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after the statement made on 23 July. It ill behoves those of us who broadly support the "Options for Change" process to begin to play politics with the fortunes of one regiment as opposed to another. That does not help the debate and that is why we have told people who have made representations to us that we are not backing a particular regiment.Nevertheless, I understand the frustration and anguish expressed by so many officers. The Secretary of State has denied that the chief of staff was responsible for the dirty work. The Secretary of State admitted that it was his decision on the basis of information and advice that he received. As I understand it, the Secretary of State was also a party to the Army Board. I may be wrong so perhaps the Secretary of State can confirm the membership of that board. I believe that it comprises the three chiefs of staff and the Chief of the General Staff and that it makes recommendations. As I understand it, the Defence Ministers in this House and the one in the other place also sit on the board. It invariably has a majority of Government politicians. Am I right ? Are not the Government well represented and do they not have sufficient votes to achieve a majority if they so wish ? The board does not act as a democratic body ; it seeks to reach a consensus. However, with five political masters on the board, I imagine that it would be easy for them to achieve a consensus at least among themselves if not among the armed services.
Mr. Tom King : The hon. Gentleman is making heavy weather of this. I commend to all hon. Members the booklet entitled "The Ministry of Defence." It sets everything out clearly. It states that the Army Board comprises five Ministers--two Ministers of State, two Under-Secretaries and myself as chairman--four Army members and the second permanent under-secretary. It has four uniformed members and one senior civil servant. They are advised, and recommendations come forward from the executive committee of the Army Board. The Chief of the General Staff is chairman and these are non- ministerial board members, together with the respective assistant chiefs of staff--therefore in uniform--whom no Ministers approach.
Mr. O'Neill : I do not think that that contradicts what I have said. There is a clear Government majority on the board. At the end of the day the Government get what they want. It remains to be seen whether or not the chiefs of staff are prepared to go along with that--certainly if we are to believe what appeared in yesterday's edition of The Sunday Times . Over the years, the right hon. Gentleman has been one of the greatest defenders of national security, one of the greatest opponents of leaks, and one who has never countenanced the consideration of a leak. However, when a leak falls not into the hands of an Opposition Member but into the hands of a sympathetic newspaper it seems to be acceptable. We have not heard any criticism of the leaks or about a full search being carried out to call individuals to account. We wonder whose fingerprints are on the letter.
In defence debates we are almost in danger of forgetting the personal consequences of "Options for Change" for service men and their families-- people who will be forced out of work and into a most inhospitable economic climate in the middle of a recession with spiralling unemployment and hundreds of people chasing every job. Redundant
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soldiers are surely entitled to more than 28 days' training and their families are entitled to assurances on accommodation. We wait with interest for the next bone to be thrown by the Minister of State. The Government have been reluctant to hand over some of their housing stock to local authorities. It is some months--indeed it is almost a year--since the Secretary of State was in Devonport. The houses in Plymouth that have lain empty for some years are not yet in the public domain. So far there has been little attempt to provide assistance to local authorities or properly to fund housing associations.That is not a matter of party contention. Over the years, the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) has raised it in successive defence and services debates. We look forward to hearing clear assurances that homelessness among ex-service personnel will stop in the near future as a result of tonight's announcement. The figures that were produced today by the Rowntree Trust make it clear that the number of service personnel in irregular occupancy of services accommodation--a polite way of saying squatting, whether or not they pay rent--increased from 760 in 1986 to 1,630 in 1990. That is an increase of more than 100 per cent. in four years.
Mr. Churchill (Davyhulme) : The hon. Gentleman has spoken of the anguish involved in redundancies, both services and industrial, as a result of the defence cuts. How many tens of thousands of service personnel and defence industry employees would lose their jobs if a Labour Government were elected?
Mr. O'Neill : The numbers who will lose their jobs and the numbers who will leave the services will be determined by sensible arrangements. They will be determined by a far more caring Government than the party which presently holds office.
Mrs. Gwyneth Dunwoody (Crewe and Nantwich) : On my hon. Friend's sensible point, would he like to comment on the fact that, at present, Army families are in real difficulty? Those who are looking for accommodation are not only suffering tremendous social stress--many marriages are at risk --but they are finding it impossible to find alternative accommodation. Also, many building societies will not even offer them mortgages because they do not have jobs. The debate should be about the conditions of existing members of the forces as well as those who will be forced into that intolerable position in future.
Mr. O'Neill : We know that great assistance could be provided for service personnel. We know that support and training could be arranged very quickly. We look forward to hearing what Ministers have to say on this issue in the run-up to the general election.
Mr. Cormack : Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. O'Neill : No, I am sorry. I have five minutes left. The Secretary of State took more than an hour to make his remarks. I have given way on several occasions.
