House of Commons Hansard Debates for 6 May 1993

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respect, and I was very reassured by the clear determination of the Minister of State for Defence Procurement to maintain standards in the future.

However, nothing is perfect and, when the Treasury is cutting the amount of money available to the Ministry of Defence, there can be no doubt that increasing pressure is being put on the Royal Navy, the Army and the Air Force. The Minister of State said that the level of defence was not Treasury-led but was led by the military necessity of the time. With the greatest respect, I do not think that that is the entire truth.

Like all hon. Members, my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Defence and his colleagues hold dear the security of this country, and they must be worried about the pressure being put on the Army, Navy and Air Force in the present climate. The hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon rightly acknowledged that there had to be a peace dividend --rightly, that is, when there is peace. But at the moment there is neither peace nor any sign of peace. In my view, any sign of a peace dividend--or at least, of a peace dividend that we could justifiably take--lies in the distant future. This must not be the time that we look for further cuts in our defence resource.

I hope that Treasury Ministers as well as the Defence Ministers here today will take note of the fact that the House is determined to ensure that the standards of the Royal Navy and of our other services are maintained, and that whatever resources are necessary for the security and safety of the people of this country are given to the Ministry of Defence. The Select Committee on Defence, on behalf of the House, is dedicated to ensuring that that happens.

I shall therefore examine one or two areas that give us cause for concern. The first is the size of the submarine fleet, which has been briefly touched upon already. There is a danger, which has emerged in evidence given to the Select Committee, that the SSKs will not come into service, and those already in service will be sold.

As my hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement said, no decision has been taken. He implored us not to leap to conclusions, but I am going to take a deep breath, and I am afraid that I am leaping to a conclusion : while no decision has yet been made, that decision is likely to be made. If that happens, we shall be left with a submarine fleet of only 12 boats. In my view--a view shared, I believe, by my colleagues on the Defence Select Committee--such a fleet would be wholly inadequate to ensure the future security of our merchant fleet and the safety of the sea lanes on which this country depends.

Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South) : Would the hon. Gentleman, who is Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, care to draw a parallel with something that he said earlier? He told the House how in the second world war the Germans, who were not seen as a major naval power, put 30 U-boats into one operation, and still lost. If the Government go ahead and sell the Upholder class, we shall have only 12 submarines to cover a whole series of potential theatres of operation. Would the hon. Gentleman care to elaborate on the fact that 30 U-boats lost an engagement, whereas the entire Royal Navy fleet will consist of only 12 submarines if this stupid sale goes ahead?

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Sir Nicholas Bonsor : In fairness to the Government, I must add that these days submarines are infinitely more expensive and complex than they were in the 1940s. It would therefore be unrealistic for us to expect the fleet to consist of as many submarines as both the German and the British fleets had then.

However, the hon. Gentleman is right to say that, as technology advances, there is a tendency to use fewer and fewer platforms, and to rely upon the increasing ability of those platforms to deliver a hard punch. But however strong the armament of one platform may be, it still takes only one missile to sink one platform.

There is a balance, and the Government must bear that in mind. If we were ever to find ourselves in a major conflict again--it would take a foolish Government to forget all the lessons of history and to put that prospect aside--it would be essential to have enough platforms to secure us against whatever attack might be launched upon us.

Mr. Wolfson : My hon. Friend makes an eloquent case for submarines, drawing--as it is important to do--on the lessons of history. Does he agree that the proliferation of submarines in third-world countries is a potential threat for which we need to be ready?

Sir Nicholas Bonsor : I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I agree with him. I am especially concerned about the Iranian Government's purchase of a Russian submarine ; we understand that it is the first of several that the Iranians plan to buy. The Iranian Government are fundamentalist, and pose an undoubted threat to the civilised world. We must watch with substantial alarm the spread of that fundamentalism through the middle east and the strengthening of the military position of the current Iranian regime. That should give the House ample warning of the dangers that lie ahead if we allow our own defences to be let down.

As for the surface fleet, the Minister of State for Defence Procurement rightly said that the Select Committee had been quite vexed by the definition "about 40". We have discussed that definition at some length, and we are indeed quite vexed by it. I do not understand why a number cannot be adopted when we define the strength of our fleet, as we do when defining the strength and number of the regiments and battalions in the Army, or the number of aeroplanes in the Royal Air Force. Numbers of ships are not that different from numbers of tanks or aeroplanes ; why does the Ministry always have to talk in terms of "about 40"?

