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We are hearing about the run-down in the number of ships that are to be trained. A critical point is that MOD is asking the Navy to move to Devonport and make a 10 per cent. saving in the cost of sea training, when it will actually be training 20 to 25 per cent. fewer vessels. If the boot were on the other foot, and we were asked to demonstrate what we can do at Portland--the Devonport costings, of course, relate to the new tasks that are to be inherited in three years--we should be only too pleased to oblige. That is certainly one of the things that we shall be doing.Portland is also to lose the sea systems controllerate. That proposal was made soon after I became a Member of Parliament, but it was kicked out. The time scale for moving the sea systems controllerate as a separate entity was 12 to 13 years. The then Chief Secretary to the Treasury, my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), who has since moved on to higher things, kicked it out because he believed that it was not cost effective and a silly waste of money.
The new proposal is that the sea systems controllerate should move into land and air systems. A much bigger and better deal has been made by the Ministry of Defence. People will be moved out of London. According to the MOD's figures, it will take 14 years to do that. The MOD, as we know, moves people round every 10 years, so after 10 years it will have to wait for another four years before it gets anything out of it. It is a foolish move.
The defence research agency has been offered £100 million from a stretched defence budget to restructure itself. If it is indeed given that sum of money to obtain new facilities, it has opted to go slightly outside Portland, though still within my constituency, to Winfrith. I know that it will set up a good research centre there, but I very much doubt whether that is a sensible use of MOD resources.
What is to stay in Portland for the time being is HMS Osprey, the Lynx operational air station. It carries out all the front line operational training of Lynx helicopter pilots and it provides first line maintenance. It is a heavily uniformed base, with 2,000 people working in the air station. We are keen that it should not be closed down when the change is made from Lynx to Merlin helicopters. We want Merlin to be used there. We fear that that will not happen. The Royal Navy sensibly decided to build an air station where it could train people and put them on to frigates and destroyers right next to where they do their operational sea training. Having split the two apart, though, I just wonder whether somebody will come up with a wonderful scheme to put this noisy but extremely pleasant air station in the middle of Plymouth. A couple of helicopters will do the early morning moves. I am sure that the people of Plymouth and Devonport will be glad to hear the sound of freedom right over their heads early in the morning.
Mr. Christopher Gill (Ludlow) : I wish my hon. Friend every success in his efforts to keep the Portland base open. I believe that it should be kept open. Has he made representations to the MOD that Portland is the only naval base that could effectively be sealed off? Security, in my opinion, is a very important consideration in these increasingly uncertain times when the threat from terrorism is real and with us all the time.
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Mr. Bruce : I am grateful to my hon. Friend. It is true that we have a secure area. We shall continue to have it. The cost of keeping the air station secure will be roughly the same as the cost of keeping the whole of the Royal Navy base secure. We found that the full cost of security for the naval and air station was knocked out of the costings for the move to Devonport. We pointed that out to the MOD, but I do not want to go in great detail into that matter. I hope that the Merlin helicopters will be based at Portland. When it becomes obvious that operational helicopters should be based next to the sea and ships, we may find that more and more ships come back to the revitalised and privatised Portland naval base, which will provide all these services, as well as civilian services, to the rest of the country.
Portland must look for future opportunities and it will continue to fight its case regarding the foolishness of these facilities being moved away from Portland. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. He has been extremely good about meeting people who have much to contribute to the debate. Most of the details are confidential. However, I can assure the House on my right hon. Friend's behalf that it takes only a phone call from me and the MOD deals with these matters from the outset. What I want to do is to gain all these additional jobs for Portland, as well as to retain the ones that are already there. We can demonstrate that we do things a great deal more efficiently.
Portland is to put in place a small ship repair yard. It is important that we should then be allowed to bid for MOD work. Our hourly rates are already lower than those of anybody else on the south coast. We believe that that will remain the case.
As for the cleaning of oil tanks, which was referred to by the hon. Member for Linlithgow, there are no United Kingdom facilities for recycling oil. Proposals will be put to my right hon. Friend regarding the provision of such facilities.
The main point that has been made in the debate is that this is a Treasury- led reduction. We are downsizing the armed forces. I do not know what downsizing is. It probably means that we are going to get 5 ft 8 guardsmen instead of 6 ft 2 guardsmen. If one picks up the estimates and the Red Books and looks at public expenditure, one finds that instead of defence expenditure over the next five years going down by 10, 20 or 25 per cent. it will not go down by a single per cent. It will be flat, at about £23 billion.
