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House of Commons
Friday 22 November 1991
The House met at half-past Nine o'clock
PRAYERS
[Mr. Speaker-- in the Chair ]
Nuclear Defence
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.-- [Mr. Greg Knight.]
9.34 am
The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. Tom King) : I welcome this opportunity to discuss nuclear defence at a time of tremendous change in the world, when the end of the cold war has come and with it the end of the nuclear stalemate and confrontation that have marked the past 45 years. The background to today's debate is the progressive assessment that the Government have been making of defence policy, in which we have taken decisions on our new strategy and structure across a wide range of defence issues.
On 25 July last year I set out our "Options for Change", the broad proposals for a new structure of our armed forces and defences. As soon as the Gulf war had ended, we proceeded actively with our NATO allies to determine the future NATO strategy and structure, out of which emerged the important role for the United Kingdom of the leadership of and significant contribution to the rapid reaction corps. That was announced on 25 May this year.
On 4 June I was able to confirm the future size of the British Army. On 10 July we published the "Statement on the Defence Estimates" and the 1991 White Paper, "Britain's Defence for the 90s". On 23 July we published "Britain's Army for the 90s".
In these ways we set out clearly for the country the future strategy and structure of our defences. That is in line with our duty to our country and to our allies and service men, so that they know where they stand. We particularly dealt with the conventional forces, but this morning is an opportunity to deal with the nuclear aspects of our defences. It is entirely appropriate that we should set out the Government's view on what future strategy should be.
This morning is also a chance, which I am sure will be welcomed, for hon. Members of other parties to set out their policies on these important matters. They should be clearly set out for the country and for the services, who are keenly interested, with an election not many months away, to know what they are. Every party has a duty clearly to set out where it stands on these issues. The House looks forward with interest to hearing hon. Members from other parties.
Mr. Andrew F. Bennett (Denton and Reddish) : The Secretary of State will be well aware that at the end of questions on the Prime Minister's statement reporting on the NATO summit he talked about the modernisation of Polaris. Will the right hon. Gentleman give us a little information about that, because it certainly surprised most hon. Members that day? Most of us were puzzled about what he might have been referring to.
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Mr. King : I shall be talking about our modernisation programme in some detail and I shall certainly refer to what emerged from the NATO summit.
We have reached agreements on conventional forces. The START agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union has moved further with an agreement to a reduction of one third in the strategic missile arsenals of the two super-powers.
It is worth reminding the House that those negotiations involved 10 years of hard, laborious work. At times, it seemed that no progress would be made, but they have resulted in a one third reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals.
Given the recent changes in the world, we have seen even more dramatic developments. Significant decisions have been made to reduce the nuclear arsenal and further proposals are imminent. I know that the House will welcome that. On 27 September, President Bush and my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister announced the latest western initiative that proposes the total elimination of nuclear artillery shells and short-range ballistic warheads. They also proposed major changes in the strategic nuclear arsenal that go way beyond what was achieved by the 10 years of laborious work in the START negotiations. I am sure that the House welcomes the positive response from President Gorbachev, who also proposed significant changes. All that is encouraging.
Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North) : Does the right hon. Gentleman concede that the announcements made by President Bush in September and October were equivalent to a unilateral declaration of a reduction in strategic arms? That met with an immediate response from the Soviet Union, which has made an equal reduction in its strategic arms.
Mr. King : I did not hear the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question ; will he repeat it please?
Mr. Corbyn : At the end of September, President Bush announced what was, in effect, a unilateral reduction in strategic arms, which received an equal response from the Soviet Union some days later.
Mr. King : The announcement from President Bush meant that there would be a standing down from the alert state and certain changes in the carrying of maritime tactical nuclear weapons. The other measures he proposed were bilateral and President Gorbachev also proposed bilateral measures, dependent upon a response from the other side. Encouraging progress has been made, but we are now faced with a different, serious problem--the virtual end of the Soviet Union and its centralised power as we have understood it. The Soviet Union, whatever the structure and the position in the individual republics, still has armed forces of 3 million and a nuclear arsenal of 27,000 weapons. The control exercised over that great arsenal is of immediate concern. It is a matter of great concern to President Bush and to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, who, as chairman of the G7, visited Moscow and put pressure on President Gorbachev and President Yeltsin. That concern was also reflected in the NATO summit communique of 8 November, which stated :
"We therefore welcome the intention of the Soviet leadership to ensure the safe, responsible and reliable control of these weapons under a single authority."
