House of Commons Hansard Debates for 9 Jul 1991

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because it was a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. That is a pathetic argument, and for too long it has been used as an excuse for Britain not taking part. I am sure that, if the British Government were willing, the Soviet Union and the United States would be prepared to adapt the treaty to make it multilateral and to include a proper verification regime. I wish to ask the Minister about a technical matter. What happens if wrong information is given to inspectors? Clause 3(1)(b) rightly makes it an offence wilfully to obstruct any member of the inspection team, but it should also be an offence wilfully to mislead or wilfully to attempt to provide false information to the team. The offence of wilfully misleading would, of course, extend to Governments.

What will the Government do to prevent people from misleading the inspection team? Are they prepared to make it an offence wilfully to mislead? Is the Minister confident that any attempt to mislead will be spotted by the inspectors? If so, he is admitting that inspections work and that we should have more of them and more arms control. If he says that inspections do not work, that emphasises the importance of making it an offence wilfully to mislead the inspection team. Britain and 139 other states have signed the non-proliferation treaty. It should be given more importance. Although many countries do not have nuclear weapons, they are close to having that capability. What will the Minister do to strengthen the treaty? The British Trident system could be seen as violating it, because it offers evidence that Britain is not undertaking to pursue negotiations in good faith or effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, as the NPT demands. Trident is dangerously close to violating the NPT. If Britain is not doing its duty, that gives other nations an excuse not to abide by it. There is a link between testing and the NPT. The final review conference is to take place in 1995, and there is a danger that it will founder if there is no significant ban on nuclear testing. The Government have set their sights firmly against that and have blocked it on every occasion. I hope that they will change their mind. In 1987, France set up the missile technology control regime. What effort are the Government making to ensure that missile proliferation is controlled?

As for the strategic arms reduction talks-- [Interruption.] These are the most important issues facing the world at present and they should be at the top of the agenda. They are worth airing so that we can try to make some progress in arms control and disarmament. The Guardian yesterday said that the four disputes holding up the START agreement were

"an agreed procedure to inspect missile factories, ways to distinguish new and modified variants of strategic missiles from older models, a formula to reduce the number of warheads on missiles not being dismantled, and an agreed way to encrypt data from test missiles so that both sides can decode it."

Will the Minister throw some light on the extent to which those are holding up the START agreements? As the article said, "even after the treaty is complete, each side will be able to deploy 9,000 strategic nuclear warheads, which some analysts believe is more than either side had when the talks began."

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It would be a disappointing outcome for a major treaty if both sides end up with more missiles than they had at the start of the negotiations.

The Government must put their will behind the Bill so that the conference on security and co-operation in Europe can tackle arms proliferation and the worldwide arms trade. We must have some answers from the Minister to show that the Government have the will to back proper measures for arms control and disarmament.

11.42 pm

Mr. Bob Cryer (Bradford, South) : I welcome this important Bill, and I have listened carefully to the Minister's opening remarks. We are fortunate that Parliament has a number of hours in which to examine the issue at our leisure, rather than having the debate curtailed at tea-time to allow hon. Members to go home for a cup of tea and a slice of toast, as proposed in a subsequent motion. In his opening motion, the Minister kept referring to the Warsaw pact countries, but the Warsaw pact has been disssolved.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd : I said "former" Warsaw pact countries.

Mr. Cryer : The Minister now says "former Warsaw pact countries", but he did not say that during his speech. I point that out as an indication of the Minister's cold war thinking. I hope that the Bill is a new step toward better relations in Europe--by which I do not mean the Common Market but the whole continent of Europe, east and west. I hope that, when he winds up, the Minister will assure us that the Government are not wedded to the idea of the cold war but welcome its dissipation and that they want NATO to be wound up. The cause of tension between east and west could then be brought to an end. The Bill deals with conventional weapons and is important because many nations in Europe are armed to the teeth and could inflict great damage with conventional weapons. It is also important that we should be able to control conventional weapons so that conflict can never take place, because conflict with conventional weapons is probably a prerequisite for the onslaught of a nuclear exchange, so the two are interlinked. NATO's flexible response policy can roughly be summed up by saying that if they come at us with tanks--it had the Soviet Union in mind- -we shall reply with conventional weapons. If they come at us with nuclear weapons, or carry on with conventional weapons and we cannot beat them, we reserve the right to blow up the world by using nuclear weapons. Therefore, the two are closely linked.

