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Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, further to table 4 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", what reductions in United Kingdom equipment holdings already announced were required in order to comply with the ceilings imposed by the CFE treaty.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : The necessary reductions will be completed within 40 months of the treaty's coming into force, as specified in the treaty.
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, further to table 4 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", what is the percentage reduction in total holdings of the United Kingdom's treaty-limited equipment required under the conventional forces in Europe treaty.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : In accordance with the table, the United Kingdom has a liability to reduce its holdings of tanks by 15.3 per cent., and its armoured combat vehicles by 0.5 per cent. The United Kingdom ceiling for artillery pieces matches the declaration. For all other equipments (i.e. combat aircraft and attack helicopters), current holdings are below the ceilings.
Nuclear Missile Launchers
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, further to figure 4 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", how many of the (a) Frog, (b) SS-21 and (c) Scud, Soviet sub-strategic nuclear missile launchers are deployed in areas from which they can hit targets in western Europe.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : The continuing restructuring of Soviet forces and the continuing withdrawal of elements of these from eastern Europe complicate the assessment of the current deployment status of these launchers. However, the mobility of these systems means that large numbers of them could rapidly be brought within range of the NATO area.
Cyprus
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what is his policy towards the continued deployment of two infantry battalions to Cyprus.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : There are no plans to change the current level of our commitment to Cyprus.
British Army of The Rhine
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, (1) further to paragraph 412 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", which units of the BAOR are to be withdrawn from Germany ; and where they are currently deployed ;
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(2) further to paragraph 412 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", when the planned reduction in the size of BAOR will begin ; and when it will be completed.Mr. Archie Hamilton : I refer the hon. Member to the statement which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State made to the House yesterday afternoon concerning the restructuring of the Army.
Contracts (German Companies)
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what contracts his Department has placed with German companies in the last year, and if he will list the names of the contractors, the amount of the contracts, and the specification of the contracts.
Mr. Alan Clark : It is not our normal policy to give details of the companies with whom we do business ; nor to disclose the value or specification of our contracts.
Homosexuality
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, further to paragraph 5, page 57 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", what procedures are in place to deal with complaints of harassment of homosexuals within the armed forces.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : All complaints of harassment of any nature would be dealt with under normal administrative or disciplinary procedures and, if substantiated, appropriate action would be taken against the offender. Homosexual behaviour is itself an offence under service law.
Tornados
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what proportion of Royal Air Force training for Tornados to deliver 1,000 lb bombs is conducted at medium level.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : RAF Tornado GR1 aircrew conduct about 5 per cent. of their weapons training practising the delivery of 1,000 lb bombs at medium level.
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, further to table 6 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", how many Tornado aircraft deployed in Germany will be removed under his proposal to reduce the number of Tornado squadrons from seven to four.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : Table 6 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates" gave a snapshot of, inter alia, the number of Tornado aircraft allotted to units in Germany on 19 November 1990. Fifty-two of the aircraft were Tornado GR1/1a aircraft from the four Tornado squadrons currently at RAF Laarbruch, of which three are to be disbanded and the fourth is to be re-deployed to RAF Marham.
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence (1) further to paragraph 406 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", how many Tornado aircraft will be involved in the reduction of three squadrons ;
(2) further to paragraph 406 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", how many of the Tornados from the disbanded squadrons (a) will be re- assigned to other squadrons, (b) scrapped and (c) held in storage.
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Mr. Archie Hamilton : As a result of the disbandment of three squadrons currently based in Germany, the total establishment of the RAF Tornado interdiction/strike force, including reserves, will be reduced by 39 aircraft. The surplus aircraft will be either held in storage or re-used as fleet management requirements dictate. There are no plans to scrap any of these aircraft.
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, with reference to paragraph 216 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", how many of the five Tornados lost in combat whilst delivering 1,000lb bombs were conducting operations in concert with Tornados delivering JP-233 bombs.
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, further to paragraph 216 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", what was the level at which the two Tornados were flying that were lost to direct enemy fire.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : The two aircraft lost to direct enemy fire were conducting loft-attacks with 1,000lb bombs.
Armed Forces Manpower
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, further to figure 3 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimate", what is the balance of total armed forces manpower between NATO and the USSR in the ATTU--Atlantic to the Urals--region.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : NATO armed forces manpower based in the Atlantic to the Urals region currently totals around 3 million, while the equivalent Soviet figure is estimated at approximately 2.3 million.
Combat Aircraft
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, further to table 4 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", what plans his Department has to increase the number of Royal Air Force combat aircraft up to the level permitted under the conventional forces in Europe ceilings.
