House of Commons Hansard Debates for 14 Jan 1992

Sir Patrick Duffy (Sheffield, Attercliffe) : Few could have foreseen that the end of the cold war would bring the world not more security, but a great deal less. As the Secretary of State told us at the beginning of the debate, the end of the Soviet Union threatens to bring anarchy and an outburst of tribal passions--"a Yugoslavia with nukes", as James Baker has put it. Given that fearful prospect, we must ber thankful for the loose association of 11 former Soviet republics that is now called the Commonwealth of Independent States, or CIS ; but the years of Soviet power have so inoculated each republic against centralisation that co-ordination will be a struggle.

Earlier this month, at Minsk, the 11 leaders failed, for example, to agree to keep a joint conventional military force. Tricky decisions lie ahead about how to split up the 4 million-strong ex-Soviet force. Last week's Ukraine claims to the full Black sea fleet is a case in point.

Last Friday, here in London--as the Secretary of State is only too well aware--Mr. Richard Cheney, the right hon. Gentleman's opposite number in Washington, said that the United States was watching the dispute over the Black sea fleet very carefully, because

"a dispute over military assets could slop over and affect the nuclear industry".

The west is now resigned to having to deal with four nuclear powers on the territory of the old Soviet Union. It is clearly not possible to ask Mr. Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation, to destroy his strategic arsenal when he has nuclear-armed China as a neighbour. The other three nuclear republics--the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan--are thought unlikely to disarm completely, because they are fearful of giving Mr. Yeltsin a monopoly of nuclear weapons.

The greatest confusion, however, surrounds the fate of central Asia, which contains five Muslim republics, of 60 million people. If they opt to break for Moscow's control, that will clearly have a profound effect on the middle east and China. Turkey, Iran and Pakistan are all interested in stamping their mark on them. Saudi Arabia has already established financial links with Kazakhstan, and there are disturbing reports of secret visits by delegations from Libya, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia to Dushanbe, the capital of Muslim Tajikistgan. All are reported to be interested in buying enriched uranium from the republic, which has deposits of the ore and houses the former Soviet Union's first uraniun enriching plant. Does that portend an Islam bomb?

The major concern of the West is to ensure that nuclear weapons are kept safe from the turmoil that threatens to engulf the area of the old Soviet Union. As we have already been reminded in today's debate, only last month General Vladimir Lobov, then chief of general staff, pronounced during a visit to London that--as he had personally assured me in Madrid in October- -he was entirely satisfied with the nuclear safeguards covering the arsenal of 27,000 warheads. Within 24 hours of his return home, however, General Lobov was sacked and replaced by General Viktor Samsonov. That added to uncertainty in the west about who was really in command of the nuclear weapons.

Column 845

How can there be effective central control of the systems when there is no longer a real political centre? That is not to say that Armageddon can be instigated by a group bent on mischief simply through the pressing of a button ; as the Secretary of State knows, it does not work like that. The chain of control is too complex and too sophisticated. Unfortunately, the more sophisticated safety measures are found only on the more modern weapons. More disturbing are recent reports that Russia and the republics will run out of money : the Secretary of State has already given us an instance of that. Soon, there may no longer be any cash to pay the armed forces, or to buy food imports.

The military-industrial complex, which may account for as much as half of the Soviet economy, is already starting to fall apart. Before Christmas, the head of Soviet military counter-intelligence, Major-General Yuri Bulygin, warned that safety standards were falling because of instability in the demoralised armed forces. While long-range strategic weapons may be secure, that is not necessarily true of shorter-range tactical weapons. Many of those are old, and may not even be as well safeguarded as the more potent strategic weapons.

The repatriation of nuclear systems--strategic and tactical--to, say, the territory of the Russian federation could be both difficult and dangerous. There would be a problem of storage, as existing facilities are overloaded. Even destroying them on the spot would be very expensive, and would probably require western help.

The best technical measures to control nuclear weapons cannot withstand the complete breakdown of social organisation. Instead of just having many hungry people, the Commonwealth of Independent States may soon have many well-armed but hungry people who may be tempted to sell their weapons and skills. As a result of such a black-market brain drain, a growing number of countries in the third world may acquire weapons of mass destruction. Thus, at a stroke, the collapse of the Soviet Union will have unravelled all the work of the non-proliferation treaties. Critically, at a time when smaller nations, from Iraq to Pakistan, have circumvented the cartel to the very edge of nuclear capability, a host of potential nuclear mini-powers has appeared on our horizon.

What can be done? First, as with the Germans, there must be more active involvement in eastern Europe and the CIS--prodding here and hand-holding there. Secondly, in exchange for western aid, technology, and expertise, there must be a binding agreement on the political control of nuclear weapons within the CIS. Thirdly, safety procedures, including physical measures as well as codes, must be strengthened in order to reduce the risk of unauthorised use of nuclear weapons. Fourthly, last month's NATO meeting in Brussels with

representatives from several of the new republics must be repeated on a regular basis, and the emphasis on deterrence must be replaced increasingly by concern with disarmament, restructuring and co-operative arms control measures.