Our experience of defence estimates in recent years is that we have always overspent, because of contingencies. Therefore, all sorts of deals have to be done, whether it be with our allies in Saudi Arabia or elsewhere, to try to balance the MOD budget. There will be no financial benefit from these difficult decisions.
One would imagine that we would be slashing defence facilities, that we would be selling off buildings left, right and centre, but that is not happening. I was interested to read in one edition of Focus about what is happening in practice. It says, "Green light for Innsworth". There will be a new office block there, on a green field site. Then we read that "DHSA forms up" at Yeovilton. That is good news for Yeovilton. However, it will have to go into temporary accommodation for a year or so before it has its
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brand-new, ultra-modern office block. And what about the Royal Artillery? A 15-acre site has been designated for a new heritage centre.I am glad to see that Admiralty Arch has been restored, because one of the things we do well at Portland is to provide Portland stone for such activities. When efforts are being made to save defence procurement money, one wonders why people are building on green field sites--for example, at Northavon. One finds that £300 million is to be spent there before the computer system is paid for, which I understand will cost another £300 million.
I have tried to find out why it is that the MOD is not tightening up. I found--in an obscure document, of course--the cost of the refurbishment of the main MOD building. It is too embarrassing to give the figures on the Floor of the House ; hon. Members will have to look them up. However, I can tell the House that not only was the estimate phenomenal but that the actual cost was more than 100 per cent. higher than that horrendous estimate. How can anyone from head office tell people who are building new office blocks that they cannot do so because it will simply be pointed out what the Ministry of Defence is doing with its main buildings? One building at Portland is about to be closed down and everyone is leaving it, but a new telephone exchange is being installed. The building will be open only for another two years but it appears to be cost effective to install a new exchange.
It is clear why we are not achieving the reduction in the defence estimates that we should. I believe passionately that, in this day and age, we should be Treasury led. We should be looking to make savings of a couple of billion pounds over a few years and we should be working to that end. If we were approaching the question from that angle, we would probably make a better job of what we are doing. Time and time again, it becomes plain that cost-saving measures can take up to 10 years to produce the intended saving and that £100 million, £200 million or £500 million have to be spent before savings are made.
If we intend to reduce staffing levels, we should consider whether we need to make anyone redundant. The armed forces are one of the unique operations which people join for a reasonably short period and then leave. If we were to change the recruiting pattern, I am sure that in a few years we could reduce staff to the desired levels without causing great harm to people's careers. Natural wastage is not only more humane but it costs less.
We need to examine fundamentally our arms and weapons systems. If one asks a military expert what a changed threat means, he says first that one must retain everything and, secondly, that one must spend more money because the threat is different. We must bite the bullet, and I well understand the Government's difficulties in keeping intelligent, forceful and persuasive generals and admirals on their side.
The transfer of redundant facilities is extremely important. A current exhibition in London shows all the wonderful facilities that the Ministry of Defence has vacated in the past decade or so but which it has not sold. It is important that we consider all the armed forces, especially the Navy. As a cost-cutting exercise, we could suggest chopping five admirals off the top brass--that might have an electrifying effect and enable us to reduce the defence budget without the Royal Navy losing its teeth.
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8.42 pmMr. Nick Raynsford (Greenwich) : I hope that the hon. Member for South Dorset (Mr. Bruce) will forgive me if I do not follow the thrust of his argument. While resisting the temptation to do so, I was thinking of the connection between his constituency and mine. We both have a common predecessor--my predecessor bar one in Greenwich was also briefly the hon. Member for South Dorset. It is a reminder, on this of all days, that even seats that are felt naturally to belong to one particular party do not always do so at by-elections. I am especially pleased to participate in the debate, as I represent a constituency that has a very long and proud history of naval and maritime connections. In the past, the great bend of the River Thames by Greenwich and Deptford was the site of bustling naval dockyards. That era is long gone but, although ships are no longer built there or moored at Greenwich, the area still preserves its naval connections as the home of the Royal Naval college. During the past year, I have had the privilege and good fortune to visit the college several times as a guest and as an occasional visiting lecturer. I was greatly impressed on every occasion by the professionalism, high calibre and commitment of the commander and staff, and I pay tribute to Commander Searle and his colleagues for their absolutely first-class work.