Nuclear Weapons (Testing)
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what are the security implications for the United Kingdom of the continued testing of nuclear weapons by other states.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : Continued nuclear testing by the nuclear weapons states helps them to maintain and modernise their forces. Where appropriate, relevant technological developments in this and other areas are taken into account in the defence programme.
Nuclear-capable Aircraft
Mr. McFall : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, further to figure 4 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates", what are the reasons for Fishbed and Flogger aircraft no longer being included in the categories of nuclear-capable aircraft.
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Mr. Archie Hamilton : Fishbed was excluded because this type was no longer considered to remain in the inventory of Soviet nuclear capable aircraft covered by this figure by the end of 1990. Flogger is included in the total shown, but the aircraft was inadvertently omitted from the list of Soviet aircraft types in the key.Nerve Agents
Mr. Flynn : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what quantities of nerve agents of the types GB and GF were imported into the United Kingdom in 1991 to date.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : A vapour sample from the United Nations Special commission's first chemical weapons inspection in Iraq was imported for analysis for the commission by the chemical and biological defence establishment, Porton Down, in June 1991. Results of the analysis carried out on the sample were consistent with the United Nations press statement that nerve agents GB and GF were present at the Muthanna establishment in Iraq. We are aware of no further relevant imports.
Aircraft Accidents
Mr. Knowles : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will provide details of the accidents involving Royal Navy Sea King and Royal Air Force Phantom aircraft which gave rise to the accident rates for those types for 1990 provided in Table 5.8 of volume 2 of the "Statement on the Defence Estimates 1991" ; and why these details are not provided in table 5.9 of that volume.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : Unfortunately, due to a clerical error, there are three omissions from table 5.9
Date |Aircraft|Parent
|service
-------------------------------------------
30 April 1990 |Phantom |RAF
8 May 1990 |Sea King|RN
7 December 1990 |Wessex |RAF
None of the above caused any deaths or serious injuries. These three accidents were also omitted from the figures on "Number of Accidents" in table 5.8
Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Mr. Shore : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether he has completed his review of the present arrangements for running the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : No. I refer the hon. Member to the reply I gave to the hon. Member for Bristol, East (Mr. Sayeed) on 15 July, Official Report, column 98.
Low Flying
Mr. Michael : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the reason for low flights by three aircraft over south Cardiff at 11.45 am on Saturday 13 July.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : Military low-flying training is not normally carried out at weekends and public holidays. The aircraft referred to may, however, have been aircraft of the Red Arrows who took off from Cardiff airport in transit to a flying display elsewhere at about the same time mentioned.
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Mr. Michael : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what are the causes of the increase in flights at low level over the urban areas of Cardiff south and Penarth during recent months.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : Military aircraft carrying out low-flying training are instructed not to overfly major urban conurbations such as Cardiff at low level although aircraft may transit some areas of the Cardiff, South and Penarth constituency at levels above 1,000 ft and, as elsewhere, the amount of activity may vary from time to time as a result of weather and other considerations.
Mr. Michael : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether there has been any change in regulations governing low-flying aircraft in south Wales in the past four years.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : The regulations governing the United Kingdom system, including south Wales, are under continuous review and are updated regularly.
Dr. Thomas : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what changes have been made to the lateral boundaries of the highlands restricted area since its establishment ; and whether any further such changes are under consideration.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : No changes have been made to the lateral boundaries of the Highlands restricted area since its establishment but all aspects of the United Kingdom low-flying system are kept under continuous review.
Dr. Thomas : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if any changes to the boundaries of the tactical training areas have been considered by the military low-flying management group since the beginning of 1989.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : There have been no changes to the boundaries of the tactical training areas in the period concerned.
Dr. Thomas : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what was the nature and purpose of the low-flying exercise held in the Forest of Dean/Vale of Berkeley area, commencing on 20 May ; how many and what types of aircraft took part ; and what measures were applied to ensure that participating pilots did not infringe the Stroud gap transit area, the Nympsfield gliding site, the Slimbridge bird sanctuary, and the avoidance areas around the Oldbury and Berkeley nuclear power stations.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : No low-flying training exercises took place in the Forest of Dean/Vale of Berkeley area on the date concerned. An exercise was held by Bristol university air squadron from 20 to 24 May, in the area concerned, which was subject to relevant United Kingdom low-flying regulations and for which an airspace co-ordination notice was issued by the national air traffic services.
