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outperformed. One of the benefits of specialisation may be to reduce the range of equipment that we have to procure. It may not always be necessary to provide state of the art equipment, but it must surely be right that those whom we ask to perform difficult and dangerous tasks should be well equipped to do the task for which they are deployed.We should also recognise that, while peacekeeping may well require different skills from those asked of the average infantry man, it may also require different equipment. Therefore, embarking on a commitment towards peacekeeping has a series of implications and possible consequences to which serious regard must be given. The right hon. Member for Bridgwater mentioned Northern Ireland, and I associate myself with some of the sentiments he expressed. I hope that the recent formation of the Royal Irish Regiment is proceeding successfully, and that the hopes and aspirations that accompanied our debates in the House are being realised. Many hon. Members clearly found the notion of a regiment drawing from both traditions in the community of Northern Ireland an attractive one. However, we must never forget that the battalions are there to support the civil power. As soon as it is feasible to transfer responsibility away from the military power to the civil power, surely it will be right to do that. Therefore, I hope that the Government will take careful heed of what the right hon. Member for Bridgwater said and will keep under proper and consistent review the extent to which the transfer of function back from the military to the civilian power can be achieved.
Croatia was one of the places that the Select Committee on Defence visited last week. As some hon. Members may be aware, British forces operating in Croatia do so under the command and control system of the United Nations, whereas those in Bosnia operate differently. As the hon. Member for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook) said yesterday, some of us were astonished to be told by a senior commander in the British force that his interpretation of the rules of engagement was that if, in order to avoid bloodshed, it was necessary for someone to hand over his own equipment or personal weapon, such action was required. That came as something of a surprise, and I suspect that it has not been generally discussed or understood in the House. I refer to that so that hon. Members can appreciate that when, not lightly but perhaps without necessarily thinking of all the consequences, we assign British forces to the United Nations, we may be putting them in a situation in which, for example, the rules of engagement are rather less robust than those that we would regard as essential in other circumstances.
Nuclear testing has featured briefly in the debate. I cannot understand why the Government do not take the political opportunity offered by the moratorium, because the practicality is that we cannot test at Nevada, as the Americans are engaged in a moratorium. The United States, France and Russia all believe that their nuclear capabilities are not being eroded by a moratorium. Why do the British Government not accept that they have a practical moratorium and seek to gain for themselves the political advantage that arises from being associated with a gesture? I freely accept that it is a gesture, but it is an important one in our efforts to try to persuade other countries, especially in the middle east, that they should not seek to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons.
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Mr. Dalyell : Does the hon. and learned Gentleman accept that, at least according to Lord Zuckerman's article in "Nature", the Americans now think that on technical grounds there is no need for testing? Even if the hon. and learned Gentleman gives me or other hon. Members who have intervened a frivolous answer, can he explain how Sir Hugh Beach, a distinguished general, could sign a letter to The Times suggesting that? We need an answer from the Ministry of Defence.
Mr. Campbell : I know better than to give the hon. Gentleman a frivolous answer to any intervention, and especially the one that he has just made. Not only the distinguished scientist to whom the hon. Gentleman referred but the former head of the Los Altos laboratory is on record as saying that it is not necessary to engage in a regular programme of testing to be satisfied that nuclear weapons are functioning.
It is customary on these occasions to pay tribute to the courage and professionalism of our armed forces and, in this debate, to the courage and professionalism of the Army. I do so with conviction borne of recent experience. During the visit by the Select Committee on Defence to Split and Zagreb it became abundantly clear that everyone in the House and in the country could be proud of the remarkable contribution in extremely difficult circumstances of our armed forces in the two United Nations efforts.
I found some resentment because there was a sense that the public perception in Britain was that the British effort as part of the UN effort rested only on the activities of the Cheshires. There is a great deal of pride in the activities of the Cheshires, but some people were anxious to point out that the logistical, engineering, transport and medical support was extremely high. The conditions in which that support was being given were frequently difficult and made substantial demands on those who provided it.
To those of us who visited Zagreb it seemed that the calm, almost matter of fact way in which substantial responsibility was being accepted and discharged could only be regarded as being in the finest traditions of British forces. It is conventional on these occasions to say how much we value them, but 24 hours a day, in Northern Ireland and especially in the former Yugoslavia, the qualities that we admire are being put to the test. It is right and proper for the House to acknowledge that.
