House of Commons Hansard Debates for 30 Mar 1993

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section on the decision of the Heads of State and Government concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the treaty of European union, the so-called Danish decision, section C includes the following interesting formulation :

"The Heads of State and Government note that, in response to the invitation from the Western European Union (WEU), Denmark has become an observer to that organisation. They also note that nothing in the Treaty on European Union commits Denmark to become a member of the WEU. Accordingly, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but will not prevent the development of a closer co-operation between Member States in this area."

8.30 pm

That raises some interesting questions. What will happen in 1995--it is hoped that it will be in 1995--if Austria, Sweden and Finland, which are neutral countries and not in the WEU, or in NATO, unlike Denmark, join the European Community? Will they wish to and be allowed to join the WEU? If they do not, what will be their position in relation to their status with regard to the European Council when it discusses with whichever country holds the presidency at that time these questions related to foreign security policies?

I have looked very closely at what has been said in recent months by our Government and some other Governments and I am not at all clear as to what that position will be. Perhaps nobody is clear about it. It could be that the reason that they are not clear is that we know that another intergovernmental conference is to be held in 1996. We also know that the 1948 Brussels treaty which established the Western European Union runs out in 1998, after 50 years. Therefore, there is a very uncertain period in the run-up to the

intergovernmental conference of 1996 and in relation to what will happen to the WEU in 1998 : its relationship to the European ministerial Council and to the European Commission, and, through them, to the Community as a whole.

Mr. Simon Burns (Chelmsford) : It is clear that the hon. Gentleman has looked very carefully into this matter. Does he agree with me that the speech that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary made in Berlin in December 1990 is crucial? Would he comment on the points made in that speech, which are particularly germane to the point that he is discussing now?

Mr. Gapes : Unfortunately, I do not have with me a copy of the Foreign Secretary's speech in 1990. I have some other documents, but I did not bring the whole library into the Chamber. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could help me with that.

Mr. Burns : I would assume that, given that the hon. Gentleman is making his speech about the future of the WEU, he would be familiar with my right hon. Friend's speech, in which he discussed the revitalisation of the WEU. Given the hon. Gentleman's interest in and knowledge of the matter, does he agree with my right hon. Friend's thesis?

Mr. Gapes : I am grateful for that clarification. The concept of the revitalisation of the WEU goes back virtually to when it was stillborn at its inception. I can recall the declaration by Genscher, who was then the German Foreign Minister, with the French Foreign Minister of that time, 1984, about revitalisation. There was

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also the first ever ministerial meeting of defence Ministers, which I believe that the right hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Heseltine) attended on occasion. The concept of the revitalisation of the WEU is something that many politicians in many different countries have talked about.

The problem with the WEU is that it is a bit like a character from a Pirandello play--it is an organisation seeking a role. It may be that in the Maastricht treaty it has now found a role as a bridge between it and NATO, or, in the French conception, as potentially a replacement for the Atlantic alliance.

Mr. Spearing : I am grateful to my hon. Friend because he is using his expertise most excellently in analysing the matter, irrespective of the point of view. I have just received an answer from the Minister of State to a question that I put down today relating to the position of Denmark. I asked which articles of title V were excluded by the Edinburgh decision and he says :

"The position of Denmark agreed at Edinburgh clarifies, though it does not alter, either the text of the treaty of European union or the obligations taken on by those who ratify the treaty. That applies to title V of the treaty as it does to other provisions. At Edinburgh, Heads of Government noted that Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the union which have defence implications."

That may help my hon. Friend. The point is that the obligations are the same even if they do not participate.

Mr. Gapes : I suspect that my hon. Friend is correct in that assessment ; no doubt the Minister will intervene if he is not.

Mr. Burns : Given that the hon. Gentleman was commenting on past experiments to try to revitalise the WEU, and given that my right hon. Friend's speech in Berlin in December 1990 put forward a number of options for revitalising the organisation, I wonder whether the hon. Gentleman could tell us which of those options he thinks would not be capable of bringing about the revitalisation that he is discussing.

