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Mr. Corbyn : I have looked at "Dod's Parliamentary Companion", and I see that my hon. Friend and I are of broadly similar ages, but we may have a different outlook on the matter. If the Maastricht treaty, as proposed, allows Britain to get involved, wrongly in my view, in another Falklands- type adventure and it does not fetter individual action, what is the point of it in achieving a unified foreign policy and why is the provision there at all?
Mr. Mandelson : Because in many circumstances the European Community, acting together through a common policy, would give greater impetus to the foreign policy aims and goals to which we subscribe than we would otherwise be able to support and achieve by acting separately and alone. It is a simple point, and it underpins my approach to these matters. It is most constructive to promote joint action through a common policy among those states between whom co-operation is practical and achievable-- that is, member states within the European Community. Generally, international problems are intensified, not alleviated, by the failure of the European Community member states to act together. It is hardly sensible to suggest that incipient chaos--for example, as we see it in eastern Europe and to a much more graphic and immediate extent in Russia--is more likely to be resolved by a looser and less co-ordinated western Europe. The opposite is the case. Member states will always give greater impetus to their policies by working together. That is the simple truth, which is at the heart of the article which we are discussing. Forging a common foreign policy in Europe does not mean that we should stop promoting British interests abroad, especially in commerce, industry and finance. For that, we need more and better diplomatic representation and freedom to act worldwide in Britain's interests. In saying that, I echo the comments of the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath) at the end of the Budget debate last week. He described the way in which the foreign and diplomatic service has been decried, demoralised and in many areas decimated by the former occupant of No. 10 Downing street, in wicked alliance with the Treasury.
Obviously, in comparison with more heartrending spending cuts made by the Government, cuts in the foreign service may not seem important. However, they are a false
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economy and the proposed scaling down of posts should be resisted strongly by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. I hope that in due course, if not tonight, he will say that he is prepared to take more to arms in defence of the foreign service of which he is the political head.What then should be the Community's foreign affairs and security agenda? What should be the priorities for action? Mr. Hans van den Broek, the external political relations Commissioner, suggested in an interview in the Financial Times on 8 March that his priorities were negotiating the enlargement of Community membership and involving eastern Europe immediately as much as possible through trade and market access prior to full membership. He also said that he was conducting the Community's role in the former Yugoslavia. That must be welcome. He said that he was trying to put the Community behind Russia's reform effort. We have learned in the past few days of his efforts with the triad of Ministers in Moscow over the weekend.
I have no time to comment on anything but the last activity in relation to Russia. I want to do so briefly, because I had the opportunity of visiting Russia this month on a delegation headed by my noble Friend Lord Healey, under the auspices of the St. Andrew Foundation and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy. When one conducts a visit like that using public funds, one should, where possible, report back to the House. I cannot do so at length, and it is difficult to sum up in a few observations the issues posed to Community policy by events in Russia, where not just one but three revolutions are taking place--a political and democratic revolution, an economic revolution and a national revolution, as nationalities within Russia vie for some form of national and self-expression. 7.15 pm
I want to make a few quick points about aid for Russia, which needs to be targeted for specific objectives. The aid should not be bundled across in vast quantities immediately ; it can and should be given in tranches. It is wrong for the European contribution to this effort to have been so muted and tardy, and for the leadership to have passed so obviously and so visibly to the United States. I do not decry the commitment of President Clinton, but there are dangers in the United States seeming to be acting alone in offering aid to Russia. It is politically undesirable for President Clinton's domestic constituency and his public for the United States to be presented in such a way that it seems to be acting unilaterally. That is wrong, and will contribute to the erosion of the public support that President Clinton needs for the aid programme which he is promoting. It is also bad from the point of view of the Russian public that aid to Russia seems to take the form of manna from Washington or from the White house.
To rely on the International Monetary Fund and the World bank is also probably wrong. They have slow and cumbersome working methods. In stepping up aid to Russia, we have to base that action much more on direct Government-to-Government aid. It needs to be multilateral. The Japanese will no doubt fall in, but Europe, including Britain, should be fully involved.
Aid should not be seen as a reward for actions taken by the Russian Government, but should be an incentive to encourage desirable actions. An attitude has grown up of,
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"Do this and we will reward you." That is the wrong approach. Aid needs to act as an incentive, an enabler or a facilitator.Mr. Corbyn : In his visit to Russia, did any thought cross my hon. Friend's mind that the headlong rush into a market economy has been a catalyst in the destruction of Russian manufacturing industry, which has in turn created the problem of imported goods and the devaluation of the currency? Does he not think that there is a case for planning in the Russian economy to ensure that such a crisis does not continue?
