House of Commons Hansard Debates for 2 May 1991

Mr. Bill Walker (Tayside, North) : I welcome this opportunity to speak in the Air Force debate. The House knows of my interest in such matters. I am astonished that, this late in the debate, no one has mentioned that this year is the 50th anniversary of the Air Training Corps, which is totally funded by the Air Force vote and budget. Many of the service personnel serving in the Gulf were ex-ATC cadets--that was certainly true of the RAF contingent. I welcome this opportunity to put that on record.

May I say to the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) that hon. Members have witnessed and, I dare say, welcomed the Labour party's robust defence policy in support of the Gulf operations. The hon. Member for Clackmannan has, on a number of occasions--this evening was no exception-- had to take some of his colleagues to task for not conforming to Labour party policy. We recognise and applaud that.

However, there are some weaknesses, not only in the position of the hon. Member for Clackmannan, but in the Labour party's defence policy. As I understand it, the hon. Member chastised Ministers because they would not order the necessary equipment for the Royal Air Force, but he fails to persuade his Labour colleagues to agree a Labour defence policy that would require increased defence expenditure, which is what his remarks call for. Are we to believe that the voice of the Labour party is that of the hon. Member for Leyton (Mr. Cohen)? I hope not--I hope that it is the voice of the hon. Member for Clackmannan and, if so, that he can persuade his colleagues to call for more defence expenditure.

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Recent "hot" war experience in the Gulf and a recognition of the Soviet Union's military capability, linked to possible political change, have provided a United Kingdom and NATO scenario that is substantially different from that which existed when "Options for Change" was introduced. The reunification of Germany and the less than enthusiastic support of our European Community partners for military action in the Gulf have also produced a dramatic reappraisal of who we can depend on in difficult political and military circumstances.

In the Gulf, air supremacy and control of the sea lanes, coupled with the use of new technology and smart weapons, made the war different from any previous war involving western forces and western technology. Air supremacy and superiority was important, and command of the skies was achieved by the United Nations air force at an early stage in the war.

However--it was on this subject that the hon. Member for Clackmannan and I had our earlier exchange--the question that everyone must ask is : why did not the Iraqi air force fight? The Iraqi air force had the equipment, numbers and, obviously, the ability. One could also ask why, with its surface-to-air missiles, the air force switched on its radar only to detect incoming aircraft and, having done so, promptly switched it off when the missile had been popped off. That meant that the missiles were flying blind and did not hit many targets. The answer is that the Iraqis did not have the stomach for war. It is not unrealistic to say that, because the military had just ended a relatively recent war of great attrition resembling the first world war. Therefore, it would have been surprising in any circumstances if the military had been ready to fight another battle as intensive as the one that it faced.

Mr. Wilkinson : Does not my hon. Friend think it possible that the Iraqi leadership comprehended that the allied war aim was strictly limited to the liberation of Kuwait, and that the allies would not go so far as to remove Saddam Hussein or the revolutionary command council from power? Therefore, it was important to retain a cadre of first-rate aeroplanes to rebuild the air force as an important component of military power for the peace after the war.

Mr. Walker : I thank my hon. Friend for that helpful intervention. I was just about to move on to that point and suggest that the situation was probably a repeat of Nasser, with Saddam Hussein seeing himself coming out of the war as the unchallenged leader of the Arab world.

I am now liable, in view of what was said earlier, to be chastised by the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman, but I shall make some comments about the war which are important. Obviously, the airfields, radar, anti-aircraft defences, communications and command and control installations were the prime targets. They were heavily attacked and made largely inoperative by precision bombing and cruise missile strikes. In-flight refuelling and airborne early warning radar, used in conjunction with radar jamming, allowed the coalition aircraft to operate and strike targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait. We saw stealth technology for the first time, working through the F117.

The use of smart weapons at safe operational altitudes during day and night sorties to seek out and destroy well protected, hardened concrete targets and bridges provided a clear sign of the military advantage in the availability

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and use of such weapons. I hope that we shall never forget that. It was those effective weapons that made it all possible.

Air superiority aircraft deployed by the United States Air Force clearly demonstrated the necessity of the availability of such aircraft in battlefield conditions. Ministers have recognised that, as shown by their support for EFA. I also suggest that we must continue to upgrade the Tornado F3. It is not a substitute for the agile EFA in battlefield conditions, but it has a complementary role for the future.

The high risks involved in accurately delivering the RAF's runway multi- purpose munitions must advance the case for stand-off weapons, which should be fitted at an early stage to the GR1 strike aircraft, which could also be adapted to take certain elements of stealth technology.

I believe, controversially perhaps, that the low-flying tactics worked. Someone had to say that. I very much doubt whether we could have operated at medium level from day one in the Gulf war--the risks to our pilots and crews would have been enormous--if the runways had not been taken out in the first few hours. Taking out the runways and radar made a massive contribution and made possible the change in tactics. Our flexibility made us successful. If we had not been able to fly low and fast in the early hours of the war, its result might have been different. A lot of nonsense is talked--we heard some this evening from the hon. Member for Leyton-- about low-level tactics. The Iraqi tactic of switching on radar only for surface-to-air missiles to locate their targets and then to switch it off again probably accounted for the low number of coalition aircraft lost. Anyone who has studied the Iraqis' equipment, and its quantity, would have expected greater losses among our aircraft. The tactic probably accounts also for some of the damage to civilian targets from falling missiles.