Fifthly, signatories of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty have a chance to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency when its board of governors meets in February. Sixthly, there are two favourable domestic factors--the only constant factors--in the chaos that was

Column 846

once the Soviet Union. The first is the red army and the second is the character of the peoples that made up the Soviet Union, especially the Russians.

The military was always the least corrupt and morally compromised of the pillars of the Soviet state, and the officer corps remains, even now, fundamentally honest and less cynical than any other section of society. Therefore, I believe that we should intensify the dialogue that began between the Soviet army and its western counterparts during the Gorbachev years.

Incidentally, that was preceded by a dialogue involving NATO parliamentarians--notably, the hon. Member for Wealden (Sir G. Johnson Smith), my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall South (Mr. George), the hon. Member for Woolwich (Mr. Cartwright) and the right hon. Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell) and his colleagues on the Select Committee. They all entered into dialogue even before our professional colleagues did so in Brussels and at other command centres. They had discussions with senior political and military Russians and with senior political and military figures throughout the Warsaw pact while it was still in being. Such dialogue forged real friendships at a high level, and I believe that they are much valued throughout what used to be the Warsaw pact as well as the Soviet Union. I hope that such friendships will be maintained and, where possible, intensified.

The other factor is the character of the peoples of the old Soviet Union. Their capacity for endurance is remarkable. Without it, they would not have survived the war years--they could not have overcome the German onslaught-- much less the trials of the past 70 years. Now, their ability to endure what western Europeans might find unendurable may be the salvation of Russia.

It is likely that the west will have to rethink its entire defence strategy, giving increased emphasis to anti-missile defence. In the new environment, can we be sure that the Trident system--however essential its deterrent value--will continue to head our strategic priorities?

5.44 pm

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden) : It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Sir P. Duffy). As he pointed out, in company with other right hon. and hon. Members, he has played a notable part in forging relationships with the eastern European countries--former members of the Warsaw pact--and leading members of the now disbanded Soviet Union. Such work, although at a low level compared with that done by Ministers, has played a useful part in building confidence between what were, at that time, two opposing blocks. The hon. Gentleman is right to say that there is a continuing role at that level, and I believe that his suggestions should be given close and detailed attention by my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench.

During his speech, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State rightly drew attention to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and hinted at other means of destruction which are also a cause of growing concern. He also said--I support his view--that for the foreseeable future we shall need a strong nuclear defence. It is a necessary and vital part of our defence structure and the defence structure of the western world.

I understand that that is also the official policy of those on the Opposition Front Bench. To be fair, their

Column 847

conversion lacks the fervour normally associated with converts, possibly because their conviction is muted by the memory of many of them--both on the Front and Back Benches--that they have devoted the best part of their adult lives to unilateral disarmament. That is why we continue what some people say is a wrangle.

It is important that, in debates such as this, we should test the sincerity and devotion of what is often professed from the Opposition Front Bench, especially by the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill), that there is no difference between the two Front Benches. There is a difference and, although we regret it, we believe that it will continue. Today, as often before, little has been said from the Back Benches that restores my conviction that, if there were to be a Labour Government, they would have the guts to go ahead with the policies that we know are right for this nation.

My purpose is not to dwell on the integrity of the Opposition and their defence policy. I have a high regard for the talents of the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell). He speaks with knowledge and a great conviction as a member of the North Atlantic Assembly. However, I could not agree more with my hon. Friend the Member for Hampshire, East (Mr. Mates) that there is a Janus aspect--it is appropriate that the debate should take place in January--to the Liberal Democrat approach. They look both ways. It is not credible to say that they are committed to a fourth Trident boat and that they support that aspect of nuclear policy, while muttering loudly and clearly to the wider public that their aspiration is to cut defence by 50 per cent. in the next decade. When politicians talk that way, some people believe them. I hope that, in due course, the views of the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East will prevail, because it is not in the interests of our nation or Parliament that we should be divided on this point. My purpose is to look at the international aspects of nuclear weapons and follow some of the points made by the hon. Member for Attercliffe. When my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State drew our attention to those nations that are seeking to develop nuclear weapons, he underlined the fact that the passing of the cold war still leaves us facing a greater variety of potential threats to our security and that, in some ways, that creates a far more volatile and dangerous situation than we have faced before.

Whether or not it is more dangerous and volatile--I believe that it is--I am sure of one thing : that we got into the habit of knowing how to second- guess the Russians. We began to learn how to out-bluff them and how to face them down. We began to develop confidence and a unity developed between the United States and the western European nations. That was one of the great achievements of statesmanship in the post-war world.

What worries me is that, in facing a new situation in which we are not sure where the next threat is coming from, we shall not have the mechanism in place to deal effectively with the problems. Therefore, the ruthlessness of Saddam Hussein, the unpredictability and exotic behaviour of some of today's leaders and the instability of

Column 848

so many countries pose new and more threats of a different type from those which we have faced and with which we became used to dealing after world war two.