Mr. Mandelson : My hon. Friend talks about a headlong rush. I assume that it is the speed of the transition that he is objecting to rather than the goal of moving towards a market economy. If it is to be prosperous, it is essential for Russia to move towards a market economy. The sort of market economy that I advocate is a mixed, managed market economy, which has at least been the model in this country in the past and in other western European countries.
Mr. Calum Macdonald (Western Isles) : I am sure that my hon. Friend has observed that the Russian Government have asked specifically for several billion dollars' worth of aid to help support the social security system in Russia which they cannot finance by themselves, and so the caricature of the current Russian Government as being simply orientated towards laissez-faire market reforms is quite false. One of the best things that the United Kingdom and the European Community could do would be to support that kind of social security programme.
Mr. Mandelson : Of course, our hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) was offering a parody of President Yeltsin's policies and what is happening in Russia, and my hon. Friend the Member for the Western Isles (Mr. Macdonald) therefore makes a good point, certainly about the need for a social welfare system. But an essential condition for any successful transition of the Russian economy is to get things under control and to stabilise the economy. Hyper-inflation is a very real and dangerous threat for Russia at present, and it is imperative to get its central bank and its credit system on a proper footing.
I believe that aid should be used in this way and for this purpose, rather than the way in which state enterprises are presently being financed, by printing money. It would be much better to stop the printing of money and to get the money supply in Russia under control, and, instead, use aid from the West to finance the state enterprises and former state enterprises in Russia.
The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Janet Fookes) : Order. Before the hon. Gentleman continues, may I suggest to him that he is now giving a discourse about the general state of the Russian economy and nation rather than about what we should be discussing, which is the common European policy, its merits or otherwise?
Mr. Mandelson : I am pulled back into order immediately and willingly, Dame Janet. I am only sorry that I did not make it clear that the points that I am
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making about aid for Russia are entirely in the context of the policy of the European Community and what aid we might promote and develop for that country.I would just conclude my point by saying that Russian aid means more than money. It must mean know-how and management skills. It must be multilateral, it needs to be in at the ground floor and it needs to be delivered as promised. There could be nothing more dangerous for the situation in Russia than for western countries to make offers that do not subsequently stand up, to say that we will do something and then not do it. It would be very dangerous indeed.
European integration is not just good for trade and economc growth ; it supports the essential steps needed for the strengthening of peace and security in Europe and in the world. Those who gleefully point out every occasion when member states fail to act together or are slow to do so are doing the cause of peace and security no favours whatever. It is easy to point out where people fail or where they do not readily or properly come together to act in the most beneficial way, but we should not be gleeful in pointing the finger. We should instead be encouraging action of a different sort, the pooling and combining of the influence of member states in beneficial and profitable ways.
All too often, European sceptics point to the obstacles and illustrate the inadequacy of Europe's response to events and conclude, by taking a great leap in logic, that European co-operation is therefore bound to fail because it has not always been successful in the past. The basic question remains : are the difficulties and tensions described in this debate best met by weaker or stronger co-operation within Europe? Should our response be a resigned shrug or greater efforts to force joint action within the European Community? My strong view is that we should be doing the latter and that we should be combining our influence in a way that maximises our strength and role in the international community rather than weakening and undermining it.
Mr. Marlow : I hope that the hon. Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Mandelson) will forgive me if I do not follow him on his blueprint for Russia. I am rather more concerned about the blueprint that somebody else wishes to impose on the European Community. We had a lovely speech from the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell), who speaks for the Liberal party. He suggested that we should look at the treaty in the round. It was as if he were suggesting that the treaty is not really a treaty at all but a pious expression of goodwill or a statement of intent rather than a treaty of 134 detailed clauses and provisions.
Mr. Menzies Campbell rose--
Mr. Marlow : I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman has never been involved in business, bought a house or had to sign a contract, because if he is as cavalier in doing that as he is when he looks at the treaty, heaven help him.