As my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces says, and as the Select Committee has been told, "about 40" does not mean about 40 at all ; it means between 35 and 45. Even that definition is somewhat economical with the facts. There is no question whatever of our being able to produce 45 frigates and destroyers. In four or five years' time we shall be extremely lucky if we have 35. I would lay a substantial bet with any hon. Member that, unless there is a great change of policy in the Ministry of Defence, we shall certainly not have 40.

Evidence was given to the Select Committee yesterday that we have 40 vessels at the moment, but that number is far from secure. We were also told that the type 21 frigates are all scheduled to be sold within the next two years or so. Again, the "two years or so" was a fairly vague time scale,

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which we were unable to pin down more accurately. Apparently, we shall have built only the next two of the type 23 frigates within the next two years or so.

Therefore, all else being equal, I do not see how we could have more than 36 frigates and destroyers available to the Royal Navy by the end of 1995. That is right at the bottom of the scale of figures that could conceivably be said to be acceptable for a surface fleet of that type, to match what will then be the requirements of the Royal Navy.

That is much worse than it sounds, because at least half a dozen--"about" half a dozen, to coin a phrase--of those ships will be put into what is known as a state of "extended readiness". That is a glorious misnomer. Under that terminology, Ethelred should be rechristened Ethelred the Extended Readiness. There is nothing remotely ready about the ships described as being in a state of extended readiness. I cannot say precisely how long it would take to bring those ships into commission, but I believe that the war would be over long before they went back to sea.

Mr. Archie Hamilton : With regard to assessing potential threats, does my hon. Friend accept that warning times are now much longer than they were in the past? In those much extended warning times, it might well be possible to prepare the ships for war.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor : That is a fair point. In the past, when major wars have been in the offing, we have had extended warning times. We can fairly say that it was only the foolish who did not realise by mid-1938 that we should have to fight the Germans. The same could be said of the Napoleonic wars ; it was clear by the early 1790s that there would be an extended sea war against France.

However, our present problem involves more than the necessity to have enough frigates and destroyers for wartime. The problem is that, if we add to the number of ships in a state of extended readiness the number of ships in refit or otherwise out of commission for one reason or another, the fleet would be reduced not to about 30 ships, as an Opposition Member said earlier, but to more like 15 ships that could put to sea at any given moment.

Given our peacetime, and peacekeeping, commitments even at the moment, I do not believe that we have enough frigates to fulfil our obligations. My hon. Friend the Minister of State for Defence Procurement has already described to the House the many duties that the Royal Navy is called upon to perform. The Royal Navy is responsible for the Armilla patrol. It is in the Adriatic and in STANAVFORMED. We have a guard ship in the West Indies. We should be able to do more--and I will return to this later--to combat piracy in the eastern oceans. That threat to world shipping is becoming increasingly dangerous.

To be candid with the House, I do not believe that 15 frigates are sufficient for us to be able to carry out a proper "emergency tour plot", to use an Army term, and to ensure that we can meet all those commitments over the next five or six years.

Mr. Wilkinson : My hon. Friend is making an extremely important point. Many hon. Members will recall that the Royal Navy had to put to sea on active operations during the Falklands war at very short notice. Admiral Sir Henry Leach and others believe that, if the full provisions of Cmnd. 8288 had already been put into effect, the Royal Navy could not have sent the task force to sea to recover

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the islands. We must also recognise that there will be a grave shortage of trained reserves, who are just as important as available hulls.

Sir Nicholas Bonsor : My hon. Friend is absolutely right. If such a requirement was placed on the Royal Navy again, I believe that it would not be able to meet it without taking ships from other important tasks. I am afraid that we will find ourselves in a position--which I admit we are not in at the moment--of having a Navy that is in danger of being overstretched as our armed forces and soldiers have been overstretched over the past year or two. Those were the two main areas of the Select Committee's report that I wanted to draw to the attention of the House today. However, I have four comparatively minor detailed points that I should like to put to my right hon. Friend the Minister and to the House for consideration.

First, it is extremely important that the fishery protection task is retained by the Royal Navy. The Royal Navy has minesweepers which are not fully deployed in peacetime. They are ideally suited for fishery protection. It would be a tragedy if the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food decided not to continue to use the Royal Navy to protect our fishing vessels.

I see no reason why British fishermen fishing in British waters should find themselves and their livelihoods threatened by fishermen from other parts of our European Community and not be entitled to the full protection of the Government through the medium of the Royal Navy. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Minister will acknowledge that the MOD is conscious of that and will do everything it can to persuade our colleagues in MAFF to continue to fund the operation to protect our fishermen.

