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budgetary concerns did away with the follow- on to Lance. We began to witness growing European disillusionment with the theory of flexible response as the scope for flexibility gradually diminished. General Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander of NATO Europe, clearly said in the international defence review this March that the old- style flexible response is dead.We must therefore consider its replacement and the nuclear arangements that will then be required. In the early days, it was recognised that if there was no third zero a dramatic reduction in land-based nuclear forces was possible. The changes in European attitudes were reflected in an improvement in east-west relations. Some may say that the first sign of this was the understandings reached at Reykjavik in 1986. The failure to hit the jackpot at the Hofte house was reviewed by some people with refief. We remember the cool reception given by the then Prime Minister to many of the reports from Reykjavik and the desperate calls and visits to the White House. The idea that the leaders of the two super-powers could set aside the thinking of the cold war and agree to a programme to eliminate nuclear weapons was too much for some Conservatives to handle. Although the eventual outcome was more modest, it was becoming increasingly clear in 1987 and 1988 that massive changes were taking place.
It is probably true to say that in about 1985-86 Mikhail Gorbachev concluded that the Soviet Union would no longer commit vast resources to a defence machine and to a war which it could not afford and which it would not win. Indeed, it could be argued that if there were any justification for star wars it was the fact that it so frightened the Soviet Union-- because of the scale of the technology and because the amount of resources needed to back it were so great that they would have beggared that country- -that it had to think again. That is the only argument that I have found in support of star wars. Nevertheless, that point has to be made and it was indicative of the sea change in Gorbachev's attitudes at that time.
Some would argue that that was a victory for the hard-line stance taken in the early 1980s, when Washington's near-apocalyptic concern about the evil empire caused a massive build-up in United States armaments. That build-up is still being paid for by the American people and is still a major cause of their deficit and their economic problems. However, others would argue that the critical factor was Gorbachev's willingness to take on the military industrial complex in his country and to recognise the social, political and economic consequences of withdrawing the military and strategic guarantees which Soviet support had given to the Warsaw pact Governments. It will probably emerge that the answer is somewhere between the two. It is clear that the willingness of the United States and Soviet Union to think afresh about nuclear matters and to come to agreements and understandings in the late 1980s would have been regarded as unthinkable only a short time before. Unfortunately for Britain, the response of the then Prime Minister to those changes was to resist them up to the very last moment and to try to secure a form of words in whatever communique to which she was a party which tried to convey that very little had changed.
Throughout the 1980s the Labour party was committed to a defence policy which, with regard to nuclear weapons, required the Labour Government to renounce ownership of Polaris and to abandon the Trident programme. That
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policy marked a change in attitude from that of previous Labour Governments. It was not unanimously accepted by the membership or by the electorate. Indeed, I recall that on 15 February 1982 the hon. Member for Dunfermline, West (Mr. Douglas), who was then a member of the Labour party, said during a debate on defence :"I make it quite clear that I am not a unilateralist. I recognise that the people of this country, having acquired a strategic nuclear deterrent, are unlikely to be so stupid as to give it up without getting something in exchange. That is just not on, in ordinary trade union bargaining terms, let alone in international negotiations. That is a gut level posture, but it does not mean that there should be no discussions or divisions as we try to find our way through this problem."--[ Official Report, 15 February 1982 ; Vol. 18, c. 52-53.] That was a statement from someone who is no longer in the Labour party and who, I believe, now has a different view, but it was a clear summation of the different attitude of a minority within the Labour ranks.
Mr. Douglas : I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will concede that, whatever posture I adopted in the Labour party, I made the nature of that posture perfectly clear to the electorate. In other words, I sought a personal mandate. Can he tell us whether at the next general election members of the Labour party--especially in Scotland--who are not in favour of the current exposition of Labour party policy will make that clear in their election addresses? I refer especially to the candidate to succeed the hon. Member who represents one of the Falkirk seats, a Mr. Ewing. The candidate has made it plain that he is still a member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and does not support the Trident programme. Can the hon. Gentleman say that every member of the Labour party--especially in Scotland--will include such information in his election address?