Dr. Thomas : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence by what lateral and vertical distances military pilots are instructed to avoid the village of Penrhyndeudraeth.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : It is not our practice to release detailed information on flying restrictions in individual areas. Military fast jet aircraft are instructed to avoid flying at low level over the centre of major conurbations
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and built up areas but it is not practicable to guarantee to avoid all smaller communities such as Penrhyndeudraeth although aircrew will avoid populated areas wherever possible.Mr. Wigley : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many low- flying exercises were conducted which involved low flying over north Wales between (a) 15 July 1990 to 15 January 1991, (b) 16 January to 28 February and (c) 1 March to 31 May.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : There were no low-flying training exercises conducted over north Wales between the dates specified, although routine low-flying training would have taken place in the area throughout the period.
Mr. Wigley : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many low- flying exercises (a) under 100 ft or (b) under 250 ft were conducted by United Kingdom forces in each week of the hostilities in the Gulf.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : Low-flying training in the United Kingdom under 250 ft by fixed-wing military aircraft is restricted to the three tactical training areas where aircraft are allowed to fly down to a minimum separation distance of 100 ft. Available central records for usage of the areas concerned in January and February 1991 were given in the written answer to the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) on 15 July 1991 at column 94.
Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act
Mr. Churchill : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence to what extent the estimate given to the House by the Armed Forces Minister on 18 March 1987, in Standing Committee C, that implementation of the Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 1987 would give rise, after 10 years, to an annual cost of £13 million, has been borne out by experience ; what has been the cost in each year for 1987-88 to date ; and what factors account for any differences between the actual figures and the ministerial estimate.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : The information required to answer the question is not immediately available. My noble Friend the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces will write to the hon. Member.
Royal Naval Reserve
Mr. Ian Bruce : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether decisions have been taken regarding the future of the Royal Navy's reserve forces ; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : Now that we have decided on the size of and shape of our regular forces, we have examined more closely our requirements for Naval reserves having taken due account of our experience of Operation Granby.
The key roles of the volunteer reserves will remain unchanged ; but detailed consideration of the unit and branch structure of the (RNR) has resulted in a decision to reduce their current manpower level of 5,900 by 1,200 ; and the Royal Naval Auxiliary Service (RNXS) is similarly to reduce its current manpower level of 2,850 by 150. As to the future of the RNR and RNXS, a tri-service study team has been established to examine the mix of regular and reserve forces. Its aim will be to develop a
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defence-wide manpower structure for the period 1995 onwards matched to forecast tasks, reduced readiness requirements and extended warning and preparation time. This will provide a foundation to develop a more streamlined Naval reserves capable of meeting their future objectives in a cost-effective manner.Redundancies
Dr. Twinn : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has for handling redundancy in the services and among Ministry of Defence United Kingdom-based civil servants ; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : I refer my hon. Friend to Britain's Army for the 90s (cm 1595) which has been published today. Details of Army redundancies are set out in paragraphs 39 to 42.
As to redundancies in the other two services, the Royal Navy judges that there may be a measure of redundancy among officers and ratings, mainly at more senior levels. Subject to further assessment of the numbers involved, it is hoped to achieve these by voluntary redundancy, some late in 1992-93, with the majority subsequently. Some compulsory redundancies might be necessary to complete the programme.
No decisions have yet been taken about RAF redundancies, but it is considered that redundancies among airmen are unlikely, with the possible exception of a small number of senior non-commissioned officers in a few trades. In the case of RAF officers, some measure of redundancy at squadron leader level and above may be necessary over the period to the mid-1990s, but it is hoped to keep this to a minimum. The terms and conditions of RN and RAF redundancy will be the same as those for the Army.
On current plans about 20,000 United Kingdom-based civil service posts will be reduced over the period 1991-92 to 1996-97. To the greatest extent possible, this reduction will be achieved by natural wastage, early retirement and redeployment. However, there will inevitably be some redundancies, particularly among industrial and non-mobile staff. Numbers will to some extent depend upon which establishments are closed and on the timing. Redundancies will be handled under the MOD redundancy agreement. Redundancy compensation is paid under the principal civil service payment scheme.
Rolls-Royce, Leavesden
Mr. Henderson : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the sale of a site at Leavesden to Rolls-Royce.
Mr. Archie Hamilton [holding answer 22 July 1991] : I refer the hon. Gentleman to the statement I made on14 May at column 140 .