The most dangerous aspect is that the ambitions of so many of today's world leaders are fuelled by nationalist aspirations and sometimes by religious fervour, which supports the belief that the possession of chemical and even biological weapons will further their economic and political aims. That is sheer lunacy.

Nearly half a century has elapsed since the end of world war two, when it seemed to Britain that our very existence depended on developing weapons which would ensure our survival. Who would doubt that our judgment on that occasion was right? We had the knowledge, which was confirmed after the war, that our main enemy--Nazi Germany--was developing nuclear weapons and was soon to be followed by the Soviet Union, which did the same.

Mr. Flynn : Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Sir G. Johnson Smith : I shall give way, but not for long. I do not want to disrupt the debate, because I want to allow other hon. Members to speak.

Mr. Flynn : How will the hon. Gentleman dissuade the countries from what he rightly describes as their lunacy by adopting the posture urged on us today, which would involve our not reducing arms but increasing them?

Sir G. Johnson Smith : I had set up my argument to deal with that very problem, and I respect the hon. Gentleman for asking the question. I see a reduction in our nuclear weapons and in our reliance on them, which is why, for example, the Government have announced that we shall withdraw the use of nuclear artillery, and that no surface ships will be equipped with nuclear weapons. There is in train a massive reduction in nuclear weapons, to which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State referred and in which we are already playing our part.

However, as the hon. Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn) said, we face the daunting task of persuading the nations that were not threatened as we were that it is not in their interests or in those of world peace to initiate nuclear programmes just as--as I said earlier--the existing nuclear powers have begun to contain and reduce their nuclear arsenals, which will lead to their virtual elimination together with that of other weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons. I refer, of course, to the agreement on chemical weapons made between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is regrettable that, at this time in the evolution of the relationship between the democracies and the former communist powers of eastern Europe, the situation has been complicated by the emerging capability of some countries outside Europe to develop or to buy at cut prices delivery systems using other forms of mass destruction. The nations which are behind their regional rivals in developing a nuclear capability can--as we know-- acquire a chemical capability as an equivalent deterrent which is cheaper and easier to make. That is why I believe that chemical weapons delivered by ballistic missiles are such an attractive proposition to nations in the middle east which are concerned about Israel's nuclear ability. Therefore, the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and missile technologies is closely

Column 849

linked. That poses a major challenge to our efforts to stop these forms of proliferation. If we are to succeed, we must deal with all the problems simultaneously.

The verification and other control procedures are inadequate. We know that, but we also know that they pose enormous technical and financial problems. No one should underestimate them, but we must--and I believe we can--do better. The common denominator of all the systems is the delivery system-- the ballistic missile.

The belated discovery of the Iraqi nuclear weapons programme has shown that the International Atomic Energy Agency non-proliferation safeguards are not up to the job. Therefore, I hope that, when the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is reviewed--as it shortly will be the Government will urge that ballistic missiles be brought under the control of the NPT formula and that they will back the nuclear non-proliferation treaty with increased powers of surveillance. As we know, export controls and diplomacy can delay missile projects, but they need to be reinforced. That is why some nations drop a few not very well disguised hints that they are within reach of developing a nuclear capability, but never openly admit that they have already become nuclear powers. They know that, if they were to do so, they would be in breach of the NPT and would be subject to enormous financial and economic pressures. Many hon.

Members--including the hon. Member for Attercliffe--referred to that issue. Any decisions taken on this front to tighten the nuclear non-proliferation treaty must have the force of economic trade pressures behind them.

The trouble with schemes designed to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is that it is difficult for the haves to persuade the have-nots. It is fundamental to the success of arms control that the haves are seen to be negotiating reductions in good faith. The recent agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union--not only those involving nuclear and chemical weapons--are good examples of what I have in mind, but we shall need to move beyond such bilateral agreements.

To succeed in reducing proliferation as well as cutting the level of nuclear and chemical weapons will require from all the nations a degree of international co-operation and intrusion into their defence, industrial and research establishments which some will certainly not find it easy to accept. Nor will they find it easy to accept the cost not only of inspection but of the safe disposal of chemicals and of nuclear materials.

The destruction of Soviet chemical weapons was due to begin at the end of 1992 under the terms of the American-Soviet agreement. However, the Soviet Union has not yet begun--it cannot start. It has no place to put the material to be destroyed and, if it does find a special site, as we hope it will, it will cost about 3 billion roubles. That is the estimate of one of the committees of the North Atlantic Assembly.

It is also estimated that the building of the facilities to destroy that category of weapons alone will be 10 times as expensive as the creation of the weapons themselves. The verification of the United States/Soviet nuclear agreement, if it is carried out effectively in the first year as promised, will be about $1 billion. Clearly, the costs will have to be shared between nations if a system of international verification is to succeed. That is why I welcome the

Column 850

assurance by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence that it is the Government's intention to help with those costs.

