House of Commons Hansard Debates for 9 Dec 1991

Mr. John Patten : One travels hopefully in legislating. I had hoped that, after my crystal-clear exposition of the wrecking element in the first group of amendments, the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Sheerman) would have had a quick look and seen that what he was attempting to do in the second group was again to wreck.

The amendments ask the Committee to turn the clock back to the legal position on reckless driving, before the thorough review of the subject by the principal of Jesus college and the consequent decision of the House in the Road Traffic Act 1991 during the previous Session of Parliament to substitute a new concept, that of dangerous driving, with a new statutory test to go with it. That report and the subsequent legislation were welcome.

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The amendments also invite the Committee in effect to convert our objectively determined aggravating circumstances all over again into subjectively determined acts committed by a particular person. The amendments are misconceived and wrong-headed. It is as plain as a pikestaff that, if we return to subjectivity, the central core of the Bill will be completely wrecked and the vessel will be sunk. I had better go on to explain that it is important to recall why we took the decision in the Road Traffic Act 1991 to change the reckless driving offences-- "reckless" is the word that the hon. Member for Huddersfield used. In the words of the principal of Jesus college, the Welsh college in Oxford, the background was the

"widespread dissatisfaction with the present state of the law on reckless driving".

That dissatisfaction was rooted in the difficulty in securing convictions in England and Wales under the then reckless driving offences. Professor North's committee had put its collective finger on the problem : that reckless driving as previously defined by the courts referred to the accused's state of mind--whether he was reckless--and therefore required some proof of the state of mind of the offender to bring a successful prosecution.

Professor North recommended that the offences should be based much more firmly on the observable standard of driving, not the state of mind of the person who committed the offence. We should focus on the nature of the conduct, not the state of mind of the person involved. The nature of the conduct is the dangerousness of the driving, not the recklessness shown by the driver.

Mr. Sheerman : Will the Minister give way?

Mr. Patten : I give way to the hon. Gentleman. I hope that he has understood.

Mr. Sheerman : I have understood. I should like to bring the Minister down to earth and ask him to consider not states of mind but what happens when such crimes are committed. Will he answer on the point which worries us?

A person may not have taken part in any reckless behaviour. He may merely have driven a car without doing so recklessly. He may have stolen a car and then stopped or even parked the car and got out of it. If the car is damaged, whether severely or not, after they have left the car, what will be the position? Could such a person be guilty of reckless driving? Under the Bill, he will be considered to be reckless when at no stage did he take part in any reckless behaviour.

It is not the state of mind but what the person did that will count. The person took a car without the owner's permission. Yes, that is against the law, and the law will have him for that. If he drives the car for three miles and when he stops at the traffic lights someone crashes into the back of the car, will he be guilty of reckless driving? I should appreciate it if the Minister would confirm that.

Mr. Patten : I should appreciate the chance to do so after that intervention, which was longer than normal from the hon. Gentleman, who is usually succinct.

It is clearly the intention of the Bill that a man, or more rarely a woman, who takes and drives away a car and as a result causes injury or damage, can be tried for the aggravation of the offence, and that anyone travelling in the car with them should be tried in exactly the same way.

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There are two defences in the Bill that a person can use, and it is up to the courts to decide whether those defences are valid. To complete my argument, we should focus on the nature of the conduct--the dangerousness of the driving--not the degree of recklessness shown by the driver. The new offences in the Road Traffic Act 1991 follow that form. They will allow more drivers who drive badly to be convicted of more serious offences with proper punishment, and quite right too.

Subsection 7 of the new section 12A of the Theft Act, 1968--which would be inserted by clause 1 of the Bill--follows the concept and definition of dangerous driving in the Road Traffic Act. Therefore, having heard my exposition of what the amendments would do to the Bill, I believe that the hon. Member for Huddersfield will seek to withdraw it immediately from the consideration of this Committee.

Mr. Sheerman : We shall withdraw our amendments in the hope that they will emerge somewhere else and be debated more fully. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Donald Anderson : I hope that the Minister can help with clarification of one matter. Perhaps he will set on record why the words "mechanically propelled vehicle" are used and not the word "conveyance", as in section 12(7) of the 1968 Act. Would he confirm that the definition, as set out, is sufficient to cover speedboats? In many of our coastal resorts, there is a problem because young people, in particular, take boats and drive them to the danger of people who are bathing or who are in those waters. Will the Minister give an assurance that the term as used is sufficiently wide to include speedboats?

