House of Commons Hansard Debates for 1 Jul 1991

Mr. George Younger (Ayr) : I strongly associate myself with the tribute that my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces paid to the conduct of our soldiers, sailors and airmen during the Gulf war. There is no doubt that the sheer quality of the British Army was shown up for its absolute completeness, and I congratulate all involved on the excellent job that they did. I refer not only to the troops at the front line but to the attention paid to staff training, which clearly paid off in a big way, because logistic support was a major factor in our success. I am also pleased that the Challenger tanks performed well, and I congratulate my right hon. Friend also on the recent decision to choose the Challenger again. I am sure that Challenger 2 will be a first-class tank, and one that will sell well in many parts of the world.

I strongly disagree with the remarks made by the hon. Member for Motherwell, North (Dr. Reid) about my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and his Ministers. If the Gulf war had gone wrong, and if Britain's involvement had been badly conducted, we would be blaming them. As it is, it is only right that we should congratulate my right

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hon. Friend and all his colleagues on the superb job that they did in beginning Britain's involvement at the right time, and in the right place.

Dr. Reid : I would not want the wrong impression to be created. I did not cast any aspersions against the Secretary of State's leadership during the Gulf war. I am happy to place on record my gratitude for the way in which the Secretary of State and his Ministers conducted themselves. If anything, it was the Secretary of State who chose to make the war a divisive issue. Despite the contributions made by some Back-Benchers and others, I refused to sink to that level of personal criticism during the Gulf war.

Mr. Younger : I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. It may be that I was swept up by the hyperbole and overstatement that characterised the rest of the hon. Gentleman's speech. It seemed that he was criticising my right hon. Friend and his Ministers for everything. I am glad to learn that that was not the case, because my right hon. Friends deserve great credit for their conduct.

In turning to "Options for Change" and the proposed Army reductions, I hope that I will be constructive in suggesting to my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State and the Minister of State the best possible way of completing the process that they have started. I do not agree with the hon. Member for Motherwell, North about the process being wrong. My right hon. Friends have put in a great deal of extremely good work. The fact that they carried on doing so during the Gulf war is a remarkable achievement, and I pay tribute to them for it.

I have great sympathy for Ministers when they tackle such an enormously difficult task as a reduction of this size in the Army. No enterprise could be more difficult, in military terms, than trying to do it at this time. However, I must tell my right hon. Friend the Minister that my sympathy for and realisation of the difficulties does not mean that I believe that Ministers do not have to listen to suggestions or criticisms which they think must be partial. There is a lot to be learned from people who have comments to make on the matter. The problems of reduction have to be faced, and I know of no one in any part of the forces, or among their supporters, who says that reductions are wrong. Everyone knows that it has to happen. The question is how. How can it be done acceptably, in a way that we can support and understand?

My constituents have brought the Scottish point of view and their concerns to my notice. Within the Scottish division there is enormous concern about how the problem is being tackled, which is not surprising because it is the best-recruited division against its establishment and has been for some time. Sad as it is, we must recognise that that is against a background where a large number of Army units are not able to get anything like up to establishment. I understand that 15 battalions are undermanned by more than 100 men and 20 are undermanned by more than 70 men. None of those is in the Scottish division, and I hope that that will be borne in mind.

Mr. Andrew Welsh (Angus, East) : Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that the Government should not try to strengthen the weak regiments by weakening the strong

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and that any across-the-board cuts would be very unfair to the Scottish regiments? We should enjoy the strength of Scottish recruitment and retain those regiments.

Mr. Younger : Perhaps it would help to speed the debate if I were to sit down, saying that the hon. Gentleman has made my speech for me, but he has not quite.

The Scottish division made a great commitment to the Gulf war--relatively, its commitment was greater than that of any other part of the Army. It is true to say that all those commitments were met by the Scottish battalions without any support or extra reinforcement, and few of the other parts of the Army could say the same.

The Scottish divisions have been excellent at recruiting and retention, which is just as important, and that should also be borne in mind. I am showing why there is concern and how we should tackle it. The Scottish division, in common with many others, has lost many important parts already. About 20 years ago we lost the Cameronians and it is interesting to note that recruiting in Lanarkshire has been difficult ever since and has never been up to average. There were two difficult amalgamations : the Camerons and the Seaforths, which have become the Queen's Own Highlanders ; and the Royal Scots Fusiliers, which came from my constituency, with the Highland Light Infantry, which have become the Royal Highland Fusiliers. Both are extremely successful and happy regiments, but it was a difficult amalgamation. Good recruiting in those conditions is a vital resource which we have far too little of. Many parts of the Army are suffering because they are unable to recruit enough men. The Scottish division does not have that problem, and I hope that that will be remembered. Apart from the Scottish division, there is the question of the Scots Guards because if a reduction is made there it could affect Scottish manpower and also the second Royal Tank Regiment and the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards which recruit from Scotland and have already been amalgamated.