Mr. Campbell : Before the hon. Gentleman develops this theme, what I said and what he clearly understood me to say was that it is not appropriate to take out of the treaty a phrase, a sentence or a paragraph which suits his argument. He must read the treaty as a whole. That is why
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the provisions with regard to unanimity and consensus necessarily qualify those passages in the treaty which he sought to put to the Secretary of State.Mr. Marlow : I can reassure the hon. and learned Gentleman. I have read the treaty. But I am a little concerned about his saying that one should not take individual items out of the treaty and make deductions therefrom, because he himself has done just that. For example, he referred to paragraph 6 of article J.3, which is the doctrine of imperative need, that
"In cases of imperative need arising from changes in the situation"
individual nation states can take their own action, that there is an opt- out, that it is rather like the Luxembourg compromise where, when vital national interests are at stake, one can take one's own view. I wonder whether the hon. and learned Gentleman believes that the Luxembourg compromise can still be used and, if so, how long he reckons that the doctrine of imperative need will survive all the other provisions of the treaty. If he wants to look at the treaty in the round, may I draw his attention to paragraph 2 of article J.2 : "the Council shall"--
not "may", but "shall"--
"define a common position. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions."
The hon. and learned Gentleman says one thing, the treaty says another.
Mr. Menzies Campbell rose--
Mr. Bill Walker rose--
Mr. Hurd rose--
Mr. Marlow : I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) and then I will give way to my right hon. Friend.
Mr. Bill Walker : I thank my hon. Friend. I trust that he will bear in mind that the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell) makes a very good living at being a lawyer in Scotland where he dissects very cleverly, on behalf of many individuals, including companies in which I have an interest, details of such things as treaties like this.
Mr. Marlow : This puts a very interesting complexion on it. I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will be more careful when he looks at the treaty in future, because it is legislation. It is the law of the land.
Mr. Hurd : My hon. Friend is obviouly at the beginning of a slashing speech, but if he is going to quote extensively from the treaty, I hope that he will quote sentences as a whole. He said, in his slashing way,
"the Council shall define a common position".
"Whenever it deems it necessary" is what the treaty says as a qualifier on that. My hon. Friend will also accept that how it is to define a common position, how it is to define join action and by what procedure is all clearly laid down in the treaty.
Mr. Marlow : As ever, that intervention by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was reasonable and persuasive, as was his speech. Everything that he said in his speech was reassuring. It is as if he was telling us not to worry because nothing would happen, it was all there before, all these powers existed in the Single European Act, there was no difference in the treaty, we had a double lock
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and everything would be all right. What my right hon. Friend said was masterly and reassuring, but it was not persuasive because those of us who have read the treaty, and read it in all its respects, not just in the common foreign and security policy, know that for every item in the treaty that is reassuring, there is another item, another route through the treaty, which is very far from reassuring and which has a very different impact on the sovereignty and position of the House of Commons and this country. As I said to my right hon. Friend in a previous intervention, article J.1 says :"The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy."
It does not say the union might do something about it, or could, or may if it feels like it, if it gets out of bed on the right side. It says that the union "shall" co-operate in every area of foreign and security policy.
Sir Ivan Lawrence (Burton) : Is not the real weakness of the Government's position the fact that, although they talk about the importance of the veto, the House has a veto over the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, yet my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary says that we must ratify it because if we do not we shall lose influence and power in the European Community ? The power of veto to which my right hon. Friend refers is as useless as the power of veto that the House has over the ratification of the treaty. At every stage it would be said that we were behaving in an anti-communautaire fashion, and that we could not do that without losing influence. Is that not the fundamental absurdity of the Government's position ? 7.30 pm
Mr. Marlow : My hon. and learned Friend makes powerfully a point that has been equally powerfully made by my hon. Friend the Member for Vale of Glamorgan (Mr. Sweeney)--
Mr. Menzies Campbell : Will the hon. Gentleman give way ?
Mr. Marlow : Hang on, let me finish.
This is the "heart of Europe" argument again : we must ratify the treaty if we want to be at the heart of Europe, and having done so, and being at the heart of Europe, we then have to accept all the commitments made in the treaty. The treaty says that we "shall" have a common foreign and security policy, so, by jingo, we shall have one.
Mr. Campbell : The hon. Gentleman is at it again. He is quoting only those parts of the paragraph that suit his argument. The paragraph says :
"The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy, governed by the provisions of this Title".
That necessarily means that article J.1(1) is governed by article J.3. The hon. Gentleman is falling into the trap of selecting those parts of the title that suit his argument and disregarding any part that contradicts it. If I may say so, he is behaving like a slick lawyer.
Mr. Marlow : I am almost tempted to say that it takes one to know one, but of course, Dame Janet, I would not say anything like that. The hon. and learned Gentleman makes his point--he has made it before. He says, "This is what I find in the treaty ; that is what you find in the treaty.
