House of Commons Hansard Debates for 27 Jun 1991

Mr. O'Neill : The hon. Member for Dunfermline, West (Mr. Douglas) barely has a constituency, so far as I can see. He is certainly schizophrenic. Hon. Members who have a direct constituency interest are placed at a tremendous disadvantage, whether they are members of the Conservative party or of Opposition parties. The manner in which the review is being conducted--behind closed doors and dependent on leaks--is not correct. The matter should be dealt with as quickly and openly as possible.

I recognise that we shall probably not be given a decision today, but I ask the Minister to make every effort to ensure that he can come to the Dispatch Box before the end of the parliamentary Session and make an announcement. He should end the uncertainty about which base may close or make it clear that all the bases will remain open. There is tremendous anxiety in all the communities. An announcement soon is the best way of addressing the problem on an all-party basis.

The Minister was somewhat ambiguous about the reinforcement of Norway. He suggested that Fearless and Intrepid might be looked at and that some craft would be refurbished. I have participated in Navy debates since 1984. I have yet to hear a Minister tell us anything other than that studies were being undertaken of the possibility of replacing Fearless and Intrepid. We are beginning to become impatient. The Government are conducting the most wide-ranging review of defence capability since 1981. The House is entitled to a better answer than the one that the Minister gave. If he cannot give us an answer tonight, I hope that, perhaps immediately after the recess, when I imagine that we shall have the opportunity to debate the White Paper, he will be able to do so.

If craft are to be refurbished or replaced, the employment prospects of yards which may be fortunate enough to obtain the contracts could be transformed. If the studies are still going on, it might be time that some of us tabled questions about how much they have cost. The cost would probably go some way to paying for a minehunter, if not a frigate, given the amount of time and effort that have been put in to the studies.

In a defence review we might consider whether amphibiosity is still appropriate for Britain's Navy. Could it be taken on by other allies ? If the review is dealing with burden sharing and a reallocation of roles in the alliance, perhaps the Minister could tell us whether that is one of the considerations behind the thinking.

We know that we are coming near the decision time for the EH101 order. It has been suggested that the matter will go to various committees in the near future. I hope that we shall have some information about that, again before the summer recess.

I understand that the contractual period for tendering expires in September. We must have an announcement from the Minister about the size and strategic significance of the order. I recognise that it is not within his capability at present to make such an announcement, but he owes the House the courtesy of making some announcement before the recess.

The Minister said that he hoped that the first of the new generation of strategic submarines nuclear would come into service at about the turn of the century. He spoke about establishing the early design stages. Perhaps he

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could clarify that. Last year it was announced that there would be a delay in replacing the SSN fleet. There have been press reports about the matter. For example, a recent one in The Daily Telegraph said that the Ministry had dropped its plans to build an entirely new class.

Will the Minister categorically say that that report of 25 June was wrong and that a new class of submarine will definitely be started? Can he be specific about when the starting time would have to be in order to have the boats in the water by the turn of the century? Whether a fourth boat is constructed by this Government or a future Labour one, as I understand the construction procedures followed by VSEL, there will be a sizeable gap in the order book of VSEL in the mid-1990s.

I notice that the hon. member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Franks) is in his place and looking somewhat worried. We have had previous debates in the House on Ministry of Defence ordering procedures and their effect on the capability and the facility at Barrow.

Mr. Douglas : I wish to clarify one point. I do not know whether it was a slip of the tongue--we all make them--and I do not want to misquote the hon. Gentleman, who has been gracious in giving way, but I think that I heard him say, "If the fourth boat was constructed by this Government or a future Labour Government." Is it now Labour party policy that it would construct a fourth boat at Vickers?

Mr. O'Neill : Until an order is placed, no one can talk about construction. If an order were placed before a general election, an incoming Labour Government would have to examine the contract, the cancellation charges, and so on. The position on that is clear. It has been reported repeatedly that we have said that in the event of a general election being called after an order has been placed, a responsible Labour Government would examine the contract before cancelling.

With regard to the future of Barrow, will the Minister tell the House when he proposes to place the order for the fourth boat and what time scale he envisages for the design stage of a new class of SSN? The Labour party has always supported the construction of a new class of SSN. When does the Minister expect that orders could be placed, provided that the terms were right and given that VSEL is now probably the only submarine yard in the country capable of building nuclear-powered submarines?

