House of Commons Hansard Debates for 1 Jul 1991

Mr. Dalyell : Perhaps the Minister will cease his party-political ranting for a moment and tell us--this is a genuine question--about the threat from the so-called Iraqi nuclear capability at Aby Gharaib and Tuweitha.

Mr. Hamilton : I was hoping that the hon. Gentleman could help us and tell us how this amazing Labour party statement was arrived at. Perhaps he was a party to it. As he knows, we are hoping to implement United Nations resolution 687 which deals with Iraqi nuclear capability. The problem is being dealt with, and the President of the United States has made statements on the matter.

I turn to other activities of the Army in the past year. The same skill and dedication are, of course, demonstrated every day in the very different circumstances of Northern Ireland. Supporting the Royal Ulster Constabulary to uphold democracy and the rule of law against the terrorist threat remains, sadly, the Army's largest continuing peacetime commitment. In this it is well supported by the other services. The Royal Marines regularly provide a commando in place of an Army battalion, and the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force continue to make a major contribution to security in the Province. The Army's force level in Northern Ireland remains at some 17,000 personnel. Over the past year, these force levels have been temporarily increased to deal with specific situations ; a battalion was deployed in December 1990 to support the RUC in a period of especially high terrorist threat in the run-up to Christmas ; another battalion was deployed in March and April 1991 to assist in the removal of two border check points ; and another battalion has just returned to the mainland from the Province after being temporarily deployed there to support an operation to refurbish some security force bases. If judged necessary, such reinforcements could occur again.

The courage and sense of purpose shown by the armed forces in Northern Ireland in the face of terrible atrocities must attract our highest respect and gratitute. Tragically, a heavy price was paid in 1990 to preserve order against violence. A total of 15 soldiers were murdered by the terrorists. Eleven were killed while on duty--six in the IRA's barbaric proxy human car bomb attacks on two check points on 24 October, in one of which a Minister of Defence civilian employee was also murdered. Four other soldiers were killed while off duty, all part-time UDR members. A further 213 soldiers were wounded or injured in 1990.

1991 has thus far seen eight soldiers murdered--this includes two members of the UDR killed in an IRA rocket attack in March ; three UDR soldiers murdered on 31 May at Glenn Anne UDR base by an IRA bomb containing some 2,000 lb explosive ; and, most recently, Private Harrison, who was murdered on 19 June by the IRA in

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front of his fiance e while visiting her on leave from the mainland. Some 100 soldiers have been either wounded or injured. The recent attempts at further attacks, last week, on the band of the Blues and Royals, and over the weekend against an RAF recruiting office in Preston, remind us yet again of the need for constant vigilance.

Mr. Terry Dicks (Hayes and Harlington) : As the Minister knows, the attempted bomb attack took place in my constituency. Will he pass on to the bandsmen of the Blues and Royals the message that they will always be welcome in Hayes, whatever may have happened? Does he share my anger at the words of the Labour candidate in Hayes, Mr. John McDonnell, who has in the past wined and dined IRA terrorists and representatives of Sinn Fein and who said, when he heard of the attack, that he would meet the IRA and Sinn Fein again tomorrow? Does the Minister share my disgust at that statement, and will he call on the Labour party to disown such a character?

Mr. Hamilton : I wholly support my hon. Friend on that. We must never give succour to IRA terrorists, and we must make it clear to them that, even if they do bomb people on the mainland, life will go on as usual and we will in no way be cowed by their activities. There have, however, been notable successes in the campaign against the terrorists' criminal activities. During 1990, 217 people were charged with serious terrorist- type offences, including 18 for murder and 62 with attempted murder. There were further successes against the terrorists elsewhere in 1990, in the Republic, on mainland Britain and on the continent, with the discovery of weapons and bomb-making equipment and the arrests of a number of suspected terrorists.

The House will, I am sure, join me in saluting the bravery and dedication of these men and women who tackle the terrorist threat every day of the year. The number of awards bestowed over the years on members of the armed forces serving in Northern Ireland reflects this gallantry and commitment. The 241 awards made in 1990 included the first George Cross in 11 years, to an Army bomb-disposal expert. In addition to the activities that I have mentioned, the House will know that the Army has undertaken a wide range of tasks over the past 12 months. They range from quiet, perhaps sometimes humdrum, roles to the most dangerous and demanding tasks. The qualities of professionalism and courage shown by the Army's men and women in these many different ways deserve the thanks of the whole British people : this year they have also earned a wider gratitude abroad by their part in the coalition effort to ensure that Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait would not stand.