I wish to discuss the vulnerability of mechanised infantry and tanks when operated without air cover. That vulnerability was highlighted in the war and it must put a large question mark against the future use of great numbers of heavy tanks. Instead, helicopters and fixed-wing and anti-armour aircraft must be recognised by the MOD as a better use of scarce military funds. It was the lengthy air campaign that made the short land battle possible. The low number of casualties sustained by coalition ground forces and the few real land engagements between the two sides can be attributed to the effective and detailed planning by coalition commanders, coupled with the clever execution and flexibility of our plans--not to mention the massive air superiority of the coalition forces.

The effective anti-missile defences and the success of the Patriot system against Scud missiles constitute one of the practical lessons to emerge from the Gulf war which must call for a reappraisal of attitudes to what is known as star wars technology.

Another lesson must be the danger posed by missile systems that can deliver nuclear, chemical or biological warheads across neutral territory. The Scud missile attacks against Israel could have carried such warheads. Today, more and more nations are acquiring ballistic and cruise technology, and some of them may be tempted to use those weapons against countries that do not possess anti-missile systems. Such cases will involve help from other countries.

The use of Scud missiles against urban, civilian targets clearly showed that unconventional warheads fitted to

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such missiles could become terror weapons in the hands of evil dictators. The proliferation of ballistic missiles, the weapon of choice in the third world, must make that scenario a real possibility. Civilian space programmes have become the development area for missile technology, and Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Japan, China, Pakistan, South Africa and South Korea are all working on space rockets. Consequently, control of ballistic missiles will become increasingly difficult, if not impossible--

Mr. O'Neill : I do not wish to enter into a long argument with the hon. Gentleman, but he should know that Brazil and Argentina recently signed an agreement that will prevent them from proceeding with the use of ballistic missile technology for offensive purposes. His list is slightly out of date, therefore.

Mr. Walker : That is the very point that I want to make. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to make such agreements work and stick. As more countries acquire the technology, the few that have signed may find themselves the victims of threats of attacks.That will lead to instability.

I am not one of this world's optimists. My experience in the short time that I have lived is that many people fail to honour the agreements that they have signed. Modern aircraft navigation aids and the relative simplicity of cruise-type missile technology will make the production of terror weapons with only a crude target-finding capability fairly simple. As a result, the missile technology control regime may now be obsolete. Smart weapons of the kind used in the Gulf will be in great demand, and oil -rich friendly states will expect to be able to buy the latest products from western manufacturers. In today's circumstances, such activity can be effectively controlled only by deploying western military personnel and hardware--and charging for them. Such countries were prepared to pay in the Gulf war, and they may also be prepared to pay for long-term stability if we provide it.

Anti-missile weapons systems have been seen to work and must now be a top priority for future defence spending. We should also remember that anti- aircraft guns can still destroy modern expensive jet aircraft ; and stealth technology was seen in the Gulf to be effective.

What I say next may also be controversial : only Britain and the United States can be depended upon when the chips are down, and only the French in Europe can be expected to provide military support once the British and the Americans are committed. "Options for Change" should be replaced by "Options for Defence Enhancement". The Treasury should be made to accept the lessons of the Gulf and to recognise the real threat that the Soviet military and political machine represents. It must therefore sanction increased spending, since it is always less expensive to deter than to fight wars.

Orders must be placed urgently for an EFA-type aircraft, for helicopters for anti-tank and rapid deployment roles, and for Sea Kings to replace the search-and-rescue Wessex. We should also consider anti-missile defence systems and, if necessary, collaborate to obtain them. Stand-off smart weapons for the Tornado GR1 and stealth technology should be top of our requirement lists. All regular units in the RAF should in future require a reserve commitment until retirement age--anyone who joins up, for however short a time, should

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be committed to his duties in future. That happens in the United States. My hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip- Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) clearly showed in his constructive speech how we can properly make use of reserves. The turnout of auxiliaries and reserves clearly showed how effective they can be. I congratulate Wing Commander Alex Dickson and his team of reserve officers who volunteered on day one of the conflict and all did their bit. We must make use of all the equipment purchased for the RAF and the cadets. The Vigilant motor glider would make an excellent communications aircraft because it flies a damn sight faster than communications aircraft that we have used in the past, and it has a better range. We must examine ways to encourage more people to become involved in the reserves.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the United Kingdom, the United States and France can expect future calls for the defence force deployment outside what is looked upon as the natural NATO area. The United States and individual states saw in the Gulf war and in the humanitarian intervention on behalf of the Kurds that we are ready and willing, so we can expect more demands to be made on us. It is also clear that President Gorbachev and his political allies intend to couple a consumer economy to an authoritarian political system and a command economy in the military industrial sectors. To those leaders, that seems an ideal recipe. Even if the Russia of the future is smaller than the present Russia, it will still be about 90 per cent. of the present Soviet Union, and we could see a return to age-old Russian demands for warm-water ports and expansion and the classic use of external threats to divert attention from problems at home.