The Royal Naval college is a centre of excellence for the training of not only British naval personnel but staff from other services and from many navies overseas. The college is keen to develop that aspect of its work and to attract more students from a wide range of backgrounds from Britain and overseas. It is an institution of which all hon. Members can feel justifiably proud, and I hope that the Government will do all in their power to support and promote the college and encourage it to attract an ever wider range of students from all over the world.
Sadly, one clear impression that I have gained from my visits to the college and from other contacts with the Navy in the past year is the damage done by the uncertainty which surrounds the future of the Navy and which has already been highlighted in the debate. Since the publication of "Options for Change", the Navy has been in a period of uncertainty, not a period of uncertainty in which it could feel that things might get worse or better but one in which the number of ships and personnel have gradually been reduced in a one-way process. When "Options for Change" was published, we were talking of approximately 66,000 men and women in the Royal Navy. The figure was expected to be reduced to 60,000, then to 55,000 and, just before Easter, the estimate was reduced to 50,000. Similarly, we have heard the rather sad story of the uncertainty about the numbers of surface ships, where again the trend is clearly downwards.
People whose whole life and career have been devoted to the Navy have put it to me forcefully that a reduction in itself is not entirely unacceptable. They are realists, and they know that Britain's role in the world is changing. They know that we no longer have the ability to maintain the size of the Navy that we had 50 years ago. They also know that international relations have changed in the past 50 years, and they accept that Britain will have a smaller Navy.
However, what they find especially debilitating is the continuing uncertainty of not knowing when the reduction will stop, not knowing what the shape and size of the Navy
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is to be and not knowing whether they will have a job in the future or whether a redundancy notice will come their way. The uncertainty and the inability to plan ahead with confidence is the most damaging aspect. Hon. Members of all parties have recognised that the atmosphere of uncertainty is the worst possible position in which we should put the men and women on whose dedication, professionalism and commitment we depend to maintain the high calibre and quality of service provided by the Royal Navy.Although I accept that the Government cannot end the uncertainty tonight, I add my voice to all those who have urged the Government to ensure that the promised White Paper is published at the earliest opportunity--certainly well before the summer recess--that it sets out a clear framework for the future and ends the ambiguity and uncertainty. At the very least, publication should save Ministers the embarrassment of having to continue to prevaricate or trying, unconvincingly, to deny that decisions, which appear to be inevitable, have already been taken.
Before the debate, I reread the record of our previous debate on the Navy which took place about two years ago. I was interested to note that the then Under-Secretary of State for Defence Procurement who opened the debate, the hon. Member for Lincoln (Mr. Carlisle), was waxing enthusiastic about the Upholder class submarine and went on record as saying that he was confident that the SSK would be a valuable asset for the Royal Navy in future. Sadly, we are now all beginning to fear that the SSK will prove a valuable asset to the Treasury, not to the Navy.
I should not like to conclude without saying a brief word about equipment. A few weeks ago, I had the good fortune to join HMS Argyll, one of the new type 23 frigates, on a voyage up the Thames to the Pool of London. That gave me a welcome opportunity to see one of the Navy's most modern warships, and I am grateful to the captain and crew for all their hospitality and their kindness and consideration in showing me round the ship.
However, I could not fail to notice the absence of one key piece of equipment. Even the eye of an untutored layman such as myself could not help noticing that the hangar was extraordinarily generous for the size of the Lynx helicopter that sat in it. Clearly, it was designed with a view to accommodating not the Lynx but the EH101. We must ask when those ships can expect to receive the greatly advanced capacity of the Merlin helicopters for which they were designed. I hope that the Minister can cast further light on that subject. I was pleased to hear confirmation that the order for the helicopters was progressing well, and I hope that we can be given some idea of the date on which the EH101 will come into operation.
The one clear message to come from today's debate is the need to bring to an end the uncertainty that has for so long hung unhelpfully over the future of the Royal Navy. The Opposition believe that that would be best achieved by a thorough defence review that would clarify the role of the Navy and the future size and shape of the service. We fear that the Government will not opt for that degree of review ; nevertheless, we hope that the White Paper, when it is published, will help to bring an end to the damaging uncertainty that is making it so hard for the men and
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women in the Navy, to whom we have all paid tribute this evening, to do the job that they want to do, the job that we all depend on them to do.8.51 pm
Mr. Christopher Gill (Ludlow) : As a former naval officer and holder of the Reserve decoration, I have a great interest to declare in the Royal Navy and in the Reserve, for both of which I have a great affection. Generally speaking, I find that that affection is, understandably, shared by millions of our constituents. I entirely endorse all the compliments that have been paid by right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House to the Royal Navy and its personnel.