I hope that the Government carry out the terms of the legislation, because I am concerned that a number of nations are looking at the Government extremely cynically. They say that, although the Government have signed the United Nations nuclear non-proliferation treaty, they are not honouring it. As my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton (Mr. Cohen) said, clause 6 commits us to getting rid of nuclear weapons, but we have not done so since the formation of the treaty. The vast majority that signed that treaty are non- nuclear nations, and have told nuclear nations at several review conferences that they are committed not to manufacture or deploy nuclear weapons. However, the nuclear powers continue to increase the numbers of their nuclear weapons. Exceptions to that are

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the United States and the Soviet Union, which, through the intermediate nuclear forces treaty, are also nuclear power signatories.

The important nuclear power signatory to the non-proliferation treaty is the United Kingdom. The adoption of Trident nuclear weapons is in breach of the non-proliferation treaty. All the non-nuclear signatories to that treaty have said that they are concerned. A joint statement was not possible at the last review conference because of disagreements over the position of the nuclear signatories to the treaty.

Some of the non-nuclear nations may look at this important legislation, based on the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, and ask whether the United Kingdom seriously commits itself to a permanent reduction in armed forces and whether it will honour the treaty that it signed, in view of the Government's failure to honour the non-proliferation treaty.

That is not the Government's view. For some extraordinary reason, they believe that getting more nuclear weapons that are more powerful than this country has ever had--

Madam Deputy Speaker : Order. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware, as I am, that the Bill deals with conventional weapons. I am sure that he is coming to that point.

Mr. Cryer : At the beginning of my remarks, I mentioned that there is no question in most strategists' minds but that a nuclear conflict will begin with an exchange of conventional weapons. The point that I am making is that, when nations enter into treaties, their conduct in carrying out those obligations qualifies the attitude of nations towards the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, which the Bill is designed to implement.

Through their handling of the passage of the legislation, and by honouring that important treaty, I want the Government to show that they will carry out its terms. Although I know that the Bill deals with only conventional weapons, there are too many of those and they should be reduced. It seeks to do so by providing the facilities to carry out that treaty, which is important. Failure to implement the United Nations non-proliferation treaty may reveal to other nations the serious nature of this Government's attitude towards the Bill. Arms control and disarmament, and the inspection of those facilities, are important. We had a recent example in Iraq involving not conventional weapons, but nuclear materials. We are all concerned that no powers should develop nuclear weapons. Inspection is vital to ensure that nations do not exceed their agreed limits on arms of all types, and to see that they move towards reducing their numbers. Although the treaty is not before us, the Minister said that it lists a certain number of weapons, and that a challenge inspection can be requested by another party to the treaty on sites where those weapons are kept. My hon. Friend the Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) asked the Minister whether he would have to allow an inspection of GCHQ if requested to do so. The Minister shuffled his papers for rather a long time and then said that clause 2 states that the Secretary of State "may" issue an authorisation in respect of such an inspection. Does the treaty actually oblige the Secretary of State to issue an

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authorisation? In relation to the treaty, does "may" really mean that it is expected and understood that such authorisation will be given?

I am sure that the Minister would not refuse a challenge. The Government want to co-operate with the terms of the treaty to the best of their ability--which brings me to Menwith Hill. It is a communications centre, with a direct link to British civilian communications at Waterstones Tower two or three miles away. About 800 people work at Menwith Hill, even though the site has never been authorised by Parliament--I wish that it had been. The site has been associated with information about the sort of conventional weapons that the Minister says are linked with the legislation through the treaty.

I have no doubt that information about the movement of troops and weaponry and about the storage and disposition of tanks will be recorded--amidst all the other chatter of communications--and analysed at Menwith Hill, where a great many Americans from the National Security Council are employed without the approval of Parliament. In any event, will it be open to a challenging party to demand to see Menwith Hill and what it does, so as to be satisfied that the communications system there is not being used to move various items subject to the treaty from one place to another?

Some signatories to the treaty may become suspicious. Many years ago, the Public Accounts Committee discovered that a base in Cyprus had seemed to have full petrol tanks only because the one that was inspected had been filled from several others, which had been drained. An ingenious system of piping devised by entrepreneurs in the armed forces that linked all the tanks ensured that only one of them needed to be kept full, so that the contents of the others could be sold off.

It is possible that a challenge inspector would say, "You claim that you have 50 tanks at Aldershot barracks, but we believe that the communications system could be used to move some of them for the purposes of an inspection, because you"--that is, the British Government--"want to conceal an increase in your conventional weapons." We might hold the same suspicion about another Government, but we would have the right to issue a similar challenge. There must be some reciprocity.