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That communique addressed a particular problem--the difficulty of maintaining that central control by a single authority when power is moving increasingly to the republics.It is interesting to note the location of the strategic ballistic missile warheads. The territories that now have the largest number of strategic ballistic missile warheads are as follows : the United States has the largest amount, Russia comes second, the Ukraine comes third, Kazakhstan comes fourth, France comes fifth, the United Kingdom comes sixth, Byelorussia comes seventh and China, eighth. I set out the information in that manner because it is not equivalent to casual geographic facts any more ; that information is of potential political significance in the future.
Mr. Dick Douglas (Dunfermline, West) : The Secretary of State has rightly drawn attention to the decentralised location of the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. What does he know about the continued centralised control of the permissible action link for those particular weapons? That is of vital importance to any discussions that take place.
Mr. King : The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to raise that important question and I shall refer to it later.
The present situation is extremely confused. In a recent interview reported in Der Spiegel, President Yeltsin emphasised the direction in which the republics have moved. He said :
"We have nothing against Russia and the Union exercising control jointly a new control mechanism should be created which will not permit anybody to press the button alone."
The situation is equally confused in the Ukraine. For some time that republic has sought to establish itself as a nuclear-free zone. When the nuclear weapons were the property of the Soviet Union, the republic wanted to get rid of them. However, the Ukraine is not nearly so enthusiastic now about any early transfer of weapons to Russia, its neighbouring republic. It is much more concerned that there should be bilateral or multilateral inter-republic destruction of the nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union.
Against that confused background, we have been extremely anxious to seek to establish that the control systems have adequate and proper safeguards. That is of particular importance at a time of great political instability. The Soviet authorities have made available to us a great deal of information and advice on the technical nature of their systems and the way in which they are controlled. We are considerably reassured by the good technical control systems that exist and the protections built into them. I cannot go into detail on the point raised by the hon. Member for Dunfermline, West (Mr. Douglas), but I can assure him that we have considered that matter closely. We have sought information about control of the codes and an assurance that they cannot be operated through unilateral action, but that it would require an interlock capability which is in a number of different hands.
Mr. Paul Flynn (Newport, West) : How reassured or worried is the Secretary of State by the attitude of the president of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nazarbayev, who has made
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it clear that he will not give up the 100 SS18 weapons on his soil and that he will use them as a bargaining chip with Moscow to achieve full independence? Surely none of us can find that reassuring. Most of us find it deeply alarming.Mr. King : I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman is correct in his assessment. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement has had recent discussions with President Nazarbayev, who said that he did not want those weapons retained on his soil. However, this is a fast-moving and confused situation, for the very reasons that I have given. That confusion is typified by the situation in the Ukraine. When it sought independence it also sought to see itself as a nuclear-free zone. However, in the temporary confused situation, that republic now understands that things are not quite the same. It wants the elimination of nuclear weapons, but it does not want that to serve to its disadvantage against a neighbouring republic. One must keep a close eye on developments. It is important to determine the quality of the physical safeguards of the nuclear stores. There is no question but that they are impressive in terms of anti-intruder devices, the fencing, their location and physical guarding. In the final analysis, the quality of that protection is dependent upon the loyalty, responsibility and commitment of those guarding those stores. Elite forces have that job in the Soviet Union, but what will happen if they are not fed or paid and are seemingly abandoned by their authority? That has not happened, but it is a risk. The breakdown of central authority will pose some major problems and we are right to be properly concerned about that issue. We will have to remain concerned--the House will understand that--for some considerable time.
The quantities involved are vast, and the problems of making safe or destroying such a huge arsenal will take time to overcome. That is part of the background against which we assess the current situation and review our own nuclear strategy.