5.54 pm
Mr. William Hague (Richmond, Yorks) : I am pleased to take part in the debate, and I am rather surprised at being called at this time. My interest is primarily a constituency one and my comments may be a little more parochial than those of some of my hon. Friends, because the heart of my constituency contains Catterick garrison, one of the largest Army bases in the country. It also has other military installations. It is a great tribute to those who serve or who have served in Catterick that their presence is viewed positively by the population of Richmond and the surrounding areas. We have a particularly strong and proud association with the Green Howards. A succession of garrison commanders has built up an impressive track record of good community relations. Even more important is the obvious professionalism and dedication of locally stationed units to their training and other tasks. Two weeks ago, I visited 521 company of the Explosive Ordnance Division, effectively the bomb
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disposal team for the north of England. It is stationed at Catterick and I cannot speak too highly of the commitment and excellence of its men."Options for Change" means an upheaval for Catterick garrison as much as for the rest of the Army. The long-established presence for the training regiment and other units of the Royal Corps of Signals is to end and that is viewed locally with some sadness. I was pleased to hear from the Minister that infantry recruit training is to be concentrated at Catterick and that the 19th mechanised brigade and other units yet to be determined are to move in. I think that that will mean an increase of about 2,000 in the number of military personnel and their dependants associated with the garrison. The Army has gone to some lengths to keep local civic leaders and planners fully informed of the changes, and the continued use and further expansion of the garrison has been strongly welcomed. I add to that welcome, having long believed that more of the Army should be stationed in the north of England in any case. Much of the Army is recruited there and it makes sense to concentrate infantry recruit training at Catterick.
I should like to make two points about the huge movements of people and material in and out of Catterick. First, a decision has yet to be announced about the use that the Army will make of the facilities currently occupied by the Royal Air Force Regiment a short distance from the garrison. The future of that base has major implications for local education provision and possibly for the design of roads giving access to the A1. The sooner a decision can be announced on this matter, the better.
Secondly, the reorganisation of Catterick camp will involve the departure of thousands of people and the arrival of thousands more with accompanying vehicles, tanks and so on. Much of it will require the redevelopment of areas of the camp, and it adds to an investment of over £100 million. It is a vast management undertaking. The commander of the garrison and his chief of staff and their assistants are able people who have provided an intricate master plan for how the whole exercise will be managed.
My concern is that the personnel in these positions seem to change so frequently that continuity of management and decision taking become extremely difficult to maintain. We are considering a four or five-year project, operating on a huge scale with rigorous management of infrastructure development, housing stock and all the movement itself required. A bit of stability is called for in the team of people given the task of carrying it all out.
Catterick garrison will continue to be a welcome feature of north Yorkshire, and the local civilian population look forward to continuing to have the Army as neighbours. We shall all work together to ensure that the garrison is an attractive, well ordered and peaceful place for a large, and now a larger, part of our Army to live. I make no apology for speaking at length about Catterick, which is the largest centre of population in my constituency. I shall now deal with the crucial role of many of the Army's support services which are also stationed at Catterick garrison.
About 1,200 civilian jobs at the garrison are to be market tested. I strongly support the principle of market testing across as wide a range as possible of the Government's activities. It is a valuable spur to greater efficiency and can give well deserved opportunities to the private sector.
I notice from the Secretary of State's statement earlier this month that it is believed that the savings flowing from
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the market-testing process in the Ministry of Defence will fund up to 2,000 additional places in front-line units of the field Army. That alone is sufficient justification for the process. However, my constituents who work at the garrison would welcome assurances that the market testing process will be open and fair and will give the opportunity for efficient in-house bids to succeed.A few weeks ago, I visited the REME workshops at Catterick. The excellence of the work carried out there to keep Army units functioning and on the road is beyond dispute. Many of the 180 people who work there have been there all their working lives and started there as apprentices. They know every piece of Army equipment inside out, and they have often been called upon to work round the clock to prepare units to move--most notably in recent weeks with the preparation of vehicles to go to Bosnia. In my view, an in-house bid put together by these people would take some beating, but a categoric assurance from the Minister that they will have every chance to make such a bid successful would do much to dispel what I believe are unjustified fears in the vicinity of the garrison.
The House will have gathered from what I have said that my constituents show a keen interest in the future of the Army and that many have a direct stake in it. Like me, most of them believe that the overall reduction in the size of the Army is a painful necessity rather than something to be welcomed. The end of the cold war justifies a reduction in our military effort and expenditure. On the other hand, it makes it more difficult to know just what sort of Army we should have.
The speed and complexity of modern warfare suggests that our forces should, in the main, be highly mobile and heavily equipped, yet the most frequent demands on them are to serve in Northern Ireland or in roles such as we see in Bosnia, where they are required to perform a more conventional infantry function. Such contrasting duties make flexibility very important, and mean that a decent interval between emergency tours, as identified in the Select Committee report, is essential for training and retraining. The decision a few weeks ago to retain an additional two regiments will undoubtedly help. With that modification, I believe that Ministers have made the right judgment about the overall size of the Army that Britain should sustain. If the Army, at its new size and in its new configuration, becomes overstretched, we must be more careful about taking on commitments rather than think that we must have a larger Army or go back to one of the size that we had during the cold war. I would not like to see further adjustments to "Options for Change" which would be at the expense of the Navy and Air Force, which it is all too easy to forget when unexpected demands are made on our armed forces in Northern Ireland and Bosnia, are in the absolute front line of our national defence.
