Aviv, launched from Iraq, have shown is the futility of the argument that a mini-Palestinian state on the west bank and Gaza was the main threat against which Israel had to guard. With modern weapons, a few extra miles of land are quite insignificant. A future threat to Israel would arise not from the west bank, but as a result of Israel's not having achieved a modus vivendi within an overwhelmingly Arab world and not having defused the Palestinian issue by agreeing to self-determination in the west bank and Gaza. If Israel was willing to do that, it would have an excellent opportunity of living in peace with its Arab neighbours, as it has successfully done with Egypt.

Saddam wanted Kuwait and refused to believe that the United Nations resolutions would be implemented, if necessary by force, so any form of negotiation with him would have come to nothing and he became interested in the Palestinian cause only when he realised that it was a useful card to play.

Even so, our reluctance to give prompt support to the idea of an international conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute--which after all is British and European policy--is not wholly easy to understand. We seemed to get unnecessarily bogged down in the semantics of "linkage".

The reality is that there is a clear association between the incapacity of the United Nations to deal effectively with Israel's unlawful occupation of Arab territory acquired by force in 1967--in particular, of the west bank, Gaza and east Jerusalem, which is all that remained of mandatory Palestine- -and the extremely effective way in which the United Nations has dealt with the unprovoked aggression on Kuwait in 1990. United Nations resolution 242 has never been implemented. Nearly half a million American and allied troops have gone to war to implement resolution 660.

We all refer constantly these days to the breaking of the Geneva convention --quite rightly so--yet the Geneva convention has been broken day in, day out for 23 years in the Israeli occupied territories provoking little protest. Why did the United States either veto or blunt successive United Nations resolutions on Israel while leading the field against Iraq? These are not academic questions--they go to the heart of the divisions, instability and bitterness that prevail in the Arab world and explain why, despite everything that a devious and cruel despot like Saddam Hussein has done, he still enjoys considerable support. Unless they are satisfactorily answered, the charge of double standards will stand and in the long run the consequences will be disastrous.

When Saddam Hussein has been defeated and Kuwait liberated there will be an opportunity to resolve these festering problems, and it must be seized.

An international conference on the Arab-Israeli question is no magic or exclusive formula. What is essential is that the Palestinian question should be resolved according to the principles of the United Nations charter and the resolutions of the United Nations.

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Resolution 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in the war of June 1967, and which my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary described as

"the internationally agreed basis for settlement",

must be enforced. The Palestinians have a right to

self-determination and Britain has a particular moral responsibility to Palestine which it must stop trying to shirk.

The Palestinians must negotiate with Israel--of course--but they are entitled to choose who represents them ; if that representation turns out to be the PLO, Israel must accept that fact. Alternatively, free elections, supervised by the United Nations, should be held as a matter of urgent priority on the west bank and in Gaza so that the Palestinians can elect their representatives. Palestinians in the diaspora should also be represented, and in any event almost certainly the PLO would continue to be the chosen representatives of the Palestinians within and without.

Israel has a right to guaranteed and secure borders--of course it has--but those borders must be defined according to international law and United Nations resolutions.

Personally I take the view that Mr. Arafat was gravely mistaken in lending support to Saddam Hussein's Iraq, even though he had been seriously provoked. Professor Waleed Khalidi put it well when he said recently that in the years before the crisis Arafat had

"probed the outermost circumference of concessions to Israel in the hopes of winning the dialogue with the United States. But no sooner had the dialogue begun than it became clear that Washington, despite its commitment to a substantive dialogue, was bent on treating Arafat like a criminal on probation, denying him a visa to the United Nations, hounding the PLO out of UN bodies."

That said, Arafat was still wrong because the principles violated by Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Kuwait are the very principles from which the Palestinian cause derives its moral strength. Western economies are oil- oriented and will remain so in the foreseeable future. It is therefore imperative, even as a matter of pure self-interest, that we should resolve a problem that has been at the root of all the disputes and turmoil in the middle east for the past 40 years and that the United Nations should retain the momentum. An overall settlement should include an agreement to ban all nuclear and chemical weapons in the area. It should apply to all the relevant countries in the middle east, including Israel, and should be properly monitored and enforced by a United Nations supervisory team backed by the Security Council. Unless these things are done, all the efforts and sacrifices to defeat Saddam Hussein will have been in vain. Bitterness and frustration will grow, other Saddam Husseins will emerge, and peace and stability in the middle east will be as far away as ever.

5.21 pm

Sir David Steel (Tweeddale, Ettrick and Lauderdale) : In the interests of the brevity that the Chair has sought, I shall refrain from following the hon. Member for Westbury (Sir D. Walters) into wider middle east questions. I do, however, agree with almost everything that the hon. Gentleman said on the subject.

This debate began in very sad and sombre mood. Just after 3.30 pm we heard reports of Saddam Hussein's television speech, in which he said that Iraq's armed forces are determined to continue their struggle--thereby, in my

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view, removing any last hope that the Soviet proposals might have any real effect. Saddam Hussein went on to say that he was sending Tariq Aziz back to Moscow tonight with counter-proposals, which he described--I think I have the correct translation--as the sister of those that he had made previously. In other words, this is a different orchestration of the same tune. This House must do what the five permanent members of the Security Council did in recent days--make it clear that we do not need alternative proposals from Saddam Hussein. All that he needs to do is withdraw unconditionally and quickly. He should announce his intention to withdraw from Kuwait and then withdraw immediately. That would bring the war to an end. But Saddam Hussein is not doing that.

In the meantime, the parliamentary human rights group has produced evidence that the people of Kuwait continue to suffer as a result of the appalling inhumanity of the occupying regime. I shall dwell on this for a moment because, like many other hon. Members, I am impressed by the effect that much of the television reporting from Baghdad has had on public opinion in this country. At the weekends in my constituency I find deep resentment at the fact that so much censored and doctored material fills our television screens. Most people accept, with deep regret, the casualties that have occurred inside Iraq as a result of allied action. They accept that those are a catastrophic harsh accident of war. But that is very different from the catalogue of deliberately inflicted cruelty that the document from the parliamentary human rights group lists. It is different in kind and, in my view, it is altogether different in moral standing. We have to remind ourselves that, in view of the action being taken by the occupying forces in Kuwait, and in view of the many peace initiatives that have been taken but have come to nothing, it is right that our forces should be given full support for the action that they have to take.

Mr. Andrew Rowe (Mid-Kent) : Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Sir David Steel : I will give way once, but only very briefly.

Mr. Rowe : I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman has seen the recent accounts of Iraqi prisoners and some refugees having said that the extraordinary accuracy of the allied bombing left their houses untouched, while military establishments next door were destroyed.

Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North) : What about the shelter?

Sir David Steel : I accept that there have been regrettable casualties. It was not our intention or our wish that there should be such casualties. All that I am saying is that they are different from the cruelty and barbarism being deliberately inflicted on the people of Kuwait- -cruelty and barbarism that were catalogued by our colleagues two days ago.

It is the view of my party that we should not be justified in moving to the next stage--what will inevitably be an even bloodier war on land--were we not fully satisfied that every realistic peace initiative to prevent that war had been completely explored. We have never pooh-poohed the efforts of the Jordanians, the French, the Soviets, or anyone else. However, we have to face the harsh reality that all those initiatives, however well meant, have failed.

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