Mr. Cecil Franks (Barrow and Furness) : The hon. Gentleman was right to say that I was looking worried. It was about the same point that the hon. Member for Dunfermline, West (Mr. Douglas) made. I distinctly heard the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) say, "If a fourth submarine is ordered by either this Government or an incoming Labour Government." It is possible that that is not what the hon. Gentleman meant to say. I want to give him the opportunity to clarify the Labour party's policy on Trident.

It is rare for Labour Front Bench spokesmen to give way to me when I seek to clarify the points that they make in debates. In last year's debate, neither the hon. Gentleman nor his Front Bench colleagues spoke about Trident. It is incredible that with Trident the cornerstone of Britain's defence policy, a supposedly credible Labour Opposition can debate the Navy without mentioning the subject.

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Mr. O'Neill : Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will give me credit for correcting the shortcomings of last year. Given his grasp of the subject, he will accept that if I can be of assistance to him, enabling him to make a point so that I can give him information, that is for the benefit of the House. He asked if I could envisage a Labour Government ordering a fourth boat. He will find when he reads the Official Report tomorrow that I did not say what he said I said. I said that if a submarine had been ordered and was under construction by a Conservative or future Labour Government--

Mr. Franks : No, the hon. Gentleman did not say that.

Mr. O'Neill : We will check with the Official Report tomorrow. The point is clear and I shall repeat it once more and leave it there. If an order is placed by the Conservative Government before a general election occurs, a Labour Cabinet will reserve the right to look at the contract before cancellation-- [Interruption.] That is our position. We shall look at it because it would be irresponsible not to do so.

Mr. Franks : What would Labour Members do now if they were running things? That is a simple question which requires a simple answer.

Mr. O'Neill : We do not consider that there is a need for a fourth boat. We have never argued for one because a fourth boat is a luxury which the country does not need. It is a craft for which the targeting, deploying and crewing arrangements and maintenance are not needed.

I understand that the availability of the present Polaris fleet is such that a number of questions are raised by a report appearing in The Scotsman and The Guardian today, about which I telephoned the Minister's office in the hope that he would respond to those issues when he replies to this debate. Will he confirm those reports, to the effect that the Polaris fleet has experienced difficulties? Can he provide explanations for the problems that the submarines are facing? What steps are being taken to rectify those problems? What are the expenditure and personnel implications arising out of those problems? The report appearing today in those newspapers may or may not have substance. The House is entitled to a ministerial response on the subject.

Mr. Gareth Wardell : Will my hon. Friend add to that list of problems a difficulty that is of great concern to me and to the Labour party and which should concern the Government? As the Trident programme is on-going, is it not a disgrace that the Government should continue to allow a boat yard manufacturing timber craft to be located on loch Gare, next to the largest construction works, in terms of defence establishments, in the whole of Europe? In other words, a large concentration of our nuclear capability is located next to a small boat yard. The Minister should comment on what appears to be a grave threat to our nuclear capability and say whether it is intended to remove that facility from loch Gare.

Mr. O'Neill : I am sure that the Minister will have given much consideration to the point that my hon. Friend raises, and will give a full answer when he replies to the debate. My hon. Friends and I have always said that problems must exist over the location of nuclear submarines, from security and other points of view.

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Sir Anthony Buck (Colchester, North) : Will the hon. Gentleman spell out Labour party policy on that issue? Would Labour maintain our independent nuclear deterrent? Labour policy should be clearly on the record, remembering that when Labour was last in office, it updated our nuclear deterrent by bringing in Chevaline, although the House was not told that that was being done.

Mr. O'Neill : We would deploy the Trident boats-- [Interruption.] --the three of them that we would construct.

It is 18 months since we last debated the Navy and during that time a number of changes have occurred in the international situation, not least as a result of the Gulf war. We have supported the efforts of the fleet and recognised the tremendous courage and determination of the Royal Marines. We recognise also the back-up that was and is given not simply by the Fleet Auxiliary but by the men and women who work in the bases, the dockyards and shipyards and in subcontracting firms throughout the country. Operation Granby made clear the wide range of people who support the fleet and service personnel, the men and women who serve in the ships--

Mr. Peter Viggers (Gosport) rose --

Mr. O'Neill : I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman because I am about to conclude my remarks. He has had ample time in which to intervene. He did not attempt to do so earlier.