Here I must refer to some of the remarks of the hon. Member for Motherwell, North (Dr. Reid), who spoke for the Opposition. He seemed to hold various contradictory positions about total defence expenditure and about the resources given to the Army. He attacked the possible overstretch of the Army and we listened with care to what he said about that, but he also said that a Labour Government would not have any greater defence expenditure than we have at the moment. The question
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whether expenditure would be lower or different in some way was left open, but if there is no commitment to greater expenditure and if the Army is overstretched, I think that what he wanted to say was that he would like to have a larger Army at the expense of some other parts of the armed forces, and that may be a perfectly coherent and respectable argument.Mr. McWilliam : Perhaps it would have been easier if we had had a statement on defence estimates debate last year, but we did not have one. This is an Army debate, and that is what we are dealing with. I caution the hon. Gentleman to read the Select Committee report very carefully. The Green Howards, who are doing their stint in Northern Ireland, and are doing it extremely well, are one of the units that we were referring to which spent excessive nights out of bed and suffered from serious overstretch.
Mr. Hague : I entirely accept the point made by the hon. Gentleman. I have read the Select Committee report. I am talking at the moment about the remarks of the hon. Member for Motherwell, North. The announcement that the 29 per cent. reduction in defence expenditure voted for by the Labour party conference was partly retrospective and was to be backdated to 1984- 85 was a startling revelation. I hope that the hon. Member will be going to the Labour party conference this year to explain that the huge reduction that it voted for has mainly taken place already and that it need not vote for such proposals in the future.
The hon. Member attacked the Government for an "unwillingness to face hard decisions", but I thought that he rather ran away from some hard decisions too, particularly on the question of the redundancies to be announced tomorrow. It is easy to whip up an emotional argument about redundancy notices being sent to officers who are serving and who may be under fire in Bosnia or Northern Ireland now, but would it be any fairer to say that a redundancy notice can be served on someone who is about to go to Bosnia or who has just come back from Bosnia? It would be a ludicrous way to decide who should be made redundant from the Army. So before the Opposition accuse the Government of being unwilling to make hard decisions, they need to reconsider how they have run away from hard decisions themselves today.
I support the stance and the policies of the Government, but I ask them to bear in mind the points that I have made about the future of Catterick garrison.
6.6 pm
Mr. Andrew F. Bennett (Denton and Reddish) : I want to deal with five areas, and I will try to be as brief as possible, but I should like to press the Minister a little on nuclear tests. I realise that it is almost impossible for the Government to make a statement in the House today if the Prime Minister is negotiating in Washington at this very moment on this matter, but I hope that we can at least have an assurance that, when the Prime Minister returns, we will have a clear statement of the position.
As I understand it, the Americans have now made it clear that they do not consider that a regular testing programme is essential to maintain the credibility of their deterrent. It is very unlikely that they will be willing for Britain to go on testing in Nevada without paying very much larger sums of money to do the testing and, if they decide to give up, they will probably be totally unwilling to
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allow us to carry out tests. So I hope that, when the Prime Minister comes back, he will make a statement to the House making clear what new arrangements we have made with the Americans about testing.I would argue that, if we want to press for non-proliferation in the world, we must give up testing when it is quite clear that many experts are now satisfied that even if we wish to maintain a nuclear deterrent we do not need to test anyway. I would also argue that we must try to reduce our nuclear capacity again if we want to have any credibility in pressing for non-proliferation. It is absolutely outrageous to me, therefore, that we should consider the expenditure on tactical air-to-surface missiles when it would be an escalation of our nuclear capability. It would be difficult to persuade others that it was perfectly all right for Britain to expand its nuclear capacity but that they should not do so.
I therefore hope that we shall have a speedy review of the whole of this area and will build up a credible case from this country for non- proliferation.
Turning to the Cheshires, I was pressed very hard by many of my constituents when the decision to merge was announced, and I made it clear to them that it would have been totally illogical for me to plead with Ministers for a change in Government policy when I have always argued in favour of defence cuts ; so I did not do that and some of my constituents were not too pleased. On their behalf, however, I must say that they are very pleased that the Government have announced the reprieve of the Cheshires. I also pay tribute to the service which they are performing in the former Yugoslavia. Some of their relatives have told me that they find it difficult to understand that their sons are out there trying to prevent people from dying of starvation but are not trying to prevent those same people from dying from bullets. They find that difficult to cope with when, throughout history, warfare has always involved attempts to starve populations, sieges and so on. I make a strong plea that it is not enough to have troops there providing humanitarian aid. We should use all possible power to establish peace and persuade people to live peacefully together. It is difficult to go on providing humanitarian aid in the current circumstances.