We know that the European Community, the Conference on Security and Co- operation in Europe, NATO and the other bodies can play a part in monitoring the trade of weapons of mass destruction and in making agreements, but if there is to be a widespread system of verification which will have the confidence of all the nations with their widely differing cultures and political traditions, our country must press hard to put such matters increasingly within the ambit of the United Nations, of a United Nations agency working to internationally agreed procedures. That point was well and truly recognised by our Prime Minister who got the United Nations to increase its role last year when he put forward the idea of a register of conventional arms sales. We should take the initiative a stage further ; that is the only way in which to ensure that the haves and have-nots work together in good faith. That is beginning to happen in Europe. The former Warsaw pact countries do not fear the NATO alliance : they even want to join it. The republics in the new commonwealth which was the Soviet Union are heirs to the arms and inspections agreements that have already been negotiated. All those are the first steps, and they are important. They have done a great deal to bridge the gap that once divided us, and what is being done in Europe can be done globally.

6 pm

Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East) : Notwithstanding the latter part of the remarks by the hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates), I will begin by paying him a compliment. He may recall that, approximately 18 months ago, on an occasion similar to this, he said to the House that the pace of change until then had seemed breathtaking, but that it was nothing compared with the even swifter pace of change which was likely in the future. If he had told the House then that, within 18 months, the Soviet Union would be no more, none of us would have thought that that was a credible proposition. He has certainly been proved right, because the speed of change has accelerated far more than anyone could have expected.

The hon. Member for East Hampshire could have used a better source of information than the recently published Conservative party pamphlet, which I have had the opportunity to read. It is a rather tawdry little missive. I hope that, in future, he will find authorities for his propositions which carry a little more dignity. As he has heard me say many times before in the House, the proper approach to the changing nature of our defence requirement is to have a full-scale defence review and to follow that with an analysis of what our obligations are and are likely to be. That will determine the military resources necessary to meet those obligations, which in turn will determine what financial resources are necessary to meet the military resources. That is also the view of my colleagues in the House of Commons.

The 50 per cent. figure is an objective. However, I must make it clear--I hope that the hon. Member for East Hampshire will accept this--that it is entirely subordinate to the requirement to provide for the United Kingdom a

Column 851

defence policy that recognises the changing nature of the defence obligations to which we are likely to be subject in future. I may have difficulty sitting here with no one behind me. I recall that, in the days when the hon. Member for East Hampshire ploughed a lonely furrow against the poll tax and when young men used to be sent in to ambush him at every opportunity, he made a point of making his speeches from the precise position in which he is sitting at the moment, to ensure that his back was no more exposed than his front. I feel a sense of disappointment that there is nothing in the motion about how we might limit nuclear proliferation. I understand that it is wrong to be too literal about the terms of the motion on an occasion such as this, but I feel a sense of disappointment that there is nothing about how we might limit nuclear proliferation ; nothing about how to continue the process of multilateral nuclear disarmament--the process begun in the INF treaty and carried on by the signing of the START treaty in July between the United States and the Soviet Union--nothing about the contribution that the test ban treaty might make to discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons ; nothing about how to persuade the emerging republics of the Soviet Union that their security need not depend on the possession of strategic nuclear weapons ; and nothing about how we may inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons technology or the sale of tactical weapons out of the deepening disarray which now grips what was once the Soviet military machine. As the debate has demonstrated, those are matters on which there is substantial consensus in the House. It is a pity that the terms of the motion were not drawn to attract that consensus. We cannot sensibly debate the issues raised by the motion without some discussion of the nature of nuclear deterrence. There is no intrinsic merit in nuclear weapons. Their utility is the perception they raise in the minds of a potential adversary. We all know that nuclear deterrence fails as a strategy if the weapons that lie behind it ever have to be used. Nuclear deterrence depends for its success on uncertainty, not about the availability of the weapons, but about their use.

To try to define more precisely the circumstances in which one would use nuclear weapons is extremely unwise. Here I part company from the approach of the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), who seemed to be anxious to try to establish the circumstances in which a Secretary of State for Defence might feel compelled to use nuclear weapons.

Mr. George Robertson (Hamilton) : The very opposite.

Mr. Campbell : I was present for that part of the debate. If my understanding is wrong, I have no doubt that I will be better informed after reading Hansard.

What is clear beyond question is that it is wrong to say in which circumstances one would use nuclear weapons. Apart from anything else, that is almost certainly an invitation to an adversary to press on to the point at which nuclear weapons might be used.

Similarly, to announce a policy of no first use seems to be wholly contradictory to the theory of deterrence. Such a declaration, even if made in good faith, is worthless. It is unenforceable and can easily be abandoned without

Column 852

notice. It embraces not deterrence, but retaliation. It accepts by implication that deterrence may fail. It may provoke an adversary to test the sincerity of a declaration of no first use.

Theories of deterrence within NATO have been the subject of considerable change. First there was mutual assured destruction--I always thought that it was aptly referred to by the acronym MAD--which was replaced by flexible response. That theory was displaced by the idea that nuclear weapons should only be weapons of last resort, and that in turn has been replaced by the theory of minimum deterrence. As the nature and the scale of the threat have changed, so has the doctrine.