Mr. Patten : I suppose that the advice given by a senior and ancient Home Office or ex-Home Office Minister, or a Department of Transport or ex- Department of Transport Minister to a junior Minister just taking up his or her post would be, never to forget to cover oneself for the old skateboard question--does this piece of road traffic legislation deal with skateboards? I never go into the arena in this place without that information.

Luckily, thanks to the excellence of those who advise me, I am fully conversant with the speedboat issue, which is a derivation of the skateboard question, but is a serious issue. The hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) is right--boat theft has been a problem. People have been using twin-screwed diesel boats, which are very powerful and are used for towing water skiers, in an extremely dangerous fashion.

This stand part debate is useful to discuss subsection 1(a) of the Bill, which provides that the new aggravated offence arises in relation to "mechanically propelled vehicles", as the hon. Member for Swansea, East pointed out. That term, which is used in road traffic legislation, has a wide meaning and covers tractors, mechanical plant, mobile cranes, bulldozers, as well as motor cars and motor cycles. However, it is narrower in meaning than "conveyance", as defined in section 12(7) of the Theft Act, 1968, which I dare say the hon. Member for Swansea, East

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has in front of him. "Conveyance" includes non-mechanically propelled vehicles, such as rowing boats and horse-drawn carriages. Ultimately, the question whether "mechanically propelled" covers speedboats is for the courts to decide. My view is that it does not, for Theft Act purposes. Certainly, the policy with which I have been concerned in drawing up this Bill relates to motor vehicles on roads. That was the policy impetus behind the Bill. Therefore, the legislation as drafted would probably not be of much use for speedboats, but I undertake to consider the hon. Gentleman's point if he is happy with that undertaking.

Mr. Anderson indicated assent.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Offence to be tried only summarily if value of damage is small

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Anderson : I have a brief point in respect of the summary offence. It is said that clause 2 provides that the aggravated offence is to be tried summarily if the only aggravating circumstance is damage, the total value of which is below a specified amount, which is the same as for the substantive offence of criminal damage. The point that I wish to put to the Minister, again for consideration later by the Home Office, is this. Magistrates courts have a problem with summary jurisdiction in respect of this matter. Although a jury may convict a defendant charged with theft under section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 of taking a vehicle without authority under section 12, a magistrates court cannot do so unless the defendant has been specifically charged in the alternative. It may well be that, in this or related legislation, the Government might deal with that point to give magistrates courts greater jurisdiction in this matter.

Mr. John Patten : That is an interesting point, which had not occurred to me. The hon. Gentleman speaks with some knowledge of the criminal law. Certainly, I should like to consider the point and take advice on it at a later stage. I doubt whether we could do anything about it during the passage of the Bill in this or another place. It may well be a sensible piece of tidying up in subsequent legislation and I am grateful to him.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

Obligatory disqualification

Mr. Sheerman : I beg to move amendment No. 9, in page 4, line 21, leave out Obligatory' and insert Discretionary'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Paul Dean) : With this it will be convenient to consider amendment No. 10, in page 4, line 21, leave out first Obligatory' and insert--

(a) Obligatory where the vehicle was driven or the damage was caused by the offender or by another person incited by the offender. (b) Discretionary in any other case.'.

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Mr. Sheerman : The purpose of the amendment isto make disqualification discretionary rather than obligatory. One is even more in danger of repeating the arguments that one made on Second Reading on a short Bill such as this, especially given the time scale, so I shall be brief.

As it stands, the Bill requires all those convicted of the new offence to be mandatorily disqualified for at least 12 months, even when they were a passenger rather than the driver or where the consequences which aggravated the offence were neither intended nor foreseen by the accused personally. That could lead to a great feeling of injustice, perhaps rightly.