Conservative Members do not seem to understand the sensitivity surrounding redundancy notices. Recently, in an engineering firm in my constituency, the personnel officer made people redundant. He called them into the office, told them about the redundancies and sent them home immediately. I suggested that that was insensitive because they might want the opportunity to discuss with other workers what action they might take. He justified sending them home on two grounds : first, when a person's world was almost coming to an end because of redundancy, that person wanted the opportunity immediately to discuss it with his family ; secondly, when people had that shock, their efficiency was not as good, and it was easy for accidents to occur.
Although it may be important in the management of the whole Army to inform people at the same time about redundancy, it does not ensure the most efficient action of individual soldiers for them to be told when they are on active service. When it involves the safety not simply of the individual soldier but of other soldiers serving with him, it is insensitive to serve the redundancy notice on him at that time. It will be difficult for the soldier to discuss the redundancy with his family ; therefore, it will increase his
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anxiety. In addition, when a person who believed that his future within the Army was secure receives the shock of redundancy, it may affect his military capability, however well trained he is. On a totally different issue, the Army pay office is to be moved. The Minister will be aware that part of the pay office is in Ashton. Although it is in the constituency of my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton- under-Lyne (Mr. Sheldon), many of the people who work there live in my constituency, and it is a substantial employer in Tameside. There is much concern at the decision to move the pay office from Ashton, probably to Glasgow, although the Minister said that a final decision had not been made. There is great disappointment in Tameside that the Government did not think of it as a site. I still hope that they will reconsider it.At Ashton there is the pay office and the audit section which has been civilianised over the last three years, with the recruitment of new staff. Many were attracted to work for the Army in the audit office in the belief that they would have long-term job security. Now they will not have that security because, if the pay office moves to Glasgow, policy has been agreed that the last in will be the first out. Therefore, there is a danger that many of the people who were recruited to work in the audit section in Ashton will be made redundant and people working in the pay office will move to the audit section.
That is not efficient. In addition, it is grossly unfair to people who in some cases gave up reasonably secure jobs, perhaps not as well paid. I hope that the Minister will examine the position and will consider the unfairness of making redundant people who were recruited to the audit section within the past three years.
I am disappointed that, in their development of "Options for Change", the Government have not taken account of the whole picture in regard to defence lands. If they wanted to improve the efficiency of the Army and the other services, they should have examined more carefully the use of defence lands. The position on defence lands has been a mess almost since the first world war. Most were acquired during the first and second world wars. There was very little logic about acquisition. It was done in the emergency of war, and lands were taken over on the basis of the quickest and easiest solution at the time.
The Ministry of Defence has been reluctant to give up defence lands. Great pressure built up in the House and outside in the 1960s for the release of substantial areas because they were no longer required. Eventually, the Government were persuaded to set up the Nugent committee, in 1969, I think. The committee was packed with people sympathetic to the Ministry of Defence. Even so, four years later--the establishment of the committee having been a delaying tactic in itself--the committee recommended that the Ministry should release substantial amounts of land because they were not being used for manoeuvres to the extent that the Ministry had claimed. Sadly, very few of the recommendations of the Nugent committee were implemented. Some access was gained at Lulworth cove and other places. Around barracks in urban areas, some land was sold for housing, but on the whole the Ministry of Defence held on to most of the land. Throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s the message from the Ministry was that eventually land would be released. For some reason, in the mid-1980s the Ministry started to change its tune and argued that it needed extra land.
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Mr. Robathan : There is a certain illogicality in what the hon. Gentleman is saying. The hon. Member for Motherwell, North (Dr. Reid) talked about keeping more troops, which I applaud. As we know, we must bring troops back from Germany. I can assure the hon. Gentleman that defence lands are under severe pressure for training. Indeed, territorial and regular units cannot get on training areas because they are so busy.
Mr. Bennett : I understand that argument. I am aware that certain defence lands are used almost to the optimum, but other areas are not used to anything like the same extent. All I am arguing for is a thorough review. In "Options for Change" the Government did not examine the implications of the use of defence lands. They have not been prepared to answer questions in the House about a review. There are areas which the Government should consider.
The Nugent report made it clear that there were unexploded bombs and other ammunition in substantial areas, particularly in northern Northumberland, which had been used for military exercises during the second world war. There was a programme to try to clear those areas to bring them back into recreational use or other military use. Because of the Falklands war, the bomb disposal activities were suspended. Although activities resumed after the Falklands war, with the conflict in the middle east the bomb disposal experts were again taken away. I would certainly argue that much more of that land could be made safe and used for essential military exercises or released for use by the general public.