The British Army continues to be a highly regarded and highly effective force, thanks above all to the qualities of its individuals and to their teamwork. Our responsibility is to give them the support they need to remain as capable and effective as they have proven to such good effect this year. In pursuing changes in structure, we must remain sensitive to those fundamental requirements.

Mr. Michael Grylls (Surrey, North-West) : At the beginning of his speech, my right hon. Friend described, while the House listened attentively, the changes in the east-west situation. Has he heard the criticism of the size of the cuts in the Royal Armoured Corps? Does it not

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worry him that there have been criticisms that the corps has been cut far more than it should have been in comparison with the rest of the Army? Would it not be better to make cuts in the tail of the Army rather than in the part that we would need if there were a conflict? Will my right hon. Friend bear that in mind?

Mr. Hamilton : I assure my hon. Friend that the reductions in the support to the front line will be commensurate with other cuts. It is important that we achieve this. The cuts in the Royal Armoured Corps reflect the fact that armoured divisions in Germany are to be reduced. Our need for armoured regiments is therefore reduced.

Sir Alan Glyn (Windsor and Maidenhead) : Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Hamilton : No, I must finish, or I shall be here for ever. I have outlined the Government's overriding concern for the future of the Army. I believe that that objective should be endorsed by the whole House.

5.42 pm

Dr. John Reid (Motherwell, North) : As the Minister said, we are having the annual debate on the British Army on the 75th anniversary of the battle of the Somme. If ever we required an illustration of the courage and dedication of the British Army, and the growing sacrifices that its soldiers were prepared to endure for this country, we need look no further than the Somme. If ever we needed an illustration of the folly and futility of war as a vehicle for solving political problems, we need look no further than the Somme. There the answer lies, on the bloody battlefield on which some 20,000 British and allied soldiers lost their lives in the first 24 hours, and where countless thousands more were destined to lose their lives over the next five months for the conquest of five miles of territory.

The anniversary is also a timely reminder that, whatever the advances in weapons and equipment over the past 75 years, whatever the progress in technological sophistication and whatever the refinement of the operational art of warfare, wars are still fought, the hardships of war are still endured, and the ultimate sacrifices of war are still made by the men and women who make up our armed forces. We gladly pay tribute to them today, not least because, for some time past, they have been asked to undertake their arduous duties under a cloud of uncertainty. They have been asked and they have responded, displaying a steadfastness of purpose in a European and international political situation that is almost unsurpassed in its fluidity. Old barriers are coming down and new problems are arising. Concepts of threat and of risk, of defence and of security are undergoing profound redefinition.

I wish that I could say that their fortitude has been matched by the insight, clarity of vision and decisiveness of the Ministers who have the temporary honour of presiding over the Army's future and fate, but that would be stretching the credibility of the House too far, even on the anniversary of the Somme--perhaps I should say particularly on the anniversary of the Somme, because that

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battle and that war proved a long-lasting saying about military life : even the most lion-hearted can be led by donkeys.

I was about partially to exclude the Minister of State from that, and to congratulate him on having made, at least in his opening paragraphs, a genuine attempt to give us some form of strategic review, but I am afraid that the manner in which he demeaned himself and the House by the misuse of the slur and his comments on the war of the United Nations, with the full support of both sides of the House, against Iraq detracted from anything that he said. What a pity that he did that. If that is the level of the much-heralded attack on the Labour party's defence policy, and if that is where the Conservative party has retired to in its attempts to gain votes at a general election, let us have more of it. I am sure that the British people will be thoroughly revolted by an attempt to use a war in which our soldiers died, a war supported by every party, for cheap political gains.

Mr. Winnick : Does my hon. Friend agree that, when it came to appeasement and trying to avoid war when it was obvious that it was inevitable, and condoning, in some respects at least, what occurred in the invasion of Kuwait, the most notorious person putting forward that view was the former Tory leader and Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) who, at least until the beginning of the war, used every argument both in and out of the House to avoid facing the fact that we had to fight fascist aggression?