Mr. Ted Garrett : I fully concur with the right hon. Gentleman in his concern about the Scottish division. However, I believe that during his time as a Minister he allowed the young soldiers recruitment depot to be moved from the Bridge of Don down to Northumberland, yet there was little outcry about it. The young soldiers' morale could not have been very high when they moved them into Northumberland without even considering the matter.

Mr. Younger : I remember that very well. The hon. Gentleman is right and we were considerably concerned about the transfer at the time. However, I understand that it has gone very happily, which is a good thing.

Mr. Robert Boscawen (Somerton and Frome) : I understand my right hon. Friend's important argument about recruiting for the Scottish regiments. Does he agree that one of the great worries affecting the British Army is what will happen to regiments after the review? Will quality of performance and excellence be the end product? We will have a much smaller Army and therefore it must be a much more excellent Army. That is what is worrying many soldiers who want to continue.

Mr. Younger : I agree with my hon. Friend. I believe that my right hon. Friend the Minister of State deserves great credit for the firm statement by the Secretary of State when he said that he believes in and supports the

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regimental system. My right hon. Friend repeated that today. There is no doubt that in large part the intensely high quality of the British Army is due to the regimental system, and the Secretary of State deserves great credit for that.

Mr. Mark Wolfson (Sevenoaks) : Does my right hon. Friend agree that one of the interesting aspects of previous amalgamations between regiments- -up to six regiments have amalgamated in the south-east--is that one can rebuild esprit de corps and regimental commitment in the larger units?

Mr. Younger : I agree, as some of the amalgamations have been extremely successful. However, one cannot recreate the ability to recruit in certain areas and that is vital, that is what the Army lacks in many places and needs, and it is something that the regiments that I mentioned can produce.

I have mentioned that aspect only to show why there is concern and will now move to the constructive part of my speech. Difficult decisions have to be faced, and in no way can my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State wave a magic wand so that he does not have to take any of them. However, he must have backing and support, and he needs to do two things to get them. First, he must convince us all that the total figure that we are supposed to be reducing the Army to will be able to cope with future commitments. Secondly, when the reductions are decided and have begun, they must have an understandable and defensible basis. When one is doing something that people do not approve of, one cannot say to them, "I'm sorry, I can't produce a rational reason for this. It's just going to happen." There is widespread doubt that 36 infantry battalions is anything like enough to carry out future commitments without being overstreched. It is difficult for those of us who are not intimately involved in drawing up the arms plot to spell out the figures. We must rely upon Ministers to help us out. There is no doubt that there is enormous concern among those who have operated the system and that is what convinces me that it is a real problem. Those people who understand about the arms plot understand how difficult it is for understrength battalions, those which have too heavy a programme and those which have not had enough leave to get the job done--the problem of overstretch.

Among people who know about such technical matters, and I do not claim to be one of them, there is a lot of doubt. If I understand what the Secretary of State said, we will have to produce two divisions of three brigades each for NATO's rapid reaction force--one at home and one in the British Army of the Rhine--which works out at 12 infantry battalions. In Northern Ireland we have to provide about 10 battalions--sometimes 11 and sometimes nine-- and we all know that a tour in Northern Ireland requires longer than the five or six months of the tour because some battalions are preparing to go, some are recovering after they come back, and leave and retraining must be taken into consideration. The actual commitment could be half as much again.

We have many other commitments as well. We have a battalion in Belize ; we do not know how long that will go on. We have part of a battalion in the Falklands, and one

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and a half in Cyprus. If we add the battalions in the air mobile brigade to the total of 36, we find that only three are left to carry out the entire home defence role.

The Secretary of State has said that the home defence requirement will not change substantially. My arithmetic may be suspect, but I quickly reached a total of more than 36 battalions. I shall be relieved if I am told that I am wrong, but I should certainly like an explanation. It is desperately important that we do not commit ourselves now to that figure of 36 until we are sure that we are not overstretching our resources.

My right hon. Friend mentioned the current doubts about whether the detente between east and west has become firm enough for us to make such reductions. I do not consider that a reason for not starting to make them in the first place, but it is, I think, a reason for us to take measured steps rather than committing ourselves immediately to such a low total.