Mr. Viggers : I hope that the hon. Gentleman will give way because this is the first time that he has mentioned

Mr. O'Neill : I am not giving way.

Mr. Viggers : --the people who serve in the armed forces.

Mr. O'Neill : I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has been here throughout the debate and heard the beginning of it. If so, he would have heard the Minister and me speaking of the way in which hon. Members in all parts of the House have great respect for the tremendous work that was done as part of Operation Granby and is now being done as part of Operation Haven. That work will continue to be done in a variety of forms, and as part of it there are many unsung roles.

I am sorry if the hon. Gentleman did not regard my comments in that respect as a fulsome tribute to the Navy. Apart from those serving in the obvious areas--in the bases and elsewhere--all others take pride in the tremendous achievements of our Navy and the contribution that it makes to the security of the nation. While we may disagree across the Floor of the House on other matters, we agree totally about that. I hope that in areas where the Minister has yet to be decisive, he will give the House, before the summer, the sort of assurances that are required by the people about whom we have been speaking who, in many instances, are many stages removed from service personnel but who feel that they are contributing to the national defence. Their jobs and personal security are on the line and they need reassuring. This is the first time the Minister has participated in a Navy debate. There have been too many occasions in the past when there have been nods and winks about the possibility of orders. We have had indications to the effect

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that the process of decision-making might be beginning. Too many decisions have yet to be made and I get the impression that they will not be made this side of the next general election. Clearly, it will take a change of Government to arrive at the decisions that the Navy and the British people want to secure the future of these islands. 6.18 pm

Sir John Farr (Harborough) rose --

Madam Deputy Speaker : If the hon. Member would be more comfortable sea ted, that would be in order.

Sir John Farr : I am obliged, Madam Deputy Speaker, for that consideration, but I shall remain standing.

I wish at the outset to congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. Carlisle) on his concise and cogent speech, which was reassuring and comforting. He took the opportunity to pay tribute to the role of the Royal Navy in the recent Gulf conflict. Like the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill), I am sure that we are all full of admiration for what the Royal Navy did, on a budget which many hon. Members consider was a shoestring. The sort of money that has been voted for the Royal Navy has not enabled it to perform a proper role in the Gulf or to be able to perform such a role if there were another Gulf conflict--please God there never will be--unless more finance is put into the service.

My hon. Friend the Minister referred to the decision to wind sown or sell off HMS Challenger to another power. It has been suggested that by losing Challenger we shall lose the capacity to rescue submariners should a submarine be lost on the sea bed. As my hon. Friend the Minister knows, that was not Challenger's main purpose. I have visited Challenger, as has my hon. Friend, no doubt many times. Challenger's role was at the threshold of naval warfare of the future, tracking down acoustic mines and listening devises placed on the sea bed, perhaps by a Warsaw pact power that wanted to know the movements of allied shipping. It has a number of small one or two-man submarines and I was lucky enough to meet the crews of many of them when I went on that trip. It will be a tragedy if we have to lose out when we were in the forefront of such developments.

My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State paid tribute to the Navy's role in the Gulf. It is my view and that of people I know who are still connected with the service that it was little short of miraculous. My hon. Friend did not have time to mention some of the dirty work that the Navy carried out. Let us imagine groping for underwater mines in harbours along the coast of Kuwait in water that is almost 50 per cent. crude oil. The Navy did so without complaint. It was a filthy job and the Navy did it so effectively. No other nation would touch it.

What a brilliant role our minesweeping force played in the Gulf. I hoped that my hon. Friend would say a little more about that. I have always wanted to know whether minesweepers that do not create a shadow are effective. There was a fanfare when the minesweepers went to the Gulf and we were told that we had a fantastic force of ships that did not create a metal shadow to explode a mine. Minesweepers did very well and I hope that the Minister will say something about that capability. Are we unique in having that capability, as I thought, and have other nations adopted other methods of tracking down mines

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and dealing with them? The Americans seem to favour helicopter search and destruction and I should be grateful if the Minister would say something about that.