I have an interest in training. I hope that my right hon. Friend will tell us tonight about experience with the Tucano training aircraft, which has now been in use long enough for a proper evaluation. Perhaps he will also tell us about female pilots and air crew who have been trained. When the Government make decisions about the future of the RAF, they should remember that it is easy to replace buildings but that one cannot easily and quickly replace airfields. One can dispose of many of the assets around an airfield, but airfields themselves should not be disposed of lightly. Before closing any military establishment, the Government should bear in mind the fact that this is a United Kingdom Parliament and that the United Kingdom and Great Britain mean something. It should also be borne in mind that the RAF is the British Royal Air Force. Careful thought should be given before deciding to close a base in a given area, such as Wales. RAF Brawdy is more than just a base for the Royal Air Force--it reminds local people that they are part of the United Kingdom. I could also mention Rosyth, but I shall not do so because we are not debating the Navy.

It has been suggested that helicopter operations should be transferred to the Army. I spoke about jet pilots being expensive to train. A pilot with a damaged back, as I have, cannot use an ejector seat because ejection could paralyse him. Such pilots with vast experience can be diverted to other duties and, of course, helicopters come into that.

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There is another and perhaps more important reason for not transferring helicopters to the Army. The RAF has developed a technical expertise in helicopters which is the envy of the world. To hand such a task to the Army would be like asking it to reinvent the wheel. Anyone who thinks that the Army has the capability to operate helicopters should compare the facilities of the two services. I welcome local financial management as the right way forward. The RAF has also welcomed it. The modern Royal Air Force has been a professional organisation for a long time. We must not believe the fairy tales alluded to earlier by the hon. Member for Clackmannan, who spoke about battle of Britain pilots. I hosted a lunch in the House of Commons last year for some surviving pilots of that battle, and they are not the sort of people projected in fairy tales. They are like modern RAF pilots and air crew, who are recruited from all walks of socio-economic life in the United Kingdom. They are selected on ability and retained because of their professionalism, because professionalism, ability, skill and courage are the hallmarks of the Royal Air Force. That courage has been demonstrated every time that the RAF has carried out what has been required of it.

The RAF should not be thought of as a Biggles outfit. It is a highly professional organisation staffed by ordinary people and not the sort of characters that one reads about in comic strips. They are the elite of the young people of our country and we are proud of what they have done in recent times.

8.36 pm

Mr. Keith Mans (Wyre) : It is appropriate for this debate on the Royal Air Force to take place so soon after the service that it performed so well in the Gulf. In that conflict, more than 100 RAF aircraft, supported by many thousands of air and ground crew, carried out thousands of sorties that clearly showed the devastating effectiveness and flexibility of modern air power. Air power on its own came close to settling the conflict, proving right the advocates of air power, right back to the 1920s, who said that air power could do that.

Of equal importance is the fact that air superiority was achieved with far fewer casualties than were estimated before the conflict started, when the media said that thousands of people would be killed. Casualties on the Iraqi side were much higher than on our side, but the accuracy of the weapons ensured that there were fewer than would have occurred in any previous conflict.

The Gulf conflict gave many air and ground crews invaluable operational experience that will be of great benefit to them in their careers. It is difficult to get good operational training, and none could be better than that gained from taking part in a proper operation such as that in the Gulf. Such training occurs infrequently and it is therefore vital that lessons are learned from it. Such lessons are useful when making decisions about money, types of aircraft, and equipment as mundane as boots. As we saw after the Falklands conflict, decisions can be reassessed and advances can be made in all areas.

The Gulf war gave us a unique opportunity to test many new weapons systems. Pictures on television and reports in the media showed that laser guidance, whether directed from the ground or from the air, was highly successful in ensuring accurate targeting. The technique of runway denial was less certain and has always been a problem in the Royal Air Force. Despite the popular idea

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that runways are vulnerable, they are difficult targets for any aircraft weapon. I fully appreciate what my right hon. Friend the Minister said about not yet being able to evaluate specific weapons systems. Such evaluation will have to continue for some time. Nevertheless, it is important that the RAF now looks closely at its tactics for runway denial and seriously considers tactics and weapons systems that do not require strike or attack aircraft to fly directly, at low levels, over heavily defended targets.

I do not want to take away anything said by my hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) about the effectiveness of the early attacks. I entirely agree with him. Without the Tornado and its highly specialist weapons system, we would have suffered considerably greater casualties, and we would have come up against the Iraqi air force very soon in the war, possibly with different results. We achieved tactical surprise. We prevented the Iraqi air force from getting airborne in any numbers to oppose us. As a result, many problems were avoided. Somehow, that lesson seems to have been forgotten.

The popular conception is that the Iraqi air force was never a threat. It was a threat. Many hundreds of modern aircraft, piloted by pilots who would no doubt have been brave had they been properly commanded, would have posed a significant threat to the allied war effort in the Gulf. Those early attacks by the stealth aircraft, the Tornados and other allied aircraft, but most specifically the runway denial capabilities of the Tornado, largely got over that problem. When the history of the conflict is written, that will probably be seen as the critical phase. Once that was over, it was relatively easy to predict the conclusion of the conflict, although the time could not have been determined until much later, when the extent of the destruction caused by our weapons systems was evaluated. In that context, I want to talk about reconnaissance, which has not been mentioned so far. It seems to be the Cinderella of air forces. Different techniques are used. The Americans believe that reconnaissance can take place at the same time as the attack is going in, and that the air crew carrying out the attack can also decide whether they have destroyed the building or airfield that they are attacking. The RAF takes a different view. It believes that, while attack-type reconnaissance is useful, there is a need for special reconnaissance aircraft to go in afterwards to assess professionally the effectiveness of the attack.