Mr. Cormack rose--
Mr. O'Neill : I am sorry, but I am not giving way any more. I am conscious of the strictures of the House, and
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other hon. Members wish to speak. The Secretary of State took a long time. I am going as fast as I can. I have given several opportunities to respond.We must provide a positive response to the initiatives of Gorbachev and Bush. We must also seek to assist in the process of inspection and verification of the reciprocal disarmament arrangements that have been announced. In particular, there must be speedy agreement to guarantee the verifiability of the removal of all sub-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons from ships and submarines. Such is the complexity of the task that work must begin immediately. Given the good will and trust now emerging, the task is not insuperable, but it has great significance for troop concentrations in the Kola peninsula and for the anxiety of people in Norway. Norway is more than preoccupied with the enormous Soviet capability on its borders. We need to know the Government's attitude to plans to replace HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid. Our amphibious capability appears to be extremely expensive to maintain. How do the Government propose to reinforce Norway if an exigency were to arise in the near future? On the wider shipbuilding front, we need clear assurances that, when the tendering process is completed and orders are placed, work will start as quickly as possible.
Mr. Cormack : Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Franks : Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. Franks : On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. About half an hour ago, the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) said that he would give way to me at the appropriate time. He has mentioned warship building, and he has also said that he hopes to finish soon. I ask you, Madam Deputy Speaker, to ask him to honour his pledge.
Madam Deputy Speaker : Order. That is not a point of order. It is almost 7 o'clock, when speeches will be limited to 10 minutes.
Mr. O'Neill : On warship building, the dependence of large communities on that work and communities beyond them, because 65 per cent. of all--
Mr. Franks rose--
Mr. O'Neill : I should like your protection, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am working against the clock. [Interruption.]
Mr. O'Neill : I mention the shipbuilding industry because it is important not only for one constituency but for other constituencies all over the country which are not even beside the sea and depend upon that industry. I make it clear that the Government's glib assurances that the Americans will continue to provide them with the technology and the means whereby they will fulfil their ambitions in respect of the tactical air-to- surface missile are doubtful, given that the American Government have abandoned support for the Boeing project. Perhaps we may hear whether there will be some support for either the French or the Martin-Marietta programmes which are still going on and how we will be able to get our nuclear air-launched systems.
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So far we have had only an introduction to the debate on this issue, but tonight's debate would not have taken place if we had had a general election-- [Interruption.] Tonight's debate would not have taken place if we had had a June election because we would not have had the White Paper and there would be no "Options for Change". The debate has clearly shown that the Government are running away from the issues and from the truth. They are refusing to provide the information that the House, the country and the armed services need if they are to have a proper debate. We shall wait until tomorrow to give the Government our opinion when I shall call on my right hon. and hon. Friends to vote in support of our amendent.7 pm
Mr. Julian Amery (Brighton, Pavilion) : Odd as it may seem, this is the first occasion on which we have been able to discuss the Gulf war which preoccupied us so much last summer. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for having put it so much on the agenda of today's debate. It was, of course, a great victory in every sense. It succeeded, it cost very little in terms of casualties, and our allies paid a large part of the financial bill, which is an important point. As a former Secretary of State for Air, I hope that it will not be taken amiss if I say that it was also an outstanding demonstration of our air power. Air power dominated the scene, punching a way through the enemy lines and pulverising the population behind the lines. It would seem a justification for the erection of a statue to "Bomber" Harris.
But what a melancholy conclusion : the ceasefire. My right hon. Friend touched on that point, but did not go into it. It was, of course, an American decision. I am only sorry that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary should have suggested in an article that it was due to air force morale. Having served in the ranks of the Royal Air Force during the war, and having been its political chief later, I do not for one moment believe that that is true. My right hon. Friend is a novelist in his spare time, so perhaps he was picking up the pen of fiction rather than of statesmanship. The failure to follow through has been disastrous and I find it difficult to understand. I cannot understand how a President of the United States, once head of the CIA, could not, in the four or five months before the final blow was struck, have prepared an Iraqi Government to take over in Baghdad. That is incomprehensible to me. Yes, it would have been a commitment, but let us consider the cost of not making that commitment.
In the first phase after the ceasefire, there was the massacre of Shias and Kurds. That has now been renewed with a second round of massacres while Saddam Hussein struts on the stage--no doubt as a hero to many young Arabs in other parts of the middle east. My right hon. Friend has produced some alarming evidence of how far Saddam Hussein's military programme has advanced in terms of missiles and unconventional equipment. Are we quite sure that we have got to the bottom of it? We could be faced with a nasty surprise if he suddenly decided to bring down the pillars of the temple.