Mr. O'Neill : I understand the hon. Gentleman's point. I must say that he does not appear to wish the charity and independence granted to him when he was a member of the Labour party to be extended to other people. That might be a feature of his change in attitude. As I have said before, I believe that the statement that the hon. Gentleman made at the time was wrong and when we changed our policy I thought that he was wrong again.
The issue was not only a source of controversy in the House and the country. In the 1983 general election different interpretations were put on our policy. The then leader and deputy leader said different things while the previous Labour Prime Minister expressed total opposition to any interpretation other than his own, which was similar to that of the hon. Member for Dunfermline, West. There was a feeling in the Labour party in the early 1980s that the membership wanted to do something about disarmament and about breaking the log-jam that appeared to have emerged in the nuclear arms race. Some members of the Labour party--some of them are here today and, given the opportunity to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I am sure that they will voice their opinions--have had a long- standing aversion to nuclear weapons. Some question the deterrence theory ; others abhor the idea of nuclear annihilation and find it morally unacceptable to countenance the threat of its use ; and others felt that a world without pacts and alliances would be better able to deal with the problems of international relations. Various strains were and have always been present in the Labour party. Some members have adapted
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their thinking to nuclear weapons because they have a specific pacifist standpoint. Others have taken that stance because of a commitment to neutralism, and so on.Until the early 1980s not even a combination of those views held the majority for very long in the Labour party, but concern about the deployment of the cruise missile system and the frustration about the seemingly endless escalation of the early Thatcher-Reagan years convinced people in the Labour party that independent renunciation by Britain of nuclear weapons might give a sign to other nuclear powers that it was possible to call a halt. That argument had at its roots the nuclear debates of the 1950s which had given birth to the Aldermaston marches and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. In retrospect, that argument was probably based--almost paradoxically--on the inflated sense of our own importance which had driven the father of the British bomb--Ernest Bevin--to encourage the Attlee Government to develop the first programme. To be important internationally we had to have the bomb and the corollary was that to get rid of it would make us even more important and influential. The experience of those of us who sought to argue Labour's position on nuclear weapons in the 1980s--not only in the House and throughout the country, but abroad-- was somewhat different. In meetings with colleagues in the Socialist and Social Democratic parties in Europe--I have regular contact with those parties which are members of NATO--we found that even those who were outside NATO and who would be regarded as being of a neutralist disposition did not appear greatly concerned about whether Britain should give up nuclear weapons. The impact of an independent renunciation of nuclear weapons by Britain did not seem to them to have much resonance throughout the world. Certainly on visits that I made to Moscow and Washington specifically to discuss these matters there was, at best, studied indifference to Labour offers in this area.
By January 1989 the mood in the Kremlin was clear. It was not interested in separate deals with Britain or excited to any extent by bilateralism, as it was called. The Kremlin wanted to sustain what it considered to be the START process and to continue the talks that had been given impetus by the Reykjavik meeting. This morning the Secretary of State spoke about the lengthy period over which the START talks took place, but it is fair to say that for a long time little happened. It was only after Reykjavik that momentum was achieved. Certainly, the talks were given impetus by Reykjavik, but, equally importantly, they were given credibility by the intermediate nuclear forces agreement.
That treaty was the first to eliminate a whole class of nuclear weapons. Equally importantly, it provided inspection and verification procedures of such an intrusive character that mutual trust and co-operation had to lie at the heart of the realisation of the treaty's aims. Therefore, while the prospects for a negotiated disarmament were good, in 1988-89 there were always the nagging doubts that the START treaty would be only a one-off and that to resume discussions one of the western nuclear powers would have to take the initiative.