The GR1A, the reconnaissance version of the GR1, was rushed into service and sent to the Gulf. It was effective not only in assessing what had taken place but in seeking, through its infra-red and other sensors, the Scud sites which caused so many problems early in the war. Again, I do not think that that aspect of the operation has been fully acknowledged. It shows the importance of the specialist role of reconnaissance, which should remain in the main stream of the tactics of air forces today and in the future. That should be developed further and we should perhaps have more Tornados with that capacity. Less easy to evaluate was the success of the system on the Tornado F3, not because, as articles in The Daily Telegraph suggest, it was ineffective and did not achieve anything, but simply because the Iraqi air force never got airborne in sufficient numbers and never flew near enough to the Saudi border to pose any threat.

I was interested in the number of modifications that were quickly made to the Foxhunter radar on the F3 for operations in Saudi Arabia and Iraq. I was also interested

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in the reply that I got on Tuesday during Defence questions about the effectiveness of that radar. The reply made it clear that the radar now exceeded its original specification, but that that did not relate to all the radar. However, there is still concern about the effectiveness of that radar, bearing in mind its huge cost to the taxpayer and the difficulties of its procurement through different contracts.

While I am obviously pleased that the radar is better than it was, it would be useful, in the general assessment of weapons and their effectiveness to be carried out by my right hon. Friend, for him to speak, rather than to weapons systems operators, to some of the pilots and navigators who fly the F3 Tornado in this country. He could hear at first hand their assessment of the stage 1 and stage 2 improvements to the system, in order to find out whether their assessments vary greatly from those of the officials in the Ministry. I am not suggesting for a moment that they might be different, but it is important occasionally for politicians and Ministers to speak to people in the front line to find out the effectiveness of procurement policy and of expenditure.

As to the future, it is clear from the Gulf experience that the Royal Air Force needs to procure a modern, highlymanoeuvrable combat aircraft with a low radar signature. In that respect, I refer to the European fighter aircraft. The point I made earlier in an intervention stands. We tend to talk about stealth in terms of certain aircraft having it and others not having it. In reality, the position is different. Most modern aircraft have lower radar signatures than their predecessors. Most modern aircraft have some stealth capabilities.

The radar signature of EFA is considerably smaller than that of the Tornado, largely because of the composite materials used and because of certain characteristics of the aircraft itself. Regardless of the view of our German partners, the programme should go ahead on its own or with our partners. It is vital to the north-west, which I represent, because it would provide a high-tech heart for industry there. Without EFA, thousands of jobs would be at risk. Not only that, but we would not have the long- term research and development capability to develop other systems.

I wish that we could have from others, particularly some members of the Labour party, the same firm commitment that we have received from the Minister this evening and previously. In my area, I have tried two or three times to get a firm commitment to EFA from the Labour-controlled Lancashire county council, but I have not so far succeeded, nor have I got a commitment from some Labour Members in the region. It is vital to employment in the north-west, and particularly in Lancashire, that we all fight together to ensure that the project goes ahead.

The project is important to the Royal Air Force, because it would provide huge export potential. It is relatively cheap compared to some aircraft that are being put in the same category. It is also an advanced aircraft, with advanced engines and aerodynamics. It is a highly cost-effective solution to many of the needs of the Royal Air Force, and indeed of other air forces as well.

I shall now say a few words about the future organisation of the Royal Air Force. I am frankly worried about the blurring of the balance between the need to keep the defence budget this year and next year within bounds and the need specified for our long-term defence in

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"Options for Change". Earlier tonight, the exchange on the Bloodhound missile demonstrated the problem clearly. The decision on that was taken largely to save money in the short term. It seemed to provide a good solution : an elderly missile coming to the end of its useful life, so we are told, could easily be got rid of and we could save some money in the short term. However, little thought was given to this decision and what it would do to the overall air defence of the United Kingdom.

Paramount in people's minds after "Options for Change", and after we have reassessed our contribution to NATO on the continent, should be the air defence of the United Kingdom. I cannot think of any other task that the Royal Air Force will have to fulfil in the future that could be put above that need. Therefore, in a way, it is the one clear and positive RAF role, surrounded by a number of other roles, that are probably open to some doubt. That role will probably become more important, because a number of the aircraft at the moment based in Germany will return to the United Kingdom, and they will need to be defended as well.

Perhaps I am labouring this point, but it has always been my understanding of the air defence environment in the United Kingdom that it can be split into three. There is the point defence of airfields, largely looked after by the RAF Regiment, with missiles such as Rapier and various types of anti -aircraft guns. Then there are the medium-range needs of air defence, out to 60 or 70 miles, or, in the case of the Bloodhound, even up to 150 or 200 miles in certain cases. The air defence of the United Kingdom or, more specifically, Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Suffolk, in that range has been carried out by the Bloodhound missile. Indeed, I can remember well, in the 1970s, Bloodhound missiles being withdrawn from Germany and Cyprus to fill what was then considered to be a gap in our air defence.

Interestingly, we then had two fighters, the Lightning and the Phantom, that could be considered capable of filling that need. They were relatively short-range aircraft, certainly in the case of the Lightning, and in the case of the Phantom highly manoeuvrable. Following the decision to scrap the Bloodhound at the end of this year, we have a highly effective short- range air defence system, a highly effective long-range air defence system in the form of the Tornado F3, but, as far as I can see, nothing in between. Air Commodore Day gave evidence to the Select Committee on Defence as recently as last month. He was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) about this problem. My hon. Friend said :

"That is well understood but what I have difficulty in understanding is you as a professional Air Force officer, accepting a four-year gap with nothing. Are you happy about that?"