However, the worst immediate consequence for us has been the decline in the authority of the west following the ceasefire. The Saudis have been reluctant to let the RAF or the American air force return to their bases. We have seen them making trouble about stockpiles. Syria is rearming
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--and Syria and Israel multiply the difficulties facing the peace conference. That is a sign of the decline in the authority that the west, and, above all, the Americans, enjoyed for a moment after our victory.All that provides some important lessons for the conference at Maastricht in a few weeks' time. We all know that if we are to put together the massive economic and financial interests that are represented by the European Community, which will extend if we expand the Community, it would be madness not to have some system to defend those interests. That is essential. The purpose of foreign and defence policy is to protect and to promote one's interests. The Gulf war provides us with yet another lesson. Europe's interests in the Gulf were greater than those of America, but we could not have carried out the campaign without the Americans. We must take on board the fact that it is not a question of arms or money, because we had enough arms and enough money to do it : we did not have the will. I am afraid that the Yugoslav crisis underlines that point again. Our French friends may be right when they say that the Americans will withdraw from Europe and that we must therefore become more self-reliant. They are right to point out that NATO is limited by its charter and is unable to defend our interests outside its area. However, we have a long way to go before we can think of doing without the Americans.
French defence and foreign policy is now at a crossroads. For a long time-- from de Gaulle's time onwards--the French thought that they were the jockey and that the Germans were the horse, but the horse and the jockey together took quite a fall when the hurdle--the Berlin wall--suddenly disappeared. Perhaps the lunch that Mr. Dumas gave the other day will be seen as a turning point by historians.
France should now join us in working for a global alliance of Europe, the United States and Japan. But it is not easy to put together a brand new structure when we are all busy cutting commitments, so perhaps we had better get on with what we have got. The Western European Union is still growing and, although NATO is declining, it still exists, so we had better make the best of it while we can. After all, as we should never forget, it has a Turkish wing that provides us with a window on the middle east.
In the early part of his speech, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State explained how the threat had greatly diminished as a result of events in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. Although it was not clear from the speech of the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill), I understand that the Labour party believes that we should have a bigger peace dividend because there is a much smaller threat. Since I became a Member of the House in 1950, we have taken up arms four times--in Korea, Suez, the Falklands and the Gulf. None of those campaigns was expected, so the general staffs had no plans for coping with them. We should all remember that fact and bear in mind that next time we may again be faced with the unexpected.
Another question is whether my right hon. Friend has got it right. Have we got the strength that we need ? I was a junior Minister in 1957 when we had the Duncan Sandys White Paper, when we amalgamated regiments and markedly cut the strength of our Army. Nothing would induce me to return to the agony that resulted from that amalgamation. As my right hon. Friend knows only too well, it is a painful and agonising task. I should like to make just one observation : when we cut our strength in
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1957, we were dealing with a mainly conscript Army. We are now dealing with an entirely professional Army. When we were living in the world of a conscript Army, it was not all that difficult to rebuild our Army and to fill its gaps. I am, therefore, a little unhappy when my right hon. Friend says, "It will be all right because so many of our battalions are under strength." It seems rather a criticism of his own stewardship. If we could not fill the battalions when we had a large number of men, are we sure that we shall be able to do so when we have fewer ? It is not clear to me.At the end of the day it depends on our opinion of ourselves. Do we see ourselves as a Scandinavian power in the old sense--the Swedes have changed, but previously countries such as Denmark said that they would not fight--or do we see ourselves as a purely European power or as a European power which must still have a global responsibility ? I have to ask my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State this question : putting his hand on his heart, can he say to us, "Yes, we could cope with another Falklands operation ; yes, we could cope with another Gulf operation" ? If he cannot, he had better get back to the drawing board.
7.9 pm
Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East) : It must surely have occurred to you, Madam Deputy Speaker, that there is a certain paradox in the fact that this evening's annual debate on the defence estimates is much more controversial than usual, on an occassion when it might have been thought that there was much to celebrate. In the first place, we can claim with some justification that the cold war has ended. We can certainly recognise the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the constitutional dismembering of the Soviet Union. We can celebrate the fact that there now appears to be a far greater opportunity for reductions in stocks of nuclear weapons than ever before. As the right hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Mr. Amery) hinted a moment ago, we can make proper acknowledgment of the stunning feat of arms in the Gulf. So why is it that those elements have not provided a backdrop to the debate against which we might have had an informed and responsible debate about how best to meet Britain's defence and security needs in the foreseeable future? We can obtain some illustration of why the debate has been so controversial if we examine the terms of the Select Committee's report on the defence estimates. Although the Secretary of State made a brave effort to blunt some of the criticisms, they remain formidable. The report records what the Select Committee thought of the document with which the debate deals.