Secondly, I should be grateful if Ministers could ensure that plans for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary are properly developed and carried through. It appears to the Select Committee on Defence that, whenever we look at the figures, we find that we have one tanker fewer than when we last looked. The auxiliary oiler replenishment vessels which, I believe, were scheduled to have been with us by now are not. I should be grateful if my right hon. Friend the Minister can tell us when another AOR is due to be ordered.

Thirdly, we must consider hydrography. I believe that the hydrographic ship which is about to be commissioned is to be contracted out. It is extremely important that hydrographic skills are still available within the Royal Navy and that the charting, which is so important for the defences of our country and for all those who use the seas around us, is properly continued in future so that the skills we now have are not allowed to wither away. Finally, and on a similar topic, Manadon, the Royal Navy engineering college, is believed to be under threat-- [Hon. Members :-- "It is."] My hon. Friends are reassuring me that it is under threat. I do not know, and I do not profess to be an expert on these matters, whether Manadon can properly be amalgamated with another Royal Navy college, and whether the education necessary can be provided in a different way. However, I must emphasise the importance of the engineering qualifications and skills and the continuation of the course currently conducted at Manadon.

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I hope that my right hon. Friend will safeguard the role and expertise of Royal Navy engineering officers in respect of any plans he might have for Manadon. It is a matter of grave concern to current engineering officers and to those who have been engineering officers that the skills which they were able to obtain may not be available in the same way to their successors.

I want to return now to my point about piracy. I am very concerned about the amount of piracy in far eastern waters. The Royal Navy could have a role to play in helping to combat that piracy. I should be grateful if my colleagues could spare a ship to assist any policing efforts in that area. The seas around Hong Kong are dangerous. Substantial threats have been made against the lives of amateur sailors when they have ventured out of the immediate area around Hong Kong.

Far too many instances of the hijacking of ships and the murdering of crews have been reported in the past two years, and those incidents are increasing. It might be worth considering arming merchantmen, as we did during the war, as a possible way to see off the pirates and safeguard the security of trade and individuals in the area.

I was pleased to hear my hon. Friend the Minister of State quote my five- times great uncle at the beginning of the debate. I remind the House that Lord Nelson also said, "It is extraordinary how, whenever we fight the French we win, but during the peace, we always lose." The lesson that we must learn from that and from history is that, whenever there is a period of peace, we run down our defences too much.

It is not my right hon. and hon. Friends on the Front Bench who concern me. I am more concerned about my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the pressures that are placed on our defence budget. I ask Ministers to be sure that, if we have to spend more money on our Army and if we have to increase our military budget because of the events in Bosnia, we do not counter that additional expenditure by finding that money from the rest of the defence budget and thus threaten parts of the Navy or the Royal Air Force. I hope that Ministers will go to the Treasury with, I trust, the full backing of the House and tell my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer, "Despite the current economic difficulties and climate, we cannot cut our defences. We must have what we need, and we want you to give us enough money to make absolutely sure that we can provide the defences that this country currently needs."

6.47 pm

Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East) : I cannot claim such a distinguished ancestor as the hon. Member for Upminster (Sir N. Bonsor). However, I believe that Lord Nelson was most successful when he displayed a robust indifference to the requirements of the Admiralty, which I suppose is the theoretical antecedent of the Ministry of Defence. If the Royal Navy and those who lead it are as robust in their protection of its interests as Lord Nelson, perhaps we can be satisfied that the Royal Navy is in good hands. As the Minister of State made clear at least by implication when he opened the debate, a single service debate of this kind has little meaning unless it is conducted against a background of the changing security environment. As interventions from both sides of the House have

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made clear, there is a belief in the House that a debate of this kind lacks the meaning that it might have if it were conducted against a background of some idea of the overall defence strategy of the Government. In that regard, because we have not had a debate on a White Paper on the subject since 1991--before the last general election-- and as it is not clear when we will debate the White Paper for 1993, many hon. Members feel that the debate might have been better informed had those other debates taken place.

We cannot consider the Royal Navy without having some regard to its current and future tasks and responsibilities. Some of them remain unchanged. The primary task of the defence of the United Kingdom--an island nation--is an unchanged responsibility of the Royal Navy. Other tasks that have previously occupied a substantial part of the debate on the Royal Navy--for example, the forward maritime strategy, the protection of supply across the Atlantic and NATO purposes--have become less acute against the background of the changing security environment. The responsibility for the nuclear deterrent, which rests with the Royal Navy, has become less onerous as the threat of nuclear confrontation has receded.