As a Member of the House, I have another interest to declare--an interest in the defence of this realm. Any Government, regardless of party, who ignore that imperative stand accused of dereliction of duty. For centuries, the Royal Navy has been the one sure sheild in the defence of this realm. The history of our nation is a history of men that go down to the sea in ships, a maritime history in which Britain's trade, influence, diplomacy and, ultimately, its defence against aggression have been sustained by a strong Navy. For centuries, the Royal Navy has been a symbol of Britain's self-assurance, a manifestation of its power and influence, and a statement of its political will.
What is that political will today? Is it right that we should give a higher priority to, for example, welfare, on which we spend one third of our national budget, than to defence, on which we spend only one tenth of our national budget? I do not agree with that order of priorities, but that is the background against which we hold the debate. The debate also takes place in the context of a Navy that has shrunk and is continuing to shrink ; given the current political will, it will continue to shrink. Scaling down an operation is much more difficult than expanding one, and we are left with more admirals than ships, more dockyards than work and more than enough uncertainty. In those circumstances, what should my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State and his Ministers do? First, I suggest that they examine the way in which ships are designed and built. Will they consider carefully whether it makes sense to continue with what could be called the committee approach to designing ships? Although I am pleased that we are to co-operate with our allies in future construction, I fear that such co-operation may lead to interminable delays, constant wrangling about what should go into the ships, and, at the end of the day-- this fear has been expressed by other hon. Members--a cost that the nation cannot afford.
I also ask Ministers to examine the specifications we establish for our ships. We simply cannot account for every eventuality or cover every threat. As other hon. Members have said, we cannot go for gold-plated solutions. In the very month in which we celebrate victory in the battle of the Atlantic, I remind the House that it was with very basic hulls, driven by the simplest of machinery--the triple reciprocating steam engine--that we defeated the U-boat menace. I do not see it as in any way inconsistent with Government policy to close down our in-house design facilities and to hand over to British industry the opportunity to design and build ships for the Royal Navy. Some of my colleagues may agree with me that our
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priorities would be more sensibly ordered if we closed down various departments at Bath rather than the Royal Navy engineering college at Manadon. There are precedents, and at least one British shipyard is successful in designing and building warships, especially for export. I suggest to my right hon. and hon. Friends in government that the very survival of British shipyards and shipbuilding may depend on our taking that route and putting out to commercial design and build the future construction of royal naval warships.I invite my right hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Forces to ask himself what will be left of a Navy that has thrown away the invaluable skills and experience that we have accumulated in anti-submarine warfare, as will happen when we dispose of the silent-running conventional submarines. They are the only type of submarine that can operate on the continental shelf, and that, of course, is where these islands sit. When my right hon. Friend considers whether we should retain the Upholder class of submarine, will he bear in mind the fact that, as has been said by other hon. Members, we cannot cover a commitment by retaining only one ship of a class ? We need to retain at least three, and ideally four. I ask my right hon. Friend to consider what will be left of a Navy that has discarded many aspects of a hydrographic service that enjoys a worldwide reputation and generates income. The replacement of the ships involved, which is apparently a compelling need, should not present a problem. We have already solved the problem involving HMS Endurance, the vessel that operates in the south Atlantic, by means of a bare-boat charter. It has not been necessary for us to design and build our own ships, and it is perfectly feasible to solve the problem in that way.
What is going to happen to a Navy which has abandoned its traditional fishery protection role in respect of which the presence ofole, will we not throw away most valuable opportunities to give young officers experience of command and other training opportunities not just for officers, but also for ratings?
I want my right hon. Friend the Minister to ask himself what will happen to a Navy which has reduced the number of frigates and destroyers to a level at which it is impossible to match the nation's demands for ships as instruments of foreign policy or for ships in time of conflict. I remind the House that the reality of the post-world war two history of defence is that we prepared for wars which did not happen and we have fought wars that we did not expect. In his opening speech, my hon. Friend the Minister drew attention to the new and imponderable problems that lie ahead.
When my right hon. Friend replies to the debate, I hope that he will give us some idea about the future of the Royal Naval Reserve. I am sure that I speak for many hon. Members when I say that a pronouncement on that aspect of naval matters is long overdue. Does a Royal Navy with a manpower of 50,000 personnel and a reserve of indeterminate number and undefined role-- a very small regular service and even smaller reserve--reflect the priorities of the electorate who sent us here or match the aspirations of my right hon. Friend's colleagues in Cabinet for Britain to play a leading role in the councils of the world?