The second important aspect was recently highlighted by the conflict with Iraq. I refer to the dangers posed by nuclear proliferation elsewhere in the world. We know of 15 countries that now have a ballistic missile capability, and believe that the figure will soon rise to 20, including Pakistan, India, Libya, Iraq and Iran. Developments in Iraq gave a clear warning that a number of countries have nuclear programmes that could have military potential.
We know from investigations being undertaken at this very minute in Iraq under United Nations authority--in which British personnel are involved in identifying and discovering every aspect of that country's nuclear, chemical and biological programme--that Saddam Hussein was on the way to developing a nuclear explosive device, albeit it crude, by 1993.
Mr. Flynn : Did the Secretary of State say that the Government know of 20 countries that have ballistic missiles? Yesterday, in replying to my question asking for details of all the countries possessing ballistic missiles, the right hon. Gentleman listed 30.
Mr. King : I am always conservative in the figures that I give the House. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for emphasising my point that nuclear capability is spreading widely, and behind it is the sinister development of increasing covert nuclear programmes with military potential.
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That is the background against which defence planners must work. We must consider capability and intentions. It is clear that whatever may be the Soviet Union's intentions, it will retain a massive nuclear capability that will require stringent security, and which could remain a threat for many years. I emphasise again the risk that confronts us in terms of the scale of that capability and the time needed to deal with it.In our assessments for the future, another serious threat that we take into account are the atomic cities within the Soviet Union--about which some right hon. and hon. Members may have read newspaper reports--where there have been concentrations of scientists working on different programmes. There are also armament cities. They were a feature of the Soviet Union's structure of centralised authority, having been established in somewhat isolated locations, enclosed and protected from the surrounding community.
Because those cities come under the direct authority and responsibility of Soviet ministries that have been or are being abolished, they may soon lack the resources that they need--so there is concern about the future destination of personnel whose particular skills and capabilities might be very much in demand in other parts of the world.
I am putting before the House an honest assessment of the risks that we face and against which we must plan our strategy. The House will understand why I drew attention to that latter point.
Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan) : We all share the Secretary of State's concerns, because they relate to matters of fact, not opinion. However, in his reference to ballistics capability, the right hon. Gentleman was in danger of confusing the ability to deliver with the ability to manufacture a warhead that could be attached to a missile. The two are not necessarily the same. Can the Secretary of State say how many of the countries concerned are capable of producing on their own account a complete ballistic missile system? If countries have to import components or adapt existing civilian technologies for that purpose, surely we must also seek to control technical co-operation and sales--an aspect about which, in the recent past, the Government were incredibly careless. In fact, the Minister of State for Defence Procurement, in seeking in a previous incarnation to export or die, may have caused that option to be reversed.
Mr. King : That is quite wrong. The hon. Gentleman seeks to make a political and unfair point. He knows perfectly well that certain countries are prepared to sell missile technology, including the People's Republic of China and North Korea, which contributed significantly to Iraq's nuclear capabilities. We tend to find an interaction between imported technology and local development. Our investigators in Iraq were impressed by the calibre and quality of the domestic research and development capabilities developed under Saddam Hussein.
I set out as clearly as I could the background against which we must assess our new approach. We draw first on the agreements reached with our allies in NATO, which unveiled its new strategic concept at the Rome summit on 7 and 8 November. Its most important conclusion was :
"the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a significantly reduced level."
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The allies clarified the make-up of the nuclear forces required : "The supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States ; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Alliance." The concept document added that the allies"will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link."