Those responsibilities have been replaced by others--notably, the contribution that we are expected to make to the activities conducted in the name of the United Nations. Our presence in the Adriatic, to which reference has already been made, seems to be a forerunner of similar tasks and responsibilities that we shall be asked to undertake. Those tasks and responsibilities involve different skills. It will be only right and proper that those whom we ask to fulfil those responsibilities have the opportunity to acquire the skills and maintain them at a high level by suitable and sufficient training. Sir Richard Vincent did us a great service last week when he said that any military action can be contemplated only when there are clear political objectives. That is as true in relation to the possibility of military intervention in the Balkans as it is to the proper conduct and management of a service such as the Royal Navy. Until one is clear about the political objectives that the United Kingdom wishes to bring about, the allocation of the military means and, of course, the resources by which those military means are to be provided cannot be as well informed or as effective as it should be. There is by no means satisfaction in the House that the Government have laid down sufficiently clearly the political objectives that they regard as being appropriate for the Royal Navy, nor the means by which such objectives may be achieved. The Minister of State for Defence Procurement said tantalisingly, "If we wait until the publication of the White Paper, all the mysteries will be revealed". He was prodded to some extent about his authorship of a recent work on President Nixon. That conjured up the vision of the Minister sitting in a well-known bookshop in Charing Cross road autographing copies of the defence White Paper for 1993 and, by his table, a queue of expectant Members anxious to have not only the document but their personally autographed copies of it.

What is worth extracting from the exchanges between the Minister and hon. Members on both sides of the House is that there is a feeling--it is almost certainly justified by the Minister's reference to the detail that we will find in the

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White Paper when it is published--that this debate may be less significant than it might have been or, indeed, should have been if the 1993 White Paper had been in our hands.

I shall say a few words about the issue of nuclear deterrence, which has featured to some extent in the debate. Since nuclear weapons are weapons of such awesome potential, and since the Royal Navy has that responsibility, no debate about the Royal Navy should pass without some consideration being given to the issue of nuclear weapons. It appears to be generally accepted by all hon. Members that a four-boat submarine fleet is necessary. The electoral significance of four boats as against three has largely disappeared. Indeed, the argument for four is as true today as it was before the general election--that if a boat is disabled for any reason, it is difficult to maintain one boat permanently on station. Essentially, the fourth submarine provides insurance against unforeseen emergencies. I firmly believe that nuclear deterrence must be constant if it is to be effective. There is no scope for part-time deterrence. I consider that a distinction must be drawn between the constant availability of a deterrent and the level of deterrence. As has been said, the Government's position still appears to be that up to 512 warheads may be deployed on the four boats.

Let us ask ourselves about the distinction between Trident and Polaris. The range of Polaris is 4,600 kilometres ; the range of Trident is 9,700 kilometres--nearly double. Trident is more accurate than Polaris. Trident warheads are independently targetable ; Polaris warheads are not. To put the matter generally, if the Government intend to deploy up to 512 warheads on four boats, that represents a massive increase in fire power. Liberal Democrat Members have consistently argued that there should be no more warheads on the Trident system than there are on the Polaris system, which it is to replace. If that were accepted in terms, there would still be a threefold increase in targeting capabilities.

I have always regarded the nuclear deterrent as being a form of insurance. Surely the level of insurance is variable according to the risk. It is worth remembering that the figure of 512 was conceived at the height of the cold war. It is worth considering that, if we were to press the Minister on the question whether we had an effective nuclear deterrent today, he would tell us that the Polaris system is an effective nuclear deterrent, albeit with 192 warheads. Since Trident represents such an enhancement in targeting capability, we are entitled to ask why it is necessary to have more warheads on Trident than Polaris and, indeed, why there should be more than 192 warheads.

Mr. Bill Walker : In the hon. and learned Gentleman's calculations, has he taken into account the fact that the insurance policy is for more than 20 years and that no one can say who will be in charge of th wise and prudent to ensure that one has a policy extension and cover for all likely eventualities when one is buying Trident today.

Mr. Campbell : If the hon. Gentleman is arguing that, in a time of changed security atmosphere, it might be necessary to acquire more D5 Trident missiles-- [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman says that they will not

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be available. I do not think that he understands that the only reason why we will be able to run them through is that we will be taking them to the United States to be maintained. Since the United States proposes to have an 18-boat fleet of Trident D5 missiles, it is reasonable to assume that we will be able to get more if necessary.