Will it be within the purview of the challenging parties to enter a secret, hidden base, not authorised by the House--such as that at Menwith hill? If so, I welcome the Bill. The sooner we rid ourselves of the cloak of secrecy that surrounds some aspects of our armed forces--such as the operation at Menwith hill and GCHQ, which is linked to it--the better we will be able to look Iraq, Iran, or any other country in the face and say, "We behave with absolute honesty. We expect you to do likewise. If there has been any chicanery or covering up of information, we expect you to reveal it, because we do likewise under the treaties that we sign."

No lower standard of honesty should be expected, but it is a matter of concern to me, and to many others, that the Government's standards are not- -alack, alas--of the highest.

11.56 pm

Mr. Lennox-Boyd : The Bill has been welcomed by hon. Members in all parts of the House, understandably, because the issue is one of great concern. The debate has at times ranged wide of the Bill, but I hope that my general

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comments will touch on most of the matters that hon. Members have raised. If I fail to give a satisfactory response in all cases, I will write to the hon. Members concerned with further clarification and details.

The hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) raised a number of questions that went wide of the debate. I will deal first with international considerations, and then with arms limitation in the European context. We welcome the prospect of a START agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Work is continuing in the alliance to prepare for short-range nuclear forces negotiations. I remind the House of the proposal by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, on which work continues, for a United Nations arms register. Conventional weapons transfers are a priority and must be carefully considered. We hope for early progress also towards a chemical weapons convention. Discussions among our allies continue, and in those we share the conviction that such a convention must include an effective verification regime.

Within Europe, we are pressing on with conventional arms control. Reference was made to the CFE follow-on negotiations in Vienna, specifically in connection with military manpower in Europe, in which agreement will be reached on national, not bloc-to-bloc limits, as was the case with the CFE treaty. The NATO is preparing a position for consultation among 35 CSCE countries this autumn in Vienna, to prepare for the new process of dialogue and negotiation to begin in mid-1992.

The hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) mentioned open skies, and NATO recently made proposals for the relaunch of this. We await the Soviet response. It is obviously immensely important in the context of the equipment that was withdrawn east of the Urals. I endorse the hon. Gentleman's remarks about the importance of inspection in arms control verifications.

Hon. Members, and in particular the hon. Member for Swansea, East, have asked about compensation. We have to put this point in context. We already have inspections in the public sector interest, for example, for safety at work and for public health. Inevitably, in a complex world, such public inspections are increasing. No compensation is paid for such inspections and a provision for compensation in this process would set an unfortunate precedent. We do not expect that the burden of the inspection regime to be particularly great. Under the rather complex provisions by which we calculate the number of challenges and inspections that can take place, we anticipate that there will be about 10 challenge inspections in the United Kingdom and our European territories each year, and that each one should be no more than 48 hours long. The hon. Member for Hamilton (Mr. Robertson) asked about requests for inspections. The treaty makes provision for us to protect information in the interests of national security. That also answers a point made by the hon. Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Cryer). The inspection will be of bulky equipment--tanks, armoured carriers, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters. We are entitled to shroud that equipment so as to deny access to certain sensitive points. The only question that is pursued is the existence of equipment, not the detailed nature of it, which can be disguised by shrouding. It will be up to companies to make adequate arrangements to protect commercially

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sensitive information. It is important to keep in mind that the verification regime is concerned only about the presence of equipment of the types limited by the treaty.

The hon. Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn) raised another point. As I said, the CFE treaty is about equipment of certain types, and all the information that has been given to other parties has been made available to the House.

I sense that the wish of the House is to move on to other matters, so I invite hon. Members to give the Bill a Second Reading. Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

Bill committed to a Committee of the whole House.-- [Mr. Boswell.] Bill immediately considered in Committee.

Clause 1 agreed to.

Clause 2

Rights of entry etc. for purposes of challenge inspections under the Protocol

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

12.5 am

Mr. Cryer : I was not clear about the Minister's response on Second Reading. He said that there were reserve powers on the treaty, that areas essential for national security were excluded, and that equipment might be "shrouded", whatever that means. Presumably it means putting a camouflage sheet over a new and secret tank so that inspectors cannot see it. It all sounds terribly childish. The military's childish obsession has cost this country dear in money and human life and limb.

Clause 2(1) states :

"The Secretary of State may issue an authorisation".

For "may", should we read "shall"--or does it mean that there is discretion to refuse a challenge inspection? Clause 2(1) also states that the inspection may be made

"within any specified area in the United Kingdom",

albeit the inspection is made under the protocol.