Dr. Reid : My hon. Friend states the facts. I have no wish--nor have my colleagues on the Front Bench or throughout the party--to reduce a magnificent effort by our soldiers and the magnificent unity of the House by involving myself in any attacks or slurs on any hon. Member. Whatever our views, and from whatever side of the House they emanated, whether it was the case mentioned by my hon. Friend or that of the pacifists, or those Labour party members who took a different view, I am certain that all spoke with the utmost sincerity. I respect the views that they espoused and will not attack them for holding them, particularly not for cheap political gains.

In the 13 months since the previous Army debate, we have witnessed events of great significance for the future of the British Army. We have seen the painful beginnings of the "Options for Change" process, an exercise which is turning into a defence review by striptease. We have seen the conclusions of NATO's force restructuring, in which our forces have deservedly been assigned a leading role. Not least, we have participated in a multinational coalition which successfully defeated Iraqi aggression in the Gulf. Each of those would have been significant enough in its own right, but taken together they will result in the most profound changes experienced by our armed forces since world war two.

I shall begin with an assessment of the Gulf war. I thought that I could say that I spoke for the whole House when I said that the contribution made by the British Army, with the support of the House, to the liberation of Kuwait was outstanding. I am sorry that, since the Minister's statement, I cannot now say that that was with the continuing support of the whole House. Nevertheless, we congratulate our forces because, from the beginning of the ground campaign on 24 February, it took

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approximately four days for the 1st Armoured Division to disable the Iraqi armoured reserve and reach its intended position north of Kuwait city.

One of the most impressive statistics of that short but violent campaign is that not one Challenger tank was lost to enemy fire. By any standards, it was an impressive operation, proving once again the superior fighting quality and logistical efficiency of the British Army--something which the Minister mentioned.

In paying tribute to our troops, none of us should forget the sacrifices that were made. During our deployment in the Gulf 44 British soldiers lost their lives and approximately 43 were injured. Remarkably light as such casualties were in the face of such an enemy, each is a tragedy to be mourned. In the wake of victory we should not forget that many Iraqis perished during and after the war. For the most part they, too, were the victims of Saddam Hussein's megalomania.

Perhaps the most tragic accident to involve British troops during the war was the so-called "friendly fire" incident in which nine Royal Fusiliers were killed by a United States A-10. Considerable concern has been expressed about those deaths, and rightly so, not least because, four months later, there still appears to be a great deal of confusion about what went wrong and who was to blame. This has been an agonising time for the grieving relatives. Whatever the final outcome of the inquiry, I hope that the Minister can promise that there will be a full and frank disclosure of the report and its conclusions. When the Minister replies to the debate I hope that he will inform us what progress, if any, is being made on friend or foe identification systems.

Another grave cause for concern that has arisen as a consequence of the Gulf war is the sanctioning of the use of about 200 Royal Engineers in mine -clearing operations being conducted by a private contractor, Royal Ordnance. I have already raised this matter with the Minister in correspondence and on the Floor of the House. There is considerable anger in the Army because its troops are effectively being used as mercenaries. I share that anger.

I have been unimpressed by the assurances I have received from the Minister of State for the Armed Forces that Royal Ordnance will cover the expenses of the deployment and that the engineers will be involved only in the location of mines and unexploded shells, not their disposal. Expenses or not, the British Army does not exist to provide such a hidden subsidy to a private profit-making concern. The location of mines and shells is in itself an extremely dangerous task and the lives of service men have been put at risk in a totally irresponsible manner. I urge the Minister to assure the House that there will be no repetitions of such incidents.

Sir Alan Glyn : What is the hon. Gentleman's view on the safe areas for the Kurds ? Should we or should we not protect those areas until United Nations forces take our place ? The United Nations observers are incapable of doing the job.

Dr. Reid : Since the beginning of the Gulf conflict we have consistently urged that all measures should be taken through the auspices of the United Nations and that all support should be given to any resolution or initiative taken by the United Nations. The problem was not the

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spirit in which the havens were embarked upon, but the thinking through of the likely outcome of the difficulties of establishing and then removing such havens.

Earlier I spoke about the performance of the Challenger tank in the Gulf. It exceeded all expectations and Vickers has now reaped the reward with an order for Challenger 2 as a consequence. That decision, along with two announcements this evening, has the virtue of allowing the Government to claim that they have managed to decide on something in the procurement sphere. That matter will be covered more extensively by my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Mr. Rogers), if he is fortunate enough to participate in the debate.