There is a more fundamental answer to the hon. Gentleman's question which he may have left out of his calculation--that is, that the nuclear doctrine of NATO is one of minimum deterrence. We have moved from mutually assured destruction, we have gone past flexible response, and we have gone past weapons of last resort to weapons of minimum deterrence. How is minimum deterrence defined? It is defined as the capacity to inflict upon one's adversary an unacceptable level of damage. If 192 warheads on the existing Polaris system are adequate to do that, the enhanced capability of 192 warheads on the Trident system seems more than adequate to inflict damage on any adversary which that adversary would be unable to accept. The other factor which the hon. Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) has left out is that, on the occasion of Mr. Yeltsin's visit to London, the then Secretary of State for Defence, the right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King), appeared on the nine o'clock news and said in answer to a question that there might well be circumstances in which one required fewer warheads than there were on the existing Polaris system. In those circumstances, we would have rather more persuasive power in the cause of non-proliferation if we as a military nuclear power did not increase our nuclear capacity far beyond what present circumstances dictate to be necessary.

Lady Olga Maitland : The hon. and learned Gentleman questioned the level of warheads. Has he taken it into account the fact that today there are increasingly sophisticated anti-ballistic missile systems and 20 years from now they will be even more sophisticated? Does not that warrant our having a sufficient level of warheads to make our deterrent credible?

Mr. Campbell : The hon. Lady refers to the Moscow criterion. When Mr. Yeltsin came to London, people like me argued in the debate which surrounded that visit that we did not need to deploy more warheads on Trident than there were on the Polaris system that Trident was to replace. Conservative Members argued even while Mr. Yeltsin was in No. 10 Downing street that it was necessary for the protection of the people of the United Kingdom that we should retain a capacity which had the ability to obliterate Moscow. That is simply not a credible position.

It is not necessary to obliterate Moscow in order to inflict damage on Russia at a level which the Government of that country would regard as inappropriae to accept. We must have some element of transparency. Under the START 1 and START 2 treaties which were signed by the Soviet Union and the United States, those countries have to tell each other how many missiles and how many warheads they have. In addition, they have to allow people to inspect their facilities.

If the two greatest nuclear powers in the world are able to reach agreement on two occasions in two far-reaching treaties in such a transparent way, why cannot we be

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similarly transparent about our nuclear capability? We should be transparent not least because it would give us persuasive power in dealing with the issue of non-proliferation. Many people feel that proliferation of nuclear weapons presents a far greater threat to the stability of the western world and the interests of the people of the United Kingdom than any other current military or political issue.

Mr. Archie Hamilton : As the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, the life of Trident is estimated to be about 30 years. Can he guarantee that during that period the only effective anti-ballistic defences will be around Moscow?

Mr. Campbell : No, I cannot, because I cannot look into the future. But I am certainly willing to make assumptions based on existing political judgments. The logic of what the Minister says is that if the United States gives to Russia an enhanced anti-ballistic missile system, the people of the United Kingdom will have to acquire a nuclear capacity greater than the 512 warheads which will be on Trident. I cannot look into the future, but I find that proposition, and the notion that any Government would seek authority from the House for it, so ridiculous that it is not worth serious consideration.

Dr. Reid : The hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate that simply to say that circumstances may change in 20 years and we have the capacity to have more than 192 missiles on Trident is no argument for not restricting ourselves to 192 missiles in the new context of today. Is it not a circular argument for the Government apparently to support the Americans in improving the anti-ballistic missile systems of the former Soviet Union, and of Russia in particular, but at the same time to argue that because those systems have improved the number of warheads on our deterrent must be increased?

Mr. Campbell : The objective of anti-ballistic missile systems is to bring a sense of security. It is a curious sense of security to say, "We will give you this capability but at the same time we shall acquire an enhanced capability so that we can beat the very defensive measure that we have given to you for your protection." Some effort at clear thinking is required on such issues, as it is required on the issue of the defence review.

Our old friend the defence review has appeared yet again in the debate. I am amused that the adjective "fundamental" is always attached to a defence review, as if any review should not be fundamental, but the words have become inextricably linked with each other. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Carrick, Cumnock and Doon Valley (Mr. Foulkes) is not with us. One should have some rigour in one's approach to the defence review.