That was why the Labour party in its 1989 document said that it would be prepared to start talking. We did not
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say that we were prepared to end the process or jump off when we reached what we considered to be a useful stopping place for us. We believed then, as we believe now, that we had to continue a dialogue with the Soviet Union on this issue. That was one reason why we were anxious to show that we did not believe that the whole of the Trident programme needed to be completed as planned.Mr. Douglas : I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his courtesy in giving way. If I understand him correctly, he is proceeding to make an argument for putting Polaris and its equipment into a bargaining regime with the Soviet Union. How was it possible in the late 1980s to put Trident into a bargaining regime, when we will not possess it until late 1994? Will he explain that?
Mr. O'Neill : The hon. Gentleman and I may have some disagreements, but I have respect for his command of basic arithmetic. We were endeavouring to develop the policy that would become the programme of a Labour Government who would take power in about 1990-91 and remain in office until about 1995-96, by which time we would have the beginnings of the Trident programme. Both the Trident and Polaris systems, whether clapped out or in embryo, were legitimate areas of concern for negotiation at that time. We saw a case for considering what our nuclear arsenal would be and whether it was completely necessary. I shall answer the hon. Gentleman's question about Trident in a couple of minutes.
Mr. Wilkinson : I am trying hard to follow the hon. Gentleman's logic. In what sense would it be a wise policy for the United Kingdom to consider putting forward Polaris or, ultimately, Trident for negotiation with the Soviets on nuclear capabilities? Even if we were to obtain substantial concessions and eliminate all our strategic nuclear weapons, we could not eliminate all theirs, so we would merely leave them with a residual capability which would be overwhelming and a continual menace to ourselves. How is that good for the security of the British people?
Mr. O'Neill : Obviously, the hon. Gentleman has not grasped what I implied. I said that the Soviet Union was not interested in doing a bilateral deal. The Soviet Union was indifferent to that. What was important was that in the event of a START treaty marking the end of the START process--the discussion on nuclear disarmament between the main nuclear powers--the secondary nuclear powers, such as ourselves, France and China, should try to retain, maintain or, indeed, establish a dialogue with the Soviet Union. That was the context of our policy in 1989. I freely admit that things have changed since, but that was part of the argument. We wanted to retain what the Soviets had called a process. We wanted that process to continue. We were fearful that a halt or a delay would result in other unfortunate occurrences in the Soviet Union.
When my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) and I visited some European capitals and Washington, it was clear to us that the whole character of the theory of nuclear strategy was under review. Germans of all parties were resistant to further deployments of short and medium-range forces. The Soviets were willing to reduce those forces. There was the prospect of eliminating the disparity between the Warsaw pact and NATO conventional forces and of short-range nuclear forces filling that gap. The traditional
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justification for short-range nuclear forces was that, as we did not have the number of forces to match those of the Soviet Union, we would use our short-range nuclear forces as a potential deterrent. There were increasing public expressions of scepticism about arguments such as the "use them or lose them" theory for tactical nuclear weapons. The argument goes that if we had short-range nuclear weapons at the front, in the event of a rapid advance there would always be the danger that a commander would have no choice but to use those weapons, either because he could not get rid of them back to headquarters, or perhaps to start a nuclear conflagration. At that time, it was becoming increasingly clear in discussions of nuclear strategy that strong voices were in favour of NATO moving towards a commitment of no first use of nuclear weapons.Labour unveiled its policy on defence and disarmament in May 1989--after all the public expressions of the shadow Cabinet that the Secretary of State quoted today. If he looks at the dates of all those expressions, he will see that we published our statement in May, even after my hon. Friend the Member for Dagenham (Mr. Gould) had made his remarks.
Mr. Tom King : What about the hon. Member for Barking (Ms. Richardson)?
Mr. O'Neill : My hon. Friend was not quoted.
Mr. King : I thought that the hon. Lady was there, too.
Mr. O'Neill : My hon. Friend was a member of the committee. Our policy was clear. We were committed to the continuance of Britain's nuclear programme. The British Polaris submarines would stay on patrol and the Trident programme would proceed. We felt, however, that the accuracy of the new system, the flexibility of use that the extended range afforded and the improved refit and maintenance arrangements all meant that it would be easier to have at least one boat available at all times, although we were to have only three. Since then the increase in warning time has merely served to reinforce the view.