Questions have arisen on the availability of spares for the 1st Armoured Division, which were smoothed over by the Minister today. It is fairly common knowledge that that division's Challengers were only kept fully operational in the Gulf by stripping parts from the two divisions that remained in Germany. Can the Minister confirm whether that is true? If it is, it appears that the British Army of the Rhine would be only partially operational in the event of war. Such confirmation would vindicate my hon. Friends, in particular my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda, who have argued that the sacrifice of the spares budget to other projects in the past few years has been a false economy.

Can the Minister confirm or deny a report that appeared on 6 June in the Glasgow Herald to the effect that the 157 Challengers used in the Gulf have been left there for a long time to rust? Can the Minister elaborate on the questions asked of him by the Select Committee on Defence on that subject? I am well aware that press reports frequently turn out to be exaggerated and that may be the case in this instance. However, I am sure that we are all particularly concerned by the report in the Glasgow Herald since it quotes a senior officer as describing the situation as

"nothing short of vandalism by neglect."

Can the Minister assure us that that is not the case? How much of the equipment has been retrieved so far? What is the estimate of any damage that may have resulted from that incident?

The Minister was correct to mention Northern Ireland, because in addition to participating in the multinational coalition in the Gulf in the past year, the British Army has continued to fulfil its other duties, not least of which is guaranteeing the security of Northern Ireland.

Since the last Army debate 16 soldiers have been murdered by the IRA, including five members of the Ulster Defence Regiment. In addition, 15 Royal Ulster Constabulary officers have been murdered. In common with the Minister, I wish to record our debt to those men and all those who continue to fight against terrorism in the most difficult of circumstances.

Last year the Provisional IRA sunk to new levels of depravity and cowardice with its use of human-proxy bombs. What could be more sadistic than kidnapping a person's family and then forcing that person to drive a van- load of explosives at a checkpoint? On 24 October six soldiers and one civilian were killed in two such incidents. Fortunately, since then, similar attempts have failed. For all its blood-letting the IRA cannot ignore one simple fact. As an organisation which likes to consider itself an army, it, too, must depend on morale. After 21 years of killing and maiming it has palpably failed to achieve its objectives and it knows it. Even the IRA is beginning to see the futility of its actions. I am sure that we

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all hope that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is successful in his search for a political solution. Such a settlement would deliver a devastating blow to terrorism.

"Options for Change" will probably and properly occupy most of tonight's debate. The House could be forgiven for remaining somewhat confused about this process--the defence review that isn't. "Options for Change" could perhaps be best described as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma", if I am permitted to misquote a former Prime Minister.

It should be put on record that the Secretary of State was apparently incapable of even choosing an accurate title for the process that is now under way. "Options for Change" is a complete misnomer. Where are the options? What options have been or will be placed before Parliament? On what grounds are the supposed options being considered within the Ministry of Defence and by whom? Against what criteria are they being measured in the absence of a full defence review? I shall be happy to give way at any stage if the Secretary of State wants to elaborate rather than sit here like the silent service.

It is becoming clearer by the day that, so far as Parliament is concerned, the only option that we will have is to take it or leave it when the bureaucracy has completed its covert endeavours. All of that would be bad enough if the Secretary of State and Ministers showed any sign of being in control of the process, but they appear to be genetically incapable of taking as important a decision. There is now a growing feeling on all sides of the House that if the Secretary of State was asked the simple question, "Do you have problems making decisions?", he would probably answer, "Well, yes and no."

The Secretary of State has now had almost 12 months to marshal the collective cognitive processes of his colleagues and what is the result of that massive intellectual effort? On 25 July last year the Secretary of State told the House that he envisaged a Regular Army of "around 120,000". He said that he would provide further substantial details in due course. On 4 June this year, after 10 long and arduous months of mental toil and turmoil

The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Tom King) : And a war.

Dr. Reid : I shall come to the war in a second. As they say in "Fawlty Towers", "Don't mention the war."