Those three statements will remain the essential guiding principles of NATO and of our defence policies for the foreseeable future. It is not that NATO, in making those statements, is standing still--far from it. At the meeting of the nuclear planning group in Taormina, which I attended last month, it was agreed that all ground-launched, sub-strategic systems will be eliminated. That means no more Lance-type systems or nuclear artillery. Air-delivered weapons will be greatly reduced and there will be an 80 per cent. total reduction in NATO's sub-strategic stockpile in Europe. If one takes into account the reductions of the past decade, at the end of that process--which we will complete as quickly as we can--we shall have one tenth of the nuclear weapons in our sub-strategic stockpile that we had 10 years ago, which is a significant development. I made it clear on behalf of the United Kingdom that, in normal circumstances, no weapons will be deployed on surface vessels. The United Kingdom will play its full part in effecting those changes. What does all that mean for our deterrent forces? I make absolutely clear the Government's commitment to Trident as Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent force for the 1990s and beyond. I emphasise the words "and beyond." We are drawing towards the end of the Polaris programme, which began in the early 1960s, and which brought the first patrols in 1968. By the time that Polaris is phased out, it will have given some 30 years' service to our country.
The Trident programme is on course, and there have been significant reductions in costs since the original budgets were made. Nearly £2 billion has now been saved. The first Trident boat will be launched early next year and will be in service in the mid-1990s. A third Vanguard class boat was ordered last November ; a tender for the fourth boat is currently being scrutinised and, subject to a successful analysis, we shall proceed with the project, thus ensuring that we can maintain and guarantee the effectiveness of our Trident nuclear deterrent.
Mr. O'Neill : May I return to the subject of the Prime Minister's statement about the modernisation of Polaris? Are we to take it that the Prime Minister was actually referring to the Trident programme, and that "Polaris" was merely a slip of the tongue?
Mr. King : I did not notice that. I expect that my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces will be pleased to clarify the matter.
Mr. Cecil Franks (Barrow and Furness) : Can my right hon. Friend confirm that the long-lead orders for the fourth submarine are already in place and that the initial work is already in progress?
Mr. King : I can confirm that, yes.
There have been questions about the number of submarines and the missile load that Trident should carry,
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and it has been suggested that we should reduce the programme. To reduce either the number of submarines or the missile load would be the silliest possible economy, for Trident would then no longer be an effective and credible deterrent.The constant availability of the Trident nuclear deterrent must be guaranteed absolutely. There must always be one submarine on patrol : that must be the minimum requirement of our minimum nuclear deterrent. Trident must also be able to carry a missile load that is capable of matching modern defences and of threatening an aggressor with unacceptable damage. That is the key requirement ; without such a capability, Trident cannot be a credible deterrent. Nothing would be more foolish and deceitful than to pretend, for the sake of political convenience, to possess a deterrent that had been so undermined and reduced that it did not actually work.
Dr. John Reid (Motherwell, North) : Before the Secretary of State works himself up to make an attack on the Labour party, will he clarify the question of the credible deterrent? If, to be "credible" in the next couple of years, Trident must have two and a half times the power of Polaris, the clear implication is that Polaris cannot itself be credible.
Mr. King : I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman, who takes a close interest in the subject, is not well aware of the answer to his question. The reason is the progressive enhancement and the growing sophistication of defence systems. The assessments of which I speak are not changed two weeks later, and then revised again in a month's time. We must make our plans against an uncertain background ; such plans cannot be implemented overnight, but must be introduced progressively and must then last for a long time. They must cover all eventualities for the next 30 years. That is what Polaris has done and we must ensure that it retains the capability to match possible future developments.
We shall be making a substantial reduction in the coming years, as part of the cut in NATO's air-delivered stockpile that I have already announced. However, we expect a small number of air-delivered weapons to continue to play an important deterrent role. I must emphasise the importance of the sub-strategic element. Trident, of course, is the ultimate guarantee of our security, but a sub-strategic option is also important.
I have already mentioned the risk of proliferation. An aggressor with a limited nuclear capability might think that he could get away with, possibly, the local use of nuclear weapons, without having to face the apparently unrealistic prospect of a total strategic nuclear reply. The sub -strategic option closes that loophole, depriving such aggressors of the opportunity to act on the belief that the United Kingdom will not respond and that, faced with nuclear escalation on such a scale, it no longer possesses a credible deterrent. The French already have a stand-off missile. The Soviets have at least three and the Americans have a range of sub-strategic options, in particular air-launched and sea-based cruise missiles. As we reduce the number of weapons, we must consider their eventual replacement : as
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NATO has agreed, we must keep our sub- strategic capability up to date. The capability of delivery must also be part of any credible sub-strategic response.Mr. Bob Cryer (Bradford, South) : The nuclear non-proliferation treaty has been signed by 138 countries, including Canada. If, as the right hon. Gentleman says, it is vital for the United Kingdom to have nuclear weapons, why is it not vital for those other countries to have them?