I hope that, in relation to the important issue of arms control and verification, the legislation will illuminate for other countries any shadowy areas. An important element of such legislation is the building of confidence between nations. People arm themselves when they are suspicious and suspect that other nations may not behave well towards them. The eradication of suspicion is another step towards reducing the amount of arms that people claim, often falsely, that they need for their nation's defence. Will the Minister elaborate on the definition and application of clause 2(1)?

Mr. Lennox-Boyd : I shall write to the hon. Gentleman with further information. I am happy to underline the principal point that, in the national interest, the Bill allows us to deny access to sensitive areas. I am not able at this time to say precisely in what circumstances the Secretary of State and other senior members of the Government would seek to exercise that discretion. Clearly, it would be exercised in a matter of great national importance. As I have said, I cannot go into details at this time.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

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Clause 3

Offences

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Cohen : I want the Minister to agree to write to me about offences. I said on Second Reading that there should be an offence of wilfully misleading the inspectorate and asked why it had not been included in the Bill. The clause provides only that someone who "wilfully obstructs any member of the inspection team shall be guilty of an offence."

The issue that I raised on Second Reading is worthy of consideration, and the Minister did not respond to it. I do not ask him to do so now, but I hope that he will give some thought to the matter and will write to me.

Mr. Lennox-Boyd : I am happy to give the hon. Gentleman that undertaking.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 4 to 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule agreed to.

Bill reported, without amendment.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

12.12 am

Mr. Cryer : We should not allow the Under-Secretary's unsatisfactory responses to go by without comment. The hon. Gentleman employed the formula that Ministers usually adopt when they do not want to answer a plain, straightforward question. In the context of national security, they say that what can and cannot be inspected cannot be defined. However, the Government will be asked about inspections by other members of the treaty and they will have to respond. After all, the Government will be bound to be open. We are discussing future legislation that arises from a treaty that has been signed by the Government and that will provide access to inspect and verify arrangements for the mutual inspection of arms. The mumbo-jumbo that the Minister produced about the national interest not allowing any definition of what can be excluded, for example, is not acceptable, given the changes that have taken place throughout Europe.

At an earlier stage, hon. Members spoke of the cold war and the threat from the Soviet Union. None of us believed in that threat for very long and it has now been proved that it was a hollow one. It was-- [Interruption.] Hon. Members may chortle, but the threat has been proved to have been hollow. Many of us, since elected to this place, have been saying that the threat from the Soviet Union was an illusion that was developed by the Conservatives and the military to justify wanton, wasteful expenditure year after year when we should have been spending the money on hospitals, schools and

infrastructure. The moneys should not have been wasted on things that we could never have used. Yet it seems that the old hollow attitude is still prevalent.

The Soviet Union is no longer an enemy. The right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) went to the Soviet Union and said that its leader was a bold, courageous man. She did not stay in office long enough to make further visits to Moscow to sustain the friendship that she developed and, in any event, it was not necessary to do so. After all, we are friends with the Soviet Union now.

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Indeed, all the eastern bloc countries have changed. We do not need to indulge in the constant repetition of cold-war language or to argue that we must retain our enormous secrets because any indication of their nature to an elected body, such as the House, would prejudice the safety of the United Kingdom. It was not true then and it is not true now.

I hope that the Minister's comments do not show a lacklustre attitude on the part of the Government in the implementation of the treaty, because any treaty that is a step towards reducing our commitment to arms expenditure, towards building up confidence and towards providing verification that we are carrying out our part of the treaty is a step in the right direction. That is why we are supporting the treaty tonight.

12.14 am

Mr. George : I shall not follow the line of argument pursued by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Cryer).

For many years, people in the Labour party and outside, some more than others, argued vociferously that NATO's figures showing the enormous disparity of conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw pact were a fiction. I remember the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament producing a document that it subsequently denied it had sent out, arguing that the concept of the Speznatz was a figment of some militarists' imagination. But when the CFE negotiations began, the Soviets honestly put on the table exactly what they had. They admitted that they had lied and, if anything, the discrepancy had been understated.

It is possible to argue that people on both sides played up the cold war for their own advantage and, bearing in mind the evidence available, most people would argue that, looking back for a period, there was a considerable threat. The cold war did exist and it was not exclusively the responsibility of a handful of warmongers on either side. But I agree entirely with my hon. Friend that the situation changed radically. One should put the past in perspective while remembering the agonies that both sets of alliances went through.