After 10 long and arduous months of mental toil and turmoil, no doubt with the able assistance of a Ministry of Defence establishment of thousands, the right hon. Gentleman informed the House that he envisaged a Regular Army of 116,000. We were told of nothing else. In short, it has taken Ministers 315 days of supreme effort to arrive at the conclusion which they had first arrived at during July 1990. If there has been a lack of decisions, there has been no lack of excuses. This evening, the Secretary of State gave us one of his favourite excuses--the war. There has been no shortage of excuses for the delay in providing us with a comprehensive review. We were told in July 1990 that the Secretary of State had made merely a preliminary statement. It was then said that decisions--D-day itself--would not be far off. Then D-day was postponed

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because of the conventional-forces-in-Europe negotiations. We were then told that D-day had been postponed again because of the consequences of German unity. That was after the wall had come tumbling down--largely, it seems, because of a trumpet blown far away in Finchley. Then it was the Gulf war that caused the delay. The next delay was NATO's restructuring. No doubt we shall soon be told that the Glasgow fair holidays are to blame.

Only one thing has become clear, and that is that theD of D-day stands not for decision but for that famous D-word, dither. I hope that we shall not be offered the same excuses this evening as those that the Secretary of State has used in the past. The excuses are that the Gulf war delayed the review and that the Government waited until NATO had concluded its defence review before they came to a decision on force levels.

I shall take up the excuse that has been given from a sedentary position by the silent Secretary of State, but I am somewhat surprised that that excuse turns out to be the war. My colleagues and I who considered the Armed Forces Bill and the Atomic Weapons Establishment Bill in Committee made the generous offer that we were prepared to suspend the deliberations of the Committees to allow Ministry of Defence civil servants and others to concentrate on the war effort. We were told explicitly--this can be found in the report of the proceedings in Committee--that there was no need to suspend the Committees because it would be business as usual for the MOD throughout the war. It is clear that the Gulf war can be no excuse for delay.

The second excuse is that the Government had to wait for NATO's restructuring. The Secretary of State's claim that he was waiting for an announcement on future NATO force structures before allowing us to enter into the myriad secrets of "Options for Change" is not borne out by General Galvin"s comments to the Royal United Services Institute on 30 May, to the effect that his officials had been waiting for individual member countries to decide on their own force levels before NATO finalised its arrangements. Indeed, most of our NATO allies are far more advanced in force restructuring than we are.

The fact is that the Government's excuses are entirely bogus, and they should admit that. They are excuses that are designed to obscure another massive dither. The Secretary of State is directly to blame for the decision-making paralysis that has gripped the MOD for more than a year. I have no doubt that if he had left the decisions to his junior Minister, the Minister of State for Defence Procurement, they would have been taken ruthlessly and speedily, though they might have been less tasteful to the House.

Damage has been caused by prevarication. The despondency that is to be found in the Army and in defence industries could easily have been avoided. We are left with a Regular Army of 116,000 troops, a cut of about 40,000. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces tried this evening to give us the nearest thing yet to an outline of a strategic position, but in the absence of a full defence review and of any clearly thought-out and published criteria by which decisions are being taken, the cut of 40,000 begs two unanswered questions. The first question is why there should be a cut of 40,000. The second question is, "Where are the cuts to be made?" Why was the cut not 30,000 or 50,000 instead of 40,000? The Opposition have asked repeatedly--we have repeatedly been refused an answer to the question --

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whether there is a strategic rationale that explains the extent of the cuts. If there is not, the cut of 40,000 is, as we suspect, a short-term arbitrary cost-cutting exercise, and a disgrace. If there is a rationale that explains the cut, it is the best kept secret since the Normandy landings and the Government have been misleading the House. That is an even greater disgrace.

Mr. Ian Bruce (South Dorset) : On Thursday, the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown), the leader of the Liberal Democrats, was kind enough to confirm that his party's defence aspiration was to reduce spending to 50 per cent. of what it is now by the year 2000. I understand that the Labour party has an aspiration, or even a policy, of cutting spending by a third at least, although that aspiration or policy is undermined by some Labour Members who want spending to be cut by a great deal more. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will explain to the House why it is the Opposition's aspiration or policy to cut spending by a third, without any comments being made about commitments, when they are criticising the Government by cutting spending by a fifth.

Dr. Reid : My policy is not to cut by a third. My policy, and the policy of the Opposition Front Bench, is to initiate a strategic analysis of the present threat, and from that to allocate a response. We do not endorse the Government's policy, which is, "How much do we have to save and what can be cut to achieve that saving?" I shall take up this issue later in my speech and elaborate upon it.

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden) : Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Dr. Reid : I ask the hon. Gentleman to allow me to make some progress. The Minister made a long speech and, unfortunately, my speech will be a little longer than usual.