Mr. King : As the hon. Gentleman knows, two of the objectives of that treaty are to ensure the peaceful development of nuclear power and to enable countries to take advantage of that while undertaking not to divert such knowledge and assistance as they have towards military ends. Of course, another objective is a reduction in nuclear capability. I have already mentioned the agreement reached by the nuclear planning group, which will reduce to a tenth of the previous level the number of sub- strategic nuclear warheads in Europe. Even after the strategic arms reduction talks and the further reductions envisaged by President Gorbachev, the Soviet Union will have about 20 times more strategic ballistic missiles than the United Kingdom can deploy. There is also the worrying risk of proliferation to other countries. We must therefore ensure that we maintain our nuclear capability. Moreover, our determination in that regard is of vital interest to the 30,000 people who work in the nuclear programme. Constituents of my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Franks) make a significant contribution.
Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood) : Within what time scale will it be necessary for the United Kingdom to acquire a stand-off air-launched sub-strategic capability? Given the enhancement of defences, that must be increasingly important. Will my right hon. Friend also outline the basis on which systems are being evaluated and choices are being made?
Mr. King : My hon. Friend knows that we are looking closely at this issue. I can go no further than to say that we recognise that a replacement will be needed. The Government, in particular my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement, are looking at alternative options.
The background against which we have set out our programme is clear. The starkness of the uncertainties that we face in the world and the real difficulties that the ending of the cold war is bringing make it very important that this country and our allies should make it absolutely clear to any potential aggressors where we stand on nuclear matters.
It is also important that it should be understood that this country adopts a consistent and relevant approach to nuclear matters. It is what our allies are looking for and are entitled to expect. A NATO summit communique has just been published. I understand that all the parties support NATO. I hope that they support NATO policies as well. These welcome changes have resulted from clear policies and resolution and have led to huge improvements.
We were faced with a very muddled position in the 1980s. There were so many siren voices opposing the firm and clear policies that we adopted at that time. I refer to the members of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the ladies of Greenham Common and so many Labour
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Members. Where are they now? Are they, like Erich Honecker and Egon Krenz, figures that have passed from the scenes of history? Where do they now stand? Some of them are still here. I am grateful that the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) is with us today. He is not a tall man, but he has a stature on the Opposition Benches --in terms of the real voices within the Labour party that he represents-- that is considerably greater than that of some of those seated in front of him.It is significant to note that three quarters of the Labour Members who are standing again at the next election have a clear anti-nuclear background. When one looks at the reinforcements seeking to come to the House--for example, in the shape of Bruce Kent, chosen as an official Labour party candidate--one sees that the idea that the Labour party is a pro-nuclear and strong NATO-supporting party is unrealistic. I suspect that it is not just on this side of the House that there are many hon. Members who hope deeply that Bruce Kent will not get there. I just wonder how many of those who sit on the Opposition Benches will be able to look him in the eye, if he comes here, and explain how it was that their membership of an organisation that they claimed to support for so long came to lapse.
One should also look at what has been said by those who sit on the Opposition Front Bench. The Leader of the Opposition once spoke of his most deeply held belief. It is not just what he said in 1983. In 1988, he sent to the CND magazine "Sanity"
"his congratulations to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament upon 30 years of effort to secure a nuclear-free United Kingdom," stressing the need
"to make and win the arguments for non-nuclear defence." In March 1989 the hon. Member for Derby, South (Mrs. Beckett) signed Tribune's appeal in support of British unilateral nuclear disarmament. The hon. Member for Cynon Valley (Mrs. Clwyd) signed the same petition.