If one had to describe the events of the last hour and a half or so the word farce would be inappropriate. The proceedings have been more than farcical. This is a critical Bill, yet party managers on both sides of the House have, for one reason or another, been determined to rattle through this important measure in a short time, late at night, putting pressure on those who wished to speak to be brief--not observed by all, myself included. That shows the House in a bad light.

When it comes to controlling the Executive in defence and foreign affairs, we are probably slightly in advance of the Supreme Soviet before the Gorbachev reforms. Events such as this vindicate the view that we are permanently bypassed. The only defence for such an approach would be if it could be argued that because of the need to implement the CFE treaty the legislation had only a narrow time slot.

Legislation going to the Lords is often perceived as being less important. The House rarely gets it teeth into legislation relating to treaties, arms control, defence--anything that is serious. One can do nothing about this now, but I register the strongest possible protest to the

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party managers and to my colleagues in the House that we have allowed something as important as this to be dealt with in such a cursory and contemptible manner.

Those who spoke are part of that process. I spoke for 10 minutes, which in itself was a mistake in the light of subsequent speeches. A matter such as this should have been dealt with in great detail, even if it required one, two or three sessions. It is insulting to the House that we cannot raise enough knowledge or enthusiasm to speak in detail about specifics. The Bill is not about START, chemical arms control, open skies or anything mentioned by hon. Members ; it is a specific piece of legislation. We did not do it justice. Although that may be partly the fault of Back Benchers, I feel that the bulk of the blame lies with those who decided to rattle through it so quickly. I very much hope that, if we deal with similar legislation in the future, Government and Opposition will decide to give us a little more time, at an earlier hour.

In a couple of weeks, I shall attend a conference of the North Atlantic Assembly. We parliamentarians--well versed in parliamentary scrutiny of the executive, and in parliamentary control of Governments dealing with defence and foreign affairs--will lecture the newly emerging democracies of eastern Europe on how to control the executive. All that I can tell them is, "Please do not follow our example." In their few months' experience of democracy, those countries have probably established more control over their executives than we have established over ours after 700 years of trying.

12.20 am

Mr. Lennox-Boyd : First let me tell the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) that the Bill was debated in another place, given a Second Reading and passed to this House. It was considered non- controversial in the other place, and came to this House--and to tonight's debate--without a single amendment attached to it. That is why the Committee stage was taken so quickly.

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We have not "rattled through" the Bill ; this has been an open-ended debate. If the hon. Gentleman wanted to debate the Bill in more depth, he and his hon. Friends could have table amendments that could have been discussed in detail. They did not do so. That cannot be the fault of the Government, the business managers or the system that the hon. Gentleman has disparaged ; it is the fault of those who scrutinised the Bill. If the people who scrutinised such Bills want to debate them, they can do so. I say that with the greatest respeect, recognising the hon. Gentleman's great knowledge of the subject. I think that he will agree, however, that the Bill--although it touches on the wider arms control debate--is a specific provision within that context, and that the Government are therefore not to be blamed for dealing with Second Reading in rather narrow terms.

The hon. Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Cryer) referred to clause 2. The clause is drafted to reflect the challenge regime, as referred to in the CFE treaty. Where the word "may" applies, rather than the word "shall", it also applies to all the signatories of that treaty--and, presumably, to any legislaton that the Soviet Union may have to implement to give effect to the treaty.

The wording allows an inspected state party to refuse a challenge inspection. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree that any Back Bencher in the Soviet Parliament whom he might contact would not find it easy to challenge his Government to give a definition of what the national interest constitutes. It is simply not possible to do that and to receive a sensible, coherent and comprehensive reply. What I can say is that in practice we would expect to refuse only very rarely, and then only for overriding reasons of national security. It must be important, however, that the right that the treaty confers on all state parties--without which it would not have been completed and signed, and which is not restricted-- be retained in the clause.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill read the Third time, and passed, without amendment.