It would be morally indefensible to continue to deploy nuclear weapons if there was no justification for doing so. Nothing would be more reprehensible than to indulge in an intellectual scramble to create some ex post facto justification for weapons that it had already been decided to keep. The deployment of nuclear weapons can be justified only if it is appropriate to the risk. Minimum deterrence means minimum in relation to the nature and scale of the weapons to be deployed. It cannot mean minimum in relation to the availability of the deterrent. A deterrent that is not constant may induce in an adversary a willingness to take risks in the hope that it is either inoperable or unavailable. In that real sense, a deterrent that is not constant may prove destructively destabilising.

If we are to have a strategic nuclear deterrent which is constant in the terms in which I have sought to define the word, we require a four-boat submarine fleet to bring it about. Before the topic for today's debate was announced, I had arranged to visit

Barrow-in-Furness and Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd. so that I could be better informed about the circumstances of that company.

Apart from the impression of extraordinary realism on the part of the confederation of trade unions and of the management, whom I met, the clear impression that I took away from the meeting was that, although people were clearly concerned about the provision of employment and about the continuation of the company, they did not see surface vessels, for example, as a substitute for the fourth submarine. They believed that, without the fourth submarine, which would have consequences for their business, they would be precluded from becoming involved in surface vessels.

The right hon. Member for Gorton appeared to suggest that, if there was no fourth submarine, it would be the policy of an incoming Labour Government-- if that were the flavour of the month in which the election was held--to provide work for VSEL. My impression--the right hon. Member for Gorton can check this if he likes--is that those responsible for the conduct of the management of VSEL are more than doubtful about the company's ability to survive without the submarine.

Mr. Douglas : I may have been completely wrong, but I thought that the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) was going a little further than the hon. and learned Gentleman is suggesting, by guaranteeing employment for the work force--more than 11,000 people, if I am right. Perhaps when the hon. Member for Clackmannan (Mr. O'Neill) sums up, he will alter one letter--change "B" to "Y"--and we will get the same guarantee for Yarrow.

Column 853

Mr. Campbell : That missile was aimed not so much at me as at those on the Labour Front Bench. I think that I will keep my head down and leave those concerned to have the necessary exchanges in due course. I would merely reinforce my point that the clear indication that I took away from my meetings in Barrow-in-Furness yesterday was that, without the fourth submarine, the survivability of VSEL is very much in question. Both management and unions told me, without any question of its being confidential, that, if the number of employees ever falls below 5,000, the question of the yard's continuation will become a matter of acute importance.

Mr. Franks : The hon. and learned Gentleman was here an hour or so ago, and no doubt heard the exchange between the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) and myself. So far as I am aware, the right hon. Gentleman has not visited Barrow during my eight and a half years as an hon. Member or ever--unless he has come in the middle of the night.

I wonder whether, during the hon. and learned Gentleman's visit yesterday, representatives of management took him into the Devonshire dock ship hall. If so, no doubt he was taken to the ninth floor and could look down and see what was being built. Can you confirm--[ Hon. Members :-- "He."] Can the hon. and learned Member confirm that, as the Secretary of State said earlier, the fourth Trident submarine is currently under construction and is roughly one quarter built already?

Mr. Campbell : I understand that to be the case, although I have to say that I was not invited to view the submarine under construction because security clearance had not been obtained sufficiently far in advance. I may have a somewhat sinister appearance, and for that reason may not be regarded as someone to be trusted, although, as a member of the North Atlantic Assembly, I was invited to inspect one of the French nuclear submarines. Clearly, the French authorities trust me more than the Ministry of Defence does.

The agreements at Maastricht have confirmed two things--first, the continuing primacy of NATO for the foreseeable future ; secondly the acceptance by the countries of the European Community of an organic growth in the nature of the defence relationships between them. NATO is likely to remain a nuclear alliance for the foreseeable future. The British contribution to NATO's nuclear armaments is not, nor need it be, designed to meet all the eventualities that NATO might face. Neither in NATO nor in the Community are we the only country that possesses nuclear weapons. If NATO's doctrine is truly one of minimum deterrence, surely it is not necessary for the United Kingdom to contribute at every level. That is why I see no reason to increase the number of warheads on the Trident system, if deployed, beyond those of the Polaris system which it is said to replace --I shall come back to the question of replacement in a moment. If Polaris currently provides an effective contribution to minimum nuclear deterrence within NATO, why is it necessary to increase the number of warheads available with Trident by what may be a factor of three? In some respects, it is misplaced to call Trident a replacement. The range of Polaris missiles is 4,600 km, whereas the range of Trident missiles is 9,700 km. Trident missiles are generally regarded as more accurate.

Column 854

Moreover, Polaris warheads are not independently targetable, whereas the warheads on Trident missiles are. That means that, if one adopts the approach that I have urged on the House and on the Secretary of State in the past--that we should deploy no more warheads on the Trident system than are available on the Polaris system--it would be able to hit 192 targets instead of 64.