As I have said, my right hon. Friend should take a second criterion into account. When the decisions have to be made, they will of course be painful, and many people will find some of them distressing. I entirely sympathise ; we must be able to give each person a credible reason. I can think of only one that would hit home when unpalatable decisions had to be made. People would have to be told, "The regiment about which you are concerned cannot produce the necessary numbers, and has not been able to do so for some time. It is so understretched that we doubt whether it will be able to recover. Sadly, it will have to go."

At present, the rest of the Army is carrying the battalions that are below strength. According to personal accounts that I have been given, someone who is stationed with the next-door battalion, which may have only two companies, will in practice do more duties, even if nothing is said to that effect.

It is vital that the 36 battalions--or whatever the new number will be--are at full strength. The only way to achieve that is to go for the areas that, year in, year out, have the best recruitment and retention levels. I could defend that position anywhere ; I should be as happy as it is possible to be to explain it to the colonel of a regiment that must go, and to say, "I am very sorry, but it makes sense to me." What I could not do is tell the commander of a fully recruited battalion with excellent potential, "I am sorry, but the powers that be are going to turn you out."

I intended my suggestions to be constructive ; I hope that they will help my right hon. Friend.

6.43 pm

Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East) : I agree with much of what the right hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) has said. I took comfort from his arithmetic--not least because, in his new life, he is chairman of the institution with which I bank. I was able to feel confident to some extent that that institution and my modest resources were in sound hands.

I was also interested by the right hon. Gentleman's reference to the amalgamation of the Highland Light Infantry with the Royal Scots Fusiliers. As he said, it has resulted in a very effective and happy regiment. The amalgamation itself, however, was by no means happy. My illustrious father- in-law, who was colonel of the Highland Light Infantry, was compelled to resign--as, indeed, was the colonel of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. The resulting unhappiness lasted for some time.

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I cannot escape a sense of frustration : we are making judgments, and commenting on the quality of decisions, at a time when we do not have before us a properly laid-out strategic framework in which the Government can operate their defence policy in the next five or 10 years. The Minister was at pains to deny that the proposals were Treasury-led, but he has found it difficult to persuade the Select Committee that they are not. A good deal of circumstantial evidence leads to the belief that much of what is now under consideration derives from a desire to find savings in the defence budget, rather than from a careful analysis of what is needed and what resources are required to meet our commitments.

All parties in the House are committed to reductions in defence expenditure but all those commitments were entered into before the events of 2 August last year. In each case, they were based on a number of assumptions : first, that there would be an early implementation of the conventional forces in Europe agreement ; secondly, that the extension of democracy in the Soviet Union would proceed smoothly ; and, thirdly--perhaps the most significant assumption--that there was little likelihood of British forces' having to fight a war outside the NATO area in the foreseeable future. All three of those assumptions proved to be invalid. The first is coming to pass, but not without considerable difficulty, owing to the eddy and ripple of military influence being exerted on Mr. Gorbachev by the red army--an influence that may yet prove more decisive and independent than the tawdry intimidation of Lithuanians in their own country, as the Institute of Strategic Studies, at least, acknowledged in its recently published book "Strategic Review 1990-91".

I do not believe that we should engage in this debate without a clear indication of the Government's long-term proposals. "Options for Change" is not a defence review ; Ministers go to great lengths to emphasise that. So far, it consists of the statement made by the Secretary of State approximately 12 months ago, with an attached list of the resources that we have now and what we might be reduced to, along with decisions that have been announced since then. I find it very difficult to test properly the Secretary of State's announcement of the reductions in Army numbers without a clear understanding of the tasks that those men and women will be expected to undertake. Much of what the right hon. Member for Ayr said struck me as self-evident, and--despite, perhaps, his efforts to avoid it-- seemed to make formidable criticism of the position adopted by the Government so far. That is hardly surprising : although he was probably too modest to say so, the right hon. Gentleman has considerable experience of fighting a rearguard campaign to ensure that a local regiment is not disbanded. The "Save the Argylls" campaign is still remembered in Scotland as a popular expression of public feeling that had a direct political consequence.

When, on 3 June, the Secretary of State announced his proposed cuts in the Army, he was criticised by the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) for delaying such action. To some extent, that criticism has been repeated this evening : there have been accusations of indecision and dithering.

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I do not charge Ministers with delaying ; I charge them with haste. They have made decisions and announcements without having reached a set of strategic conclusions that they could share with the House. It is true that uncertainty is damaging to morale, but it cannot be more damaging than flawed certainty. There is a substantial risk that some of the certainty that is being demonstrated contains assumptions that are invalid and judgments that, essentially, are flawed.