Air Commodore Day replied :

"No, we are not happy but I think one has to say that is the situation we have ended up in and where we believe it is not cost-effective to run on Bloodhound."

Well, it may or may not be cost-effective to run on Bloodhound but it is cost-effective to run on something ; it must be more cost-effective to do that than to leave this gap. Whereas the Lightning and the Phantom had the capability to operate in this air defence gap relatively effectively, although not effectively enough to fill that role in the eyes of former RAF chiefs when they withdrew the Bloodhound from Germany to the United Kingdom, the

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Tornado F3 is not the aircraft to fill that gap, because it has been specifically designed to do something else. It is a long-range interceptor and it is not as highly manoeuvrable as the Phantom and the Lightning, in certain instances. Most important of all, if it, or its radar, has a shortfall at all, it is in short-range combat, for which it was not designed.

I hope that when my hon. Friend is winding up, he will promise to give serious consideration to looking closely at the possibility of shrinking that gap, which now looks as if it is inevitable, and procuring a missile which I believe is essential for one of the primary tasks of the Air Force, whatever else is decided as a result of "Options for Change".

Apart from air defence, a number of other roles will also be important to the Royal Air Force. We have heard quite a lot tonight about the strike attack Tornado, the GR1. I have mentioned briefly the GR1A, the recce aircraft, but the GR1 has a great length of life ahead of it. Its one shortfall has been its short range. One of the lessons of the Gulf is that equipping it with, ironically, the long-range tanks originally specified for the F3, has made it a much more effective aircraft. That, coupled with the flight refuelling capability, which is being enhanced, should mean that that aircraft has many years of useful life ahead of it. As with stealth, which I mentioned briefly earlier, there is the possibility of adding on things to reduce its radar signature further and give it an operational life well into the next century.

There is one thing lacking, however, and that too has been mentioned tonight : a stand-off weapon capability, and not just a short-range stand- off capability, so that the aircraft is able not only to take out runways into the foreseeable future but to fulfil its primary role of strike more effectively. I am talking about an air-launched missile, either nuclear or conventional, with a range of at least 200 or 300 km. With that capacity, that aircraft will remain effective well on into the next century. Equipped with some of the smart weaponry that we have seen working so effectively in the Gulf, it will provide an excellent weapons platform with an excellent performance. We must not forget our commitment to, and the importance of, the concept and development of the Harrier, which can take off over a short distance or vertically. In the years ahead, the Harrier will provide a more effective means of delivering air power than will aircraft that take off and land conventionally.

I want to refer to another interesting lesson that has been learnt from the Gulf war. The Iraqis, indeed, like NATO in western Europe, built considerable numbers of concrete shelters. Countries put their aircraft inside those shelters, thinking that they were safe. To realise how untrue that was, one had only to look at some of the magazine and television pictures of holes in the sides of extremely strong concrete shelters, inside which bombs had caused devastation. In other words, such shelters, far from providing protection, acted as traps. It is highly significant that the Iraqis decided that the one means of getting round this problem was to tow aircraft off airfields and park them beside hospitals, houses and anything else that might deter attacks on them.

Long ago, of course, the Harrier embodied the concept of dispersal. I envisage the development of that aircraft in a supersonic mode, with smart weaponry and, possibly, stealth characteristics. Of course, it is very difficult to combine short take-off and landing and vertical take-off

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and landing capability with stealth capability. If it can be done, however, it will provide the sort of aircraft that will see us well into the next century.

Here, too, we have demonstrated the need for a highly efficient research and development base on this side of the Atlantic. In our decisions about what to do in this sphere, we shall have to be quite ruthless. We shall not be able, as we were 10 or 15 years ago, to spread our research and development effort widely. It would be too expensive to do so. We shall have to be highly selective in deciding which sectors it is critical to keep in this country, or on this side of the Atlantic, and then go for those sectors. I suspect that many of them will be in avionics and electronics. With the shrinkage that must take place in the size of the Air Force, we shall have to spend on research and development capability--I stress the word "capability"--a high proportion of whatever money is made available for defence so that we may be able to react quickly to a change in circumstances, a change in perception, or a change in the sort of weapons that a potential aggressor may be able to develop in a short period.

It is important to think about the overall system for weapons. Let me refer to a problem that we have had in the past. An air-launched weapon system is made up of three or four parts--the airframe, the engines, the avionics, and the weapon. These tend not to be developed together. Perhaps the developers get the airframe right first, and it flies around with a lump of concrete in the nose. Indeed, that has happened occasionally in recent times. Then the engine is developed to its full potential, and, rather belatedly, the avionics make an appearance. Finally, the weapon system has to be strapped on, and the various parts have to operate together. In future, we shall have to ensure that the whole system works properly.

Next to my notes I have written "Foxhunter". I do not want to say anything about that, other than that it is a classic example of a highly successful airframe doing the job that it was designed to do, but also of an aircraft whose radar, so critical to the F3's role, fell behind, and did not meet the specifications--indeed, in some instances, it was slightly inferior to the radar on the Phantom. That sort of thing results in the downgrading of an entire weapon system. Until a whole system comes together, taxpayers' money is wasted. Unless we are careful, we shall be in danger of falling into this trap in the development of air-to-air weaponry. I do not wish tonight to deal in any detail with the transatlantic agreements for the development of long-range and short-range air-to-air weapons. However, we may have been here before. We go along with a bargain and agree to buy the other nation's product. I am thinking in terms of helicopters in relation to the French, as well as our willingness to go along with the American side of the transatlantic bargain. When it comes to the Americans' agreeing to our having design leadership on this side of the Atlantic, things get a bit wobbly. Perhaps, they say, it is not such a good idea ; perhaps they will simply develop the Sidewinder missile further--which, I understand, they are thinking of doing.