It is wrong to imagine that a defence review will be what one might call a soft option for change. If the purpose of calling for a review is to procrastinate on difficult decisions or to provide a cloak over policy differences, one lays oneself open to the charge of intellectual dishonesty. The defence review can be no substitute for difficult decisions. Indeed, if one carries it out properly, it will throw up a greater series of difficult decisions than the conduct of affairs of this nature on an ad hoc basis.

Therefore, those who advocate a defence review must have the intellectual rigour and political courage to carry through the decisions that the defence review reveals. I

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continue to believe that Britain needs a fundamental--if I may fall into the trap of the cliche --defence review which is properly conceived and implemented.

We have moved from "about 50" to "about 40" frigates and destroyers. The hon. Member for Upminster is the distinguished Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence and he presides over our proceedings with genial firmness. As he said, when we took evidence yesterday it was made abundantly clear to the Committee that "about 40" certainly could not be thought in practical terms to mean 45. The expression "about 40" is meaningless. It is an ambiguous expression. Of course, it is deliberately so.

If the Government said that the figure was a minimum let us say a fixed minimum of 35 or 36--the Government and civil servants would be open to much more serious criticism if that minimum figure was not maintained. "About 40" allows the Government the flexibility and leeway which means that any criticism of numbers can essentially be deflected. It is a kind of anti-ballistic missile system for officials and Ministers.

As the hon. Member for Upminster said, "about 40" looks to be 35 in reality for the foreseeable future. But, as he said, at any one time the figure could be much lower than that due to refitting or serious maintenance, not least as a result of the introduction of the rather curious and novel concept of what is now to be called "extended readiness". Logic would suggest that a reduction in numbers was justified by a reduction in tasks. I find little evidence of that in current Ministry of Defence thinking.

It seems to me that today's discussion raises a number of important questions. Having concentrated on a role in the east Atlantic, what has now come to be described as the grey water role, are we expressly and deliberately moving away from that? Is force projection now a more dominant factor in the thinking of the Ministry of Defence with regard to the Navy than anti-submarine warfare?

As we are considering the development of an anti-air warfare frigate, does that not suggest the use of such a frigate for the protection of Royal Navy task forces which suggests something more of a blue water role than the roles we have recently fulfilled? One might put the question more starkly : is the Royal Navy moving back from a grey water role to a blue water one, and is that part of the thinking behind the decision to proceed with the LPH? If it is, what will be the consequences for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, because clearly a blue water role and the use of the LPH and Royal Navy task forces raise important issues of support which will also have to be dealt with? Those questions require answers in order better to inform the debate about the future of the Royal Navy.

Submarines are just as crucial and the hon. Member for Upminster dealt with them at some length. In 1990, we had about 29. Under "Options for Change", we were to have about 16. Now the Government are contemplating a reduction to about 12, and that reduction will necessarily contemplate the elimination of SSKs from the fleet. If that is even being considered, it can only be because those who have put it on the agenda as a measure to be considered believe that it has some validity. If it were of no merit or significance, it would not even be put on the agenda and, if it is on the agenda, it can only be because it is believed to have some substance. What is the basis of it being on the agenda? Is it a capability that we no longer require, or is it a question of expense?

It is customary on these occasions for hon. Members to pay tribute to the men and women of the Royal Navy, and

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several hon. Members have done so already. I do so because it is well deserved, but there is another tribute that we could pay to those brave men and women. We could pay them the tribute of establishing in a clear and comprehensive agenda the tasks which we need them to perform and the resources that we are prepared to allocate to them for the fulfilment of those responsibilities. 7.12 pm

Mr. Neville Trotter (Tynemouth) : In the two years since the last Royal Navy debate, we have seen the terrible events of Yugoslavia and added to the Royal Navy's challenges the need to send significant numbers of ships to the Adriatic. The Royal Navy responded to that new challenge by showing its capability, mobility, flexibility and endurance.

I was talking recently to the captain of the Ark Royal, who has just been relieved, and he was telling me about the high state of morale of the crew throughout their time at sea and the excellence of his team. The endurance of the Navy in difficult circumstances is something of which we can all be truly proud.

History has always shown that the control of the seas is essential, and Britain is well aware of that. It is fitting that we should be having this debate in the same month as the official anniversary of the battle of the Atlantic.