Mr. Gapes : I will come later in my contribution to my own prescriptions in my own time.

I want to draw attention to the question of enlargement, because it seems to me that there are clearly significant problems if neutrality is seen as being defined in the old way of east-west politics. The previous Swedish Government--and this is taken further by the present Swedish Government-- have said that since the cold war is over and the Warsaw pact no longer exists, what have they to be neutral against? As my hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Mandelson) said earlier, some of us were concerned that enlargement might be stopped because of too rapid a move towards consideration of the questions of common defence and the relationship of the European Community with the Western European Union. Clearly, since the events of November 1989, that has changed. It is now clear that, for the Austrians, the Swedes and, probably, the Finns, just as currently for the Irish, it is no longer an obstacle to their membership of the Community, even to membership of the Community with this close relationship to the WEU.

However, other difficulties could arise, not with European countries, but with the United States.

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Mr. Rowlands : As I understand it--I think it was from evidence that the Minister of State and his officials gave to the Select Committee quite recently--no applicant will have the right to derogate, or even to strike the Danish deal, when it applies to join ; it will have to accept every obligation under the treaty as it stands.

Mr. Gapes : That is what we were told. It remains to be seen what happens in the negotiations on the detail of the particular countries when they come to join the Community. None of us can predict what will happen over the next two or three years.

Mr. Garel-Jones : Sometimes there is confusion in the minds of hon. Gentlemen as to the difference between a security policy and a defence policy. According to the union treaty, the union does not have a defence policy ; it has a security policy and therefore there is no incompatibility with a neutral country assuming the full Maastricht acquis, while remaining neutral. That is perfectly clear.

Mr. Gapes : I am grateful to the Minister for his intervention, although I draw attention to paragraph 1 of article J.4, which talks about

"the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might lead in time to a common defence."

The phrase "might in time" is an interesting concept, but it is in the treaty. Despite the negotiations and the Government saying that they would not allow defence to be included in Maastricht, nevertheless it is there. Perhaps the Minister could explain why.

Mr. Garel-Jones : It will not surprise the hon. Gentleman, who is knowledgeable about these matters, that those words were carefully chosen, and the Government were party to including them in the treaty. If the hon. Gentleman reads them with great care, as I am sure he has, he will see that I am correct in saying that there is no defence component to the union treaty.

Mr. Gapes : I assure the Minister that I have read the words with care. I should be grateful if I could now develop the rest of my argument.

Mr. Macdonald : My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I draw the Minister's attention to paragraph 2 of article J.4, which states : "The Union requests the Western European Union which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications." So the Western European Union is an integral part of European union.

Mr. Gapes : I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention and give way to the Minister.

Mr. Garel-Jones : In seeking to be helpful to the Commmittee, the hon. Gentleman read out the word "requests," which was also a very carefully chosen word. It does not say "instructs"; it says "requests". The Western European Union is free standing from the union.

Mr. Spearing : It is an integral part of it.

Mr. Gapes : I agree with my hon. Friend. I move on to other concerns.

The American Administration, for budget reasons and because of domestic pressures, will be looking to reduce military spending in those places where there are no

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members of Congress protecting defence plants and contracts in their own states. It will be looking to make reductions in those parts of the world where they will cause the least possible damage to the United States' internal political consensus. It is therefore quite likely that there will be further reductions in the American military presence in Europe in future.

Britain and other members of the European Community should take care in the debate leading up to the intergovernmental conference in 1996 and the one in 1998 on the future of the Western European Union not to send the wrong signals to the American people and Administration. It would be short- sighted of us if, by our own actions, we precipitated an unnecessarily hasty American withdrawal from Europe.

I do not believe that that is the policy of the current American Administration ; it was not the policy of the previous one. The reappointment of Mr. Seitz as the American ambassador is to be welcomed as he clearly understands Britain and British politics and will convey accurate messages to his Government, unlike some of his predecessors.

In discussing the role of the Western European Union as a putative defence component or defence arm of the European Community, we need to be careful that we are not signalling that we are ready for the Americans to withdraw from Europe.