The Government's answer to the proposition that we should not deploy any more warheads than are available on Polaris is that, because of the increasing sophistication of defensive systems, we need the enhanced capability that Trident possesses. But those defensive systems are to be found around Moscow, and the question that we must ask ourselves--even taking the Government's position as the correct one--is whether the United Kingdom, as a member of NATO, requires a strategic system with which, acting alone and independently, it can penetrate the defence system round Moscow. To put the question another way, do we foresee circumstances in which the United Kingdom, acting independently, would want to fire strategic nuclear weapons at Moscow? I cannot conceive that the answer to either of those questions can be in the affirmative. In my judgment, the United Kingdom's contribution to NATO's doctrine of minimum deterrence can be met if we limit the number of warheads on the Trident system to be deployed.

I am also of the view that NATO's philosophy of minimum deterrence can be met without the United Kingdom having recourse to a tactical air-to-surface missile at a cost now put at around £3 billion. I understand that a decision on that has yet to be made. If what Ministers say is to be accepted, such a decision may be made towards the end of the century. There may be a NATO case for a tactical air-to-surface missile, although I think that a number of questions require answers.

First, in the absence of the doctrine of flexible response, is a tactical air-to-surface missile required? Secondly, being deployed on aircraft, is not TASM vulnerable to pre-emptive strike? Thirdly, did not the Gulf war show that the power of conventional weapons is so great that any so-called benefit from TASM can be more than outweighed by the use of conventional means? I can see no merit in the case for the United Kingdom deploying TASM. In the end, that case must depend on the proposition that all the NATO strategic and tactical nuclear weapons will be an insufficient deterrent without the addition of a united Kingdom tactical weapon. I beg leave to doubt the validity of that proposition.

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Douglas Hogg) : May I seek to clarify the hon. and learned Gentleman's thinking? I have heard him argue the case against TASM. Will he tell the House whether, in addition to what he said against TASM, he is saying that a sub-strategic weapon of any kind is unnecessary from the point of view of the United Kingdom?

Mr. Campbell : From the point of view of the United Kingdom, yes. I argue that the United Kingdom is a member of NATO, an alliance that is likely to be a nuclear alliance for the foreseeable future, and that there is no justification for the United Kingdom endeavouring to provide that alliance with nuclear weapons at every level. That seems a well-founded proposition.

Mr. Julian Brazier (Canterbury) : Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Column 855

Mr. Campbell : I should like to make some progress if I may. I have given way once or twice, and I know that other hon. Members want to speak before the witching hour of seven o'clock.

It is clear that the end of what came to be called the east-west confrontation has given rise to a whole range of new threats. It is clear from what has been said today that several hon. Members recognise that fact. Those threats are based on the nuclear proliferation that has been caused by the break-up of the Soviet Union and by the access to nuclear technology that several other countries have been able to achieve.

Following the successful containment of the Soviet empire, it seems to me that our efforts must be directed towards non-proliferation. In that respect, I agree with what the right hon. Member for Gorton said, in a particularly powerful and appropriate passage of his speech. The one thing we know is that we cannot afford a rash of new nuclear states. In the short term, it may not be possible to prevent some of the former Soviet republics from obtaining a nuclear capability, but surely it is essential to persuade them to subscribe, and to continue to subscribe, to a strategic-weapons centralised command-and-control system. We should be encouraging them to destroy both strategic and tactical weapons, and should be giving them the means to do so. The scale of the problem with which we are dealing may be reflected in two figures. First, some estimate that there are 14,000 tactical nuclear weapons in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Secondly, it is estimated that there are 5,000 scientists--people previously in the employment of the Soviet Union--with experience in plutonium separation and uranium enrichment. One recalls that, after the second world war, the United States was careful to ensure that Dr. von Braun was transported to the United States--not because of any inherent qualities of personality but because he was the leading exponent of rocket technology. [Interruption.]

Mr. Douglas : It was not Ron Brown.

Mr. Menzies Campbell : The names may sound similar, but I fear that comparisons are not easy to draw.

Under the somewhat frenetic stimulus of the impending general election, our own domestic concerns may seem increasingly urgent, but this debate may justify the conclusion that our safety is more likely to be assured by vigorous pursuit of the goals of non-proliferation and arms reduction in the international arena.

6.23 pm

Mr. David Howell (Guildford) : Having listened to the expose of the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell), I cannot say that I have a crystal-clear understanding of Liberal Democrat defence policy. However, the hon. and learned Gentleman raised some very interesting points. My hon. Friend the Member for Wealden (Sir G. Johnson Smith) unkindly said that Liberal policy was two-faced. Having heard the hon. and learned Gentleman, I think that it would be quite an achievement for the Liberal Democrats to have just two faces. There is some work to be done before Liberal policy reaches that stage.