The performance of HMS Gloucester and her anti-aircraft crew dealing with incoming missiles was wonderful, as was the performance of all Her Majesty's helicopter pilots.

Our efforts in the Gulf were beyond comparison and I am lost in admiration for them. However, was it really impossible for us to deploy a tiny carrier task force? At the time there was a rumour that one of our carriers was to be deployed, but it never went to the Gulf and we had to rely mainly on the Americans to secure air supremacy. Let us hope that there is not another Gulf conflict, but if some other international situation arises will we not need our own air superiority? If some form of aircraft carrier force is not available it will be impossible to deal with such threats.

My hon. Friend the Minister will agree that a delicate balance has to be maintained. One could ask whether we need a nuclear deterrent--that decision must be taken on high. I think that we do and I am confident that the Government's decision to go for a four Trident nuclear fleet is correct. Are we right to choose to retain the nuclear deterrent and to have four Tridents? In a short time, if the eastern bloc withdraws from international affairs, it will make it transparently obvious that one ballistic missile submarine makes nonsense. One must consider the necessity of having any ballistic submarine fleet, as it is a weapon which one could never contemplate using. However, there are pros and cons which are not to be aired in a Royal Navy debate.

There is a delicate balance in deciding whether to go for a four-Trident force or to abandon it and advance on another front, by developing the SSN- 20 submarine, where we are in the forefront internationally. Such submarines are totally silent and a new generation is due to come into service next year. However, reports in the papers suggest that it is due to be scrapped. Obviously one cannot have everything, but the SSN-20 is in a new field in which our research and technology is very advanced.

If my hon. Friend does not reply to my remarks I shall know that nothing is on. There is the question of securing the sale of a nuclear submarine. We nearly made a deal with the Canadians, and if we were able to interest Canada or any other nation in a joint development programme it might be easier to cope with the financing of the development of SSN-20s and such technical advances. I was disappointed at the extent to which we had to rely on foreign merchant ships to provide the impedimenta of war for our troops in the Gulf. The Royal Navy, Army and Royal Air Force all did a first-class job in the Gulf, but it seems a pity that more than three quarters of their supplies went by sea in merchant vessels flying another flag. Has the red duster collapsed completely? Do we no longer have a British merchant fleet? If we have, why was some effort not made--even if it had meant a little extra cost, and possibly even for security reasons-- to use the red ensign for supplying Royal Navy ships and all the British forces in the Gulf that did such a splendid job?

While ending on that slightly disappointed note, I want again to congratulate my hon. Friend the Minister, and to say how proud we all are in the House at the way in which the Royal Navy performed in the Gulf a few months ago.

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6.30 pm

Mr. Paddy Ashdown (Yeovil) : It is a privilege to follow the hon. Member for Harborough (Sir J. Farr), whose expert views on the Royal Navy are widely respected in the House. I particularly agree with his two early points about HMS Challenger and about the importance of mine counter- measure vessels in the Gulf war. There is an unsubstantiated story--though perhaps it is not untrue--that on one occasion, an American minehunter in the Persian gulf discovered one morning that it was surrounded by mines and had to call on the assistance of a British minesweeper to find its way out. That is testimony to the Royal Navy's supremacy in minehunting and mine clearing to which the hon. Member for Harborough referred. I regret that I shall have to leave the House shortly after I finish speaking. I have already apologised to the Minister and to the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) for the unintended and unavoidable discourtesy of not being present for the rest of the debate.

I associate myself and my party with the comments of the Minister and of the hon. Member for Clackmannan on the role played by the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines in Operation Granby and Operation Haven. They performed, as they always do, in the highest traditions of the service, and the House and the nation are much indebted to them.