That view is not the preserve of the Labour party. A number of naval and maritime strategists have questioned the need for a fourth boat. James Eberle, for example, the former head of Chatham House and former chief of naval operations in the Atlantic, has supported it. As the Secretary of State said, the tendering process for the fourth boat has started. Should it be completed before the next election, the Labour Government will be in a position to examine the full costs of cancellation. It has been suggested that the contracts for the earlier boats in the programme have entailed penal cancellation charges. I say, "It has been suggested", because, for sound commercial reasons, the Government never make such information available. The possibility of penal cancellation charges in the public domain is a rumour ; I put it no more strongly than that. If that were carried forward, the termination of the contract for the fourth boat could be more costly than its completion and subsequent deployment. The Secretary of State shakes his head. Perhaps he would care to tell the House the status of cancellation clauses, what the penalties would be and what that would mean for a future Government--Conservative
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or Labour--who decided to cancel. That would be a major breakthrough and would certainly assist us in formulating our policy as we move towards government.Mr. Tom King : The hon. Gentleman certainly needs assistance. I have never heard a more hesitant and pathetic approach to the problem. The hon. Gentleman must first decide where his responsibility lies. Does he believe that a fourth boat is needed? That is the point : is a fourth boat needed to maintain our deterrent? If the hon. Gentleman thinks that it is not, why does not he have the courage to stand up and say so? Whatever stage we have reached and whatever the problems with cancellation charges, given the running costs of the fourth Trident submarine, we are bound to save money in the long run. One cannot duck the issue by pretending that the decision will depend on the date of the election and on which bills have or have not arrived from VSEL or other contractors. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for trying to answer the question, but can he improve on that answer and tell the House clearly whether a Labour Government would or would not have the fourth boat?
Mr. O'Neill : The position is as I have stated and I will repeat it for the benefit of the right hon. Gentleman. I do not personally consider that there is a need for a fourth boat. In 1964, it was argued that we could not provide an adequate deterrent without five boats, but we took the decision to proceed with only four and we carried it through.
On the question of cancellation charges and other matters, the Minister has made it clear that he is not prepared to talk in terms of sums. I do not think that even the right hon. Gentleman would be prepared to say that every programme remains the same, irrespective of costs.
Mr. John McWilliam (Blaydon) : Perhaps I may assist my hon. Friend. The Secretary of State was being totally disingenuous because, if the cancellation cost of the fourth boat is the same as the cost of cancelling the first boat would have been, it would be cheaper to build the thing--so saving on the unemployment benefit that would otherwise be payable to the constituents of the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Franks)--and not deploy it.
The Minister of State for Defence Procurement (Mr. Alan Clark) rose --
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker) : Order. The Minister cannnot intervene in an intervention.
Mr. O'Neill : I am grateful for the intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon (Mr. McWilliam), but I realise that the Minister responsible now wishes to intervene.
Mr. Alan Clark : The hon. Gentleman said that he personally does not want a fourth boat. Can he say whether it is the Labour party's policy to have a fourth boat or not? That was the question that he was asked by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State.
Mr. O'Neill : The Labour policy is clear. I am sorry if the Minister finds it difficult to understand that, when I say "personally" in this respect, I mean that I am expressing my view and the view of my party.
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Mr. O'Neill : I am glad that we have cleared the matter up.Mr. O'Neill : May I ask you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to ask the clype behind me to be quiet? If we are to have a serious debate, we can do without the barracking that passes as comment from the hon. Member for Dunfermline, West.
Mr. O'Neill : In the Labour party's view, the Government have not advanced an adequately forceful strategic case for a fourth boat. We have made that clear ever since 1989 when we issued our policy statement. We believe that the country can be adequately defended by three Trident boats. If we find, on reaching office, that the programme is sufficiently far advanced to render it foolhardy to go back on it, we shall review the matter carefully. We have said that consistently.