I fully concede that, in the past, one of the problems in debating nuclear deterrence has been that the issues are so fiendishly complex that it is very difficult to state them at

Column 856

all. It is a relief that, on this occasion and in these times, one issue stands out with stark clarity. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State gave an assessment of the dangers in the world today, and the hon. Member for Sheffield, Attercliffe (Mr. Duffy), who is extremely well versed in these matters, made a very informative speech. My right hon. Friend and the hon. Gentleman made the point that there could not be a worse time to contemplate weakening our nuclear defences or our commitment to them. It is crystal clear that, because of the terrifying vista of proliferation, now is the time to keep our nuclear defences and to ensure that they are totally effective. If our policies were not to succeed, we could be on the verge of a quantum leap in nuclear proliferation. The number of nations with nuclear or ballistic missile capacity and the ability to gain access to plutonium warheads or enriched nuclear warheads could be about to double or treble. This is what, 20 or 30 years ago, defence and policy experts saw as a nightmare. The stark scene was set with great calmness and clarity by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and by other hon. Members. It is one for which we have to plan with the utmost care.

Reference has fairly been made to another obvious point : that there must be some evolution of the nuclear doctrine of the west. Although there has not been final confirmation, it looks as though the context has changed totally. We are facing entirely new conditions and new threats. As the hon. Member for Attercliffe said in what was almost an aside, it may well be that, given the fact that threats could come from all sorts of areas and in all sorts of ways that we cannot yet quantify, the need will be not for major cuts in our defence spending but for expenditure in that voraciously expensive area of defence--effective anti-missile systems. In the world into which we are moving, people will rightly want to feel that their nations are absolutely secure against totally unpredictable and wild acts of international banditry. It is into anti-missile defences that we shall have to put many more resources.

Whether or not that is the right way forward, however, it seems to me that the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) missed a point again and again. It is a point that his hon. Friends missed in the early 1980s. I refer to the fact that all improvements and other changes in the nuclear climate--all effective means of heading off the horror of proliferation, such as the achievements, jointly with the former Soviet empire, in winding down nuclear defences--are the result of operating from a position of strength. All the successful moves have resulted from negotiation from a position of strength. If that is not understood--and I fear that Labour Front Bench Members still do not understand it--those who see things differently would condemn this nation and the rest of the western alliance to ineffectiveness in dealing with the terrors and horrors of the spread of nuclear weapons.

The new dangers and challenges have been mentioned by almost all hon. Members who have spoken, so I shall not refer to them in detail. There has crept up on us the prospect that Iraq, probably Iran and perhaps even Algeria--countries which were dismissed as being incapable of producing ballistic missiles or nuclear warheads--have a very advanced capability. In addition, the break-up of the Soviet Union raises the prospect of proliferation and of the export of warheads, equipment and personnel. That is something of which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State reminded us. In that area, therefore, our mission is to do everything possible, by

Column 857

means of our own policies and strategies and those of our NATO and other western allies, to discourage proliferation and, where possible, to encourage denuclearisation.

A number of the states which have succeeded the Soviet Union have said that they want to be non-nuclear. However, I am not hopeful on that front, and I think that the same can be said of the hon. Member for Attercliffe. The independent states may say that non-nuclear status is their intention, but Kazakhstan, for instance, is in what amounts to a nuclear neighbourhood of central Asia. It is surrounded by countries--Pakistan, India, China and Russia--with nuclear weapons openly developed or with the prospect of achieving nuclear weapons. It could be a very long time before the understandable aspiration of those new democracies, or semi-democracies, to be non-nuclear powers is realised. That is one challenge, anyway.

The next challenge--in a way, it is the biggest and the most immediate--is to help to locate, control and destroy thousands of nuclear weapons, as required not only by START but by the September Bush-Gorbachev proposals for non-strategic weapons and by the aspirations of those countries. Hon. Members are right to remind the House that those weapons are not just the new ones that are easily coded and described, and for which procedures are laid down, but old nuclear weapons as well.

We do not even know the number. We talk about 27,000 or 30,000 strategic and non-strategic weapons being around somewhere in the established Soviet system. It makes us warm to feel that Marshal Shaposhnikov and his colleagues have a location not only for the strategic weapons being controlled through their authorising and enabling codes--incidentally, we do not know whether they are authorising or enabling--but for all non- strategic weapons, both the warheads and the launchers, which I understand tend to be kept by different branches of the former Soviet armed forces.

On top of that, we do not really know--and we do not know whether the former Soviet command in control of communications systems knows--where all the older weapons are. We know by comparison that, since 1945, the United States has manufactured some 60,000 to 65,000 nuclear weapons, of which it has about 18,000 to 20,000 outstanding. Over the years, it has had a programme of, first, maintenance and control and, secondly, destroying, degrading, deactivating and dismantling nuclear weapons. Has that gone on in the successor states? Has it gone on in the Soviet Union? We have no idea. Until we establish that point, the danger of some of those warheads going for a walk and ending up in utterly irresponsible hands is very acute. We are now entering--I detect almost a lack of urgency even in policy-making circles--a terrifying transition period in these matters. What existed before in the united Soviet Union was not just a few generals and a few little bags with code numbers. It was a huge complex of nuclear fabrication--the making of rich uranium, of course, and plutonium, and the component parts, the gigantic culture of science behind all that, and the vast knowledge and organisation required to maintain all those weapons under the control of the custody cadres--the custody troops, as opposed to the launch troops. I refer also to the huge organisation and bureaucracy required for the transport and movement of those equipments and weapons, which at one time covered not just the Soviet Union but the whole of eastern Europe. It

Column 858

is possible, although I agree that it is anecdotal, that some tactical warheads are still in areas of eastern Europe and have not finally left. Above all, there is the vast complexity of the control system at all levels, both for the strategic weapons which are in the four major republics and for the tactical weapons which we now know are spread over many more republics.