I found myself much in agreement with the hon. Member for Clackmannan-- which is not always the case in respect of defence matters--when he said that the Government's approach to reconstructing and reshaping our forces in the face of the new threats that so self-evidently compose themselves against us is all wrong. That task should be approached on no other basis but that of a proper defence review. We know that the threat to this nation has changed. In the light of the collapse of the Soviet empire--albeit the Soviet Union is still producing submarines at a faster rate than ever before--the threat to our nation has manifestly and self-evidently changed. We know also, in the light of the Gulf war, that our ability to conduct out -of-area operations in co-operation with other nations may be absolutely vital in ensuring future world peace. To allow decisions to be taken without a proper defence review, and only according to the requirements of the Treasury--rather than make a rational response to the threats that now confront us--is folly of the highest order.

We are seeing a defence review of death by a thousand cuts. It will result in defence forces that are not properly balanced, and a climate in which providers of defence equipment will be unable to make the right decisions for their own industry or properly to serve our armed forces. It will result in a series of spatchcocked decisions, which will not add up to a proper, balanced structure for our armed forces.

Rosyth naval dockyard was mentioned by the hon. Member for Clackmannan, and its future has been raised before by members of my party and by other right hon. and hon. Members. Rosyth is a classic example of a profoundly crucial naval facility of strategic importance, yet hundreds of thousands of jobs associated with it are at risk. To allow that dockyard to be cut as an item on its own, without framing it in the context of a proper defence review, is folly.

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If the Government take rational decisions about reducing or changing the shape of our armed services--and decisions must be made--after a full defence review, the Minister will not find them opposed by Members on these Benches on the basis only of constituency arguments or special pleading. However, such decisions must carry the support of the House.

The subject of the EH101 helicopter was touched on by the Minister, but somewhat disappointingly. I hope that he will be able to say more when he winds up.

Mr. Ian Bruce : Wil the right hon. Gentleman allow me to intervene?

Mr. Ashdown : I will give way to the hon. Gentleman. As other right hon. and hon. Members wish to contribute, I do not want to speak at length, so this will probably be the only intervention that I will allow.

Mr. Bruce : I appreciate that the right hon. Gentleman wants to move on to give his views about helicopters, on which I am sure that I shall support him, even though it may seem that we both have a constituency interest in the subject. The right hon. Gentleman said that defence decisions should not be Treasury-led. I understand that the Labour party suggests cutting back defence expenditure by one third, and that the Liberal Democrats have mentioned a cut of about one half. Can the right hon. Gentleman confirm his party's policy--or would it accept whatever figure the Government produce after their review?

Mr. Ashdown : Obviously such matters have to turn on Treasury considerations as well. The nation must know how much its defence is to cost, and decide whether it can afford to meet that cost. However, the hon. Gentleman is wrong in his remarks about my party's policy. We have said that it seems to us that a 50 per cent. cut in the defence budget by the end of the century is a reasonable aspiration--but that is an aspiration, not a policy. It is an aim that we may be able to achieve, consistent with proper defence. No Government, and certainly no responsible party, would put that aspiration before the security of the nation. However, the way matters are developing, it is reasonable to aspire to a cut of that size-- but not at the expense of the nation's defence. We expect that our armed forces in the future will be much more mobile and flexible than currently, and probably smaller. There is no doubting that. The measure of that can only come after proper assessment of the threat and proper judgment of the forces required to meet it.

Of course I have a constituency interest at heart in respect of the EH101. Perhaps I should declare that I have more than a constituency interest, because I have the fantastic number of 25 shares in Westland which, when I purchased them more than 20 years ago, was the minimum required to allow me to attend the company's annual general meetings. Last year, those shares returned me the princely dividend of 30p. Right hon. and hon. Members will therefore appreciate that my constituency interest in Westland somewhat outweighs my financial interest in the company.

The Minister will appreciate anyway that the matter goes beyond Westland or Yeovil, because only about one third of a modern helicopter is manufactured by the company whose name it bears and about two thirds of it

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is bought in. I suspect that upwards of 100 right hon. and hon. Members have a direct interest in the future of the EH101, so I speak for a greater number of constituents than the 5,000 or 6,000 who work for Westland in Yeovil.

The EH101 is a world-beating helicopter in all senses. It incorporates many technical advances--vibration suppression probably being the most recent of them--representing the front edge of world aerospace technology. The EH101 is the only helicopter in the world in its class of 28,000 lb to 30,000 lb all-up weight. I believe that the Russians are attempting to produce an "EH101ski" but, as usual, that two-engined aircraft will not meet the requirements. The EH101 has an unrivalled dominance in both the civil and the military market place.