Most of us involved in criminal justice want offenders to cease offending as soon as possible, to learn the error of their ways as soon as possible and to return to society as fully law-abiding citizens as quickly as possible. Therefore, it is important that we do not introduce barriers to that process. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that we encourage young people to become law-abiding, fully operating young citizens as soon as possible. Discretion should be exercised in those circumstances where the aggravated factors are outside the control of the defendant. In some cases, a juvenile will be banned from driving two years after the offence was committed. A ban on driving imposed on a 15-year-old obviously will not come into force until that person is eligible to drive at the age of 17. However, two years is a long time. The individual may have paid his debt through some form of treatment or participation in a scheme. He may have become a model citizen. As the Minister acknowledged, young people change a great deal in a short time. They may mature and grow out of such a ghastly fashionable crime. If such a person is barred from driving for a year at the age of 17, that could hamper the process of making that young person a law-abiding member of society. The frustration felt may provide the spur for further offending.

9.30 pm

The magistrates courts and other courts are better able to make the relevant decision. They should have the discretion to decide whether a ban should be enforced. In many cases, disqualification will be the right course of action, but the courts should have the ability to exercise that discretion. The amendment aims to provide such flexibility.

We had similar arguments when considering the Criminal Justice Bill last winter. The amendments have been tabled in a positive spirit, and there are two reasons why they should be supported. The first is one of principle, because justice requires that the courts should have the ability to tailor their penalties to provide the just deserts to the individual offender. That principle underpinned the Criminal Justice Act 1991. Local magistrates and judges should have the option not to disqualify if the offender had no personal responsibility for the aggravating factors.

This argument will be repeated when we consider those found guilty of an aggravated offence who were not driving. Other offences which carry mandatory disqualification require bad or drunken driving on the part of the offender. It cannot be right to provide for mandatory disqualification for an offence with no such requirement. The second argument in favour of the amendments is a practical one. Disqualification will often hinder the work of motor projects, which hon. Members have identified as

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a positive step. They divert offenders and potential offenders away from car crime and they are extremely effective.

I recently visited a motor project and was told that, to have maximum impact, that programme must consist of five essential elements. First, auto offenders should be confronted with the reality of their behaviour, and their attitudes should be challenged. That is no soft option, because the young people were made to meet victims and also relatives of those who had been killed or seriously injured. Secondly, offenders should receive education and training in the legal use of motor cars. Such training is a carrot to encourage young people. They are taught how to drive a car and to pass a test, which is a positive incentive.

The third element in any programme should obviously be practical hands-on driving experience with a view to taking a driving test which requires a full driving licence. Much of the preparatory work in many such projects is done off the road, but it is important to have some experience on the road when getting ready for a test. Fourthly, a programme should contain a range of activities which are equally, if not more, exciting than driving illegally. Such programmes should provide excitement to young people. I know of programmes which involve climbing and other outdoor pursuits as well as difficult tasks to be completed with cars and motor cycles. They were challenging, got the young people on their mettle, tested their skill, and consumed a lot of their energy.

The fifth element in most courses is training in basic auto mechanics. I have been impressed by the enthusiasm shown by instructors and young people. All that is very good.

The sixth, unscripted, element that I would throw in is that many young people find themselves, for the first time in their lives, involved in something that interests them, and able to share their enthusiasm with a group of people who care about them. That is a very positive aspect. I wish motor schemes every success, and I would not want the Bill to harm the chances of those who run them working successfully with young people.

The opportunity for a young offender to obtain a driving licence is important. Project workers say that one of the most powerful incentives that they can offer young people is the prospect that they will eventually be able to drive legally and safely. As the Bill stands, that incentive could be eliminated in many cases because of disqualification, and because insurance companies require high premiums of recently disqualified drivers, in addition to those that they already require of drivers under the age of 25. If we stop young people who very much want to drive from doing so by that combination of factors, we might edge them into reoffending.

The courts must have flexibility in such cases, and the amendments provide alternative ways of providing it. Amendment No. 9 would make disqualification discretionary in any case, and amendment No. 10 in cases where the accused was not personally responsible for the aggravating behaviour. They are not wrecking amendments, but positive amendments which will improve the Bill, and they are sensitive to the real situation.

Mr. Anderson : I am against mandatory penalties in principle, but there are probably some cases in which they would work in justice. We should perhaps concede from the start that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, there

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must be disqualification, but the Minister must accept that, in a small number of cases, mandatory disqualification would not work in the interests of justice.