In paragraph 2.1 of its report the Committee says :
"Anyone buying the White Paper' in order to discover the strategic rationale for the changes proposed would be sadly disappointed. What the White Paper' regrettably fails to do, and does not even set out to do, is to argue in any detail the rationale behind the changes proposed, or to provide a coherent strategic overview".
A little later, in paragraph 2.3, the Committee says : "There remains a yawning gap between shared perceptions of what has changed and the role of British armed forces in the new order". I cannot imagine that the Committee would have seen fit to make those judgments in the form in which they appear in the report unless it felt that they were justified.
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In many quarters there has been an over- optimistic expectation about the immediate financial savings which may be obtained from a reduction in both arms and men. In the longer term, such savings will undoubtedly be available, but in the shorter term they cannot be assumed. Lower force levels will demand better trained, better equipped and better paid regular troops. Fewer regulars will mean that reserve forces must be adequate in numbers and in their turn better trained, better equipped and better rewarded.If I may introduce a somewhat parochial note, I shall be writing to the Secretary of State about my visit to HMS Camperdown, a shore installation of the Royal Navy Reserve in Dundee. Several of my constituents are members of it. I intend to put to him some of the points that I gleaned from that visit.
The increasing sophistication of equipment must mean that the replacement of existing equipment, even at lower levels, may require proportionately greater expenditure in the short term. We should never forget that the peace dividend is peace itself. But, along with that, we can assuredly retain the objective of substantial reductions in defence expenditure. The effective end of the cold war means that we do not require to retain the same number of men and women under arms or the same levels of equipment. But, against all that, the overriding principle must be the proper funding of a defence and security policy which reflects what most acknowledge as Britain's diminished role in the world and the diminished threat to our security.
Notwithstanding what the Secretary of State said, I still believe that the Government would be well advised to institute a full-scale defence review. It would necessarily involve political judgments about the obligations and responsibilities of the United Kingdom in defence and security, both domestic and international. It would involve military judgments about how best to meet those responsibilities. Lastly, it would involve a financial judgment about the resources which would need to be found to provide the military means by which the obligations would be discharged.
Policy ought to be dictated by the outcome of such a defence review. It is legitimate to have financial aspirations and objectives as long as they are subordinate to the policy considerations that emerge after careful, rigorous and even intellectual analysis of both the actual and the potential threat.
The continuing existence of NATO for the foreseeable future is not inconsistent with my belief--nor, indeed, that of the Secretary of State, if accounts of yesterday's meeting are to be accepted--that a European defence policy will ultimately evolve in some form or another. The inevitability of that has been underlined by recent events, not least the initiative recently launched by the British and Italian Governments to which the Secretary of State referred. We should make it clear that we value and expect the continued commitment of the United States and Canada to Europe, but that equally we are aware that the level of resources which each may be able to devote to Europe is likely to fall substantially in real terms and perhaps in relative terms, too. One cannot ignore the fact that the continuing budget deficit in the United States will be a powerful consideration in that regard. There will inevitably be a need for Europe to assume a greater degree of responsibility in such matters.
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I believe that Britain should continue to have the protection of a nuclear deterrent for as long as other nations have nuclear weapons. The proposals and counter-proposals of Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev make it clear that we may be on the brink of substantial reductions in nuclear weapons, but it is important to draw a distinction between unilateral reductions and unilateral renunciation. Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev are offering the former, but I am not yet aware that they seek to offer the latter.I remain committed to the view that four submarines are necessary in order to maintain the deterrent effect of Trident at all times. But I part company with the Secretary of State--as he perhaps anticipates, because we have exchanged views on the matter many times--in his view that it is necessary that the D5 Trident system should be deployed with a total number of warheads which, if some reports are to be believed, would be three times the level of warheads on Polaris, which it is to replace.
The Secretary of State properly referred to minimum deterrence. He and I must read the same reports because he used the definition of it as the sort of deterrence that would be seen by an adversary as capable of producing unacceptable levels of destruction. That is rather a chilling phrase, but I think that we all know what it means. I cannot believe that a four-boat Trident system with the same number of warheads as Polaris would not be regarded by an adversary as capable of producing unacceptable levels of destruction.
May I briefly say--you will appreciate, Madam Deputy Speaker, that I am constrained by time--that I do not believe that there is a case for the United Kingdom to acquire a tactical air-to-surface missile with a nuclear warhead. There may be a case--I put it no more strongly than that--for the allies to have such a weapon, but I can see no justification for the United Kingdom to seek to deploy such a system.