I remind the Minister that it is four years since the then Secretary of State for Defence promised the House, in 1987, an order of 25 utility EH101s and reconfirmed that promise in Yeovil. That promise has yet to be delivered. At the same time, he made a commitment to the Merlin.

The EH101 is more than just a powerful helicopter with substantial defence sales overseas--Canada is particularly interested but such sales required a commitment from our Government--it is the centrepiece of the Government's strategy for the Navy in its anti-submarine protection role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the North sea and the north Atlantic. The type 23 frigate, which is designed around the EH101 helicopter, has only about 50 per cent. of its operational capacity without it. But the first type 23 frigate, Madam Deputy Speaker-- [Interruption.]

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker) : Order.

Mr. Ashdown : I apologise, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

The first type 23 frigate was launched in 1987--a full four years ago. If the Government take a decision on the EH101 this year, the first one will not come off the production line until 1995. That means that the first type 23 frigate, costing £243 million will have spent a minimum of eight or nine years--

Mr. Douglas : It is not as dear as that.

Mr. Ashdown : I am told that it is. I stand to be corrected, but I obtained that figure from the Library this morning.

The first type 23 frigate, costing a substantial amount of money--£243 million was the figure that I was given, but if I am wrong I concede the point to the hon. Gentleman--will have been in service for nine years, on about one third of its keel life expectancy of 25 years, without the weapon system around which it was designed. There are now three type 23 frigates afloat, worth three quarters of a billion pounds, but without the weapon system around which they were designed. By the time the aircraft comes into production and is in service with the Royal Navy in 1995, there will be seven new frigates plus the three already floating--a total of 10--which means that £2.5 billion-worth of Government defence material will be floating without the weapon system around which and for which it was designed. The aircraft also has substantial civil potential. Many believe that the standards of comfort of the EH101 match turbo prop levels. We believe that, in Japan and elsewhere, there is a considerable sales potential for the aircraft.

The EH101 is the centrepiece of probably one of the most successful existing European collaborations--the

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Anglo-Italian one. The Italians have made their commitment to it clear, but we have not yet heard from the British Government in unequivocal terms.

We have an enormous commitment in Westland. I choose my words carefully, not without consultation, and I believe that it is no exaggeration to say that, if the order does not go through, or if it is delayed, we put at risk Britain's capacity to have a stand-alone helicopter manufacturer. That risk is posed not merely if the Government make the wrong decision--I hope they will not, and the Minister's commitment seems to show that they will take the right decision--but if they take no decision. If there is a delay we face that risk.

We are talking about a piece of equipment that our services desperately need. A senior Royal Navy officer told me the other day that he believed that without the EH101 the Royal Navy could not carry out its anti- submarine duties in NATO on the present force levels of which the Government speak. That fundamental duty depends on the EH101. At risk are overseas military orders, civil market potential, European collaboration and the integrity of the design teams which are at the heart of Westland's capacity to produce this remarkable aircraft.

Again, I choose my words carefully--if the Government delay until after July some of the crucial decisions necessary for that project to go ahead, Westland will not be able to put off for long the dismantling of the design teams at the heart of the aircraft. If they go, there is no doubt that we shall never get them back, and Britain will have lost a substantial aerospace asset. I do not use those words lightly--I have thought about them carefully and consulted widely, and I hope that the Minister will listen to them. The Government can delay making the decision no longer than the end of July. I hope that today we shall hear a clear, confirmed United Kingdom policy commitment to the EH101. I hope that the Minister in his wind-up speech will say that we are to have an announcement on the mission prime contractor before the House rises at the end of July, as we were promised. I very much hope that the Minister will make a commitment to the Westland IBM part of that programme. I see that the Parliamentary Under- Secretary is speaking to the Minister of State for Defence Procurement. I remind him of the promise that the announcement would be made this summer. It is not good enough for the announcement to be made in the late summer. In all honesty and fairness to Westland, it ought to be made before the House rises at the end of July.