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9 pmMr. Harry Cohen (Leyton) : I will restrict my remarks to the question of Trident. It has been said already that we have not debated the defence estimates yet. I suspect that one of the reasons for that is that the figures are not particularly genuine and that all sorts of deceptions and slush funds are involved. Nowhere is that more true than in respect of Trident.
I am sure that hon. Members have received, as I have, a briefing for this debate from the British American Security Information Council--or BASIC-- which casts doubt on the cost of buying Trident missiles from the United States. The briefing states that the MOD's figures for the purchase of these missiles simply do not measure up. Even at the lowest unit price that the United States set in the history of the programme, the figure that the MOD gave to the Select Committee on Defence comes nowhere near that figure.
The briefing states that, in the financial year 1994, the estimated cost to the United States is about $49 million per missile. However, according to a memorandum from the MOD submitted to the Select Committee on Defence, the cost would be about $24 million per missile. That is half the actual unit cost.
If that is not the true cost, the Minister has some explaining to do. If that is not the truth, he should explain why the House and the country have been deceived. If that is the true cost, and it is half the cost stated in the United States programme, there is an old northern saying of which all hon. Members are aware : "You don't get owt for nowt."
The Minister must explain what the deal was. It has been said that Trident is truly independent as far as Britain is concerned. There must be doubts about that if the missiles are being obtained on the cheap--although on the expensive cheap of course in this context. The United States might be able to call the tune and, whenever the United States says, Trident might have to enter the disarmament negotiations and be cut. That would mean that millions of pounds of taxpayers' money would have been poured down the drain and wasted.
As has been said, the Royal Navy faces an uncertain future. It faces conventional cuts because of the Government's obsession with a nuclear role. The Royal Navy is wrongly shaped. The concentration and costs have related to the nuclear element. They are tied up with an anti-submarine warfare role in line with the United States maritime strategy so that we would rush into the North sea at their behest, and into the front line, in any conflict.
That nuclear aspect is out of date. The Royal Navy now needs a peacekeeping and sanctions enforcing role. As a result of the nuclear obsession, the Royal Navy is not resourced or equipped for that role. Trident is unsuitable. It is a post cold-war relic and doomsday weapon that is totally unsuitable in the modern world.
The Minister has been asked this question many times : what is the purpose of Trident? Who is it aimed at? In what scenario would it be used--because it is a massive weapon? Each warhead has the minimum of Hiroshima--200 kilotons. It has a massive use which is morally indefensible. Even in a sub -strategic role, whether it has only one war head on it, that would be equivalent to one Hiroshima, or perhaps even more. It simply cannot be used in the battlefield context. Trident is obsolete and
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stops us from getting on with the other role that is essential for the Royal Navy--the conventional or the peacekeeping and sanctions enforcement role to which I referred.Earlier, my hon. Friend the Member for Denton and Reddish (Mr. Bennett) referred to the proliferation implications, which are extremely serious. They include the increases in nuclear weapons by a nuclear weapons state. Under its original design, Polaris was to have 16 missiles with three warheads--that is 48 warheads per boat. If there are four boats, that is 192 warheads--192 Hiroshimas. Where is the justification for that?
Lady Olga Maitland rose --
Mr. Cohen : Time is short and I want to let other hon. Members speak, if possible.
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute year book referred to Britain having only 96 Hiroshima warheads. However, with Trident we will have 128 warheads per boat--we will have 512 Hiroshima warheads on five boats. The paper produced by the House of Commons Library refers to the yield of those weapons being greater than that. The number of warheads has increased from 96 to 512.
The figure of 512 is an appalling proliferation, and it is unjustifiable. The Government will be told at non-proliferation treaty conferences that that is the case. The figures will be used by non-nuclear weapon states as an excuse for them to go nuclear. Instead of the Government using the political way to disarmament, they will simply be left with supporting military action in the future. That is a dangerous thought.
I shall refer to global protection against limited strikes because it is a new factor in the Trident debate. GPALS is the post-cold war version of the strategic defence initiatives--star wars. The United States is discussing such a limited defensive shield with Russia and, indeed, other countries. That is likely to involve the installation of early warning facilities at Fylingdales. It is an absurdity to have GPALS, in which the British are involved, yet the United Kingdom's nuclear weapon Trident will have to penetrate the combined United States-Russian defence, which partly relies on British information. It is nonsense. Even if we proceed with GPALS, which seems to be the approach, Trident does not fit in : it does not make sense.