I come to the matter of infantry battalions, with which I suspect that many of the speeches from now on will almost exclusively deal. We must maintain sufficient battalions to meet our obligations. There is increasingly strong opinion--although I accept that the Secretary of State has a case to make against it--that a reduction in the Army to a force of 116,000 will not permit us to maintain our infantry battalions at the necessary level. Some Members will argue later the case for the Scottish regiments on geographical or even sentimental grounds. I do not discount the power of such things in the minds of many people, but the real argument, which the Secretary of State has been unable so far successfully to challenge, is that seven infantry battalions for Scotland are necessary to ensure that the obligations that are likely to be placed on the British Army can be discharged. I make one final plea for the 15th Para TA battalion. It is absolute nonsense to suggest that Scotland should have no parachute unit whatever, whether territorial or regular. The Secretary of State should take that away and think about it again.
7.20 pm
Mr. Michael Mates (Hampshire, East) : The White Paper appeared on 9 July and the Secretary of State courteously and promptly came to see the Select Committee the next day. We agreed our report on 24 July, the day after the publication of the detailed proposals on the Army. The Committee will examine those proposals in
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the greatest detail in the coming weeks. I hope that my right hon. Friend will give information on how the decisions were reached, even if some of it must be in confidence. I have not had a chance to consult my colleagues about this, but I am sure that I speak for them when I say that we shall want to know how these highly controversial decisions were reached. I hope that there will not be a quarrel about this.From a substantial report I shall draw just three points to the attention of the House, in particular to the attention of my right hon. Friend. First, there is a need for a thorough review of the social security rules as they apply to service personnel and their families. In particular, there is a need for an urgent review of the decision not to make retrospective the waiver of the residence qualification for severe disablement allowance. That would leave unqualified to receive the allowance severely disabled personnel and their dependants who have served for long periods abroad. That cannot be right.
My second point concerns the value of laying down basic principles under which the Ministry of Defence and the services carry out humanitarian work, so that the rather unhappy episode of contracting out Royal Engineers to clear mines in Kuwait will not be repeated. Thirdly, there is a need for an on-going programme of base closures and reductions to be properly conducted, and for announcements to be accompanied with details of costs and savings. That cannot be said to be a description of how the naval support review was conducted. When announcements were made, they were by barely informative written answers. From figures now provided it is clear that annual savings from the measures proposed so far are minimal and will run at about only £30 to £40 million a year. That is nowhere near the sort of sums that we were led to believe were being sought. Further announcements are obviously pending and the House and its Committees are entitled to proper facts and figures.
In July the Committee also completed its work on the preliminary lessons of Operation Granby, which was published as our tenth report. As we record, we made two highly informative visits to the Gulf in November and March. As we also record, the principal lesson was the overriding value of the skill, dedication and courage of individual service men and women. To that I would add their versatility and flexibility.
As our report sets out to be no more than a preliminary survey, we must advise caution against leaping to conclusions. I would now emphasise only three points while commending the report to the House. The first is the crucial contribution made by years of NATO training and exercising. The war was won primarily by NATO forces operating NATO procedures. The second is the need for thorough examination of the way in which reserve forces were and were not used. The Committee called for several specific points to be addressed in the current working up of proposals for the future of reserve forces and I hope that they will be, before my right hon. Friend announces his conclusions. The third point is the significance of the degree of dependence on non-United Kingdom ships and aircraft for transporting stores to the Gulf and back--a subject which has often been raised. That must be explicitly addressed by the Ministry of Defence in its analysis of Granby, as the Committee recommends.
In our fourth report we published a generally favourable overview of six major projects on which we had already published detailed reports earlier in this
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Parliament. That is a demonstration of our determination to maintain a continuing watching brief over the Ministry's procurement performance and to show that we are not always being critical. Our seventh report continued our scrutiny of MOD's procurement of helicopters, particularly of the EH101 Merlin. Since we reported, MOD has awarded a prime contract to IBM/Westland, and a first production batch of 44 is now expected. I am sure that we all welcome the award and hope that the steps towards full production can now be hastened. I have, however, two points which I hope that the Minister will feel able to answer at the end of the debate, because they will be of some general interest.First, the Government's helpful reply to our report, which we published today, refers in several places to changes to the aircraft from the capabilities specified in the original staff requirement, in addition to the decision to reduce the original reliability and maintainability requirements. What are these principal changes and what in broad terms will they mean for Merlin's capabilities? Secondly, we warned at paragraph 54 that
"It would not be sensible for MoD to keep within its budgeted overall cost by artificially reducing the number of helicopters to be ordered."
Several officials told us that the changes in the size of the surface fleet would not affect orders. In February one official told us that :
"The numbers are really not reducible."