8.45 pm

Dr. Liam Fox (Woodspring) : Given that the hon. Gentleman is so worried about defence and about sending the wrong signal to the United States, why at the Labour conference did his party continually call for cuts in defence spending? Most recently in the House, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Dr. Jones) and many of her colleagues were telling the House to cut £7 billion from defence.

Mr. Gapes : I refer the hon. Gentleman to the excellent speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Motherwell, North (Dr. Reid) some weeks ago in which he made clear the position of the Labour party and pointed out that the cuts being being planned by the present Government and the trend for future years would be in line with the policy that was voted by recent Labour party conference. I suggest that the hon. Gentleman addresses his remarks to defence Ministers rather than to me.

I believe that we need to ensure that western Europe does not give another wrong signal through Euro-Gaullism. There is a danger that the French and British nuclear weapons and their continued development could be perceived as an obstacle to further nuclear arms reductions in the United States, Russia and other countries. It is regrettable that the British Government have not done more to persuade the Ukrainians to ratify the START 1 and START 2 treaties and to move towards the elimination of the nuclear weapons on their territory. Clearly there are financial reasons ; the Ukrainians have no money and are asking for western financial support. The recent visit by President Kravchuk led to certain undertakings and commitments, but what will be more important in terms of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and its review conference in 1995 will be a firm commitment by Britain to join Russia, France and the

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United States in a nuclear weapons test moritorium as was called for by my right hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Dr. Cunningham).

Today the campaign has been launched for a test ban and I hope that the House will have a chance to vote for a British nuclear test ban so that we can join the other countries that want to establish a comprehensive test ban treaty. That would be the best possible way to guarantee the continuation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and the implementation of article 6 of that treaty under which the states with nuclear weapons pledge to act in good faith to secure real measures towards nuclear disarmament.

Our past contributions in global strategic and tactical terms were small, but as the Russian and American arsenal are cut the British and French represent a larger proportion of a smaller total. Therefore, we are potentially important players in negotiations if we choose to be so. If we send the wrong signals, we shall be an impediment to further progress, but if we work for further negotiated and verified disarmament, our role will be crucial to the future not only of our continent but of the whole human race.

Reference has been made in the debate to the role of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It is interesting that the Maastricht treaty refers to that. I suspect, although I was not a party to the discussions, that the wording in the treaty has far more to do with trying to assuage German concerns about Germany not being a member of the Security Council and with Germany not feeling that it is being given the involvement internationally that its economic and political strength warrants than it has to do with the conspiracy theories about President Delors, about which we heard so much earlier this evening.

Mr. Corbyn : While my hon. Friend is on the subject of the permanent membership of the Security Council of the United Nations, does he not think that this is a good time to put forward proposals for reform of the United Nations so that that body more properly reflects the world's population and its make up and the lack of Security Council permanent representatives from Africa and Latin America?

The Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Michael Morris) : Order. I do not think that we can reform the United Nations under this amendment this evening.

Mr. Gapes : I agree with my hon. Friend, Mr Morris, but I will not give in to the temptation to stray into that area.

We need to look at Europe's role in the world collectively. Those people who are opposed to a common foreign and security policy have to answer one question : what is their alternative? Is their alternative, as it seems to be with other opponents of the process of European integration, a return to what has been called national sovereignty? Is national sovereignty in defence, security and international relations something which, when we look back over the centuries of the history of this continent, has brought us lasting peace, harmony, friendship and co-operation? Did it bring us that in the hundred years war, in the thirty years war, in the Franco-German war, in the Crimean war, in world war one or world war two?

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The arguments for a common foreign and security policy, based on working out a consensus position among the major economic, political and military countries in this continent, are unanswerable.

Mr. Winnick : Is there not a danger of my hon. Friend lightly dismissing the concept of national sovereignty? I am not aware that we have any mandate to do away with national sovereignty or that it is the wish of the people of this country to do anything of the kind. To try to avoid the tragedies that have occurred, and none more so than in the 20th century, in Europe, is it not necessary to make a distinction between co-operation and the federal concept which my hon. Friend seems to be aiming for, where we would not be in a position to decide our own policy?