I shall deal with the safety implications of Trident because they are serious. It is likely that Polaris will continue for many years to come. As hon. Members know, there are problems with the Trident programme--the first one will not come on stream until late 1994 at the earliest, and probably later than that. Therefore, Polaris is likely to continue for more than 10 years. Sir Ronald Oxburgh, the Government's chief scientific adviser, said that that could have serious safety implications for the submarine programme.
There is no disposal plan for nuclear submarines, yet the Government continue to commission new ones. There are transportation problems with nuclear weapons and the nuclear submarine cores. The Ministry of Defence was refused a licence for its flasks by the Ministry of Transport in 1991, although it had plenty of time in which to redesign them. However, it did not do so, which is a sign of its negligence. There are enormous problems of transportation. There are also problems of storage. There is a lack of
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space in the dockyards and elsewhere to keep the used nuclear reactive cores. Yet the Government ignore all those problems. Trident lacks important safety features. It uses volatile propellant and the warheads are placed around the third stage rocket motor. The latest safety equipment in the United States, such as insensitive high explosives, the enhanced nuclear detonation safety system and fire resistant pits, is not included in the United Kingdom's Trident system. That leads to anxiety about safety. BASIC said in its briefing :"A fire in the missile compartment of a submarine could result in the detonation of several nuclear warheads--at less than maximum yield--and include the reactor core, producing serious radioactive dispersal."
The Minister should answer that comment because that dispersal would be as great or perhaps greater than that from Chernobyl. Trident is bad strategically. It is bad for the Royal Navy, bad for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, bad for Britain and bad for the world, and it should be scrapped.
9.11 pm
Mr. John Wilkinson (Ruislip-Northwood) : So late in the debate I can only throw away such notes as I had prepared and speak from the heart, and speak briefly at that. I declare three interests. First, I am a parliamentary adviser to Thorn EMI, which provides defence equipment to the Royal Navy. Secondly, I have the privilege, with the hon. Member for Glasgow, Govan (Mr. Davidson), of being on the parliamentary armed forces scheme with the Marines. That is a remarkable privilege. It is a fine scheme. I pay tribute to our former colleague, Sir Neil Thorne, who instituted it.
Thirdly, without wishing to be tediously repetitious, I must point out that week after week at business questions I have asked for a Navy day debate and a two-day debate on the defence estimates. Without, I hope, being churlish--because I am pleased that we are having this Navy day debate--I observe that, in parliamentary terms, today is the closest one can get to a dies non, in as much as a key by-election and county council elections are being held today so that attendance in the House is thinner than it normally would be. This is perhaps symptomatic in a parliamentary sense of the current importance attached to defence and naval matters. I can only express my regret that it is so. However, I should not be too unhappy because, with a thinner House, I am allowed as an erstwhile crab to be called on fish heads day.
Mr. Wolfson : On my hon. Friend's point that it is symptomatic of the priority given to defence that the Navy day debate has been held today, does he agree that it is increasingly important to bring back to the top of our agenda the defence of the country and spending on defence ?
Mr. Wilkinson : My hon. Friend is right on that, as he is on so many matters. He speaks trenchantly and with great authority. I am sure that he is right. I add my warning to the warning that he uttered : if the party to which he and I and our hon. Friends belong does not revert more clearly to its traditional attachment to the importance of national defence, we shall lose much of the trust that should rightfully be ours of those who care for the security of our country.