For example, a young man of good character may enter a vehicle, then learn that it has been taken without the owner's authority--and after travelling just a few hundred yards, it might collide with another vehicle in such a way that the gravity of the incident makes it an aggravated offence.

The Bill would impose disqualification for at least one year on such a person which would have the insurance repercussions that my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Sheerman) mentioned. In a number of cases, that could be viewed by the bench or the judge as working against the prospects of rehabilitation. There must be some scope for discretion in a limited number of cases. I hope that the Government will reconsider.

Mr. John Patten : The young offender cited by the hon. Member for Swansea, East might not, in the circumstances that he described, fall foul of the law, because he might not be convicted of the basic offence under section 12 of the Theft Act 1968. He could be found not guilty, because an individual could not be found guilty of the aggravating offence unless he was found to have transgressed in respect of the basic offence.

I do not disagree with the hon. Member for Huddersfield about the value of motor projects. Any sensible programme aimed at dealing with car crime committed by young men should address prevention and punishment. Those schemes are valuable on the prevention side--as, in my opinion, are the adequate punishment and deterrence measures proposed in the Bill.

Disqualification will begin to take effect at the moment of conviction : that is, when the hands of the clock will start moving. There will be no delay, even when the offender is only 15 or 16. That may seem peculiar, but I believe that it is in the interests of justice. Between the ages of 15 and 17, the offender might go straight, in which event it would be entirely wrong for any part of the punishment--the driving ban, for instance--to come into effect on his or, more rarely, her 17th birthday.

The ban would be recorded at an early stage. When the person concerned obtained a driving licence on, say, his 17th birthday, the endorsement would still be on that licence and it would remain there for up to four years.

Mr. Sheerman : I was under the impression that the disqualification of a person aged 15 would not become meaningful until that person became eligible, at 17, to obtain a licence. I would take a rather different view if the Minister meant that the disqualification would be spent by the time the person reached the age of 17.

Mr. Patten : It could well be spent by that time if the offender was younger than 16 when convicted and if the driving ban was for less than 12 months. That, of course, is merely the mandatory minimum ; the bench could impose a ban lasting five or 10 years or longer--although I understand that the Court of Appeal has advised against long bans, because people find it difficult to keep to them and may reoffend. That is a guideline judgment which has been handed down in a leading case.

What is the point of disqualifying a person who is not yet old enough to drive, the hon. Member for Huddersfield

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asks? I have given one answer : any punishment should happen from the moment of sentence. I believe that it flies in the face of natural justice to delay punishment. Secondly, if a person offends while banned from driving--even if he is still only 15 or 16 ; at any time before his 17th birthday--he will have committed a serious offence, as the hon. Member for Swansea, East will testify. Driving in defiance of a ban carries a sentence of six months' imprisonment, even if the offender is not yet old enough to hold a licence. The courts are free to impose a period of disqualification that extends beyond the offender's 17th birthday, if they see fit.

Surely it is right for every offender who commits and is found guilty of the more serious offence to be kept away from the wheel of a vehicle for at least 12 months. Similarly, the Bill is not concerned with who was directly responsible for the specific aggravating event ; it is concerned with the illegal taking of a vehicle and its consequences. It is not relevant that a person who was a willing participant in the crime was not driving the vehicle at a particular time, or that he had not incited the driver--if I may revert to the language of an earlier set of amendments. Passengers and drivers will be equally liable, as they are for the basic section 12(1) offence in the Theft Act 1968. It makes no sense to differentiate between them for the purposes of endorsement. This is a serious offence. The Government view it seriously and so, I believe, do the public. All who become involved should be equally liable for the penalties incurred by their criminal behaviour. I hope that, following that explanation, the hon. Member for Huddersfield will see fit to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Sheerman : I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

9.45 pm

Mr. Sheerman : I beg to move amendment No. 11, in page 4, line 26, leave out subsection (2).

The First Deputy Chairman : With this, we shall take the following amendments : No. 12, in page 4, line 29, leave out subsection' and insert subsections'.

No. 13, in page 4, line 34, at end insert--

(1AA) Where a person is convicted of an offence under section 12A of the Theft Act 1968 (aggravated vehicle-taking), a special reason for the purposes of subsection (1) above may relate either to the offence or to the offender'.