What are the Government's plans for reserve forces, and I use that expression in its generic sense? This is not a time for cliche-ridden pleasantries about their contribution. I shall try to set out my stall for the principles that should be taken into account. Logic demands that if reductions are made in the professional Army, there should not automatically be parallel, similar proportional reductions in reserve forces. Logic also demands that if reductions are made in the professional Army, more reliance will almost certainly have to be placed, potentially and perhaps in actuality, on reserve forces. Reserve forces on whom greater reliance may be necessary require to be trained and equipped to perform at a higher level, and at a level that might take them into the front line. Reserve forces who may find themselves in the front line must be so well trained and equipped that they can, with a minimum of disruption, fit in with professional forces.

Those propositions seem self-evident. They do not seem to be embraced by the suggestion that one should simply make a flat-rate percentage cut in the allocation of resources to our reserve forces. I ask the Minister to consider this question, which I hope crystallises the points that I have made. Do the Government undertake that in their treatment of reserve forces they will apply the principles to which I have referred and not be seduced by a simplistic percentage formula, the purpose of which is merely to obtain financial savings?

There must be lessons to be learned from the Gulf. The success of the helicopter surely shows the need for an end to the uncertainty about the procurement of the Apache aircraft. The conclusion that no ground army could have withstood the aerial bombardment to which the Iraqi forces were subject, which has substantial support, underlines the close relationship between air and land resources and the extent to which the effectiveness of those on the ground, however well equipped or trained, is prejudiced if inadequate air power is available.

We know that tanks proved to be extremely effective, but we cannot ignore the self-evident problems of moving them from Germany to the theatre in which they are to operate. To some extent, we were fortunate that Saudi Arabia had extensive port facilities, not least at Al-Jubayl, which might not be replicated in other circumstances where we sought to deploy such armour.

But it is on regiments that, I suspect, much of the debate will turn. I shall not be the first or the last to say that. The Government have seriously miscalculated the consequences of indiscriminate disbandments and amalgamations. That is why I was so impressed by what the right hon. Member for Ayr said. We know that the regimental system is central to the organisation of the Army. I think that it was being suggested that, to some extent, the system was established in the 19th century. I think that Secretary of State Childers and his immediate successor were responsible for a reorganisation then, but the regimental system had existed for many hundreds of years before that.

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We know that regiments have a special place in the affection and loyalty of the communities from which they recruit. It is not only retired generals who feel strongly about these matters. I received rather an emotional letter from the widow of someone who had served in a Scottish regiment. She now lives in my constituency, and she said that the regiment was one of the things of which her husband, who served in the ranks, was most proud throughout his life. She kept his medals because it reminded her of the tremendous affection and loyalty that he had for his regiment. It is not only generals or colonels who are anxious about the continuance of regiments with which they have been associated.

In considering which regiments may have to be reduced, we must have regard to those that have recruited and retained best. The Scottish regiments fulfil those criteria. I am urged by my hon. Friend the Member for Brecon and Radnor (Mr. Livsey) that Welsh regiments also fulfil those criteria. I feel a deep sense of unease that the Government have seen fit to leave it to the Army to make proposals on the cuts. That may be described as consultation, but the perception is that responsibility for the decision has been handed to the Army. That is an unwitting dereliction of ministerial duty. These are matters for ministerial decision, not for Army decision. If the Scottish colonels are correctly reported as having declined to do the job that was urged on them, I believe that they were right to do so. Indeed, they may have been constitutionally right to do so. When such decisions are made, they are inevitably political, and responsibility should neither be diluted nor devolved.

Last year, we paid tribute, as is customary on these occasions, to the bravery and professionalism of the men and women of the Army. When we did so, I doubt whether many believed that within 12 months those men and women would be exposed to such challenges and risks as many of them faced in the Gulf. I hope that, like me, you, Madam Deputy Speaker, were impressed and proud of the announcement of the awards to those who served in the Gulf. It was eloquent testimony to their bravery and skill.

This year, because of the example of our forces in the Gulf, we can renew that tribute to their bravery and professionalism with redoubled conviction. But there are others who almost daily must show great courage, matched with great restraint. I speak, as some may suspect, of those who serve in Northern Ireland. I doubt whether Northern Ireland is regarded as a glamorous posting, although there is strong evidence to suggest that many who serve in the Army look forward to it as it is an opportunity to put into practice the skills that they have acquired and to show their commitment in a practical way to the Crown. They deserve our support and recognition, and, as long as their presence in Northern Ireland continues to be necessary, a debate such as this should not take place without their contribution being properly recognised.