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We are a naval nation by tradition. We are island people. Unless we have a balanced fleet, we cannot hope to secure our commercial and strategic interests, nor can we be worthy allies. In the sense of retaining a balanced fleet, let me make it clear to my hon. Friend the Minister that we are in danger of something happening for the first time in our history--of being No. 2 in naval terms in Europe. The Government may have noticed that one of the first decisions taken by the newly appointed French Defence Minister, Mr. Le otard, was to call a halt to the cuts in defence spending and announce the go-ahead for a second nuclear carrier. That will mean that the French navy will have two proper CVSs with no fewer than 90 Rafale Ms embarked upon them, whereas we will have only three air groups, one being a training air group, which has a maximum of 36 Sea Harriers. That disparity is not acceptable to the British people.We expect our nation to be at the forefront of naval matters in Europe. Our training is second to none and the quality of our vessels is very high, but I hope that my hon. Friends on the Front Bench take to heart the wise observations made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter), who knows more about the naval construction industry than anyone in the House, and my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr. Gill), who is a former naval person and who spoke more authoritatively than I could. I endorse everything that they said. 9.15 pm
Mr. Ian Davidson (Glasgow, Govan) : I welcome the clear statement that the LPH order will be placed in the near future. I am glad that the importance of amphibiosity has been recognised and I am happy to hear that technical and financial factors will be taken into account to determine where that order is placed. I hope that any decision that is taken can withstand subsequent scrutiny by either the National Audit Office or the Defence Select Committee, or, indeed, both. No doubt the Government have taken into account the recent critical reports on procurement of oiler ships in particular. I support the bid of VSEL and Kvaerner Govan and have no doubt that it will be successful in a fair and free competition.
I turn to the general issue of the Navy. We are being told that we have the fourth largest navy in the world, but we have to consider seriously whether we can afford that when we have an economy in the second division, fast heading towards relegation. We need a review not only on the desirability of many of our objectives but on their affordability ; that is missing. There is a danger that we will end up identifying tasks which we believe to be desirable but which cannot be afforded without overstretching the limited resources we are prepared to make available.
Earlier, there was an interesting little dance around the issue of whether defence matters were determined by policy or by financial criteria. It essentially missed the point. They have to be taken together ; there has to be iterative process to determine what we are prepared to spend on defence and in what direction. That is why the Labour party is right to call for a thorough defence review. I want to touch briefly on one or two points relating to Trident submarines, although a great deal has been covered by my hon. Friends. I should like to draw
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attention to the fact that it is easy to achieve an underspend on the estimates if one overestimates in the first place. That is not sufficient cause for satisfaction.The Minister spoke well about extended readiness as a means by which a vessel could be kept in readiness to be brought into service when needed, but at minimum cost. Perhaps he will be prepared to consider applying something similar to the Trident submarine force, or at least part of it. Is it absolutely necessary to have complete commissioning of all four boats? Will it not be possible to make some saving as a result of partial commissioning of at least one of them? If it is an insurance policy, is it necessary to have them all completely activated from the beginning? I hope that the Minister will genuinely examine that suggestion as that approach would ensure that money could be freed up and, if possible, spent elsewhere. I also wish to echo earlier remarks about avoiding proliferation. This is an enormous issue on which we in this country have the opportunity to give a lead. If we decide to be anything other than clear that we are not expanding the number of nuclear weapons, we give the wrong message to the rest of the world.
The Government are keen on market testing. I hope that they will show some restraint, particularly on fishery protection and related matters. The prospect of the French or the Icelandic navy winning a fishery protection contract for British vessels is entirely inappropriate. Allowing Group 4 access to quick-firing cannon might be a solution to the present difficulties in the prison service, but it would not be entirely appropriate for fishery protection. We should take account of the points made earlier about piracy. Although there is an important role for the Navy, it must be seen in the context of the Government's policy towards the British shipping and shipbuilding industries. It would be inappropriate for us to provide naval ships to protect vessels which have been built, crewed and flagged abroad and which turn to this country simply for military protection. We must have a coherent and holistic vision of our maritime strategy.
I support the concept of an early defence review and hope that it will be supported by the Minister.
9.21 pm
Mr. Mark Wolfson (Sevenoaks) : I am pleased to have the opportunity to speak in the few minutes that are left before the Front-Bench speakers reply to the debate.
The tone of this debate on the Navy is very different from the tone of debates held in the early years after the Conservative victory in 1979. I remind the House and, in particular, Treasury
colleagues--because many of my remarks are directed to them rather than to the Ministers now responsible for defence--that at that time the fact that we went through a recession with difficult spending problems did not prevent us from giving a high priority to defence spending, which was expanded in those years.
I voted for "Options for Change" under pressure, under duress, but I was assured by the then Secretary of State that "Options for Change" would be continuously reviewed in the light of developments. At the time, we all expected a real peace dividend. The Gulf war was unexpected, as was the conflict in the Balkans. Northern Ireland is no better than it was then and terrorist threats and action on the mainland are worse now. I suggest that
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the basis on which "Options for Change" was put forward has altered and that those spending intentions need reconsideration.My plea, therefore, is that we put defence spending higher up on our agenda, that we make it the first priority for this party in government and that we realise that any failure to maintain our defence capability does no service to our country or to our allies. Specifically on the Navy, concern about the lack of clarity in our strategy is another aspect that has come out in the debate. That needs to be resolved. If the Government do not want a full defence review--I can understand the argument for that ; it is a sort of catch-all that may not produce the right results--we expect to have in the White Paper a clear definition of the Navy's requirements and how we are to meet them. We expect, for naval personnel as well as for the House and the country at large, a clear picture of where the Government expect the Navy to be, together with precise clarification of the numbers of personnel and ships.