That is what existed before. It is too optimistic to assume that that system still exists. If it existed before, it depended upon central political authority. We know for a fact that central political authority does not exist. There was the Minsk agreement that the three signing-up members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and perhaps Kazakhstan, would carry on with the stategic nuclear control system in the hands of the military, Marshal Shaposhnikov, and the four political heads of the four states. We have no guarantees at all of the huge complex system which has to lie behind an effectively maintained system of control over a vast arsenal of nuclear weapons, some new, some old, some well maintained, some deteriorating, some under close guard near Moscow, and some perhaps lost away under guard or perhaps not under adequate guard in faraway places. We have no guarantee that the politico-technical system required to contol all that exists any more. In fact, it is almost certain that it does not exist.

That leads me to the view that, when thinking about maintaining and being committed to nuclear deterrence--there was never a more important time to do that--we should also combine it with the most accelerated and intense efforts to work with our other NATO allies, including the Americans, in coming to grips with the problem in the successor states. Mr. Bartholomew, the Under-Secretary of State at the Department of Defense, has gone with a team to Kiev, Alma Ata and other places. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary will travel in that direction at the weekend. The American Senate has had some very good debates on the subject. After talking earlier about a $2 billion sum that it wanted to devote to resources for coming to grips with the control of that splintered and dispersed vast arsenal, it voted an initial $400 million, which is still a vast resource. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will confirm that the Americans have invited their NATO allies to begin to form a coalition force--an international task force --this time, not for getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait but for bringing together all the nuclear expertise of NATO to ensure that the crumbling system of nuclear command and control in the former Soviet Union is replaced extremely quickly by effective systems which can maintain control of the system before real irresponsibility and real danger creep in.

What is needed over and above strengthening the territorial defence of this nation--as I suggested in my remarks about improved anti-missile defence, perhaps we should do more in that direction--is, of course, that the successor republics carry through their commitment to stick to the START provisions. It looks as though they have done that. They need also to carry through their commitment to stick to the principles outlined at the Bush- Gorbachev meeting in September 1991, which in theory was far-sighted in its undertakings and its verbal side as it pointed to a huge mutual destruction of non-strategic weapons.

Column 859

We do not know whether any capacity exists to carry that out. We shall not know, until we ourselves assist in the forming of task forces, whether forces are equipped and have the resources to move all those weapons to deactivation and dismantling sites. We do not know whether the political resources exist, even if politicians are found in Alma Ata, Kiev and Moscow to agree to the fulfilment of START and the Bush-Gorbachev deal, and whether their political power extends to actually achieving all that at present.

There is a problem about sending vast teams of people to remote cities. They sit in hotels and discover that they cannot find anybody in charge of programmes. However, I do not think that that should deter us for one moment. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister is to chair a Security Council meeting at the end of the month to try to focus on those matters, on how the new successor states fit into the international order, on how Russia takes its place as a member of the Security Council, and on what that will do to relationships with the other successor state countries. That is very good, but I urge my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and our right hon. Friends to accept that the issue is by far the greatest and most dangerous issue facing the world at this moment.

The urgency is immense, and the task forces should now be mobilised. I know that the cry "public expenditure" goes up, but heaven knows, the prize is very great. If we fail to prevent proliferation and ensure that safe systems are in place, defence expenditure further down the line would dwarf anything that we might have to spend to get the task forces moving. We must also ensure that all successor states sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. As we know from the Iraq experience, that treaty is not good enough. The International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, which may be a worthy organisation, failed in the Iraq case. It did not spot what was going on. Clearly, the whole treaty needs beefing up very fast indeed. That, too, should be done not in a few months, not when we have considered all the factors, but now--at this moment--before the equipment begins to fall into other hands, as it will.

As has been said, if some of the Muslim states in the transcaucasian republics find such equipment on their soil, their incentive to hand it over to Moscow is low whereas their incentive to hand it over to their Muslim brothers in other areas is high. We must remember that irresistible incentives are being offered to some of the scientific teams, experts and individuals who could earn hard currency, be given housing facilities and exchange their present misery--their shortages of food, freezing conditions, inadequate heating and low salaries in devalued roubles--for the sort of salaries being offered in Baghdad, Tehran and Peking. The incentives are irresistible, and they will not be resisted. Those people will be--may already be--on the move.

The House, the Government and the policy makers of the west must consider either how to keep such people in Moscow where the former Soviet--now the Russian--academy of sciences is considering that question, or whether to bring them into western universities and academies, as happened with some of the leading German rocket scientists after the second world war. We must

Next Section

Home Page