All the evidence suggests that no strategic rationale lies behind the cuts. It seems that there is no logic attached to them. I shall give two examples. First, in his statement last year on "Options for Change", the Secretary of State said that there would be a greater reliance on reserve forces. There are strong rumours a year later that the regular-reserve force mix that is being considered within the Ministry of Defence will involve cutting the Territorial Army to 51,000. If that is so--I hope that the Minister who replies will be able to confirm or deny the rumour--we are talking of a 40 per cent. reduction in the Territorial Army's formal establishment, compared with a cut of 25 per cent. in the Regular Army's establishment. How is that consistent with the words of the Secretary of State in July 1990 that there would be a greater reliance on reserve forces? If there is to be a greater reduction in the reserve establishment than in that of the Regular Army's, and if there is no strategic rationale for that, the inescapable conclusion is that the cuts will be made not on the basis of military and defence criteria but according to political and lobbying criteria. Could it be that the disproportionate cuts that are about to be inflicted on the reserve forces are the result of the relatively weak lobbying power of those forces within the Ministry of Defence?

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith : I understand the hon. Gentleman's thinking and I know that he is trying to advance a valid argument. I think, however, that he forgets an important factor, which is that a review has been conducted, with us playing our part, through NATO. That

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is the strategic review. If he examines that, he will more clearly understand what "Options for Change" is all about.

Dr. Reid : A review has, indeed, been conducted by NATO. There has been far more of a review at NATO level than at Government level. Although the United Kingdom is a member of NATO, and although there is an overlap of interest, the United Kingdom has a separate dimension. Not all of our military commitments are related directly to NATO, as the right hon. Gentleman knows. We have four and a half roles, and some of them have nothing to do with NATO. I agree that NATO has done a considerable amount of thinking and has published many more options than the British Government. I am asking the Government to follow NATO's lead and to tell us the basis on which decisions about reserve forces and regiments of the Regular Army will be made. If they do not do that, they will be subject to pressures from lobbying from local interests or by the Treasury.

The questions that arise in respect of Territorial Army cuts arise also in terms of the Regular Army. It has been strongly suggested in the press, presumably on the basis of unattributable briefings by representatives of the Government, that the headquarters, one regular battalion and all three reserve battalions of the Parachute Regiment are to be cut. Where is the logic in cutting a highly mobile, fully established and well-regarded Parachute Regiment at exactly the same time as Britain is being assigned a leading role in NATO's rapid reaction corps? Surely greater emphasis, not less, is being placed on the mobility and flexibility of troop deployments. The answer is that no one knows what the logic is, precisely because of the lack of any coherent, top down, strategic declaration by the Government. The same problem is apparent with the infantry divisions.

One of the major problems affecting the British Army during recent years has been recruitment and retention. The Army is 3,000 soldiers below strength, and even after a cut of 40,000 the problem of recruitment and retention is likely to remain. However, from the rumours that we have heard there appears to be no sign--until tonight, when the Minister gave a reassurance--that the divisions and regiments with the best recruitment and retention records will be treated any differently from those with bad records. Again, lobbying power appears to be playing a significant part, especially in any consideration of the future of the Household division, which has a number of influential supporters.

My second question is about exactly how those cuts will be made. Perhaps the most craven act of the whole sorry business was the Secretary of State's attempt to protect himself politically by demanding that the Army decides which regiments are to be cut. It must be the first recorded case of a firing squad being ordered to stand in a circle. What leadership, what courage, what a cheek--the Secretary of State gives a whole new meaning to Churchill's phrase, "What a chicken! What a neck." This bunch of Ministers could never be accused of cowardice in the face of the enemy, only cowardice in the face of their friends.

Are not the Government embarrassed by the fact that two divisions, the Scottish and the Queen's, are reported to have refused to make any recommendations? Can anyone blame them? It is silly of the Secretary of State to expect the regiments effectively to sign their own death warrants.

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It is an abdication of responsibility and another example of the right hon. Gentleman being incapable of making a decision.

Mr. Livsey : The two Welsh regiments in the Prince of Wales division --the Royal Welch Fusiliers and the Royal Regiment of Wales--are being outmanoeuvred within the division, with the aim of one of the Welsh regiments having to go. The people of Wales are resisting that most strongly.