I shall say only that I have a shrewd suspicion that, if we were to come back in two or three years' time, the United States would be offering us that modernised Sidewinder--or, indeed, a brand new short-range missile that it then decided to develop, following our initial loss of capability to produce any sort of air-to-air missile. It is important that we maintain our capability to develop

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air-to-air missiles further, if that is necessary. That is one of the critical sectors into which I feel we must put research and development funds in future.

We must not, however, forget the other roles played so well by the RAF in the recent and, indeed, the distant past. Earlier tonight, reference was made to the Hercules, which I believe has now been in service for about 24 years. It must come to the end of its useful life quite soon. I fully accept what my right hon. Friend the Minister said. It is very easy for Back Benchers to list all the aircraft that need to be replaced, but it is not so easy to find the money to replace them. I am not suggesting that we should go out and procure a replacement for the Hercules ; I am merely saying that this is an interesting aspect of aviation.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the Americans clearly understand the shift that pushes research development money spent on military matters towards helping their commercial aircraft programmes. Every aircraft that Boeing has produced over the past 40 years--until the development of its latest model, the 777--has been funded largely by the Department of Defence. It is interesting to note that when, for the first time, Boeing had to decide to develop a new aircraft itself, it took an awfully long time to do so, and then decided that the only way in which it could afford it was to bring in partners from outside--the Japanese, for instance.

In the development of new transport for the RAF, I see a direct spin-off for this country and, indeed, for the European aircraft industry. That should not be lost on us. We are in heavy competition with the Americans, and, I suggest, we shall be in equally heavy competition with others in the future--in the business of what are now lucrative returns, but will remain so in the long term only if we are prepared to put down a substantial amount initially.

There is a synergy between the development of new transport aircraft for the RAF and the development of new airliners for our airlines in this country and abroad. Although there is slightly less synergy, there are also similarities between the need to develop a replacement for the Nimrod and the parallel circumstances in commercial aviation.

The decision on Nimrod is rather different. I think that I am right in saying that the avionics are rather ahead of the airframe. The avionics that will go into the EH101--as my hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Waterside (Mr. Colvin) said at length, and with great knowledge--is ahead of the game ; it is the most effective anti-submarine avionics in the world. It could, indeed, be suggested that the role of the maritime force in the RAF could--in part at least--be met by a helicopter-borne force. That might be one solution. None the less, we shall have to look at either re-engineering or heavily modifying the Nimrod force. It should be borne in mind that the design goes right back to the Comet, so there is a big question mark over whether it can be allowed to continue much longer or whether we shall have to go for a brand-new aircraft.

Here again, we are talking about possibly a twin-engined aircraft with perhaps not the same capability as the Nimrod, bearing in mind what I have said about the use of helicopters and the fact that the Nimrod was produced, or at least developed, at a time when Britain still had a role in many parts of the world where it is no longer as important for us to have a presence. It may be that we can get away with a smaller airframe, and it may be that

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that would form part of the same sort of development programme that would go into the development of a STOL transport plane. There is a similarity there, and if that is looked at closely enough, it will be seen that there will be a lot of synergy with the development of civilian aircraft.

Earlier tonight, a couple of my hon. Friends mentioned training. That is an interesting subject, for a number of reasons. First, I think that the jury is still out on the effectiveness of the Tucano. It was probably, on balance, right to go for a turbo-prop trainer, but I am not fully convinced of the arguments that it was quite as cheap as was said at the time.

There is a trade-off between an aircraft such as the Tucano and the one it replaced. It goes more slowly than the one it replaced and does not fly as high, and as a result, the amount of training that can be done on it in preparation for the next stage of training on the Hawk is a little limited on the edge of the flight envelope. It is important for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and his Department accurately to assess the benefits of Tucano training, going on to the Hawk afterwards, to see where the crossover point is and to ensure that we are not effectively comparing apples with oranges, saying that the Tucano is much cheaper to operate than the Jet Provost because it can be turned round quickly, does not use so much fuel and is a much simpler aircraft, and then finding out in a year or two that it is necessary to increase the length of the Hawk course. As soon as that is done, any saving that was made is rapidly diminished. I am not saying that the decision to go for turbo-prop training is wrong, simply that it is not quite as efficient as has been made out.