Friendly Fire Incidents
Mr. Oppenheim : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on the results of his investigations into friendly fire incidents involving British troops in the Gulf.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : There were four incidents during the Gulf conflict in which British soldiers were killed or injured by friendly forces. Nine soldiers were killed and 16
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injured in these incidents. The board of inquiry into the incident when nine soldiers were killed and 11 injured in two Warrior vehicles belonging to the 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers Battle Group (3 RRF) has now reported. It has been the practice of successive Governments not to publish reports of this kind, but I wish to give as full an account as possible of the board's findings. On 26 February 1991, 3 RRF had fought their way through a number of enemy positions in southern Iraq. After a brief but intense sandstorm during the early part of the advance, the weather had improved to give clear skies and good visibility by about 1500 hours local time, when C Company 3RRF, with some 37 Warrior and Engineer vehicles, was reorganising. The terrain in the area was flat and featureless apart from some Iraqi defensive positions and abandoned vehicles and equipment. During the reorganisation, Royal Engineers prepared to destroy nearby Iraqi artillery pieces. When the demolition charges were about to be blown, C Company commander instructed his men to re-enter their vehicles, close hatches and move away from the gun emplacements.8 Platoon had been stationary and out of their vehicles for about 15 minutes before this order was given. As they started to comply, one Warrior, callsign 22, exploded. Another Warrior, callsign 23, immediately manoeuvred in front of callsign 22, and some crew members had just begun to move the casualties to the first aid post when callsign 23 also exploded. A -10 aircraft were seen in the area at the time of the explosions, but at first mines were suspected. Earlier during the day, two successive flights of United States Air Force (USAF) aircraft were tasked by Headquarters 1st (British) Armoured Division to attack Iraqi armour at grid reference PT6857. Subsequently, a further flight of two USAF A-10 aircraft reported for tasking to the British assistant divisional air liaison officer (DALO). His intention was that these aircraft should attack the same target as the two previous flights but there is a conflict of evidence over whether a grid reference for the target was passed from the assistant DALO to the A- 10s. The target location was over 20 km to the east of C Company 3 RRF's position at 1500 hours.
The A-10 pilots identified what they thought was the target area from a physical description given them by a departing USAF F-16 of the previous flight, and shortly afterwards saw what they thought were about 50 Iraqi T54/55 tanks and support vehicles heading north. The pilots had been told that there were no friendly forces within 10 km of their target, and these vehicles were closer than that to the point they had identified as their target. The lead aircraft made two passes, at 15,000 and 8,000 ft, to observe the vehicles with binoculars, but saw no friendly markings. Both aircraft then fired one infra-red Maverick missile from a height of about 9,000 ft, each destroying one of the vehicles, before reporting the engagement to the assistant DALO and leaving the area.
The pilots' report of 50 Iraqi vehicles differed so dramatically from earlier descriptions of the target that the assistant DALO asked them to confirm the location. The flight leader reported that the attack had taken place at grid reference PT 418518. The assistant DALO immediately realised that this position was more then20 km from the intended target and corresponded with the location of 3 RRF. He then called up a reconnaissance
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flight over the area, which reported that fluorescent air recognition panels could be seen from 6,000 ft and the type of vehicles could be identified from 14,000 ft.The board of inquiry found that 8 Platoon, C Company 3 RRF were on operations as ordered. The board also found that the air planning procedures allowing a distance of more than 15 km between the target for any air attack and friendly forces had been followed and should have been sufficient to ensure the successful and safe conduct of operations. The board further concluded that air control at corps and divisional level which provided tasking information to the A-10s was in accordance with established procedures.
The board found that 8 Platoon's vehicles were displaying correct inverted V recognition symbols and fluorescent panels. The board noted that some of the panels could have been partially obscured by open hatches or equipment, and that while a reconnaissance flight observed the panels at 6,000 ft, this was below the operating height of the A-10s. The board could not make any finding as to whether the pilots should have seen the identification panels at their operating height.
The board concluded that no blame or responsibility for the incident could be attributed to 3 RRF.
The board noted that there was a conflict of evidence between the statements of the witnesses from headquarters 1st (British) Armoured Division and those of the A-10 pilots. The assistant DALO stated that he passed the target grid reference but the A-10 pilots deny receiving this. There was no evidence to suggest that the two previous missions had attacked anything but the correct targets. On the evidence presented, the board found that no blame or responsibility should be attached to the assistant DALO.
The pilots stated that, notwithstanding the absence of a grid reference, they attacked on the basis of information passed to them by the previous flight and of their positive identification of the targets as enemy vehicles. The board noted that a USAF reconnaissance flight shortly after the Warriors were attacked was able to identify the types of vehicles from 14,000 ft. On the basis of the evidence before it, the board was unable to establish why the attacked Warrior vehicles were misidentified by the A-10 pilots as enemy T54/55 tanks, particularly in view of their previous identification runs at 8,000 and 15,000 ft. In forwarding the board's findings, the joint commander has drawn attention to the way in which aspect, weather and light conditions can critically affect a pilot's ability to identify the detail of objects on the ground.