I remind my hon. Friend of what happened in 1991 over the invasion of Kuwait and the way in which this country and the United States acted decisively against criminal aggression but there was not as much response from the other countries of the Community--at least not from the majority of them.

Mr. Gapes : There is some truth in what my hon. Friend has just said about 1991 but I do not believe that the concept of national sovereignty, as it has been espoused by some hon. Members today, could bring about the kind of international action against aggression that my hon. Friend and I both supported in 1991. The problem with those people who take what I regard as a narrow-minded nationalist opposition to all things European and to all things concerning the European Community and who try to cloak themselves in the phrase of national sovereignty is that they fail to explain how this nationalist position would add to the security of this country. In a world with nuclear weapons, in a world of aircraft, with international environmental disasters and diseases, how on earth can we, on our own, deal with those problems? Some people, it seems, believe that because we are an island--but I gather from Government policy not for long- -we will be able to be immune from events in other countries.

The strength of political and economic co-operation in Europe will require co-operation on the security level as well, in the widest sense. By "security", I do not just mean defence. Defence is an important component of security, but we have also to take account of the economic, political, social and environmental aspects of security for our country and our people.

Reference has been made to federalism. I am not a federalist. I believe that the kind of Europe we are creating is a mixture between the confederal and federal. The institution has some federal aspects. I regret that, where we do not have more intergovernmental co-operation, there is a democratic deficit.

I am worried that some aspects of the common foreign and security policy and the home policy are being developed in such a way that there is neither effective scrutiny by nor accountability to the House of Commons nor to the European Parliament. In time it is inevitable that the European Parliament will demand--and I support this--more and more control over decisions taken in the elopments. The House does

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itself a disservice by not recognising that the European Parliament is an ally rather than an enemy in exercising democratic control over the executives, the civil servants and the Government Ministers. For those reasons, I support the Maastricht treaty, although in my view it is inadequate in the respects to which I have referred.

Mr. Corbyn : My concerns surrounding the foreign policy section of the Maastricht treaty are that I believe that the proposals with which we are presented are designed to enhance the power of the European Commission over the powers of the individual member states without any concurrent increase in the democratic accountability of those organisations. The reason that I make that assertion is that the proposals put forward envisage the establishment of a sort of shadow agency that will be able to make proposals on foreign policy, as has been said today, and that additionally there is no increase in reality in the power of the European Parliament to have any say in what those proposals are, or to call to account the civil servants who will be making those proposals. So there is a transfer of power away from national parliaments towards the European Commission without any consequent increase in democratic accountability.

Mr. Macdonald : While I do not agree with my hon. Friend's interpretation of the treaty, I accept that the Foreign Secretary underplayed its significance, considering, for example, that title I says in article B that the United Kingdom shall be committed "to assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy including the eventual framing of a common defence policy". That obligation to frame a common defence policy goes far beyond the sorts of co-operation between international bodies and states to which the Foreign Secretary referred.

9 pm

Mr. Corbyn : I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention, which underlines the fact that we are moving towards a common European defence and foreign policy. That being so, one must ask who proposes it, who controls it and what it is for-- [Interruption.] I have asked that question of my Front Bench-- [Interruption.]

The Chairman : Order. If hon. Members do not wish to listen to the hon. Member who has the Floor, I suggest that they stay quiet or leave the Chamber if they want to have a conversation. I wish to hear the hon. Member.

Mr. Corbyn : Thank you, Mr. Morris.

I have expressed some concerns because we live in an era in which, thankfully, the cold war is at an end. Some of us were not particularly enamoured of the cold war, anyway. We now believe that the military expenditure and arms race involved in the cold war resulted in, among other things, massive budget deficits in the United States and the destruction of the Soviet Union.