There has been a change. Some years ago, we had what was described as a blue water Navy that covered the world. Then the strategy narrowed, becoming more concerned with European defence within the NATO area. Now it has expanded again and the Navy has resumed a world role even though it is now much smaller. There is a serious danger of overstretch--I include surface vessels and submarines in that. I am not hung up about specific numbers. Manpower, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State said today, is needed less for modern ships, but I am anxious that those who serve in the Navy should have a secure future and should know clearly what their career opportunities are.
Mr. Bill Walker : On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I draw your attention to the fact that I have been here throughout the debate--I make no complaint about that--and I wanted to speak about Rosyth, an important Scottish matter--
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Geoffrey Lofthouse) : Order. So far, the hon. Gentleman has not delivered a point of order for me, and he knows it. If he has one for me, I will listen to it.
Mr. Walker : Is it in order for me to apply, because of the circumstances, for an Adjournment debate on this specific and narrow matter, and particularly on nuclear safety?
Mr. Deputy Speaker : That is for the hon. Gentleman to decide. 9.26 pm
Dr. John Reid (Motherwell, North) : As the local election polls have now closed, I want to go on record as being the first to offer my condolences to the Government for their awful performance tonight.
It is a pity that the timing of these debates sometimes means that we do not have many speakers, but that is usually compensated for by the fact that the quality of contributions is far higher than that in some other debates because of the expertise that hon. Members bring to bear on them.
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The hon. Member for Sevenoaks (Mr. Wolfson) mentioned one of the recurrent themes of the debate : the lack of clarity in the Government's intentions in respect of the Royal Navy's objectives and roles.The Liberal spokesman, the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell), pointed out that it has been two years since our last general debate of this nature, so we have been somewhat lacking in opportunities to discuss the subject. As several speakers have said, next year's White Paper will be presented to us before we have debated last year's--and that has not happened for 20 years. He also spoke of the need for clear political objectives. The hon. Member for Upminster (Sir N. Bonsor), who brings a great deal of experience to these matters, made it plain that he, like us, does not believe it when the Government say that the cuts in the Navy and elsewhere are not Treasury-led. When a Conservative Member who chairs a body as august as the Defence Select Committee agrees about this, surely Ministers should pay attention.
The hon. Member for Cornwall, South-East (Mr. Hicks) agreed with most hon. Members that the Government appear to lack a strategy. The Select Committee has pointed that out, too.
My hon. Friend the Member for Denton and Reddish (Mr. Bennett) made several important points. As most sensible people have been saying for the past couple of years, he supports the case for a defence review ; and he expressed the feeling held by all Opposition Members that the Government have been less than candid about nuclear issues. The hon. Member for Tynemouth (Mr. Trotter) stressed, as did several others, the importance of an amphibious capability. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), with his usual ingenuity, managed to give us an analysis of the position in Bosnia but related it to the importance of the Royal Navy in the performance of its task not only in the Adriatic but much wider. With some success, he contrasted the record of the Labour Government with the pitiful record of this Government on naval as well as other matters.
The hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Martin) called for a period of stability for our dockyards, a point to which I will return.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne, East (Mr. Brown) was an able advocate for his constituents in general and for Swan Hunter in particular. Like several hon. Members, he stressed the need for the landing platform helicopter vessel and welcomed the Government's intimation that there may be more definite moves on that in the near future.
The hon. Member for landlocked Somerset and Frome (Mr. Robinson) spoke with considerable insight for a landlubber. I think he was unique in raising the representational role of the Royal Navy. Again, he stressed the role of the LPH.
As ever, the hon. Member for Dorset, South (Mr. Bruce) was honest enough perhaps to impede his promotion up the ladder of office when he referred to the fact that Portland will lose under Government plans. He finds it difficult to accept the decision because, as with so many other Government decisions, it was based on spurious figures, as he correctly pointed out.
My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) raised an issue with which we are familiar and on
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