We need a proper review. The Minster says that there is a review, but in its report just over a year ago the Audit Commission was extremely critical about the fact that there seemed to be no proper strategy for the use of Ministry of Defence land. There seemed to be considerable pressure for exercises to take place on some sites, but other sites seem hardly to be used at all. If we develop an increased peacekeeping role in the world, the exercises and training manouvres are likely to change and it may be possible to carry out those exercises where people are involved in other activities rather than in totally secluded areas. We need a proper review before there is another haphazard Government attempt to acquire fresh land. The Minister will be aware that there was a public inquiry into claims by the Ministry of Defence that it needed more land in Kent. There was then the question whether the Ministry should take over more land at Holcombe moor. There was a great deal of upset around Bury about the prospect of part of the moor being taken over for military exercises. The Government told the public inquiry that the land was absolutely essential for military exercises and the inquiry found in favour of the Government. Then, perhaps for political reasons, the Government suddently changed their mind and announced that they had decided not to continue with their proposals. Last autumn, the Government proposed to take over the Cnewr estate in south Wales. Again the proposal was not based on any rational plan. The Government really need to carry out a proper review. There needs to be a proper debate in the House about how much land the military needs for its exclusive use, how much land it needs for exercises but which also could be used by the general
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public at other times and how much it all costs. So far, there has been no effective response from the Government to the criticisms of the Audit Commission.My final point concerns arms sales. I do not consider that it is very graceful for Britain to be selling arms around the world, but I understand the argument that, if we do not do it, other people will and that, allegedly, we are extremely choosy about those to whom we sell arms and that we try to choose people who are not likely to use those arms against us or our soldiers. However, some of the messages that I have been getting from the former Yugoslavia suggest that some of the arms used by various factions there have come from some very odd places.
If we are to sell arms, we must work hard to ensure that, when we supply people with new arms, we do not set in motion a chain of second-hand arms sales which ultimately lead to some of those weapons ending up in the most obnoxious places in the world.
Mr. Bennett : Cascading, as my hon. Friend says.
The Government should consider the possibility that, when arms are sold, attempts should be made to persuade those who are modernising their weapon systems that, as part of the deal, we should buy back the old weapons so that they can be destroyed and taken out of the arms circuit. It is appalling to see the consequences of the cascade of arms throughout the world, particularly in some parts of Africa and in the former Yugoslavia. It seems stupid for us to encourage the arms trade and then to be asked to provide peacekeeping forces to separate people who are using weapons that we have not supplied directly but have allowed to cascade down to the combatants in those areas.
Mr. Robathan : Which particular peacekeeping operations does the hon. Gentleman have in mind that involve British troops who are likely to be under attack from British arms?
Mr. Bennett : I very much hope that our troops do not become targets in the former Yugoslavia, but we are on a knife-edge in that country, and the situation could escalate.
I am told that some of the weapons finding their way into the former Yugoslavia were manufactured in Britain. I have not been there, so I speak not from experience but from the messages that I receive from my constituents who have members of their families serving there. The Gulf war is another example.
Mr. McWilliam : I got back from Bosnia last week. The only weapon we saw that was not of indigenous Yugoslav or former Warsaw pact manufacture was an old American tank in Croatia.
Mr. Bennett : It is clear that arms are percolating through the world and increasing tension. If we continue selling arms, we must look at the ways in which we can reduce the use of second-hand weapons to create areas of tension in which we are then asked to perform a peacekeeping role. It will be far better for people not to have the weapons for the conflict than for our soldiers to attempt to maintain peace between warring factions.
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6.25 pmSir Nicholas Bonsor (Upminster) : Before I reach the main purpose of my speech about the two reports before the House, I should say a word or two about the Defence Committee's visit to Bosnia. It was covered quite extensively yesterday in speeches by my colleagues on that Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Mr. Viggers), and the hon. Members for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook), for Walsall, South (Mr. George) and for East Lothian (Mr. Home Robertson). I strongly recommend that hon. Members read those speeches, all of which I whole-heartedly endorse.
However, I should like briefly to make one or two new points. First, I extend the thanks of all members of the Select Committee to those members of the armed forces and in the Ministry who organised and hosted the trip. In the extremely dangerous circumstances in which our soldiers operate, it is not always easy, necessary or welcome to receive a delegation of parliamentarians. However, we were given a very warm welcome and I understood from those who greeted us that they appreciated the fact that we went to see what was happening. I certainly have a very much better understanding of the appalling tragedy being enacted in that country.