Mr. Sheerman : The Committee will be pleased to know that this is the last group of amendments. Like the previous group, they are designed to provide the courts with greater flexibility over disqualification. They approach the issue in a different way, through the use of special reasons for not disqualifying a person. The effect of the amendments is to permit the courts to regard the fact that the offender was not driving as a special reason for not disqualifying him. However, the court could still disqualify, if it thought that that was appropriate. The amendment would also enable a court to take into account special reasons relating to the offender as well as the offence.

The last group of amendments builds on the main thrust of trying to make the Bill more reasonable and effective. We strongly believe that if the Bill eventually

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becomes an Act retaining some of its present imperfections, it will not address the very real problems that it should address.

Mr. John Patten : It is important to be clear about what the special reasons are, for the purposes of the legislation. Special reasons must relate to the offence, not to the offender. Special reasons do not include and have never included ill health and loss of employment. They might--I say "might" with a heavy emphasis on that word--cover an accident victim being carried to hospital in an emergency after a crash has been caused where special reasons could be pleaded, although not necessarily accepted. The courts are loth to find special reasons. The hon. Member for Huddersfield will find that section 34 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 is the legislation that governs special offences.

Amendment No. 11 would allow a court not to impose obligatory disqualification if it felt that there was a special reason--I have tried to explain, I hope to the Committee's satisfaction, what a special reason is--for not doing so : the fact that the offender was not driving the vehicle at the particular time. That runs entirely counter to the point of the Bill, which is that all those involved in the offence of illegally taking a vehicle are guilty and should be treated as such.

I can see no reason why this offence should be singled out in a way that would allow people to have taken into account the fact that inconvenience would be caused at work, when it is a long-established legal principle that special reasons do not relate to an offender's circum-stances. To do so would seriously weaken the effectiveness of obligatory disqualification. I can see no reason for it.

In the light of what I have said, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Sheerman : I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4

Short title, commencement and extent

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Anderson : Again I raise the question of Scotland. How can the Government justify this Bill in respect of England and Wales only? The Government say, properly, that the offence is prevalent in England and Wales and argue that there is considerable public concern about it. They say that it merits urgent attention and that the present law is inadequate in terms of its scope and penalties. What, therefore, makes Scotland different?

Is it said that the offence is less prevalent in Scotland and that degrees of latitude make the offence less frequently committed in Scotland? Is it said that there is less public concern in Scotland and that there is less urgency about the matter? Or is it said that the relevant legislation, as applied to Scotland--the 1988 Act--is such that there are no lacunae in the law as it applies to Scotland? I do not think that the Government can argue that there is a serious difference between England and Wales and Scotland, so will they assure the House that legislation for Scotland will be introduced with the same urgency?

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Mr. John Patten : We are often told that Scotland is different, that it is a nation and that it has its own laws. Home Office Ministers are often lectured by Scottish Members that we should import decent bits of the Scottish law into the English and Welsh legal code. I see the hon. Member for Roxburgh and Berwickshire (Mr. Kirkwood) nodding in agreement.

In Scotland, aggravated taking is dealt with under section 178 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and under other statutory or common law offences, some of which were described graphically by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Perth and Kinross (Sir N. Fairbairn) in his brief intervention earlier this afternoon.

Measures suitable for one area of the United Kingdom may not be equally applicable to another.

Mr. Anderson : Surely the common law offences that the hon. and learned Member for Perth and Kinross (Sir N. Fairbairn) related in respect of Scotland are equally applicable in England. The Minister will be aware that the penalties available under section 178 are lower than those in England and Wales--three months imprisonment or a fine, but not both. On indictment, I believe that the maximum penalty is 12 months imprisonment. Surely the Minister is not arguing that the offence is less prevalent, or that there is less public concern, in Scotland, so why is there a difference?

Mr. Patten : I recognise that the penalties available under section 178 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 are different. The maximum penalty north of the border is 12 months imprisonment. I am not arguing that there are no differences between us. On the contrary, I am arguing that there are substantial differences between us, but all that I can say is that these are matters for my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Scotland, not for the Home Secretary or myself. Question put and agreed to.

Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Bill reported without amendment ; not amended, considered. Order for Third reading read.