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We look at it in different ways. You are taking a selective piece out of the treaty, but my selective piece of the treaty is totally different."We have had those debates and arguments before. We had them in 1985, over the Single European Act. Many of us asked the Government various questions then, and the Government said, "It does not matter ; the Act is simply about the single market. There is no transfer of power." Yet now, who will make the decision on the 48-hour week ? Who will make decisions on immigration policy ? The Government got it wrong then. I dare say that the hon. and learned Gentleman got it wrong, too--and, by golly, he is getting it wrong now.
Mr. Cash : My hon. Friend is making trenchant points. I also have the greatest sympathy and agreement with what my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Sir I. Lawrence) said. Does my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Mr. Marlow) accept that the very fact that the arrangements will be made under a separate pillar but will, so it is claimed, be subject to international legal obligations will create the most massive confusion? The need for joint action plans could easily arise in the middle of the night. When there is a need to make an immediate decision, the 12 member states will be running around to one another with lawyers, administrators, Foreign Secretaries and Ministers of State if Ministers of State are still in place--trying to arrive at positions. The idea is absurd. At the moment, at least we can make our own decisions, as we did on the Gulf.
Mr. Marlow : If my hon. Friend is referring to potential bureaucracy and suggesting that a common foreign policy will be an imitation in foreign affairs terms of the common agricultural policy, it is most responsible of him to bring such comparisons to the notice of the Committee. Clearly we must be concerned about such issues.
Mr. Spearing : Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
The hon. and learned Member for Fife, East--
Mr. Campbell : Fife, North-East.
Mr. Marlow : Even more--north and east Fife ; I congratulate the hon. and learned Gentleman. The hon. and learned Member for Fife, North- East said that he was in favour of co-operation with the other nations of western Europe on foreign and security policy--I presume that that means defence policy ; I do not know whether there is a great deal of difference between security policy and defence policy. We are all in favour of that. We all agree that if we have friends and interests in common we want to co- operate with our friends with whom we have those interests in common. But we do not and will not want to do that through the provisions of the treaty. Some of us believe that the treaty does not go about the matter in the right way, and that, rather than helping and making matters better, it will make them worse.
Mr. Spearing : Is it not possible to reconcile the apparent conflict between the hon. Gentleman and the Foreign Secretary on the question of having to have a single policy, but having to arrive at that policy by unanimity, which, as the Foreign Secretary and other hon. Gentlemen have insisted throughout the debate, seems to
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suggest that there is some sort of lock or safeguard? Rather like article 99, which requires, ultimately, a common system of taxation and so on, and says that that shall be achieved by unanimity, the provision does not remove the obligation, but, by the requirement for unanimity, it forces discussion and a certain amount of compromise and trading, because that is the only way in which unanimity can be reached on the single policy that is mandatory within the text of the treaty.Mr. Marlow : I take the view that if we commit ourselves to allowing the union to define and implement a common policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy--the treaty says that it "shall" do so--and if we commit ourselves to the declaration, and to being at the heart of Europe, the hon. Gentleman's argument is powerful.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary would say--and any sane person would agree with him--that we want to co-operate with our European colleagues on foreign and security policy. I am sure that that is right. I should be happy to co-operate with other European nation states on defence policy and foreign policy and I hope that the co-operation will develop and improve, and one day be greater than it is today. But there are ways of achieving that. Either such things can happen organically or a blueprint can be imposed from above. Organic development, where we take people with us, will work. Informal co-operation, in which different nation states have different views but decide to pool their views and come together on a common policy, will work because there is no coercion and no moral blackmail. But the formal policies set out in the treaty, and the complex procedures for applying them, may well have the opposite effect, trying to lock unwilling partners into a common policy that some people find disagreeable. That will cause stress and distraction, and will weaken the objective that the Foreign Secretary and I share.
Mr. Winnick rose --
Mr. Marlow : I give way to the hon. Member for Walsall, North.
Mr. Winnick : I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's courtesy. Does he recognise another weakness? There has been a general willingness by most people, including myself, to accept co-operation between European countries --certainly between the countries in the Community. I consider that perfectly logical. However, if the treaty comes into force our suspicion, justified or otherwise, will be that the closer the co-operation, the more likely it is to lead to a type of federal set-up. Therefore, whereas previously we would have taken such co-operation as a matter of course, which would cause no controversy among those of us who oppose the treaty, after the treaty came into force we should be constantly on our guard lest it lead to the dangers to which the hon. Gentleman refers.