6.59 pm

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden) : The hon. Member for Motherwell, North (Dr. Reid) referred to 1 July and the battle of the Somme and rightly reminded us of the sacrifices that have been made by the British Army and the valour, courage and proficiency that it has shown. I, too, would like to pay a tribute not only to past

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generations but, as the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell) said, to those who are serving in the Army today.

I suggest, however, that in the first world war it was the predecessor of Kitchener's citizens' army, the 100,000 strong all-volunteer regular Army who fought in the concluding months of 1914, who offer a lesson that is more relevant to our experience today. After three months, they were virtually decimated, but in the face of overwhelming odds they slowed up and eventually stopped the Kaiser's army. In the last few weeks of that campaign, what helped to stem the tide, and therefore made the basis of the allied offensive possible, were the forces of the Territorial Army, who supported what was left of the regular British expeditionary force. That small army of 100,000 was highly trained. Its soldiers used their weapons with such proficiency that the German generals thought that they were equipped with machine guns, although in reality they had far too few of them. Their morale was second to none, and we all admire their sense of duty.

Those forces were supported by the Territorial Army ; they were all volunteers ; and they were highly trained--ingredients which many of us have emphasised as the qualities that must be retained if we are to make a success of "Options for Change".

I am now speaking under the 10-minute rule, and I know that many right hon. and hon. Members are anxious to speak. I shall make my points, although too briefly to do them justice.

I warmly support the regimental system, which is fundamental to the morale, sense of duty and proficiency of the Army, especially the infantry. It would be unwise of me to go into which units should or should not be retained or into how many should be amalgamated or even disbanded.

I should like to put a point to the military specialists, the professionals, who will have the unenviable task of making recommendations to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, although I imagine that the Government, not the generals, will make the decisions. Will the professionals consider retaining at least a cap badge at company level or, if that is thought unworkable, keeping a regimental tie with those reserve units which are expected to play a combat role at short notice? Time will not permit me to elaborate, but I believe that that is probably the most workable of the suggestions which I have heard.

It has been argued that the changes proposed by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State do not bear any relationship to our military needs or strategy and that the figures produced for the three services, especially the Army, have been plucked out of the air and are almost entirely Treasury driven.

I have some reservations about the Government's proposals, but if the implication is that they have little to do with the threat to our security, I beg to differ. We played a constructive part in the review of NATO strategy. We cannot have a series of individual national defence reviews. That does not work any more. We are all part of an integrated command. Britain alone cannot come up with a defence review and think that that will provide for its defence or for national interests. There must be a collective and international system involving the closest friends and allies.

The trust and confidence built up in the NATO process have served us well. I do not accept that there is a need for

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a purely national defence review. Once we have agreed the figures with our allies--I believe that the cuts make some sense--we have a duty to consider how they can be implemented within the broad parameters of the NATO defence review.

The United States believes that it should cut the size of its armed forces in Europe by 50 per cent., compared with 30 per cent. for Germany and 20 per cent. for Britain, of which a large portion will be borne by the Army. The changes mainly involve the NATO central front, in which the Army plays a greater part. If our commitment to the central front is substantially reduced, it follows that, much as one may regret it, the Army will be called to bear a greater burden than the Royal Air Force or the Navy.

On grounds of logic and military sense, the Government are right to point out that there has already been a review. From that review has emerged a role for Britain for which no other country could be better suited. The new NATO strategy fits in with the Army's traditional role, recognising that the massive Soviet presence in eastern Europe is withdrawing, that East Germany is now part of the Germany bundeswehr, that the Warsaw pact is being disbanded and that there will no longer be troops almost muzzle to muzzle glaring at each other across a division of about 150 miles. For the first time since the end of world war two, the bulk of our Army, with all its dependants, will no longer be stationed in Germany, at great expense.

The new NATO strategy will emphasise flexibility and mobility, which could not be better suited to an all-volunteer Army. We have been relieved of the prospect of fighting, as part of a mass of land forces in continental Europe, one of those old-style clashes of continental armies. That analysis may be incorrect, although I believe that it is the best one. I am comforted by the thought that Germany, the United States, France--although it is not part of NATO--and the rest of our allies agree that that is probably a reasonable scenario. An outbreak of hostilities involving the Soviet Union is not thought likely to occur in the foreseeable future. If it did, we would have available nuclear weapons and the capability of the Air Force and our sea forces.