Memorandum of understanding No. 4, initiating investment preparations for production between the United Kingdom and Italian Governments, which should have been made by January 1991, must be made this summer--preferably before the end of July--and

intergovernmental memorandum of understanding No. 5, which commits to production, must be made by the end of 1991.

The Minister cannot delay a decision on that any longer. If he fails to decide and to announce that decision, he will weaken our forces, especially the Royal Navy, by denying them the equipment needed to do their job. He will prevent the Royal Navy from carrying out its functions in NATO in the north Atlantic and deal a deadly blow to European collaboration, just when we should be building on it. He will place at risk the technological lead

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that Westland has accumulated. He will sacrifice overseas orders and severely, potentially fatally, damage the United Kingdom's only stand-alone helicopter manufacturer.

I have one message for the Minister--that further delay would be folly. The Minister must decide, and he must do so as soon as possible.

6.47 pm

Mr. Churchill (Davyhulme) : I think that many hon. Members would agree with the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) when he expressed concern at the importance of the maintenance of our defence industrial base. If one allows the levels to fall below certain points in some sectors, one loses an entire capability for ever. The right hon. Gentleman was right : when the Tripoli was struck by a mine in the Gulf, a United States minesweeper came to a dead halt in the water and had to wait until it was led to safety by a British Hunt class minehunter.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State on his opening speech and on drawing attention to the Labour party's achilles heel in defence matters--the deterrent. The Labour party's ambivalence on the future of Britain's deterrent will undoubtedly play a central part in the forthcoming general election campaign. In the face of the threat of nuclear proliferation, Britain's deterrent becomes even more vital than it has been in the past with a multiplicity of decision-making centres and individuals involved in them who appear to be increasingly reckless and irresponsible in their use of political and military power.

This afternoon the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) said that a Labour Government would deploy Trident. That is a welcome opinion, but it is valueless against the assertion by the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) and the Leader of the Opposition that Trident would be deployed only in order to negotiate it away. What is the value of negotiating it away if that leaves us at the mercy of military dictators such as a future Saddam Hussein who manages to acquire nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them, thereby placing the British people at risk of an attack?

I pay tribute to the calibre and record of our forces in the Gulf which I had the privilege to visit twice with my colleagues on the Select Committee on Defence. The Royal Navy's part in that campaign was remarkable, and there are still Royal Navy vessels in the Gulf continuing the blockade of Iraq. We must not underestimate the Royal Navy's contribution in the allied context. The United States battleships Wisconsin and Missouri, with their magnificent 16 in guns, which we all saw on television would never have been able to get close enough to the Kuwaiti coastline to bombard the Iraqi defensive positions but for the five Hunt class minehunters deployed by the Royal Navy. One cannot speak too highly of what they achieved. The alertness of a 17-year-old seaman aboard HMS Gloucester at 5 o'clock in the morning when a Silkworm missile was launched towards the USS Missouri probably saved that vessel or one of those in her immediate company from massive damage caused by the Silkworm's three-quarter tonne warhead. The total flight time of that missile was no more than 50 seconds, and the speed in tracking, identifying and engaging it with two Royal Navy Sea Darts was of the highest order of seamanship and modern technology.

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Many lessons will be drawn from the Gulf conflict, but two stand out. The first is the need always to be prepared for the unexpected, and the second is to learn once again that our military disposition must be based on an asssessment of a potential enemy's capability and not his intentions. Intentions are difficult to assess at the best of times, and they can change overnight. That truth is underlined by the fact that, as far as I am aware, no one claims to have foreseen the invasion of the Falklands by Argentina or Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. That brings me to "Options for Change". That is a sad misnomer, because the options were foreclosed 12 months ago when the Government selected the minimum option on offer, since when their policies have largely been set in concrete. Even the convulsion of the Gulf war has changed nothing, except that we have seen the emergence of a rapid deployment force in Europe under British command. I welcome that as a tribute to the professionalism and expertise of Britain's armed forces.