Mr. Marlow : I follow the hon. Gentleman in believing that there will be a feeling, if things go on as they are at the moment, that the treaty is being imposed on an unwilling and reluctant European public by the political elite of the European states that make up the Community. I believe that the problems to which the hon. Gentleman refers will arise. If they do, there will be a great deal of resentment about the way in which the treaty has been put together and about the lack of proper consultation with the people,
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especially in this country. At the moment, we do not even have the chance of a referendum. If great issues come out of the treaty which cause great stress and disagreement within the United Kingdom, where people have not even been allowed to have a vote on the subject, I tremble to think of the popular reaction.My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary says that it is all different now. He says that previously we had a monolithic European Community, whereas now we have the three pillars. We are now discussing the pillar on foreign and security policy. My right hon. Friend says that the institutional control and management of this pillar is different and that we have more independence. That is all true. However, my right hon. Friend then says that we are winning the argument, that things are coming our way, that everyone now agrees with us and that the powers are coming our way. They are not, are they?
In all the areas and in every area of policy in which the European institutions had power before the treaty, they still have those powers ; in the new areas the treaty gives them powers that they did not have before or extends the powers that they had before. The treaty is not rolling back the frontiers of bureaucracy. It is not rolling back the powers of the Commission or of the European Parliament. By the treaty, we are increasing them, especially in this pillar. We are not winning the arguments and we are not gaining ground ; we are losing ground to European institutions.
Mr. Hurd : I do not think that my hon. Friend will find that I have ever said that the treaty of Maastricht would roll back those powers. What I have said in these debates is that it represents a check to the centralisers. [ Hon. Members-- : "Why?"] Why? We have been committed for many years under the treaty of Rome and under the Single European Act, as the Opposition and a number of my hon. Friends, although not those who oppose the treaty, have been, to an ever-closer union of peoples. That has not been defined. It is defined in the treaty of Maastricht in a way that makes it absolutely clear that the ever-closer union embraces and can include work together as Governments. That is the novelty and that is why I am justified in saying that the treaty, which is not a perfect treaty but a compromise treaty, represents a check to the centralisers. The centralisers recognise that, which is why they preferred the Dutch draft, which was rejected.
Mr. Marlow : As my right hon. Friend says, the centralisers have not got as much as they wanted. However, my right hon. Friend also says that the treaty is a check to the centralisers. Within the meaning of the English language, to give the centralisers more power than they had before, even though one does not give them as much as they have asked for, is not a check. I see it as a gift to them.
Mr. Bill Walker : My hon. Friend will be aware, as I am, that during the passage of the Single European Act, I kept asking Ministers for a clear definition of what "union" meant. Many of my hon. Friends who voted for the Act did so believing what they were told at the time. They now find that "union" meant what I always believed it meant, which was why I was so concerned about and so opposed to the Single European Act. I did not oppose it because I opposed co-operation in Europe ; I did not and do not. I am opposed to tying the United Kingdom and especially the citizens of Scotland, who have another union--the
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Union that created this Parliament, which is why we understand what union means--to this union. So many misleading things have come about because people have not fully understood what the meaning of "union" is and was.Mr. Marlow : I shall touch on that subject in a few seconds. ns to slow down? It does not mean to stop. If a policy arises in the European Community--in the union--with which it wants to go ahead, all that the processes will allow us to do is to check it--to say, "Think again." If the Community thinks again and decides to go ahead, nothing in the world will stop it as long as we want to stay part of the European Community, which we have every interest in continuing to do. The point will go on arising. It may be in the Community's interest not to be checked. We shall lose influence and we shall lose power if we insist to the contrary. We shall have exercised our check--"Good night and thank you very much." The issue will go forward as the union wants.
7.45 pm
Mr. Marlow : It is a one-way street with a ratchet in it. There is no turning back and every time we move forward, it becomes part of the acquis communautaire. There is no sign or potential legislation from anywhere to suggest that that will not be the case. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Sir I. Lawrence) knows, there will be a conference in 1996 with a view to increasing and enhancing the powers of the treaty. The ratchet will move forward yet again.
My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary smiles. I point out that his predecessors in 1986, when we discussed the Single European Act, also smiled if people said that it was a one-way street and that we were moving progressively towards a federal Europe. I grant that my right hon. Friend may be right to smile. That may not happen, but the provisions of the treaty and the commitment of the United Kingdom to be at the heart of Europe make it far more likely that it will happen than that it will not happen.