Yet the Government's reply refers to 44 being enough to introduce Merlins on
"type 23 frigates and one carrier".
Does that mean that type 22 frigates will not carry Merlin as originally envisaged? Why have the numbers fallen from 50 to 44? That is a quick gallop through some Select Committee points as I am caught by the 10-minute speech limit. I shall now make some remarks on my own behalf.
My right hon. Friend faces difficulties with "Options for Change". First, we should put the "Options for Change" argument, particularly that about infantry battalions, into perspective. It is at the margin of huge changes that have taken place in all three services. Because it is at the margin I hope that my right hon. Friend will have a little room for manoeuvre. It is not as if we are saying that he should restore all the Navy cuts or all the RAF squadrons that are to be reduced for the reasons which have been examined and found to be, broadly speaking, acceptable. We are simply asking whether we have got the reduction in the number of infantry battalions right, given our commitments and the fact that the present size of the corps of infantry is and has been in the past years thoroughly overstretched in carrying out those commitments. That has had an effect on recruiting, retention, morale and all the other aspects which are so crucial to the well being of the infantry.
It would not be right for me as Chairman of the Select Committee to enter into the various arguments about individual battalions. Of course the Scots are upset, as are the Cheshires, the Staffords and others, but there are others who may not have articulated their upset so loudly--the Royal Anglians, the Queen's and my county regiment of Hampshire. If we focus the debate just on that, we shall probably not get the right answer. The important question to ask is whether 38 infantry battalions are
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enough to do the job. In July I put that specific question to the Secretary of State and he gave me the specific answer that the Army Board was content that that number was enough and could give the advice that had been demanded.It is extraordinary that 15 months ago when the initial figures for "Options for Change" were issued the answer--it could only have been a guess--was 116,000 for the Army. Since then, look what has happened. There have been lessons, but not one figure has changed. I beg the Secretary of State to reconsider, not the individual regiments, which are rightly a matter for the executive committee of the Army Board, but the numbers. I beg him perhaps to consider the lessons of Granby and the fact that there will be much more overstretch just to maintain the commitments in Northern Ireland, Belize and Cyprus, or else to say that we cannot manage Belize and Cyprus any more. That is an option which would make a certain amount of sense of the present cuts.
I beg him to reconsider the figures and to return to his remarks that the cuts are not Treasury-led. If they are not Treasury-led but are Defence- led, a good look, as we tried to take in our report, at the commitments dispassionately--not looking at Scotland or anywhere else--should tell my right hon. Friend, as it has told me and all my colleagues, that we shall run a bit short, that the proposal is a bit tight and that we shall have difficulty in managing all our commitments with the proposed arrangements. Therefore, I ask him to make a small change at the edge of the whole panoply of "Options for Change" which would not only allow the infantry to breathe a little more comfortably and inevitably help with morale, recruiting and so on, but would turn away some of the anger which is naturally coming from some of my hon. Friends whose counties, regiments and their histories are being affected.
7.30 pm
Dr. John Gilbert (Dudley, East) : I congratulate the hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) who, in the latter half of his speech, made many points with which I agreed, and I am grateful to him for making them.
When the Secretary of State was describing developments in the Soviet Union --and I appreciate that he was under pressure of time--he mentioned the acceleration in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the former allied territories in eastern and central Europe. There were many other matters, some positive and some negative, that he did not mention, but which are of some significance. One of the more positive matters is that those forces may now be taken further east than was originally intended. It is possible that they will end up not just east of the Polish-Ukrainian border, but east of the border between the republic of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. That leads to many questions. Will there be any central forces for the former Soviet Union? We know that there will be a Ukrainian army and that Ukraine has declared its independence. If it is to have its own armed forces, sovereign and independent, will they be stationed to defend all of Ukraine's borders? Will they be stationed on the border between the Ukraine and the Russian Federation? Will they be facing east?
What will happen to the non-nuclear central assets of the former Soviet Union? What will happen to the Black sea fleet? Apparently, the Ukrainians are saying privately that they will have the Black sea fleet. They certainly have the only serviceable port from which the Black sea fleet can
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operate. However, the Russian Federation may take a different view, and it is in that context that Mr. Yeltsin has spoken of restoring previous boundaries between the republic of Ukraine and the Russian Federation. If the assets of the Black sea fleet are to be broken up, presumably the new republic of Georgia will want to have a say in the disposition.Many other questions need to be answered in determining British defence strategy. Will the Vilnius area be demobilised? Is that enclave of the former Soviet Union now wholly cut off from the rest of the territory of the Soviet Union? I take it that it is now a part of the Russian Federation. It used to contain important bases for the Baltic fleet, but reports now suggest that the Vilnius area will be demobilised.