I spoke briefly earlier about the EH101. That helicopter programme is important. It has been on the stocks for some time. A decision has still not been made to procure it either for the Royal Navy or the Air Force. In terms of its role for the Air Force, I am rapidly coming to the conclusion that it is the only viable solution. There is a lot of discussion about whether it would be better to buy a few Chinooks and perhaps the Black Hawk. However, I understand that the Black Hawk suffers from the rather ecentric disadvantage of not being able to accommodate a guardsman with his helmet on. I do not know whether that is a relevant point to take into account on the procurement of a helicopter to transport troops across the country or across Europe, but I suspect that somewhere in the Ministry of Defence, something along those lines will be written suggesting that that is an important reason for not buying the Black Hawk. The EH101, particularly with its RTM322 engine, is a highly effective helicopter. It has been expensive to develop, but it seems to fulfil many of the needs of the Navy and the Air Force. It may not fulfil them all, but it would be a mistake to procure one aircraft for the Navy or the Air Force and then to decide that it does not quite fit the bill and that something else should be procured. If experience is anything to go by, having taken a decision, the Air Force--and to a lesser extent the Navy--has quite a reputation for changing its mind a year or so later and for looking rather enviously over its shoulder at what the other service possesses and deciding that the alternative would be better. In that regard, the Navy had the

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Buccaneer first ; rather belatedly, the Air Force accepted that it was an extremely good aircraft and procured it. Conversely, the Navy realised that it could continue to use the Harrier when the larger carriers were cancelled under the Labour Government.

I now want to consider the future organisation of the RAF. We have an opportunity with "Options for Change" and the changes in our relationship with the eastern bloc nations to consider closely the way in which the RAF is organised. The Binbrook scheme for the organisation of RAF stations dates back to the early 1950s. Binbrook station has sadly shut, but if nothing else, that shows the length of time that the scheme has been running. The scheme has three prongs based on an operational wing, an administrative wing and an engineering wing. Is such a scheme right for the 1990s?

Are we not spending a little too much money on the support services and in particular on the administrative wing? In this age of modern technology, could we not get by with slightly fewer wing commanders on station, for example looking after station headquarters? What about the number of ranks in the RAF? There are about 11 ranks in the service. Is that too many for a shrinking force? Surely that is too many for a level of management and command necessary for a force that will soon be reduced to 60,000 or 70,000 personnel.

Should we not consider closely whether we can get away with fewer personnel, particularly in the higher ranks, who spend a high proportion of their careers across the road in the Ministry of Defence? Should we not consider more closely the ratio of people on operational stations, engineers servicing aircraft and the number of people in administration back here in the MOD? With our commitment to NATO reducing in terms of numbers, I am absolutely convinced that we can probably make do with a slimmed-down command headquarters and a greater proportion of the RAF based where the action is--next to the aircraft.

If I have any worry, it is that, as my hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire explained, there will be a conflict between the Treasury's desire to make cuts in the RAF everywhere and anywhere and the desire of the RAF hierarchy to resist those cuts. If we are not careful, we will end up with the worst of both worlds--an unbalanced force that is heavily bureaucratic and unable to intervene effectively to support our legitimate interests wherever they may be. That must not be allowed to happen. Knowing my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement as I do, I strongly suspect that he will not allow it to happen.

9.19 pm

Dr. John Reid (Motherwell, North) : Despite the attractions of the local government elections, we have had an interesting and substantial debate tonight, and that is to the credit of all those who have participated. It is also a timely debate. Last year, the Royal Air Force debate took place during the 50th anniversary of the battle of Britain. Although I did not participate in that debate, few of those who did would have thought that, within 12 months, the RAF would again be in action and our young service men and women called upon to risk their lives in war, once again against a brutal dictator.

I add my tribute to those that have already been paid to the skill and courage of the pilots, the ground crews and

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the associated support services. We must include in that tribute the headquarters, the civil service and the families. In particular, we pay tribute to those who made the ultimate sacrifice, giving their lives in the fight for justice and against tyranny. I know from the tributes that have already been paid that I speak for the whole House in sending our condolences to the families. The country owes them a great debt. We are proud of them and we are grateful for the opportunity to acknowledge our debt to them.

I did not visit the Gulf. As I listened to the speeches tonight, I increasingly came to the conclusion that I was the only Member in the House who did not do so. At one stage, I began to wonder how the aircraft managed to take off in what must have been an extremely crowded area. Never in the history of human conflict have apparently so many visited such a small place in so short a time.

Although I did not visit the Gulf, I subsequently visited RAF Germany, and spoke to some of the air crew who had been involved in the war. I was impressed by the determination and sacrifice of all those involved, including those who had remained at home and, as the Minister said, done without free time and time with their families for many weekends, over many months, so that they could provide the support necessary for the effort in the Gulf.

Not having visited the Gulf is only my first disadvantage. Another is that many of those who have spoken tonight have far greater personal experience than I of the matters that we are discussing. That is partly because many of them are older than I am, and partly because of their service in the Royal Air Force in particular, and in the armed forces in general. A number of speeches were based on that personal experience, especially that of the hon. Member for Wyre (Mr. Mans), to whom I listened with great interest. His speech was of some length, but necessarily so as there was some substance in it. He made a thoughtful speech.

The hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) gave us a valuable insight into the Gulf, and an especially valuable insight into the potential of our reserve forces. I have read our previous debates, and the hon. gentleman's speech tonight was very much in keeping with his previous speeches. At the risk of ending his career, I recall that last year my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Mr. Rogers) suggested that the hon. Gentleman would do well to assist the Ministry of Defence as an adviser.

The hon. Members for Dumfries (Sir H. Monro), for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) and for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) made important points, although I am not sure that the suggestion of the hon. Member for Tynemouth that guard duty should be hived off to the reserve forces, whether the Territorial Army or the Royal Air Force Reserve, would be effective in assisting recruitment. Nor am I sure that the confidence in the reserve forces shown by hon. Members on both sides of the House is necessarily reflected, according to rumour, in some of the options being considered by the Ministry of Defence, especially for the Territorial Army. That has been sufficiently alarming to cause a number of hon. Members to demand Adjournment debates on the matter so that they can outline their fears.