Dr. Reid : I am genuinely trying to help the Secretary of State and the Minister. The Minister knows that I always try to be helpful on these issues. In the absence of any published strategic criteria or a full defence review, whatever decisions they take they will be murdered by local interests, by lobbying and by the Treasury. In the absence of a full defence review, which has been constantly urged on the Government by the Labour party, it is inevitable that decisions will be determined largely not by strategic and military considerations, but by a combination of political expediency, old-boy lobbying and Treasury cost cutting.

To enter into a major force restructuring process without first having carried out the essential preliminaries of a full strategic review is to concede all the arguments in advance to the lobbyists and to the Treasury. It is a recipe for expediency, not for rational restructuring. It will mean not only a diminution of defence spending and of force levels--both of which are understandable and welcome in the present circumstances--but a maldistribution of resources within the reduced budget and a maldeployment of the reduced forces, neither of which is understandable or welcome.

Mr. Tom King rose --

Dr. Reid : My speech will have been successful if only because it has brought the Secretary of State to his feet.

Mr. King : The hon. Gentleman touches on a serious matter--the maldistribution of resources and the need to avoid that. If I understand him correctly--and I do not want to mislead the House--he said that the Labour party has not yet conducted any strategic review of the future for defence. Has it yet decided how much money it will spend on defence ?

Dr. Reid : The Secretary of State is not misleading the House. He was correct to say that the Labour party has not yet carried out a full defence review, but we intend to do that within the first six months of government. We have not had the assistance of 150,000 civil servants, as the right hon. Gentleman has had. It is, therefore, all the more incredible that the Labour party is far more advanced on strategic thinking than the Secretary of State and his Ministers. We do not blame hon. Members or ex- members of regiments for fighting their corners, but we condemn the Government for embarking blindfolded on the exercise.

The regimental system and the structure and organisation of the British Army developed in the 19th century in response to its role as an imperial policeman, and it still reflects that basic structure. If it is to meet the demands and the challenges of the 21st century, its reformation should be based on at least a full review of those demands and challenges.

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Sir David Price (Eastleigh) : The hon. Gentleman is wrong.

Dr. Reid : I am referring to a document called, "The Operational Arm of Warfare". I shall give the hon. Gentleman the relevant pages later. If I am wrong, the Army is wrong.

Sir David Price : The history of our regiments shows that they were founded in the 18th, not the 19th century, and many were raised privately. Is the hon. Gentleman recommending that we return to private armies?

Dr. Reid : If I am wrong, I shall stand corrected, and I shall bring that to the attention of the author of "The Operational Arm of Warfare", which was produced by the Army staff college. No doubt the hon. Gentleman, with his reservoir of knowledge, is better versed than the staff college.

Mr. Ted Garrett (Wallsend) : A piece of regimental history that should be known is that some of the regiments are more than 325 years old. The hon. Member for Eastleigh (Sir D. Price) was right to say that they were raised privately. They were given numbers, and they were then given county titles if they so wished. That is why their titles have the county first, then the number.

Dr. Reid : I shall stand corrected if I am wrong, but I repeat that the regimental system and the structure and organisation of the British Army developed in the 19th century in response to its role as an imperial police force, and it stil reflects that basic structure. Those words can be read in Hansard, and they can be compared with the report by the Army staff college. If I stand corrected, so does the Army staff college.

If the consequences of the Government mishandling of "Options for Change" will be hard on the regiments, they will be no less hard on the individual service men and women. Ministers would have done better to remember the stricture of Field Marshal Viscount Slim to his officers :

"You will put first the honour and interests of your country, and next the safety, well-being and comfort of your men."

The Secretary of State hopes that as much as possible of the 40, 000 reduction will be achieved by natural wastage. Even allowing for that, there is no escaping the fact that a large proportion will have to be achieved through redundancies. We are therefore entitled to ask about the arrangements that the Government are making to help service men and women made redundant to find a secure place in civilian life. The answer to that question is not encouraging--the Government have not made any proposal to offer service men and women a better quality of pre-release training, despite being urged to do so by the Labour party. There is not even the slightest sign that they are thinking about doing so. That is disgraceful in the economic climate that the Government have created and in which ex- service men and women will have to live when they are thrown out of the Army. Governments used to wash their hands of responsibility for soldiers once they left the forces. The present Government apparently intend to wash their hands of soldiers while they are still in the forces, before they are thrown out.