Mr. Cash : Does my hon. Friend recall that in 1986, we had a major debate on the Single European Act? Although he may not remember, I raised almost exactly the same point with the then Foreign Secretary, now Lord Howe. In reply, as reported in Hansard , he said in effect that I was living in a fantasy world about the prospects of a federal Europe and, furthermore, that these were horror stories for little children which should not be disseminated. Those are exactly the arguments which we are hearing now. We have been proved right. Nobody doubts that the treaty has all the ingredients necessary for a federal state and a central bank. Does my hon. Friend agree that we are being given the same run-around that we were given before?
Mr. Marlow : My hon. Friend makes his point powerfully. Some say that he is wrong ; I do not say that he is wrong. Some say that we have many protections, not least the protection of subsidiarity. If my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary wants to say that subsidiarity is important and wants to give proof that subsidiarity will
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work in this area, as in others, he can cite the 48-hour week. He can tell us that he is quite convinced that under the new procedures of subsidiarity, we in Parliament alone will be able to decide whether there should be a 48-hour week in the United Kingdom. If he can do that, we may take some heart from the fact that the ratchet is moving in the other direction. If not, the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Cash) must stand.Mr. Rowlands : Should not the Committee have at least one modest objective in obtaining information from the Foreign Secretary? Although the language of the Single European Act, which says that member states
"shall endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy shall take full account of the positions of the other partners shall ensure that common principles and objectives are gradually developed and defined",
is simple and gentle--the language of co-operation--it is to be replaced by the language of article J.1. There is a qualitative difference in the language. I hope that the Foreign Secretary will tell us why one has to move from the Single European Act to this. From a practical point of view, what is the difference between the two types of language?
Mr. Marlow : It is the difference between "may" and "shall". I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has any children. To say to a child, "You may go to bed", is different from saying to a child, "You shall go to bed." There is a great deal of difference in terms of the result one anticipates from using the two different words. I take two examples from the treaty, one of which I have used already and to which the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr. Rowlands) has just referred. The kernel of the debate and the basis of a common defence and foreign policy is paragraph 1 of article J.1. There is no ambiguity. It states :
"The Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy"--
I would prefer to call it a common defence policy because they are much the same--covering not some but
"all areas of common and security policy."
By ratifying the treaty we are committing ourselves to that. Whatever the qualifying phrases, whatever other parts of the treaty say or those that want us to ratify it might say, and whatever little bits of it that they care to select from title V, that is the part which matters supremely and above all else.
Mrs. Dunwoody : When we are told that we may rely on the fact that the other structures mean that no votes will be taken without the agreement of the United Kingdom, should the hon. Gentleman not remind the Committee about the Luxembourg compromise, which he briefly mentioned but did not spell out? Initially, we were told that it was a way to protect our interests, then we were told that it was not in the treaty and then we were told that it was no longer relevant because "We have now moved on." Will the hon. Gentleman underline the fact that occasionally those beautifully presented compromises somehow disappear two or three years down the line?
Mr. Marlow : I think that that is known as the principle of progressive erosion of national powers and it seems to have worked effectively so far.
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Mr. Hurd : In answer to the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney (Mr. Rowlands), rather than make a further intervention later, may I say that it is perfectly true that the language of the treaty is more elaborate than the language of the Single European Act. In some ways, that Act has an advantage. I gave examples of the way in which sanctions would be introduced and on the role of political directors, which I think are helpful. I gave examples defining the role of the Commission and showing that it has the right to propose but not a monopoly--excluding the role of the European Court. Those are advantages. They show that co-operation in foreign and security policy is moving in a sensible direction.
My hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Mr. Marlow) was also kind enough to give way to the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody). She mentioned the Luxembourg compromise, but the huge difference is that that is not in the treaty. I do not want to go into an exposition of the strength of that compromise now, but it is not in the treaty--
Mr. Cash : It is not in the treaty.
Mr. Hurd : That is exactly my point--whereas article J.8 is in the treaty and it lays down the only way in which a common foreign and security policy can be constructed. It is very clear--it is in the treaty. That is what I mean. I am not saying that the formulations in the treaty are perfect, but the way in which foreign policy and security co-operation is defined and organised, and the way in which common positions and joint action can be taken, is clearly set out and is a check to those who believe in centralising--that it is inevitable that the Commission should steadily increase its powers on such matters--and to qualified majority voting. It is a check to those ambitions.
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