How much will the individual republics be prepared to pay towards the maintenance of a central defence capability? Of course, all such contributions will have to come on top of the costs to them of maintaining their new, sovereign, national forces. What will be the attitude of the republics to the CFE process--something to which they were not party? The Secretary of State said nothing about that. It is possible that the results of the CFE process will be in jeopardy because of developments within the Soviet Union.
For once, I can say that in the previous defence debate I predicted something that appears to be coming true. I always thought it possible that on the territory of the former Soviet Union more than one nuclear-capable, sovereign state would emerge. It appears that, at the very least, there may be three or more. The Ukraine says that eventually it wants to be nuclear free, but that for the time being it wants to keep nuclear weapons on its territory and have a say in how they will be used. Kazakhstan has said unambiguously that it wants to keep the weapons and have title to them. It does not want to share control. We do not yet know what the attitude of the authorities in Belorussiya will be to nuclear weapons on their territory.
Lest anyone thinks that those are minor matters, I should add that only last week the Moscow press published a report of a secret analysis by the KGB of its concern about where future control arrangements for nuclear weapons on the territory of the Soviet Union would reside. Those are matters of the very greatest concern to us all. It is one reason why, I regret to say, we should not lower our guard. Of course, the reductions in the nuclear inventories that President Bush announced are very helpful, and the response of President Gorbachev is equally helpful. I always thought that negotiations and haggling over nuclear inventories and the attempts to achieve parity over the range of individual weapons systems were a waste of time. It has always been my view that either of the super-powers could unilaterally reduce its inventories of nuclear warheads by about 80 per cent. without any loss of individual security--and that is still my view. I am glad to say that, at least in this part of my speech, I can endorse the Government's policy of maintaining a strategic nuclear capability with the Trident system--
Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline, West) : Four boats.
Dr. Gilbert : Yes, four boats. We shall also need one air launch system. Having seen some of the developments in Washington recently, I think that we will need to make a decision quickly on whether to go along with an
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Anglo-French system. I hope that the Minister will answer that question when he replies to the debate. I do not dissent from the decision to eliminate the nuclear depth bombs, but I should be interested to know how we will take out submarines of the Typhoon or Oscar classes without the assistance of nuclear depth bombs. Possibly more important than the developments in the former Soviet Union is the continuing expansion of ballistic missile capability in other countries, and especially--although not exclusively--in the middle east. I want briefly to touch on the missile technology control regime--the MTCR-- because it is potentially--and I emphasise "potentially"--one of the most healthy developments for us all. My briefing from our admirable Library shows that India, Israel, Saudi Arabia and North Korea are maintaining their programmes and their momentum. It was thought that several other countries were dropping theirs, including Argentina and South Korea. However, I read recently that both Syria and Iran intend to acquire a new manufacturing capability for much longer-range ballistic missiles than they currently possess. It is imperative that the MTCR is widened and better enforced. Of course, it is not a treaty, and I should be grateful if the Minister could tell me whether that is because of Trident. Is it true that if the MTCR were a treaty, we would no longer be able to receive Trident missile technology or the missiles themselves from the United States?I wish to raise only one other matter, and it is something on which I dissent from the remarks of the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North- East (Mr. Campbell). I do not envisage in the foreseeable future, and nor would I recommend to the House, the development of a unified defence capability, let alone unified defence decision-making with the countries of the European Community. When we look at the history of the past few years-- the Falklands, Iraq, and Yugoslavia--we should consider ourselves fortunate that the House was capable of taking sovereign decisions without having to consult the other countries of Europe--such as Belgium, which would not sell us its ammunition, and Germany, which said that we should send our troops but it would not send its own forces.
The way ahead is through defence procurement. In that way, we can achieve better efficiency at lower cost, and without having to subordinate our decision-making powers that, I am glad to say, repose in this House.
7.40 pm
Sir Ian Stewart (Hertfordshire, North) : I am particularly glad to follow the right hon. Member for Dudley, East (Dr. Gilbert) in his concluding remarks, in which he made several important points. He referred also to the rapidly changing background against which the decisions that we are debating today must be taken. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and his Ministers, and the Army Board in particular, had many extremely difficult decisions to take, and I do not envy them the task that confronted them.
The hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) said that this debate was abnormal in that it lacked any references to Opposition defence policies. However, it is fair to remember that the great reduction in tension between the east and the west and the collapse of the Warsaw pact would not have occurred had we listened to
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the continued advocacy of the Labour party and of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament to abandon Britain's nuclear capability and to avoid the disposition of cruise missiles in this country- -which gave a lead to the rest of Europe and undoubtedly contributed directly to the Soviet Union's acceptance that the arms race was one that it could never win, and that the deterrents we were able to keep in place were something that it could never outbid. Had it not been for the British Government's resolve under a Conservative leadership, we might well not have had the debate that we are having now. It is not surprising that the Army has been chief among the concerns of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, because both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force have a unified structure, and the regimental system has aroused particular concern and the emotions of right hon. and hon. Members--not least because of geographical associations and historical loyalties that regiments carry with them.It is right that the regimental system is to be preserved. Even if reductions must be made, we ought to remember that the regimental system is the bedrock of the Army. It is unique to the British Army, and is one of the factors that make it more efficient, effective, dedicated, and exceptionally successful than any other army in the western world. That is something of which we can be proud. I will illustrate the difficulties that confront my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State in a way that I hope will allow me also to bend his ear. My Hertfordshire constituency comes within the area of the Royal Anglian Regiment, which is being reduced from three battalions to two. However, the Royal Anglians must still cover no fewer than nine separate counties--Hertfordshire, Bedfordshire, Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk, Cambridgeshire, Northamptonshire, Leicestershire, and Lincolnshire. I hope that my right hon. Friend will at least feel able to retain the Royal Anglians' three voluntary battalions. Even in areas where recruitment has not been so good, there is nevertheless a tremendous reservoir of available reserves, which can be an important element in maintaining overall potential numbers at a time when the number of regular battalions is being reduced. My other particular example is that of the Royal Scots, and not just because it is my son's regiment. The Royal Scots is the oldest infantry regiment in the British Army. Is such an institution simply to be allowed to disappear? It is difficult to understand, on the basis of recruitment and retention, how a regiment of that kind and distinction can be selected for amalgamation. If there is to be any reconsideration and reprieves, I hope that the Royal Scots will be number one on the list. I trust that, at the very least, it will be able to retain its name and its title as a royal regiment, and not lose them in some wishy -washy general phrase, to apply to the Royal Scots and to the King's Own Scottish Borderers--two very proud and ancient Scottish regiments.
I mentioned those two regiments not only because of my own interest in them but because they illustrate part of the remaining task that lies before my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and his colleagues--to treat with the utmost sensitivity the issues raised by many of my right hon. and hon. Friends about regiments in their own areas.
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It is the attachment of geographical loyalties to recruitment, and to performance in situations of war, that has given the British Army its tremendous flexibility and success. We have seen that time and again.My right hon. Friend will have to make his decisions about overall numbers on a gradual basis. He cannot take a decision today and say that it will be absolutely right for an indefinite number of years ahead. We do not know what developments are to come in Europe--let alone in the whole of the middle east and in other parts of the world. We do not know what will be the reactions of our allies and of our colleagues in the coalition forces in the Gulf. We do not know what lies ahead for those who might be alongside our forces in any joint action to which our country may contribute.
I hope that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will judge matters as they progress, and that it will be seen as a sign of strength on his part, not of weakness, if he finds, in the light of circumstances, that changes should be made. My right hon. Friend said that he will keep his decisions and plans under review, and that adjustments could be made if need be. I hope that that commitment means exactly what it seems.
I hope also that we will be able to maintain the commitments that have been made even with the Army's lower numbers. I share my right hon. Friend's anxieties about Northern Ireland--not in respect of overall numbers, but on the frequency with which particular regiments may be sent to serve in the Province. The Northern Ireland commitment is a major part of the British Army's overall commitment. When I visited Berlin a few years ago, I found that the three battalions there regarded their time in Berlin as a period of training and recuperation. That commitment is to go, and may be substituted by one that is much more demanding. We must be concerned all the time about the danger of overstretching our forces.
I entirely agree with the right hon. Member for Dudley, East that it is essential to maintain our individual voice and decision-making ability in the commitment of our forces. I cannot imagine the circumstances in which all the members of the European
Community--whose national interests in respect of foreign affairs often differ materially, and whose defence interests differ even more--are likely, in the emergency circumstances that usually trigger the need for military operations, to come to a rapid, decisive, clear-cut, and effective decision. It is not that I resent the European Community ; it is in many respects a most useful body. However, it is totally unsuitable for the purposes of defence. The idea of putting military decisions through the EC process of endless horse trading goes against all practical considerations of military success.
I hope that we shall play a continuing role in Europe, in the United Nations and in any informal groupings of nations that come together for defence and military purposes. I hope that we shall not be ashamed of playing a leading if not necessarily a dominant role. Very often the actions of the British armed forces and the decisions of the British Government have stimulated others to follow our example and thus make international activity effective.
7.49 pm
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