In those circumstances, the proposed cuts are probably about right, but that leads me to my caveats. The strategy should not work on the cheap ; if it is on the cheap, it will not work. It will break down if we believe that the Army can do the job without the best possible equipment. Compared with the continental armies, ours is small. There is a risk that it is too small. That can be overcome only by Ministers meeting the wishes which have been expressed today. We must emphasise that the proposed force can discharge its new role effectively only if it is "meaner"--to use the word bandied about the Ministry of Defence. Flexibility involves airborne troops and other specialised troops, especially those trained in amphibious landings and equipped to operate in difficult terrain. For the force to fulfil its role, better equipment and rigorous and more realistic training are needed. As the force is on the small side, if it is to perform its tasks, particularly in Northern Ireland, the obligations which I have spelt out must be met.

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My last point is also a warning. We must pay more attention to our reserve force. Because the size of the regular Army has been reduced and the world is still an uncertain place--I am not talking just about Europe and the Soviet Union--we must have reserve units which can easily be called out to fill any gaps.

Some people argue that that is a cheaper way of dealing with any unexpected troubles that arise. Whatever happens, it will cost money. Some may look for a big dividend from "Options for Change" and believe that we can go much further down the road of saving money. I remind them that, in 1984-85, 5.2 per cent. of our budget was spent on defence compared with an estimated 3.7 per cent. in 1992-93, according to the public expenditure White Paper.

If we are to discharge our duties in the way that I have outlined, and if we recognise that we cannot fulfil expectations of making great economies in the armed services, we shall be able to fulfil our duties as laid down and agreed by us in NATO.

However, I emphasise the role of the Territorial Army, which in 1914 supported the first 100,000. It supported the regulars against the Kaiser's army and helped to stem the tide. That is a lesson that we should never forget.

7.9 pm

Mr. John Morris (Aberavon) : I also congratulate our forces who were in the Gulf. They were professional and brave, and we were all relieved that the conflict was short.

However, I very much regret the Minister's remarks in which he tried to misrepresent the role of the Labour party during the Gulf war. We wanted every effort to be made to ensure that a war was avoided and that peaceful measures should be tried first. I, in my innocence, thought that that was exactly what the Government were purporting to do. Once the die had been cast Labour Members, led by my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition, went time after time into the Division Lobby in support of our troops. The burden of the Minister's remarks showed that he failed to recognise the overwhelming support from all parties for our troops once they were at war. That was very churlish of him, and I want to put the record straight.

In the few minutes that I have at my disposal I want to follow the speech of the right hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) who is also a former Minister of Defence. It is a long time--21 years--since I was a Defence Minister. The right hon. Gentleman spoke about the importance of the regimental system. There must be something in it. That may not sound tidy to the civil service mind, but the regiments are important blocks for building the modern infantry in this century as in previous ones. The system has lasted a long time and is based on local loyalty, on families and friends who join a particular unit because their forebears did the same.

There is a marvellous Welsh word that I shall spell out for the convenience of the House. Cynefin means affinity to one's habitat and ties to one's area. It is a major plus factor in times of stress, when the chips are down and our forces are in battle. That idea may not commend itself to the tidy civil service mind, but it is reflected in recruitment, certainly in the Principality, and in other parts of the country.

We are facing a period of cuts, and I have always accepted--as most hon. Members now accept--that we must reap the benefits of the peace dividend and of the

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general warming of relations. It is important that if the rationalisation and the restructuring are to happen, it must be on a fair basis. I was disturbed by the Minister's remark to the effect that the Army should be left to get on with it. Nothing similar has been said about washing one's hands of the issue. It is a constitutional decision for Ministers to take. The Army should decide on the minutiae and the niceties. No amount of Pontius Pilate-like washing of hands will get Ministers out of this difficulty. It is for them to decide ; they are answerable to the House and they must take into account all the factors, including history, tradition and their political answerability to the House.

We do not know what criteria will be used, and that fact has been echoed in many speeches today. As the right hon. Member for Ayr asked, will recruitment be an important factor? We know that some regiments are undermanned, but in Wales--and in other parts of the country--we are able to recruit and man its three regiments of foot.

Mr. John P. Smith (Vale of Glamorgan) : And more.

Mr. Morris : And more. We may lose one regiment of the line--like other parts of the country, we have also suffered cuts. I am old enough to remember the South Wales Borderers and the First Welsh Regiment leaving. I had the privilege of serving with them as I have also done with the Royal Welch Fusiliers. Wales has suffered cuts and has lost many major military establishments, which resulted in a loss of local employment. We want to know what the political criteria will be. Can we be assured of fairness? Will recruitment be considered important? In view of recruitment in Wales and of the past cuts, I believe that there is a strong case for Wales to maintain its three regiments of the line.