In the development of the idea of a common European foreign and defence policy, the obvious question is, against whom are we defending western Europe? Where is the external threat, and who is the enemy? I intervened in the speech of my right hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Dr. Cunningham) who, speaking for the official Opposition, said that the enemy was the instability in the

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former Soviet Union, in the former Yugoslavia and in the middle east. Obviously, there is serious instability in those areas. We cannot deal with the instability in the middle east by pouring arms into every sheikhdom and country in the region and so increase tension, any more than the deployment of large numbers of troops in the former Yugoslavia, awful though the situation is there, will necessarily bring about the resolution of that conflict. So what are all the forces for and what is the purpose behind what we are doing?

Mr. Geoffrey Dickens (Littleborough and Saddleworth) : How could anyone have foreseen the Falklands conflict or the fact that Iraq would invade Kuwait? Such things happen out of the blue, meaning that we must have the protective shield of NATO around us. It would be easy to give in to the hon. Gentleman's argument, but our nation would be left vulnerable, and that would be stupid.

Mr. Corbyn : That was an interesting intervention, because neither event to which the hon. Gentleman referred was within the NATO sphere of influence--nor, we are told, was undertaken by NATO. The hon. Gentleman may not be aware that the Falkland Islands are in the southern hemisphere, whereas the NATO sphere of influence is restricted to the northern hemisphere, north of the tropics, and the territory of member states and their dependencies. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was without the NATO sphere of influence, although the hon. Gentleman is on a fair point in that the NATO command structure and intelligence network were used to support the Gulf war effort. I did not support either of those wars. Indeed, I was active in opposing both, and the subsequent chaos in the middle east, with the poverty and hunger there, hardly testifies to the success of the operation, in which 300,000 people died, or the huge expenditure by the British Exchequer on the Falkland Islands. At some stage, somebody will have to grasp the nettle and decide that such a level of military expenditure is not peace but a long-term armed truce that drains us all of our resources.

I believe that a common European defence and foreign policy will lead to further arms expenditure and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear know-how. We should take such issues extremely seriously. Title V states that the objective of such a policy shall be

"to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union".

What exactly does that mean? Do the "fundamental interests" refer to what is happening in the south Atlantic or to some perceived external threat from a non-member state such as Scandinavia, north Africa or Iceland?

Do they refer to the preservation of what I believe is an extremely unjust world economic order? That is where the development of a common foreign and defence policy will lead to more wars like the Gulf war, which is, happily, behind us, although the peace has yet to come to the people of that region. It will also lead to further interventions in third-world countries which attempt to assert their economic independence from an unfair world economic order. In other words, the north-south element of the agenda must be examined seriously.

It is also important to examine how foreign policy decisions are made. There are many imperfections in the workings of the British constitution : we do not live in a

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democracy, we do not have an elected head of state or an elected upper Chamber, and we do not have an accountable judiciary. We have only an elected House of Commons, in which the Prime Minister can use the royal prerogative virtually to pass legislation. Indeed, the Government were legally advised that the Maastricht treaty could be passed in that way.

However, there is some accountability for what the Executive are doing in terms of foreign and defence policy. Under the Maastricht treaty, with a common foreign and defence policy, that accountability will not exist. It will not exist in the European Parliament, which can question but not call to account. It will not exist here, because we shall always be told that policy is being made somewhere else. Article J.1(2) talks of safeguarding

"the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union",

but what does it mean? What are the common values which it is attempting to defend and which the security policy is attempting to underpin? Why is it trying to strengthen the union of the member states? What is the purpose of the various paragraphs of article J.1?

The proposals in article J.1 represent a departure from the usual foreign policy-making and a move towards something new. Article J.1(4) states :

"The Member States shall support the Union's external security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with."

That paragraph raises a number of serious questions, and some examples spring to mind.

Earlier today, we talked about what I believe was the premature recognition of Croatia by Germany. It was not an objective foreign policy decision, but a quid pro quo for support for the exchange rate value of the pound against the deutschmark within the ERM. It was also part of a buy-off to enable Britain to opt out of the social chapter at a later stage.