The hon. Member for Tynemouth praised the armed forces parlimentary scheme. I endorse that, as someone

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who spent a month, not with the RAF, but with the Army. I found that experience valuable, as I hope did the armed forces. Not surprisingly, one of the main issues in the debate has been the lessons that can be learned from the Gulf war, as has correctly been mentioned by several hon. Members, including the hon. Members for Woolwich (Mr. Cartwright), for Ruislip-Northwood and for Wyre and by the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell). It is precisely because of the sacrifices made by our service men and women that an even greater burden than usual is placed on those of us who must ultimately ask for that sacrifice when we seek to examine with great clarity and care the operational aspects of Operation Granby.

I do not underestimate or diminish the might of Iraq's forces which, surprisingly, my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton (Mr. Cohen) seemed to do. It is unfortunate that he is no longer in his place. I do not underestimate the potential power that then lay within the armed forces of Iraq. The House will not be surprised if I express my amazement that such an underestimate was made tonight, because the people who are now telling us in retrospect that we were too hard on the poor Iraqis are the very people who spent the previous six months warning us that the body bags would be coming home and that blood would flow through Iraq in rivers because we were taking on one of the strongest armies in the world. Consistency is helpful in approaching such matters.

No one should seek to diminish the power of the Iraqi armed forces and thereby the determination, courage and accomplishments of our forces. The allied air campaign during the Gulf war was one of the most successful in history. I take issue again with my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton : notwithstanding his comments, I believe that that air campaign was probably also the most precise in history. To be perfectly truthful, I wish that some of the siren voices that were raised during that difficult time about the horrendous possibilities of endangering and damaging the shrines in Iraq were now wailing as loudly about the fact that, without any recourse to conscience or religious sentiment, the Iraqi dictator has laid bare not only nations within Iraq but its shrines and places of worship. The allied air losses were astonishingly light. The RAF lost six aircraft in combat-- all Tornados--out of a total of 4,000 combat sorties. As has been said, once it was pinned to the ground, the Iraqi air force ceased to pose a serious threat, and the Iraqi planes that eventually took off flew to Iran. We must remind ourselves that that was precisely because of the RAF's activity in the initial period, and no doubt was also due to the quick learning processes of the Iraqi air force. It learned that, when facing the RAF and the United States and allied forces when they were in that mood, discretion was often the best part of valour.

We are indebted to the hon. Members for Wyre and for

Ruislip-Northwood for mentioning the calculated political decision that was taken by the revolutionary command structure and by Saddam Hussein himself to play a long game and to preserve intact some elements of his forces.

Those facts are a testament not to the lack of vitality or potential power of the Iraqi air force or army, but to the superior quality of our pilots and the technology that they employed. Nevertheless, valuable lessons can be learned by assessing the air campaign, especially about the use of low flying. I admire the courage with which this matter was

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referred to by several hon. Members, including the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East and the hon. Member for Wyre, because I believe that we have a duty to reappraise our tactics as carefully as possible. That duty is all the more arduous and important because lives were lost.

The issue of low flying is a tactical and legitimate question and we should not demean it by suggesting that it is treasonable or indicative of splits within the parties or the House to question whether it is tactical. We must reappraise low flying not because that tactic was necessarily wrong or foolish, far less because it was known to be so in advance, and certainly not because it was ineffective--we can all accept those three premises--but because we have a duty and an obligation to inspect and to examine tactics whenever and however lives are lost.

Five of the Tornados that were lost in action were lost during the first week of the air campaign. It is not yet apparent whether low flying was a major contributory factor in those comparatively high losses. The hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East referred to other factors which may have been involved. But it is surely no coincidence that when the RAF tactics were varied and Buccaneers were deployed to provide laser targeting from a higher altitude, the attrition rates dropped. It is also significant that, having sustained the loss of two combat aircraft in the first hours of the war, the United States navy abandoned low flying within 24 hours. I do not argue that low flying should be discarded as a tactic. It can offer a pilot an important element of surprise. The delivery of the JP233 runway denial weapon undoubtedly played a significant part in achieving the air superiority which was necessary and ultimately saved hundreds, perhaps thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of lives. But a legitimate question can be asked about the extent to which we can continue to rely on low flying, especially in the context of a protracted war. We all agree that, even if the same intent and capability remained in the Soviet Union, a blitzkrieg attack from that direction would not be possible. We would face a protracted war, with the continual need to go back to runway denial. That is the context in which we should examine the need for low flying.

We knew in advance, and the Gulf war illustrated in practice, that there was a variety of other ways in which enemy air defences could be penetrated, such as use of stealth technology, electronic jamming of radar, anti-radar missiles and stand-off missiles that can be delivered from outside enemy air space. We should encourage the professionalism of the RAF to ensure that the most comprehensive appraisal can take place.

Can the Minister tell us this evening whether the options to which I referred are being studied by the MOD? I say that in advance lest I list some questions and at the end the Minister simply says that I am asking him to give a positive response to them all. I am not doing that. However, I should like to know whether at least some of them are being thought about and that somewhere along the line there is at least the prospect of a decision being taken on the occasional question that we raise.

Can the Minister tell us whether future RAF specifications will include stealth features--a matter raised by several hon. Members tonight? Has any consideration

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