What are the current proposals? Like all those who take an interest in these matters, I have heard that a suggestion emanated from a meeting of generals and colonels of regiments at which those representing Wales were heavily outnumbered that the Royal Welch Fusiliers should be amalgamated with the Cheshires. I have never heard such a ridiculous and politically inept proposal. Thirty to 40 per cent. of the Royal Welch Fusiliers are Welsh speakers. Does anyone believe that if the oldest Welsh regiment disappears people will flock to join the Cheshires? That is nonsense. If recruitment means anything, there must be a political input into this major decision.

I do not know what the input of the Welsh Office is. When individuals and organisations have been to see the Secretary of State for Wales they have received a pretty dusty, non-committal answer. He, unhappily, serves two masters. He represents Wales, in theory, but he has his Cheshire constituency at heart. He does not believe that there is any great difference between those interests because people cross the border. He has allowed his Cheshire responsibilities to come first.

There is a problem with the Royal Welch Fusiliers because we were outnumbered at a gathering where there were more English than Welsh and because the Welsh Office did not speak out. The Minister of State announced to the Western Mail a fortnight ago that he was in charge. He said that everyone from the Queen down knows that he is acting as Secretary of State for Wales. This is his great opportunity to speak up and to do something for Wales.

The suggested amalgamation is reprehensible. The Army would suffer, Wales would suffer and it would be disastrous if recruitment were not recognised as an

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important factor. The least that the Minister can do is to tell us what the criteria will be. The House should know, so that we can judge before the die is cast. The issue is too big to be left to the generals. There should be a political input and a political decision. The Government cannot wash their hands of an important regiment which has served the country well and which I hope will continue to serve it in the future.

7.18 pm

Sir Philip Goodhart (Beckenham) : Every right hon. and hon. Member who has spoken has rightly praised the enormous skill and courage with which the Army has in the past year carried out its role in Iraq and in Northern Ireland. Those two names--Iraq and Northern Ireland--remind us that the world is still a very dangerous place despite the collapse of international communism during the past few years.

The nature of the threat has changed, and it is possible to make substantial cuts in the defence budget. When my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced that the size of the Army was to be reduced by about 25 per cent., I did not object. I think that there is room for a reduction in the size of the Army, especially as, for the first time since the end of world war two, it will basically be returning to this country. For the first time since the war, more than 50 per cent. of trained soldiers will be serving in the United Kingdom. That means that we ought to be able make substantial cuts in the administrative tail of the Army.

In Germany, we need major hospitals and big supply depots, but we shall not need them once the Army returns to this country. The means that we should be able to make disproportionately large cuts--within the 25 per cent.--in the administrative tail.

It is astonishing, therefore, that larger than average cuts are proposed for our combat units. Infantry battalions are ideally suited to provide a flexible response to the uncertain threats that we shall face in future. I was astonished to learn that it is proposed to cut our infantry from 55 battalions to 36, of which two will be Gurkha battalions. That means that there will be only 34 British battalions left.

The senior officers who have to plan are clearly unhappy, and some of them have said, "It will not work." Unlike, say, the Green Jackets, or the Airborne division or the Argylls, the Queen's division is not made up of prima donnas. The Queen's division is at the heart of our infantry. The council of colonels of the Queen's division "question the viability of an Infantry of only 34 British Battalions in the light of what they perceive to be the commitments".

What can be done? First, I suggest that the Gurkhas should be taken out of the "Options for Change" exercise. I do not believe that they should be disbanded. We should keep a brigade of 4,000 Gurkhas, but as the basis for a United Nations force. There is a need for a United Nations force in northern Iraq at this moment and, in the near future, there may well be a need for such a force in Cambodia. There has also been a collapse of authority in Somalia ; aid workers have had to leave because there was no one there to protect them. The Gurkhas could provide the basis of an ever- ready United Nations force. There is much interest in the concept of a United Nations standby force given the thawing of the cold war, and Britain should play a role in developing such a force.