The House will not be surprised if I refer to the case for amphibiosity. Recently, the much-needed decision has been taken to go ahead with the order for the LPH. I suggest to my hon. Friend the Minister that it is time that we decided on a name for it. We keep talking about the LPH, but it means little to those who are not well informed on naval matters. It is time that we brought out a name for it, such as the next Hermes or Albion. A ship of such importance deserves to be given a name very soon.

The LPH--the landing platform helicopter--is a major warship of 20, 000 tonnes, the largest ship to be ordered for many years, and it was commissioned only after the most intense examination. I offer my thanks to colleagues on all sides of the House for the support they gave during that long-standing argument. I should like in particular to pay tribute to the wisdom of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence and my hon. Friend the Minister, who showed the vision to realise the importance of that ship in the future requirements of the Royal Navy.

Amphibiosity has been proved in recent times. In the Falklands, we could not possibly have retaken the islands without that capability. In the Gulf war, United States amphibious shipping did not use it in that role, but it played an important part in distracting Iraqi defences and tied down some six divisions which otherwise would have been available for operations in the desert.

Amphibious vessels have a special capability ; they can hover, poised for as long as necessary across the coast, and land on potentially hostile coasts at a time and place to suit military and political considerations. One can certainly envisage circumstances in which it would be necessary to evacuate offshore in a crisis. Ships of that nature have great potential for use in a whole range of lower-intensity scenarios : disaster relief, humanitarian aid, civilian evacuation and military support to coastal states. The Americans illustrated that recently in Somalia.

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Nothing has happened over recent years to diminish the importance of amphibious capability. Recent events in the Adriatic with the Ark Royal and the Argus pressed into use served to reinforce the need for it.

Up-to-date transportation for the Royal Marines is paramount. I am delighted that the orders for landing platform docks to replace the Fearless and the Intrepid are still going ahead. I was particularly pleased to hear in the Select Committee this week that there are to be two more major ships following the LPH. The landing ships are to be rebuilt and modernised for future life. There is no doubt that amphibiosity requires proper command and control, proper facilities for docking and a specialist force. One cannot make an ad hoc force into an amphibious force ; it just does not work. It requires ships and crews that are constantly practised in the skilful operation of disembarking in amphibious operations.

I am delighted that the Royal Marines have a sure future ; they are almost alone in the services in having strength that is not subject to any major review and providing Britain with a specialist role on the world scene.

I believe that the order for the LPH is a sign of Britain's determination to continue to play its part on the world's defence scene. The cost of the amphibious capability is small compared with the much larger cost of Britain's contribution to the allied rapid reaction which I personally welcome as I believe that it is in the interests of Britain and NATO. It is important that we have decided to retain and enhance our amphibious capability.

The House knows how important the elements of the amphibious package are to Swan Hunter and to Tyneside. I have made it clear on many occasions how important those orders are to the last of the United Kingdom's big shipbuilders at Swan Hunter. The Ark Royal, now in the Adriatic, was herself built at Swan Hunter. I was pleased to hear my hon. Friend the Minister say that the award of the contract will be made on the basis of technology and value for money, and I am quite confident that the excellent team on Tyneside will win that order.

It is interesting to reflect on the commitments of the frigate and destroyer forces. Some six ships are now permanently away in the south Atlantic, on the Armilla patrol in the Gulf, in the West Indies and on other permanent commitments. If we allow for the time for passage to distant parts, the back-up before they sail and leave for the crews when they return, we are talking about something like 12 ships permanently tied up in those six posts. If, on top of that, we allow for refits, for training, and for trials for the very long periods that are now needed to work up very complex new ships, we have a significant number of vessels tied to permanent duties. In the case of the Adriatic, the Navy was able to respond, and that it could do so successfully proves our existing capability, but I have concern about the sustainability of an operation of that nature. For instance, Ark Royal will be coming back in the summer to this country. If the situation in the Adriatic continues as it is now, presumably Invincible will have to go out there to replace her. When Invincible's period of service is at an end, Ark Royal will have to return with her crew. To sustain a long operation in that area will demand many resources from the Royal Navy.

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Looking to the future, it is the sustainability of a task force for any length of time, on top of the commitments that we already have, that concerns me.

Mr. Wilkinson : Is not my hon. Friend making an important argument for the necessity of retaining three CVSs? Were we to go down to two, as envisaged in Cmnd 8288, John Nott's review which had to be set aside because of the Falklands, it would be very difficult to keep one carrier on station. Furthermore, would there not be another potential difficulty, in that we have only two operational air groups? If we want to give adequate time for training and for leave, there may well be need to revert to three.