These non-options with which Parliament has been presented are already being implemented. I regret to say that the cuts go too far and are too deep. It is painfully slow and difficult to build up a capability, but it can be cut at the stroke of a pen. I urge the Government to reconsider the cuts before irreparable damage is caused to a defence capability that has been built up over decades. I appreciate that there has been a significant evolution in the nature and immediacy of the Soviet threat following the removal of Soviet forces from eastern Europe and the signing of the CFE agreement. It is right that such changes should be reflected in the dispositions of our armed forces and, in particular, in the major cuts on the central front. It is one thing for the United States, with its vast military resources containing much waste and fat, to make a cut of 25 per cent. It is quite another for us to impose a similar level of cuts upon our already small and overstretched armed forces. Our armed forces are lean and highly efficient and have nothing but muscle and bone to cut.

In many cases, the implemented cuts go far beyond 25 per cent. The strength of the Royal Navy's submarines is being cut by no less than 40 per cent., from 27 to a mere 16, even though the Soviets have maintained a production rate of one submarine every six weeks. Paragraph 5 of the sixth report of the Select Committee on Defence, which was published only today, states :

"We concluded that by the year 2000 there would be a Northern Fleet"--

that is a Soviet fleet--

"submarine force of between 30 and 50 Akula class SSNs, a dozen or more Oscar class SSGNs and around 20 Delta IV or Typhoon SSBNs." We must not forget that, in world war two, just 57 U-boats sank 18 million tonnes of allied shipping, and that today's Soviet submarines are infinitely more capable than the U-boats. That is why I view with dismay the scale of the intended cut in our submarine forces. It is impossible to cut so deeply our naval, army or air force capability without eliminating roles and capabilities. Thus far, Ministers have not faced that or, if they have, they have not owned up to it to the House. It is time for them to be frank with the House in spelling out the clear consequences of current cuts.

When the cuts have been implemented, will Britain, if it is ever required to do so, be able to implement a

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naval-based operation on the scale of the Falklands conflict? Many doubts have been raised about that, not least because of the fact that sea-lift is no longer available. In the last decade, the British-registered merchant fleet has fallen to one tenth of what it was and the Government must urgently find a way of reversing that decline. I hope that the Chancellor of the Exchequer will address that matter next week.

It is not just the Falklands conflict that we would find difficult to repeat. In five years, will we be in a position to make a comparable contribution in an allied context to the sort of operation in which we have just participated with such distinction in the Gulf? Is the abandonment of those capabilities a conscious decision of Government?

The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Mr. Alan Clark) : We are not doing that.

Mr. Churchill : I am delighted to hear my right hon. Friend say that these capabilities are not being abandoned. I hope that he will give us clear assurances that, if necessary, we shall be able to repeat our contribution and participation in the Gulf.

The cuts are not being based on a thorough-going defence review, a reappraisal of Britain's foreign policy interests and role in the world or on any intellectual consideration of the threat and interests involved ; they are essentially Treasury driven. It is significant that, when the Secretary of State announced "Options for Change" to the House on 25 July 1990, it was expected that the Soviet Union would destroy no fewer than 100,000 major items of conventional military equipment. That has not happened. Although the Soviets signed the agreement, they have managed to evade its provisions by withdrawing no fewer than 49,000 items of treaty- limited equipment to behind the Urals. The fact that the Soviet military has been able to take the west by surprise, and its motives for so doing, should have set alarm bells ringing and, even now, should cause a rethink of the scale of the cuts under "Options for Change".

The Gulf war showed the capability of smart weapons and made one wonder whether we can afford weapons that fail to hit their targets. Tomahawk proved a spectacular success, with 98 per cent. hitting their targets. If the Royal Navy is to stay in the forefront of naval technology, it must acquire a cruise missile capability not only for surface ships but for a new generation of submarines.

The Defence Select Committee has expressed its concern about the impact of Government policies on the defence industrial base, with particular reference to submarines. Submarines have been built at Barrow for 85 years. For the past 20 years, Vickers, which is now VSEL, has maintained a work force of more than 12,500, which increased to 15,500 for Trident. It will be slashed by more than half unless orders are soon placed for a new generation of nuclear attack submarines. If they are not forthcoming, that central core of skill and industrial expertise will be lost for ever.

VSEL and the Ministry of Defence went to great lengths to develop the Upholder class of diesel electric submarine. It was intended that 12 should be built, but the Government now say that only four will be built. The Defence Select Committee says in its report that at least six should be built. I hope that the Government will reconsider that.

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