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Secondly--and here I admit to an element of special pleading--I think that it is crazy to cut the third battalion and the regimental headquarters of the Parachute Regiment. If we are to play a leading role in the rapid reaction force, it is plainly barmy to reduce the size of the Parachute Regiment. There will also undoubtedly be an extra need for special forces to tackle the terrorist threat in the years to come. We should remember that about 70 per cent. of the Special Air Service and more than 50 per cent. of the special forces as a whole are recruited from the Parachute Regiment. To dry up the recruitment pool for our special forces does not seem to make any sense--except, perhaps, under a policy of equal misery for all. Thirdly, the 36 front-line battalions should be supplemented by a force of perhaps 10 base battalions in a lower state of readiness--perhaps with some reserves with special training and call-out liabilities on their strength--which could be reconstituted in 30 to 60 days to support the 36 front-line infantry battalions that would be kept up to 100 per cent. strength and receive the best possible training. The existence of "hybrid base battalions" could act as an insurance against the problem of overstretch which, under present plans, will undoubtedly face the Army.

The Secretary of State and his colleagues earned warm plaudits from the House for their conduct during the Gulf war. It would be a tragedy for them, and for the country as a whole, if they went down in the history books as Ministers who broke the back of the British infantry.

7.26 pm

Mr. Jack Ashley (Stoke-on-Trent, South) : I echo the tributes to the Army, its leadership and its training ; they are superb. In the time at my disposal, however, I can choose only one theme. I shall concentrate on disabled service men and ex-service men. I welcome the Minister's comment about the three Grenadier guards whose solicitors are to meet representatives of the Ministry. I regard that as half a step forward, but only half a step. The Minister could simply have said that he accepted the principle that they would be paid. He has not done that yet, so they are not guaranteed compensation. I want to raise again the problem of those ex- service men disabled by alleged negligence before the Crown Proceedings Act was changed in 1987. Unlike the Guardsmen, those ex-service men do not have the right to sue, nor do they receive compensation. It is scandalous that they should be left in limbo.

The House will know that between 1947 and 1987 members of the armed forces were banned from suing the Ministry of Defence for injuries due to alleged negligence. The House may recall the campaign that I led to change the law and abolish section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act which ended in victory. On 8 December 1986, the then Secretary of State--the right hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger), who spoke from the Back Benches today--announced that the Government had decided to abolish section 10. There is no doubt that that was the result of the campaign. Subsequently the Bill introduced by the hon. Member for Davyhulme (Mr. Churchill) became an Act, and section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act was abolished.

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Ironically, the very disabled ex-service men who had campaigned with me were denied the benefit and did not even receive an ex gratia benefit. Among those severely disabled service men was one of my constituents, Martin Ketterick, and Snowy Clingham, both of whom have become well known. Their loyalty for the services has never been doubted. However, they have felt betrayed.

As the Ministry of Defence remained intransigent, I contacted the then Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher). Her answer merely echoed that given by the MOD. I suggested to her that a trust fund should provide ex gratia payments for those ex-service men who were disabled before the law was changed before the announcement of 8 December 1986. I said that payments could go to those who could show evidence that their injuries were probably due to negligence.

However, the then Prime Minister said that the trust fund proposal did not surmount the principle of restrospection. She objected that an open-ended scheme would

"cause distress and embarrassment to former service men alleged to have caused injury to others."

I suggested a compromise to the then Prime Minister. I said that to avoid an open-ended commitment claims should be considered only from those injured in action which led to an official investigation and a conclusion of faulty behaviour, equipment or procedure. That was a very reasonable proposition. To overcome the problems of retrospection, I suggested that ex gratia payments should compensate only for costs and suffering experienced after the decisive date of 8 December 1986.

As a further attempt to solve the problems, I leaned over backwards and suggested to the then Prime Minister that the ex gratia payments should be based only on the written evidence available as that would undoubtedly rectify the major causes of injustice. Every one of those proposals was rejected by the right hon. Member for Finchley. When the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) became Prime Minister, I asked him to reconsider the issue. He said that the difficulties

"in principle and in practice"

were too great to act. The Government encountered difficulties "in principle and in practice"

when they dealt with haemophiliacs who were infected with AIDS as a result of contaminated NHS blood transfusions. The Prime Minister found his way round that and commendably so. He should do precisely the same thing for disabled ex-service men. He should find his way round the problems and difficulties. They believe that the MOD's behaviour has caused difficulties and they believe that the Ministry has misled them.

Very few people inside or outside the House have heard of the "redress of grievance" procedure. However, when that campaign was at its height and when the disabled ex-service men were helping me, senior Ministers in the MOD told them about the procedure. It was suggested that the disabled ex- service men should divert their attention to that procedure. They took the Ministry at its word and they pursued the redress of grievance procedure.

Later, at exactly the same time that the Secretary of State for Defence announced in the House that the law was being changed, my constituents and the other ex-service

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