The board did not establish whether the USAF personnel involved were at fault. It was clearly established that the USAF A-10s delivered the missiles, but the board could not establish precisely why they attacked the wrong target.
The board remarked that it was clear that all United Kingdom and USAF personnel involved were striving to achieve their individual tasks to the best of their abilities in a fast-moving battle. The board thought it inevitable that, at some stage, difficulties may arise when individuals are under such pressure. On 26 February 1991 difficulties arose in relation to the location and identification of the target, and the board concluded that only the clearest of standard operating procedures and sophisticated identification systems will help to prevent such tragedies in the future. The board recommended that a study be initiated to identify a suitable air recognition system for future use,
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confirmed the importance of standard operating procedures for the control of aircraft in offensive air support operations and recommended that they must always include instructions that a grid reference or a latitude and longitude is specifically included in mission briefs and that this is always acknowledged by pilots. The Government--and the United States Administration--wish to express their deepest sympathy and condolences to the relatives of those who died in this tragic incident.During the conflict there were a further three incidents involving friendly fire in which British service men were injured.
The first of these occurred shortly after 1100 local time on 26 February. An officer attached to 1 Staffords received shrapnel wounds when a Warrior vehicle was attacked by a Challenger tank of the Scots Dragoon Guards. Personnel from 1 Staffords were guarding prisoners of war when a Challenger tank from the Scots Dragoon Guards began to engage nearby Iraqi armoured vehicles, which later turned out to be abandoned. The tank mistakenly fired on the vehicles of 1 Staffords, hitting the Warrior, before moving off. Visibility at the time was reduced by a dust storm to about 400 m. All the Staffords' vehicles were marked with the inverted V device and carried fluorescent orange panels. The four personnel in the Warrior were unharmed, but shrapnel injured an officer who had dismounted from another vehicle. Once the mistake was realised, the Scots Dragoon Guards returned to the scene and evacuated the officer to hospital.
Another incident occurred shortly before 1100 local time on 27 February. Two personnel from the Queen's Royal Irish Hussars (QRIH) were injured when their Scorpion armoured reconnaissance vehicles were fired on by US M1 Abrams tanks. Both Scorpions were carrying the black inverted V device and visibility was good. United Kingdom and US forces had their own areas of operations and the QRIH reconnaissance section was about 2 km within its area. They had stopped to take the surrender of Iraqi troops, when one Scorpion was hit in the front by a round from a US M1 tank, firing from about 1500 m to the north. The driver escaped without injury, but a soldier walking alongside received shrapnel wounds. The other Scorpion came under tank and machine gun fire, and the soldier manning the turret-mounted machine gun also received shrapnel wounds. When the US personnel realised their mistake they assisted with the treatment of the injured British soldiers and their evacuation to hospital. The third incident also occurred on 27 February. At about 1445 local time, two soldiers from 10 Air Defence Battery, Royal Artillery received burns when two Spartan armoured vehicles from which they had dismounted were engaged by Challenger tanks from 14/20 Hussars with thermal sights beyond the range of unaided visibility (about 1500 m). In these conditions, it was not possible to identify the inverted V device carried by the vehicles. The rearmost vehicle was hit and burst into flames. The other vehicle was also damaged in the ensuing fire. The Spartan destroyed was empty and was being towed after breaking down. The Spartans had become detached from a convoy of 7th Armoured Brigade vehicles which had been delayed in getting clear of the area because of the difficult terrain.
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Sea Harrier Accident (Wentwood)
Mr. Roy Hughes : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he has now received the report of the board of inquiry following the accident involving a Royal Navy Sea Harrier in the Wentwood area of Gwent on 10 May.
Mr. Kenneth Carlisle : No. Once the board of inquiry's report has been fully completed and considered a summary of its findings will be placed in the House of Commons Library.
Mr. Anthony Pordage
Sir Eldon Griffiths : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what reason Mr. Anthony Pordage of 77 Trinity avenue, Mildenhall, has been barred from further entry to RAF Lakenheath, RAF Mildenhall and RAF Feltwell.
Mr. Archie Hamilton : My noble Friend, the Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, will write to my hon. Friend.
Helicopters
Mr. Hind : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will make a statement on his decision to award prime contractor status for the Merlin helicopter project.
Mr. Atkinson : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when he expects to announce his decision on the number of launch production EH101 helicopters his Department expects to purchase ; and if he will make a statement.
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