Mr. Andrew F. Bennett : Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
In 1988, the hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook), in that charming turn of phrase that he has, said that it was "nonsense on stilts" for Britain to pretend to be a nuclear power. The hon. Member for Dagenham (Mr. Gould)-- another leading member of the shadow Cabinet--told The Daily Telegraph in May 1989 :
"The purpose of retaining a deterrent is not to use it, or even to threaten to use it."
I do not think one ever heard of a bigger waste of money than a policy such as that. I appreciate the fact that the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) is not here today, seeking to elbow his way into yet another debate. I do not know how many hon. Members realise that in 1987 he sacked his research assistant for daring to write an article in support of British nuclear weapons. Does not the House think that if the right hon. Gentleman had any sense of decency he ought to offer his research assistant his job back, since the right hon. Gentleman is now making speeches explaining why it is necessary to have a nuclear deterrent?
Mr. Andrew F. Bennett : Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
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Mr. King : I am sorry. I know that it is an embarrassment to the hon. Gentleman, but I thought that he might support me.
Mr. Bennett : Will the right hon. Gentleman please give way?
Mr. King : No. I give credit to the hon. Gentleman. I believe that he is one of those who sticks to the Labour party's original policy. I hope that he has not changed his principles. He must allow me to express some irritation with the Labour party's present approach.
Mr. Bennett : Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. King : No. I am afraid that I have got more bad news for the hon. Gentleman. I must refer to a few more hon. Members.
The hon. Member for Barking (Ms. Richardson)--a member of the shadow Cabinet--is still, I believe a vice-president of CND. Sixteen of the 22 members of the shadow Cabinet have an anti-nuclear background. Fourteen of them are either members of CND or of the parliamentary Labour party's section of CND. They have pretended to change, but they do not understand or support the deterrent. The hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) said :
"The so-called British independent deterrent does not enhance the defence of this country."
He is entitled to hold that view and I should respect him if he stood up and said, "I hold that view." Has the hon. Gentleman changed his view? If he still holds it, it is the biggest waste of money that one can imagine to pretend, as he does from the Opposition Front Bench, that he would still keep the nuclear deterrent. Or would the hon. Gentleman not keep it? Is the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) right that if the Labour party can change its policies to win the election, certain right hon. and hon. Members know privately that they can change them again when they have won? If so, how many policies is that?
Mr. Andrew F. Bennett : Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. King : No. The hon. Gentleman does not speak for the Opposition. The Opposition are about to face the British people in a general election. The British people are entitled to make a choice, but that choice should be based on clear knowledge of what the Labour party's policy is. There should be no equivocation. At Question Time only this week it was made very clear when my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness--
Mr. Bennett : Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?
Mr. King : No. This is difficult and painful for the hon. Gentleman, but in this House one sometimes has to endure a little pain, grief and sadness on account of departed friends who may have supported the hon. Gentleman in the past but who have now left him.
How many policies does the Labour party have? The first is that Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen try to pretend that they are deeply committed to the nuclear deterrent. Another policy is meant to appease CND activists on the Benches behind them. Most cynical of all is another Labour party policy that is meant to pacify the work force in Barrow. When we debated that, up jumped the hon. Member for Houghton and Washington (Mr. Boyes)--another official Front-Bench spokesman on
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defence matters--and produced a fourth policy--not just the supine policy of pretending to go along with the nuclear deterrent but querying why the fourth boat could not be built more quickly. I realised later why that was. After leaving the House I returned to my office and found in my mail VSEL's "Link" magazine for its employees. I found a picture in the magazine of shopstewards--employees of Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd.--who had been to the House. The hon. Member for Clackmannan had taken them to see the Leader of the Opposition. I shudder to think what promises they were given. The Labour party is probably going to have a fifth and a sixth Trident programme, because someone has told the right hon. Member for Islwyn (Mr. Kinnock) that there might be some votes for him in Barrow. We see the shabby sight of the Labour party, who are seeking to form the next Government, being absolutely paralysed. The hon. Member for Clackmannan did not need the poll on the British people's patriotism in The Daily Telegraph today to know that they are not prepared to abandon the deterrent while nuclear weapons are pointed at them. He must pretend that Labour will keep those weapons, but he knows that the majority of Labour Members oppose that.