The French have a predilection for military involvement in certain west African countries, on the basis that they have an inalienable right to decide who should be in government in francophone countries. To what extent would we be dragged into approving and supporting such acts ? When questioned about that, the Foreign Secretary seems to want to have it both ways. He says that we can undertake these as independent acts, but not in concert with the rest of western Europe. These are serious questions. What is the purpose of this part of the treaty, if it is not to drag us into some kind of unified foreign policy, and therefore a series of military adventures ?

The same applies to the foreign policy and constitutional position of individual member states. Ireland voted in a referendum to support the Maastricht treaty. In my view, it did so mistakenly, but that was its right. The Irish people had an opportunity at least to vote on the treaty as a whole. Maastricht undermines fundamentally the principle of neutrality enshrined in the Irish constitution--just as, in my view, it undermines the non-nuclear, or anti-nuclear, parts of Danish foreign policy and the constitution of Denmark. These issues have to be dealt with seriously.

We are told that everything is underpinned by the principle of unanimity in the Council of Ministers in respect of proposals received from the Commission. I am

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not sure that it is. The article says that, where there is agreement, there can be majority voting. Let me pose a hypothetical case. If the Commission had proposed, and the Council of Ministers had agreed, that Kuwait should be given support to deal with its problems with Iraq, and if decisions had been made by majority voting, the conduct of that conflict would have been in the hands of a majority in the Council of Ministers, which could have imposed on member states decisions with which they did not agree.

I did not agree with the Gulf war, but I have to say that the proposition I have just posed would have resulted in the dragging of member states and their troops into a conflict over which they no longer had any individual control.

Mr. Dickens : Surely the attack on Iraq was mounted by the United Nations Security Council, and had nothing at all to do with the European Community or NATO. The hon. Gentleman will correct me if I am wrong.

Mr. Corbyn : It was not mounted by the Security Council. The United Nations called upon Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, but at no stage were the forces in the Gulf region under United Nations command. Indeed, under the terms of the United States constitution, troops of that country may not go into conflict other than under the control of its commander-in-chief, who is the President.

Let me return to the question of majority voting and the effect that it would have on particular defence and foreign policy initiatives. The Foreign Secretary has heard my comments. If he wishes to intervene, I shall happily give way to enable him to clarify the implications.

Mr. Hurd : Under the treaty, defence policy would not be a matter for this process. It would be a matter, if anything, for the WEU as the defence component of the union.

Mr. Corbyn : So the Western European Union would make decisions about the operation of defence policy. But what about the accountability of forces during the operation of any specific conflict? There must be some very clear control in this field, just as there has to be clear control in the promotion of a common defence or foreign policy.

Article J.2 says :

"Member states shall consult one another within the Council on any matter of foreign or security policy of general interest in order to ensure that their combined influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted and convergence action.

Whenever it deems necessary, the Council shall define a common position."

It then says :

"Member states shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions."

I come back to the examples of the way in which Germany recognised Croatia, the way in which France operates in west Africa, the way in which the British Government operated in the case of the Falklands or the way in which the British Government are so closely tied to the interests of the United States militarily and as a whole. Any person who is seriously concerned about the democratic accountability of institutions and about

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bringing peace and disarmament to the world ought to be worried by the proposals in this section of the proposed treaty.

9.15 pm

It also has serious implications for membership of the United Nations. I made an intervention earlier in the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, South (Mr. Gapes) about membership of the Security Council ; Mr. Morris rightly called me to order because I was going wide of the treaty. There is an important point involved, in that it puts obligations on the two permanent members of the Security Council from western Europe--Britain and France--who have to represent the interests of the western European community as a whole rather than their own individual interests. When there is a conflict, how are those representations to be made?

I come back to the example of the Falklands. There was not agreement throughout western Europe on the attitude of Britain. Sometimes there were abstentions ; sometimes no statement was made. How can a member of the Security Council represent two conflicting points of view? Is precedence to be given to the national interest or to the western European interest? These are serious practical problems.

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