I make three brief points arising from the visit itself. First, as the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell) said, there is some resentment that there seems to be a perception in Britain that only the Cheshires are serving. The Cheshires are doing a magnificent job, and it is wonderful news that my right hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench have decided to reprieve them. However, there are also other units there doing a great job. I single out in particular the Royal Engineers, who have carved roads through virgin territory to enable United Nations aid to get through. Those roads can accommodate heavy-track vehicles two abreast through mountain passes and forests. The quality and calibre of their work is breathtakingly good.
I join the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East in paying tribute to them and to all our soldiers serving in the former Yugoslavia who are facing much greater danger than one might perceive from the limited casualties that we have suffered so far. The death of Lance Corporal Edwards was tragic and extremely unfortunate. He was most unlucky in that he was struck although he was in an armoured vehicle and quite heavily protected. A young officer was also wounded. We have suffered no other casualties as yet, and I pray that whatever casualties we may face will be limited.
However, our troops face increasing danger and I do not believe that the Bosnian situation can be sustained for very long at its present level. It seems to me that the danger is increasing daily, given the increase in the number of direct attacks on our troops. The officers to whom we spoke were gravely concerned about that, although the men faced it with their usual courage and equanimity : their morale was extremely high.
There is a limit to our ability to continue to provide the service that we currently provide and to sustain the limitations on our involvement. I do not believe that, if we try to continue for many more months, we shall escape more direct attacks, or escape being drawn into much more direct commitment to the conflict that we want. I must tell my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of
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State that, in my view, unless we move forward--which will mean the fastest possible promotion of the Owen-Vance peace plan, or something very like it--we shall have to decide either to send in more troops to sustain our support, or to withdraw our troops. The current level has only a limited life.Let me now deal with the reports. Although publicity has been given principally to the concentration on numbers and tasks which is evident in our report, the equipment side should not be forgotten. I am glad to see that my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement is present. We await news on the Challenger I upgrade and on the degree to which we may order more Challenger II or upgrade more Challenger I ; the Army needs to know the details as soon as possible, in order to plan for the future.
We also await news on the MLRS III--the updated multiple-launch rocket system--and its air-launched equivalent, the 1238. I hope that the Government will be able to make an announcement in the near future ; I believe that the MOD has carried out an operational search to assess the possible need and has concluded that both systems are indeed required. I hope that both will be supplied and that we shall not be forced to choose between the two.
I pay tribute to my predecessor as Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates), who is now Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, with responsibility for security. He chaired the Committee for at least eight years and performed a splendid task. His report, produced a year ago, foretold the current problems of infantry overstretch long before my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King) acknowledged the existence of any such problems. I am sorry that my right hon. Friend is not present to hear me say that.
The Select Committee report was greeted with some scorn by the MOD. In its reply--produced, I believe, in July--the Ministry stated that it saw no reason to review "Options for Change" at that time and hoped that the matter was now closed : I remember that phrase. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater is now present ; I do not know whether he heard what I said, so I shall repeat it. The current Select Committee's predecessor criticised "Options for Change" and suggested that there were problems earlier than was suggested today by my right hon. Friend. I cannot accept that "Options for Change" was right and that only subsequent events have altered that.
Mr. King : I apologise to my hon. Friend for not being present earlier ; when his name appeared on the annunciator, I was on the telephone.
We always made it clear that "Options for Change" must provide a plan to which people could work. We owe no less than that to the armed forces, whose personnel needed to know where they stood. We set out our plan clearly and, at the same time, made it clear that it might be necessary to review that plan. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces nods. If my hon. Friend studies the document from which I quoted, he will find the statement to which I refer. We said the same throughout the process and what we forecast is precisely what happened. My right hon. Friend the Minister has honoured the pledge that I gave then.
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Sir Nicholas Bonsor : I did not come here to pick a squabble with my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater, but I have said that there are points that I wish to pursue with him. I have also said that, in its reply to the Select Committee report in July--my right hon. Friend had given up his job by then and I do not attribute this to him--the MOD said that, at that time, there was no need to review "Options for Change" and that it hoped that the matter was closed. I was going on to say that the matter was not closed and that our report--which followed from the report produced by the predecessor Committee--made several recommendations, which I have no doubt that hon. Members have read.
The Committee reached four main conclusions. First, it concluded that additional emergency tours--particularly the two in Northern Ireland and the one in Bosnia--had led to additional unacceptable contraction in the emergency tour interval for infantry units and, prospectively, for the armoured artillery and engineer units, which also do emergency tour plots. The average was supposed to be 24 months ; now it is down to 16 or 17. Unfortunately, the welcome additions to infantry strength will not alter the ETP interval, either in 1993-94 or in 1994-95--or so we have been told by the Ministry. I regret that, because it means that we shall be left with a wholly unacceptable level of ETP commitment during that period, which is not covered.