Mr. Franks : The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that what he is saying is crucial to the livelihood of thousands of people in my constituency. I want to be absolutely clear precisely what he is saying. I shall repeat it and, if I have it wrong, I trust that he will correct me. As I understand it, he is saying that it is the official policy of the Labour party not to build the fourth boat and that his only reservation arises from the fact that certain clauses in the contract might make cancellation commercially prohibitive. The hon. Gentleman is speaking from the Front Bench on behalf of his party. I assume, therefore, that what he has said represents the majority view within his party.
Mr. O'Neill : It is the policy of the Labour party. The hon. Gentleman can make whatever he wants of it, but it will still not save his seat.
Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South) : Before the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Franks) gets on his high horse, perhaps he would care to consider the devastating consequences for his constituents--and any constituents involved in the manufacturing of submarines--as a result of the collapse of submarine orders. Those who may at some stage look at VSEL's order books may care to consider that, even if the fourth submarine is constructed, the consequences for employment in such constituencies will remain severe because of what the Government have done in relation to naval and submarine construction.
Mr. O'Neill : The sea-launched ballistic missile system that we have been discussing does not account for all our nuclear arsenal and we must look at what is left. Over the past 40 years, there have been shifts in nuclear strategy and changes in technology and in the appreciation of the perceived threat. When all that was available was the free-fall bomb, air- delivered systems were essential to the deterrent, but, once the first land and sea-launched ballistic missiles were to hand, it was possible to have weapons systems that operated from comparatively safe sanctuaries and, in the case of Polaris, from the virtually impenetrable depths of the sea. The introduction of MIRVing further improved the lethality and accuracy of the weapons. Miniaturisation enabled small nuclear
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artillery shells to be produced and that, in its turn, made way for the development of the theory that we now call flexible response. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) was one of the main authors of that doctrine in the 1960s and today it enjoys some credibility due to the efforts of the present Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, who has argued clearly for the theory of flexible response in a series of public lectures and articles. Despite the quality of the logic, such theories are, in my view, based upon the flawed assumption that it would always be possible to deter the enemy by the controlled use of nuclear weapons of increasing size and on the assumption that nuclear war fighting could be discrete and managed. But in battle as in life, as Robert Burns said :"The best laid schemes o' mice an' men
Gang aft a-gley".
Certainly, many serious military men have always been fearful of the use or implied threat of short-range nuclear forces. Many will be relieved at the announcement by the Secretary of State this morning that many of these weapons will no longer be available.
Nevertheless, we continue to be faced with a large empire whose structure is creaking and whose nationalities, after decades of Soviet subjugation and, in some cases, centuries of Russian imperialism, are seeking independence. That third-world economy with a super-power arsenal could be in terminal decline. The command and control systems for its nuclear arsenal may still be intact, but it is not clear whether the terms and conditions of the draft treaty will be adhered to. It is not certain who wants to own which system. We know that Russia would like to assume responsibility for the arsenal within its borders. The positions of Byelorussia and Kazakhstan are less clear, while the Ukraine, with the nightmare of Chernobyl etched on its consciousness, wants to rid itself of those weapons. We must help to clear up the confusion, dismantle--where appropriate--the weapons and assist in the disposal of the fissile material. Until that capability is brought under systematic control, although the threat may have changed, it will still exist in some shape or form.
Ms. Joyce Quin (Gateshead, East) : On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Have you received a request from the Department of Trade and Industry to make a statement on the sale of the Export Credits Guarantee Department ? We have heard that, far from realising the £100 million which was originally talked of, the sale may now fetch as little as £6 million. That would be an appalling way to dispose of a valuable public asset. Has there been a request for a statement on that subject ?
Mr. Deputy Speaker : No, there has been no request to make a statement. Doubtless, the hon. Lady's request will have been heard.