Most cynical of all, the hon. Member for Clackmannan must pretend to the shop stewards and work force of VSEL that Labour would guarantee their jobs, when he knows perfectly well that if a Labour Government had been in power in recent years its 4,000 workers would have been thrown on the dole.
I ask the hon. Member for Clackmannan three straight questions that the House, the country, our allies and our service men should like to be answered. He must remember that, as we talk, our nuclear deterrent is being maintained by our service men to ensure that it offers the ultimate security. Does he now believe in the importance of keeping the strategic nuclear deterrent while other countries have nuclear weapons targeted on us? Will he ensure that the fourth Trident boat is built to guarantee the effective operation of that strategic deterrent? Does he support the NATO policy that is subscribed to by every other country in the NATO alliance-- be it socialist, Conservative, Christian Democrat or Liberal--of sub- strategic nuclear forces being based in Europe and kept up to date? After years of our being castigated by Labour policy documents, without a single one on defence, the hon. Gentleman has a duty to tell the House where Labour stands.
10.21 am
Mr. Martin O'Neill (Clackmannan) : If the Secretary of State will allow me, I shall answer his questions in the course of my speech. If he does not agree, no doubt he will intervene.
I recognise the Government's embarrassment in attacking parties for changing their policies. At the last election, and in 1979, we were told that in no circumstances would VAT be increased, yet in the past 10 years it has been increased twice. Perhaps more importantly, in the past few days the Government have had to use a guillotine, in unique circumstances, to dismantle one of their major election pledges--the poll
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tax. The need of political parties to review their policies and make changes as they see fit need not necessarily be the subject of criticism.We welcome the debate because it offers an opportunity to consider nuclear policy. The focus of attention in the two-day estimates debate and in the individual service debates is often on other matters. We are happy to have the opportunity to assess, as the Secretary of State has, developments in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, especially since the coup of 28 August. We should carefully consider the command and control system and the changing character of the nuclear threat.
Labour's changes to its defence and nuclear policy have been the subject of much interest and have engaged the interest of the British people. Since the changes were made, the British people appear broadly to have supported us. The results of successive by-elections and Euro-elections show that a political party should listen to its supporters and make changes. In a democratic society, a political party must listen to its supporters and potential electors. We make no apology for doing so.
In the early days of this Parliament, before the collapse of the Berlin wall and the signing of the intermediate nuclear forces treaty, a rather different note was struck by Conservative Members. The then Prime Minister regularly came to the Dispatch Box to abuse everyone who did not agree with her. I realise that that is her normal approach to political argument and debate, but I remember in particular that on 4 March 1988 she returned from a NATO summit and abused Labour Members for having no memory, no stomach, no spine and no guts--the usual moderate way in which she dealt with not only her political opponents but her so-called friends and colleagues. She said that we wanted a war-free Europe and that we need nuclear weapons to achieve it.
That was not the message of the Secretary of State this morning. In many respects, we agree with much of the information that he offered and, to a certain extent, his analysis. But the Conservative party's almost McCarthyite approach to people who have advocated nuclear disarmament in a variety of ways, particularly through the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, is, "Are you now or have you ever been a member of that organisation?" I make it clear that I have been, but I am no longer. I shall explain why I and many others have left the cause. I have no reason to be ashamed of it or of giving my reasons for leaving.
The issue in recent months has been the changes not only in the policies of the Opposition but in the emphasis and attitude of the Government. At Reykjavik in 1986, there was some embarrassment in American circles about the continuing hard-line stance adopted by the United Kingdom. Between 1987 and 1988, the Germans became increasingly hostile to the notion of short- range nuclear forces being located in central Europe and targeted on their eastern relations. The famous statement, "The shorter the range, the deader the German", left the Government particularly cold. They were indifferent, it would appear, to the plight not only of German citizens on the other side of the wall but of British troops located in Germany.
When the lack of credibility of the short-range nuclear forces became apparent, it was increasingly clear that the bottom rung of the so-called ladder of escalation had become rotten and decayed. The INF treaty eliminated the middle rungs of the ladder and the United States
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