Motion made and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

9.53 pm

Mr. Jim Lester (Broxtowe) : I support the Bill because I know that this serious offence was drawn to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Minister of State by the chief constable of

Nottinghamshire two years ago. I rise simply to ask whether it is possible for the Home Office to publish a pamphlet on the change to the law that can be widely distributed to sixth forms and to many others who commit this offence--many of whom have been charged once but have repeatedly offended-- so that our young people understand how serious it is to steal a car, to drive it dangerously and in some cases to set it on fire wilfully? We want to ensure that they understand the way in which the law has changed and how it can be reinforced. I ask my right hon. Friend the Minister to find out whether that can be undertaken as early as possible on completion of the Bill's passage.

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9.54 pm

Mr. John Patten : My hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Mr. Lester) makes a constructive suggestion. I know how long he has been concerned about the aggravated taking of vehicles and the mayhem caused by young men in parts of Nottinghamshire over the past couple of years. His concern has been reflected by the chief constable. I have not contemplated production of the type of leaflet to which my hon. Friend referred, but it is a good idea. We shall try to do more about car crime during 1992, and I shall reflect on my hon. Friend's comments to see whether we can accommodate his request. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science--the Member for Darlington (Mr. Fallon)--is on the Front Bench with me. We know how important it is to educate children, sometimes even those in their late primary school years, about the offending temptations with which they may be faced. Last week, I was at a Salford school, having visited one of those motor projects to which the hon. Member for Huddersfield referred. I was struck by one of the comments of the primary school headmistress. She said that she felt that children aged between seven and 11 were at particular risk of being cloned by their elder brothers or elder friends into people with the same offending habits. We may well want to follow my hon. Friend's suggestion.

I believe that the Bill, as it goes to another place, has been properly and fully scrutinised on Second Reading and in Committee--as will be shown in Hansard. I hope that this excellent measure will receive not only the assent of the House but the strong support of everyone who has been so concerned about this issue during 1991. I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill read the Third time, and passed.

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Teachers' Pay and Conditions

9.56 pm

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science (Mr. Michael Fallon) : I beg to move

That the draft Teachers' Pay and Conditions Act 1987 (Continuation) Order 1991, which was laid before this House on 20th November, be approved.

In each of the past two years, Parliament has approved continuation orders extending the life of the Teachers' Pay and Conditions Act 1987. Last year, an order was needed to ensure that the recommendations of the Interim Advisory Committee on School Teachers' Pay and Conditions in 1991-92 could be given effect. The IAC reported for the last time in January this year and, under the terms of the 1990 continuation order, the 1987 Act is due to expire on 31 March 1992.

During the debate one year ago, my hon. Friend the Minister of State assured the House that new arrangements for deciding teachers' pay would be in place by 31 March 1992, and so they are. The School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Act 1991 received Royal Assent on 25 July. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has appointed the eight members of the schoolteachers' review body under the chairmanship of Sir Graham Day. On 20 September, my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Education and Science asked the review body to submit its first report in January 1992, making recommendations on teachers' pay and conditions in the year commencing 1 April 1992. There is, however, a need for a further continuation order, for entirely technical reasons. Before my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State makes the order giving statutory force to the 1992 schoolteachers' pay and conditions document, he is required under the 1991 Act to consult interested parties on the review body's recommendations on the Government's proposals for implementation. He has also agreed, following the practice adopted in previous years and as specifically requested by the employers and the teachers' unions, to consult the same interested parties on the details of the draft pay document giving effect to the Government's recommendations. We will, of course, move as quickly as possible, but it is most unlikely that my right hon. and learned Friend will be in a position to make the first pay and conditions order under the new Act immediately upon the expiry of the 1987 Act on 31 March 1992.

Until the first new pay and conditions order is made under the new Act, the 1987 Act needs to be kept in being for a very short time for a very specific and limited purpose to ensure that all teachers continue to be covered by the existing pay and conditions order made under that Act. Section 6(3) of the 1987 Act provides for statutory conditions of service to continue to apply to existing contracts until new provision is made.

Teachers who enter with new contracts of employment after the Act expires will not, however, be covered. Therefore, we must ensure tonight that there is a smooth transition between the old and new pay and conditions orders and that the provisions of the 1991 pay document will continue to apply in the case of contracts of employment entered into after 31 March 1992, but before the new order giving effect to the 1992 pay and conditions document comes into force.

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