Secondly, the report emphasised that, although the situation had been exacerbated by the non-availability of battalions undergoing amalgamation, the mismatch of commitments and resources looked set to continue after 1995 as new commitments arose. I heard what my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces said ; I must tell him that I have seen no evidence that we are likely to be able to achieve a minimum 24-month gap between ETPs after 1995. If such evidence exists, I should be grateful if my Committee could see it. It strikes us as far more likely--given that more peacekeeping commitments are likely to occur in the next few years-- that we shall continue to be unable to meet the 24-month minimum. It is common ground between the MOD and the Select Committee that that should be the interval between ETPs.
It was for that reason, and others set out in the report, that the Committee concluded, first, that a review of armoured reconnaissance strength was needed : the initial peacekeeping role that we are being asked to play calls for additional reconnaissance strength. I agree with the report of the predecessor Committee that we have cut armoured reconnaisance too much.
The report's main conclusion was that the remaining United Kingdom infantry amalgamations and disbandments should be cancelled. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces made great play of the costs of implementing the report's recommendations : he has named a figure of some £200 million. That exactly matches the Committee's assessment ; although we did not include it in our report, I shall not quibble with my right hon. Friend. I suspect that the gross cost of reprieving the units involved would be in that region. However, I do not think that my right hon. Friend dealt fairly with the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Davyhulme (Mr. Churchill). I do not accept that reprieving another seven battalions would mean that all the existing redundancies in those battalions stood and
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that the men concerned would be replaced entirely by new recruits. I am sure that, on reflection, my right hon. Friend will not persist in that view.Mr. Archie Hamilton : My point was that the front-line battalions that might be reprieved were, by nature, made up of young men who need to be recruited. Those whom we are making redundant are, on the whole, people who have served some time : most have served for more than 12 years. Obviously, some redundancies would be saved, but not very many.
Sir Nicholas Bonsor : I take issue with that. I do not think that my right hon. Friend has thought the matter through. I do not believe that, if seven full battalions were reprieved, my right hon. Friend would replace 75 per cent. of the personnel involved : I use that figure for the sake of argument. Were he to save, say, 50 per cent. of those personnel, on his figures, some £175 million a year would be saved for the next two or three years from the redundancy costs. Futhermore, there are ancillary costs to the Treasury.
That brings me to one of my hobby horses, but I shall resist the temptation to ride it too far. The Treasury will have to meet the additional costs of housing allowance, social security and other welfare payments. They will not affect the budget of the Ministry of Defence, but they will have to be met by the country. I believe that keeping these battalions in being would not cost the country a penny over the next two or three years.
I accept that we are proposing what amounts to a long-term reprieve, not something that would end in 1995. In that regard, I should like to make two points. First, I hope that the present economic plight of this country will not be eternal. When the economy recovers, it should be easier to fund a proper Ministry of Defence budget. Secondly, in 1995 or 1996, if various other things change, we may properly be able to make cuts such as are being put forward as being correct now. If nothing else, that would save us two years in which the emergency tour plot would remain at 17 months. People are expected to spend far too much time away from their families and their homes and it is regrettable that they will be asked to do so in the next two years.
On the question of the emergency tour plot, I do not want to go over old ground or to spell out eternally the point that I have just made. I should like, however, to refer the House to an answer, which I received on 17 February, concerning units due to replace those currently in Bosnia. When it goes to Bosnia, the 1st Prince of Wales Own will have had barely 12 months since its last emergency tour. Even more disturbing is the fact that those elements--and I believe them to be substantial--of 21 Engineer Regiment that will take over from 35 Engineer Regiment in a couple of months' time did an emergency tour in Northern Ireland last September.
A gap of that kind between emergency tour plots--especially ones such as Northern Ireland and Bosnia, which are high-risk operations--is not sufficient. At present, we are putting far too great a strain on our soldiers by asking them to undertake such commitments with such frequency.
I should like to have clarification of one or two of the points that have been made about the extra 5,000 troops to be put into the front line. We have been told that about 1,300 of the 3,000 additional men will go to the two
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restored battalions, and that the other 1,700 will be added to armoured regiments, the logistics corps and public- duty infantry battalions."to reduce the need for augmentation from other units for operational tours".
The Select Committee will look further at this question. I should be grateful for an assurance that the 300-strong public duties increment, which has always been planned, is not included in this number and that it is additional to the 5,000 to whom we are referring. With regard to the 5,000, I shall be watching with some interest to see whether any misuse is made of mirrors in moving the 2,000 personnel from one part of our armed forces to another. While I am on the subject of reprieve, I cannot resist saying that during my trip to Bosnia I was astounded to be told by the Cheshires that my right hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces, who had been in Bosnia the previous week, had told the Cheshires that he personally had reprieved them. [Laughter.] That is how it was put to me. It is a version of events slightly different from what I had understood to be the case. Anyway, I look forward very much to my right hon. Friend's being able to claim the reprieve of the other seven battalions which I hope will in due course be added to our strength.