Mr. Trotter : My hon. Friend is absolutely right in his observations both about the ships and about the aircraft on them. Illustrious is coming back into service from refit next year, and it is fortunate that she is doing so ; otherwise, the existing two would have to take six months about. In other words, their whole time would be tied up in that task.

The Navy is a technological service, and its capability depends on the number and age of its ships. Reference has already been made to crew size, and it is significant that the new ships have crews 30 to 40 per cent. smaller than those that they replace. That should be borne in mind when we are considering the total number of people in the Navy.

A balance must be kept in deciding how funds will be spent on ships and on men, and there are considerable advantages in having new ships, not just because they are much more capable but because they need fewer crew--a big cost saving--can be expected to be easier and cheaper to maintain and, one would hope, will take less time in refit. All those are strong arguments for building new ships.

The second balance to be maintained is between the vessels in the fleet and their cost and the support structure and the cost of the bases ashore. This question must be faced. I refer particularly to refits. One understands very well the historical reasons for existing over-capacity in the royal dockyards, but if there were true competition between those dockyards and the rest of the shipbuilding and repair industry in the United Kingdom, I am sure that we would get better value for money. The result of unnecessarily high spending in the dockyards must be less money available for operating ships or for buying new ones--in short, a smaller Navy than we could get for the same amount of money.

That money unnecessarily spent in the dockyards means less strength and capability for the Navy. I strongly urge my hon. Friend to look carefully at the possibility of more work going out to capable yards like those on the Tyne and in other parts of the country. Recent figures show that only 14 per cent. of the money spent on refits at present has gone out to competition.

There was an interesting experiment in 1985, when a submarine went to a yard on the Humber for a refit and a Leander class frigate was refitted on the Tyne. Both exercises were regarded as successful, and it was hoped that they would be preliminary to further, similar refits in the future going out to competition. That has not happened, and I hope that the matter will be reconsidered, because I believe that the Navy would benefit significantly from doing so.

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I too end by paying tribute to the men and women of the fleet. We started with the quotation of Nelson's tremendous signal at Trafalgar. These days, one must refer to England expecting every man and every woman to do their duty. I was delighted to hear from the captain of the Ark Royal of the successful inclusion of women in his crew. There are 100 women now at sea on board Ark Royal, fitting successfully into the team.

The example of the Navy's response to the challenge of crisis in the Adriatic has shown how well it responds to the task we give it. Its men and women respond with great skill and professionalism. The country has never had a better team at sea on the ships of the Royal Navy, and we can justly be proud of them.

7.24 pm

Mr. Bruce George (Walsall, South) : Two Opposition Members have already referred to the fact that we have had no defence White Paper debate. I believe that it is the first time since 1970 that a defence White Paper has not been debated in the calendar year of its publication. We may even be in the bizarre position of having a debate on the 1992 White Paper after the publication of the much trailed 1993 White Paper. There should be more regular debate, and there should be taking part in all these debates, either introducing or winding up, a Treasury Minister. Let us be honest : the Treasury determines defence policy.

In my extensive study of the North American Indian, I found a character, a Sioux, with the delightful name of White Men Run Him. I suspect that that principle of naming ought to be referred to our Defence Ministers. So let us be honest and bring into this debate those who call the shots.

The Treasury would like to cut defence expenditure, and it has done. It is not very good at running the economy, and history shows that it is not very good at determining defence policy either. I would have thought that the Ministry of Defence should not leap on the fact that the Treasury has given it orders to cut defence expenditure, to cut commitments, to cut our forces and to cut the number of platforms that we possess. It is rather naughtily trying to provide a sophisticated justification for what it is doing, but it is sounding a little hollow these days.

The cold war is over, but when we look at history we see repeated cycles of conflict and peace. The Minister has said that he cannot look into the future, and no more can the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell). I should have thought that the world was sufficiently unstable and had quite enough hot spots. Jane's Defence Weekly identified 72 hot spots round the world. An unclassified Sandhurst briefing a couple of weeks ago announced 35 situations of conflict, or potential conflict, in the former Soviet Union alone. Then its author acknowledged that there had been a small error in subsuming under north Caucasus and south Caucasus two crises, whereas there are probably as many crises within the Caucasus as there are in the rest of the former Soviet Union.

When we talk about proliferation, about conflicts over scarce resources or about the growth of fundamentalism, we must remember that Boutros-Ghali has said that by the end of the century there could well be 400 states in membership of the United Nations, many of which will have been created as a result of physical violence, war and

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