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Sittings of the House (Select Committee)

12.24 am

The Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John MacGregor) : I beg to move

That a Select Committee of fifteen Members be appointed to consider whether the public and private business of the House might be conducted more effectively by making changes to the order and timing of business, the hours of sitting, and the arrangement of the Parliamentary year ; and to make recommendations thereon : That five be the quorum of the Committee :

That the Committee have power to send for persons, papers and records ; to sit notwithstanding any adjournment of the House ; to adjourn from place to place ; and to report from time to time : That the Committee have power to appoint specialist advisers either to supply information which is not readily available or to elucidate matters of complexity within the Committee's order of reference : That the Committee have leave to confer and meet concurrently with any committee of the Lords on procedure of that House for the purposes of deliberating and of examining witnesses on any aspects of the Committee's order of reference which affect that House as well : That Hilary Armstrong, Mr. A. J. Beith, Mr. Andrew F. Bennett, Mr. Alistair Burt, Sir Peter Emery, Mr. David Harris, Dr. Kim Howells, Mr. Michael Jopling, Mr. John McFall, Mr. Cranley Onslow, Mr. Stanley Orme, Mrs. Marion Roe, Mr. Peter Shore, Mr. Roger Sims and Mr. Michael Stern be members of the Committee :

That the Second Report of the Select Committee on Procedure in Session 1986 -87, in the last Parliament, relating to the use of time on the Floor of the House, be referred to the Committee : and That these Orders be Standing Orders of the House until the end of the Parliament.

Madam Deputy Speaker (Miss Betty Boothroyd) : Before we proceed, I should tell the House that Mr. Speaker has selected an amendment, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Cryer), which seeks to leave out

"to adjourn from place to place".

Mr. MacGregor : Some may regard it as somewhat ironic that a motion to set up a Select Committee on the sittings of the House and its hours should begin at this hour of the early morning. Therefore, I shall be brief. If the House approves the motion we will set up a Select Committee which will make recommendations to the House and to which all hon. Members may give evidence. Much of what we will be discussing can be dealt with on many occasions from now on. When I announced my proposal for the review we had detailed exchanges in the House. I believe that it would be right to say that that proposal commanded widespread welcome on both sides of the House. In my statement of 27 June I made it clear that I believe that, following the consultations I have had with many hon. Members since I became Leader of the House, we need a wide-ranging and in-depth study of the way in which we organise our business.

The House will note that this is a House matter, not a party one. It is important and symbolic that the motion for approval tonight stands in the names of the hon. Members for Copeland (Dr. Cunningham) and for Berwick- upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) as well as mine.

Rev. Martin Smyth (Belfast, South) : Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that there is some regret that the names

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set down for membership of the Select Committee do not include any hon. Members from Northern Ireland ? We all recognise that Northern Ireland has not been given proper attention in the House.

Mr. MacGregor : I understand the hon. Gentleman's point, but the difficulty is that there are many in the House with varying points of view who would have wished to be on the Select Committee. I am sure that the hon. Members for Copeland and for Berwick-upon-Tweed have, in common with me, been informed by a number of hon. Members that they would have wished to serve on that Committee. A number have also made that clear tonight. It is difficult to achieve the right balance. It is relevant, however, that all hon. Members will be able to give evidence to the Select Committee and express their views on its recommendations.

It is clear that a number of hon. Members want to speak, so I shall not give way again, but will rather respond at the end of the debate to the points made.

This is not just about the hours that we sit. I hope that the Select Committee will consider the whole way in which we organise the handling of public and private business. In my earlier statement I suggested some of the issues that the Committee could examine. They include the increased quantity and complexity of Government and European business ; the increased role of the Select Committees and the new system of scrutiny of European Community legislation. I believe that those European Standing Committees have demonstrated a better scrutiny of European proposed legislation and have helped with the hours of the House. I accept, however, that those Committees will be subject to review.

The Select Committee will also consider the widely differing views of hon. Members. It is also important to stress the input of the Select Committee on Procedure--four members of that Committee are on the new Select Committee. Its report on the use of time on the Floor of the House is referred to specifically in the order of reference for the new Select Committee contained in the motion.

As a result of a number of discussions that I have had with hon. Members on both sides of the House, I believe that the Select Committee should be able to include within its terms of reference the experience of overseas legislatures that follow the Westminster model. It is for the Committee to decide what to do, but several colleagues have impressed upon me the importance of including that overseas experience. That is why I made provision for it in the terms of reference. It is for the House to decide on the amendment tabled by the Member for Bradford, South (Mr. Cryer), but I believe that it would be a pity if we excluded the experience of other legislatures from the Committee's considerations.

I emphasise that the new Select Committee and the Procedure Select Committee have complementary tasks. The Procedure Select Committee will continue its valuable work on detailed aspects of our procedures under the valuable chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Member for Honiton (Sir P. Emery). The new Select Committee must examine private and public business and bring the wealth of its membership's experience and views to bear. I hope that the House will agree that its proposed Chairman, my right hon. Friend the Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Mr. Jopling), is one of our most experienced Members, who has long experience of all aspects of the

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