Mr. Cryer : Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I wonder whether the Treasury Minister has applied to make such a statement, because this concerns the Treasury as well as the Department of Trade and Industry ? Yet again, a piece of the family silver is being sold off at rock-bottom price, at great--
Mr. Deputy Speaker : Order. I cannot add to what I have already said.
Mr. O'Neill : As I said, the Soviet nuclear capability needs to be brought under systematic control. There is no
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division in the House on that matter. It is fair to say that the problems created by those developments can be handled. However, the uncertainty of the minor and near-nuclear powers remains-- India and Pakistan are two obvious contenders. The changes in American foreign policy may present grounds for optimism on that subject. America's new attitude towards India may result in its having a great influence over that country in its relations with the United States' old ally, Pakistan.I am not sure whether it is possible to have the same optimism about Israel in the middle east. Indeed, it is most unlikely that Israel will give up its nuclear capability in the foreseeable future, so long as it foresees a threat to its land from its neighbour.
Mr. Andrew F. Bennett : Will my hon. Friend give way?
Mr. O'Neill : No, I should like to develop my argument. I have allowed several interruptions and, although I do not wish to be discourteous, I should get on.
The problems of Iraq are well known. We have seen that the inspection facilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency are completely inadequate. Worthy though that organisation's aims may be, it has neither the resources nor the authority to undertake the vital work which the United Nations has given it. Therefore, it must be incumbent on the Government of this country, as one of the Permanent Five and one of the main sponsors of the United Nations, to give a clear lead in seeking greater authority, support and resources for the IAEA.
In some countries, the prospect of inspection, verification and access is not as great. I refer in particular to North Korea. If there is one country that we would have difficulty in isolating, it is North Korea. How can we isolate a pariah and a country which, by its own admission, does not wish to deal with most of the world? The parts of the world with which it deals would probably not be too critical about its nuclear development anyway. That is the most difficult and persistent area of non-proliferation. There are grounds for qualified optimism because in the past 18 months South Africa has renounced its nuclear ambition, no longer considering that there is a regional threat to the authority of its state. Argentina and Brazil have also decided that they will no longer pursue military nuclear development. That have concluded that the differences between two democracies in South America are not great enough to warrant arming themselves to the teeth.
We must build on the experience of regional disputes which shows that there can be a role for international law, the United Nations and, above all, the permanent five of the Security Council. That is where Britain, China, France, the United States and the components of what was the Soviet Union have a clear responsibility. They must show potential proliferators that they are prepared to secure further reductions in their nuclear arsenals.
It has already been accepted that it is possible to de-MIRV ballistic missiles. We must consider whether it would be desirable or possible to do so to sea-launched ballistic missiles. It is often said that the quantitative increase in Trident firepower is to accommodate, or seek to pierce, the anti-ballistic missile defences that have been established in the Soviet Union. The Secretary of State advanced that argument this morning when he was asked about the increase in the size of the Trident arsenal.
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However, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces said, in answer to a question from my hon. Friend the Member for Western Isles (Mr. Macdonald) :"Under the 1972 United States-Soviet ABM treaty and subsequent protocols, the Soviet Union is limited to a maximum of 100 ABM launchers located within a radius of 150 km around either the national capital or one area containing silo fields.
Future Soviet ABM deployments are similarly expected to conform to the 1972 treaty and its protocols or any future renegotiations of the agreement."-- [ Official Report, 13 November 1991 ; Vol. 198, c. 613-14. ]
It may be helpful if, before the end of today's debate, the Secretary of State and his colleagues could get together to explain what they mean by the enhancement in the anti-ballistic missile capability of the Soviet Union which requires us to make a quantum leap in the warhead capability of the Trident programme. If we could have an agreement on reductions in the number of warheads, it would show clearly that although we possess nuclear weapons, their scale does not have to be as great as we considered in the recent past. There is still work to be done on maritime arms control. Those hon. Members who take an interest in such matters will know that it is a hobby horse of mine. However, as long as there is a Soviet nuclear presence in the Kola peninsula and Soviet forces in the numbers presently there, we shall continue to have a threat to our continent and to Norway, a state which we, more than any other country in NATO, are obliged to support. Therefore, it is in our interests to address the problem of maritime arms control, to secure reductions in the size of the Soviet fleet and to reach agreement on the
Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap area.