The situation is even worse in respect of housing provision for ex-service men and women, who are disadvantaged in two ways. There is a low percentage of home ownership in the Army, particularly among

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ordinary soldiers, and, having moved around frequently, the ordinary soldier will not receive high priority on a council house waiting list. In any event, waiting lists are longer than ever, and housebuilding at lower levels than ever, since the Government came to power.

What do the Government propose to do about those 40,000 of their brave young lads and lasses, of whom they like to speak so proudly, when they are thrown out without a job or home?

The Government should have at least made a decision--and I am glad to announce that they have done so. The Government have decided to do nothing. They are not even discussing with local authorities the problems that will inevitably arise--as the Minister of State made clear to me in replies to my parliamentary questions. There are no proposals either to utilise vacant land or empty properties owned by the Ministry of Defence. This is the same Government who castigate local authorities for leaving properties vacant.

Currently, the MOD owns 2,527 acres of vacant land that could be used for low-cost housing. We only ask that the Ministry considers doing so. Also, according to a parliamentary answer given last year, 16.3 per cent. of the 76,068 married quarters owned by the MOD were vacant, 5.4 per cent. of them for more than one year--and the Government love to castigate Lambeth council over precisely the same kind of figures. Of the 1,790 civilian properties owned by the MOD, 12.5 per cent. were vacant, and 6.7 per cent. of those had been empty for more than six years.

I quote those statistics to highlight the inactivity of the hierarchy within the Ministry of Defence when it comes to protecting the quality of life of our soldiers and of those likely to find themselves made redundant. Perhaps the Government's indecision and indifference should not surprise us.

I am glad that the Minister of State clarified tonight his remarks concerning the payment of compensation to the three young Grenadiers who were unfortunately injured. His clarification was useful, because many of us were horrified at his reported comments--but I accept that they were taken out of context. However, I say in all sincerity to the Minister that he should not be so defensive, because when he is, it can sound--even though the right hon. Gentleman might not mean this--as though he is accusing people who have been extremely badly injured of trying to profit from their injuries. I am glad that there is some movement in that regard, and I look forward to considerable sympathy being shown to those young men when the proposed meeting takes place.

In almost every sphere, and at almost every level, the performance of the Secretary of State and of his Ministers over the past year, and in respect of "Options for Change", has been woefully inadequate.

Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury) : Will the hon. Gentleman now answer fully the question put to him earlier by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, because he only answered part of it? The hon. Gentleman accepted, as my right hon. Friend's question implied, that Labour has not undertaken- -or could not undertake--any review of Britain's defence strategy. However, the hon. Gentleman did not say whether Labour has already decided on the level of its defence budget--that is, that it would be one third less than the present budget.

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Dr. Reid : This may be difficult for the hon. Gentleman to grasp, but the whole purpose of a review is to review matters. If one draws conclusions at the beginning of a review, there is little point in undertaking a review. We make two pledges. First, we will spend whatever is necessary to defend Britain. Secondly, that expenditure will be based on a strategic analysis--a full defence review--within the next year, within the first six months of the incoming Labour Government.

That is in stark contrast to the performance of the present Secretary of State and his Ministers. At the level of analytical review, they have gone absent without leave. At the level of procurement and finance, they are in a shambles. At the level of force structures, they have passed the buck in the most craven fashion to the Army itself. At the level of service conditions, they have shown an indifference exceeded only by their indecision. If the Secretary of State and his Ministers were judged by the same criteria that they set for soldiers, they would not proceed beyond page 32 of the "British Military Doctrine", which sets out the three elements of fighting power. They are the conceptual component--the thought process ; the physical component--the means to fight ; and the moral component--motivation, leadership, and management.

The present Government fail abysmally in respect of all three. At a conceptual level, they are unable, unwilling, or incapable--or perhaps all three--of undertaking the necessary review and analysis that is an essential prerequisite of any fundamental change. At a physical level, they have abysmally failed in their projected expenditure targets for the 1990s, and in the provision of rational procurement for the present. At the moral level, they have abrogated leadership, provided no motivation, and have undermined morale.

It is almost 400 years since Cardinal Richelieu remarked that history knows of many more armies ruined by want and disorder than by the efforts of their enemies. Almost four centuries later, the Government have set out to prove Richelieu correct. After all that, the British Army is entitled to ask, "With friends like the Government, who needs enemies?"

6.26 pm

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