I should like to take up another point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater made. I am glad to say that on this occasion I wholeheartedly agree with my right hon. Friend. I refer to the review of our use of troops in Northern Ireland. It seems that the only alternative to having additional forces is to find a way in which, without in any way reducing the cover for Northern Ireland and without increasing the risk in the Province, the troops who are involved can be used more efficiently.
We have heard some very good points about the areas in which we may be able to replace soldiers with members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. I feel strongly that we should be able to find a way of achieving a reduction from the very high number of soldiers--19,000--we now have in the Province. I think that I am right in saying that, when the noble Lord Bramall was Chief of the General Staff, we had only 9,000 soldiers in Northern Ireland. That is not so very long ago, and the risk at that time was probably perceived to be as great as it is now.
We should look very closely for ways in which a greater part of the peacekeeping and policing role in Northern Ireland could be transferred back to Northern Ireland itself, with the emphasis obviously on the Royal Ulster Constabulary. I very much hope that we shall be able to find a way of doing something along those lines. The Select Committee has been criticised for not looking in greater detail at proposals concerning means of reviewing commitments. I do not see how we could reduce other commitments. I do not agree with some of my hon. Friends who asked whether it was desirable to keep our forces in, for example, Belize, where we provide a very useful service and have the advantage of being able to train our men in jungle warfare. Nor do I see any immediate prospect of our being able to withdraw from the Falklands. With the sole exception of a close look at Northern Ireland, it would be very difficult properly to reduce our commitments.
We are on much more difficult ground when we talk about potential new commitments. There is no doubt--I do not think that this will be disputed-- that the world is a very different place. The peace dividend for which we looked two years ago has disappeared. We cannot now
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look forward with any hope to a world in which we can afford to lower our guard as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union. My right hon. Friend, in opening the debate, talked about putting this whole question in a global context. I happily do so. I fear that the former Soviet Union increases rather than lessens the likelihood of war. With the stand-off between the old Soviet Union and the western alliance, we had the mutual nuclear deterrent, which had kept peace in the world for many years and looked likely to continue to do so. The Soviet Union has broken up, but there remains a collection of extremely powerful countries. The Ukraine still has 650,000 men under arms and 178 nuclear missiles--quite enough to blow the whole of Europe out of the water. Were those resources to be misused--were there even a threat of their being misused--we should need armed forces and a deterrent of the kind that was required when we were facing the Soviet Union.Russia itself, currently in good and trustworthy hands, may not remain so. President Yeltsin is not secure, and the reforms are by no means safe. There is a very real danger--a danger of which the Russian leadership itself is acutely aware--that Russia will again fall into bad hands, the hands of ideological, militaristic communists. Were that to happen, the west, including this country, would need to deploy weapons not very different from those that have been needed for the past four decades.
My hon. Friend was right to say that the Americans are cutting their defence, as are most of our European allies. I do not suggest that we should not cut ours ; I say that we have cut too much and that our allies are cutting too much. The fact that our allies are cutting back is no excuse for our doing so. I note with some amusement that, in the debate in another place on 10 February, Lord Orr-Ewing, who was a Defence Minister 30 years ago, pointed out that at that time he had looked at the 20 years preceding his term of office. He had found 54 operations in which British forces had taken part. None of them had been anticipated by the Ministry of Defence and none had been allowed for in the forward planning of the day. I take some comfort from the fact that nothing has changed, but it is slightly cold comfort.
Finally, the Army needs leeway for the reason that I have just mentioned. We cannot plan accurately for or know precisely what we shall be called on to meet in the next 10 to 20 years. We now have a high-tech Army with immensely expensive equipment. We cannot make it and unmake it according the peaks and corresponding dips in our economy. We must take the long view --that view is expensive, but we must not shirk from it.
With due deference to my hon. Friend the Member for Davyhulme, I shall quote his grandfather, Winston Churchill, who wrote, on 17 December 1904 :
"The Army is not like a limited liability company to be reconstructed, remodelled, liquidated and refloated from week to week as the money market fluctuates.
It is not an inanimate thing, like a house to be pulled down, or structurally altered at the caprice of the owner ; it is a living thing.
If it is bullied, it sulks ; if it is unhappy, it pines ; if it is harried, it gets feverish ; if it is sufficiently disturbed, it will wither and dwindle and almost die ; and when it comes to this last serious condition, it is only revived by lots of time and lots of money".
This country made the error of cutting back too hard on its defences in the late 18th century and again in the late 19th century and before the first and second world wars.
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