Finally, we must work hard to convince our NATO colleagues that we do not desire the continued presence of short-range and tactical nuclear forces on the continent of Europe. In short, we should be arguing for a third zero within NATO. That is not to say that the Labour party would not have signed last week's communique --we would have. We are democrats and accept that until we have convinced people by the force of our argument, we should go along with the view of the majority of the organisations of which we are a member. We are not talking about jumping off or about creating unnecessary trouble, but we consider that that is a legitimate concern for a British Government--
Mr. Tom King rose --
Mr. O'Neill : I shall give way to the Secretary of State in a minute. He is entitled to have an opinion. More than any others in the alliance, we have stated our willingness to host and to accept our nuclear responsibilities during the years that such forces have been present in Europe.
Mr. Tom King : I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving way. He has made his position clear. He is saying that he is not in favour of NATO's present policy of maintaining adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe and of ensuring that they are maintained and kept up to date. Although he has said that he is not in favour of that, he would nevertheless still keep them if that was NATO's decision. The Labour party would make its contribution and support the sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. I take it that that is his view.
Mr. O'Neill : That is correct. To make it perfectly clear, I repeat that we are not saying that Britain should acquire
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a subsequent follow-on generation of weapons to replace the free-fall bombs that are nearing the end of their useful life.Mr. Wilkinson : That is an incredible contribution.
Mr. O'Neill : No. On that issue, there is little enthusiasm in other parts of Europe for air-launched systems. There is little requirement from other European members for Britain either to have or not to have such weapons. At the moment, the moratorium that the United States has announced on the development of its tactical air-to-surface missile programme means that we would have great difficulty getting a credible system from the United States if we wanted one. If we had to go to France, that would create other questions which may or may not be quite as acceptable to some of the hon. Friends of the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson), whose suspicion of things European have been evidenced-- [Interruption.] Not necessarily the Conservative Members who are present, but other Tory Members probably would not be quite so keen on--as they would see it--mortgaging their nuclear future to the French.
Our view is that the maintenance, deployment and continued support for the sea-launched ballistic missile programmes of both Polaris and Trident would be sufficient for us to make a contribution to the defence of the west and of these islands.
Mr. Tom King : It is helpful of the hon. Gentleman to give way on this important point because this is one of the questions that I asked him specifically and which he is now seeking to address. He has made it clear that he would not necessarily support the idea of independent nuclear forces in Europe being contributed to by the United Kingdom, although the NATO communique draws attention to their overall deterrence value and security to the alliance to which they contribute. However, he is also saying that if NATO decided to maintain that policy, which is the unanimous policy of all the NATO countries, any future Labour Government would maintain a sub-strategic nuclear capability that would be based in Europe and kept up to date. That is an important statement because it is not in keeping with the Labour party's previous policy statement. It would be helpful to have that on the record.
Mr. O'Neill : If I have to qualify it once again, I shall do so, because it seems that the Secretary of State is adamant in his attempts wilfully to misrepresent our position. We will not proceed with our own TASM programme--
Mr. Wilkinson : Or keep it up do date.
Mr. O'Neill : One cannot keep up to date something that does not exist. That is the first point. We are talking about the replacement of the WE177 when its useful life has ended with a system that has a far greater range, is more flexible and is potentially more destabilising. It may also be more useful in some belligerent or bellicose sense, but if we are talking about weapons that will be used by NATO in the NATO area, I have great difficulty envisaging how such weapons would be deployed or used. I should like to go on-- Mr. Tom King rose --
Mr. O'Neill : No, I am sorry--
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Mr. King rose --Mr. O'Neill : No-- [Interruption.]
Mr. Deputy Speaker : Order. I remind the Secretary of State and the hon. Gentleman that this is not a private dialogue. Other hon. Members want to participate in the debate--
Mr. Corbyn : When do the wind-up speeches start?
Mr. Deputy Speaker : Order. Perhaps the Secretary of State could leave some of these matters for the Minister to deal with when he seeks to catch my eye at the end of the debate.
Mr. O'Neill : I am grateful for that stricture, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I realise that I have a duty to enlighten the House this morning and I am endeavouring to do that, but I am mindful of the fact that other hon. Members wish to participate-- [Hon. Members :-- "Hear, hear."]--and I shall not accept any further interventions.
Not only do we wish to see reductions in our existing or potential arsenal, maritime arms control and a third zero being acquired or established in Europe, but I should like to think that we could take advantage of the Soviet offer of a moratorium on testing to establish how clear its wishes are in respect of a comprehensive TASM treaty. In the past, suspicion has always arisen over requests for a moratorium on testing because such calls have always come immediately after the completion of a testing programme. We should be prepared to use the moratorium to take advantage of what we consider to be the Soviet Union's improved attitude to see whether this is a confidence-building measure that could lead to a comprehensive test ban treaty. We are conscious that the advances in modelling and monitoring techniques and the like are such that most of the work--probably all of it- -on the maintenance of existing systems and on systems that are already in the pipeline could be carried out by laboratory testing techniques. Old- style testing gave a clear signal to all those who were potential proliferators that if the major nuclear powers were carrying out such testing, why should not they? Turning to my final point, I echo the view expressed by the Secretary of State. We have to give due credence to the significance of crisis management techniques. We must consider how we handle that in the short term, especially in relation to what was the Soviet Union and the nuclear powers there. We must also seek to establish means whereby nuclear or near-nuclear powers give clear undertakings on such matters. In terms of arms control, we must also consider the ability to transfer the technology of one system to a nuclear system.
The point about ballistic missiles has been well made. We must have control over ballistic missile production and sales. If we are committed to doing that for ballistic weapons, as we are committed to it terms of chemical weapons, we must recognise that the management of the market in ballistic equipment must be far more tightly structured and organised than has been the case in the recent past. Security is not only about defence. Nuclear weapons can be a source of assurance in certain circumstances. They can pose a threat to the countries that do not have them--and to those that do. In the past six months, we have seen greater changes in all our thinking on nuclear weapons than ever before. The Labour party is committed
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to sustaining that momentum. It is committed to sustaining that momentum while it retains the British nuclear deterrent. It will continue to have that nuclear deterrent until such time as all the other owners or potential owners of nuclear weapons still have ideas in their heads about their ownership and development.We welcome the opportunity to participate in this debate. We have said that we believe that the objective of a nuclear-free world is something which we can still pursue, but until that is achieved, Britain will have a Labour Government who are are committed to sustaining the nuclear defence of this country for as long as it is necessary or for as long as required to do so.
11.19 am
Sir Philip Goodhart (Beckenham) : I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State on the devastating strategic assault which he delivered, with the precision of a Trident missile, on the CND background of so many Opposition Front-Bench Members. It does not require even a sub- strategic nuclear weapon. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and my hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Franks) only needed to fire a conventional torpedo to sink the speech by the Opposition spokesman, the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill), and to reveal the astonishing view that the Opposition hold about the fourth Trident boat.
When the debate started there were just 10 members of the parliamentary Labour party present and only half of them support the present line taken by the Opposition, which I assume would have been carried on the casting vote of the Labour Whip, who was present. I assume that he is in favour of the present Opposition party view.
Mr. Flynn : How does the hon. Gentleman know what our views are? For instance, what is my view?
Sir Philip Goodhart : I assumed that the hon. Gentleman was more or less in favour of his party's policy.--[ Hon. Members-- : "He may be against it."] In that case I fear that even the casting vote of the Labour Whip would not have carried the Back Benches in support of the official policy.
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