House of Commons Hansard Debates for 15 Jun 1993

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Associated Newspapers and Associated British Ports, acted when they decided to change their negotiating arrangements.

Mr. Frank Dobson (Holborn and St. Pancras) : Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that, when it came to the meat of the matter, Lord Jacques, for the Labour party, in the same debate said :

"The clause provides, negatively, that the employer must show tolerance and not prevent participation in union activities" ? On behalf of the right hon. Gentleman's party, Lord Gowrie--who some time later gave up being a Minister in the House of Lords because he could not get by on £33,000 a year--said :

"In dealing with individual rights, we were anxious that negative rights-- the right not to be forced into doing things--should be part of such laws."

Lord Jacques said the alternative to passing the measure would mean that

"The individual employee has no rights to take part in any of his union's activities at work".--[ Official Report, House of Lords, 23 September 1975 ; Vol. 364, c. 189-92.]

But this clause was passed, and they are so entitled.

Mr. Hunt : I shall savour this, as it may be the only occasion on which I agree with every word that the hon. Gentleman has said. I have those quotations at my disposal as well, because they prove my point, which is that this clause does not concern collective bargaining issues. Anybody who knows anything about trade union membership will know that many other benefits of such membership exist side by side with, but separate from, collective bargaining issues. That is an important point to make.

Another debate in the other place on 28 July 1982 again expresses the point that I am seeking to make. Earl Ferrers said :

"it would not be unfair to have a differentiation between rates of pay".

If one looks at the context in which he said that, one will see that the situation about which we are now talking has been thrown into considerable doubt by the two Court of Appeal cases. When the companies that I have mentioned decided to change from collective bargaining to personal contracts and to reward those employees who agreed to accept personal contracts, they had every reason to believe that they were acting lawfully. They have made it clear throughout that they were in no way seeking to prevent their employees from remaining union members. Had they done so, they would have been acting unlawfully. That was never the purpose or the effect of the action that they took.

Mr. Dobson : The right hon. Gentleman referred to the 1982 debate involving Earl Ferrers. Will he confirm that, at the end of the paragraph from which he quoted, Earl Ferrers went on to say--it is the reverse of this situation, but we can assume that it applies both ways--

"What would be unfair would be to say, We shall negotiate a wage increase for union members and union members will have a wage increase, but meanwhile non-union employees will have no increase.' "

It appears from that debate that Earl Ferrers did not know whether he was talking out of his hat or his elbow.

Mr. Hunt : I was quoting from the end of the paragraph. The hon. Gentleman said that he was quoting from the end of the paragraph, but he did not. That is a matter of detail. The quotation used by the hon. Gentleman continues :

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"However, it would not be unfair to have differentiation between the two."

The end of the next paragraph says :

"That would be unfair, but it would not be unfair to have a differentiation between rates of pay, provided that they are consistent."--[ Official Report, House of Lords , 28 July 1982 ; Vol. 434, c. 331.]

It is simple to understand, but the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) obviously has some difficulty with it. I shall explain in another way. Cases were brought against the two companies in question under what is now section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. In each case, the industrial tribunal found that the employer had contravened section 146, but in each case that finding was reversed by the employment appeal tribunal. The latter's rulings were fully in line with what had been generally accepted as the intention of the section and were in line with the words of the Labour spokesman--which I have already quoted--in 1975.

Mr. Eric Martlew (Carlisle) : Will the right hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

Mr. Hunt : I am still dealing with the point raised by the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras.

April, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the employment appeal tribunal and ruled that the employers had acted unlawfully inboth cases. As a result, it is clear that section 146 can be interpreted in ways that go far wider than was ever intended when Parliament originally adopted this provision in 1975. When the law has become so confused on such a fundamental matter, the case for amending the statute is overwhelmingly persuasive. Mr. Peter Bottomley (Eltham) : I join other hon. Members in welcoming my righthon. Friend to his new position, but I wish that his first debate was not on such a subject.

The Court of Appeal said that the employment appeal tribunal was wrong to find any complication in the law. The Court of Appeal made it very plain that the industrial tribunal had been right to rule that the employers had acted unlawfully. There was nothing in the Court of Appeal judgement to suggest that there is any need for clarification or that the industrial tribunal ruling had changed the law. Having heard my right hon. Friend's speech, and bearing in mind what I call section 23(1) (a) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 but which my right hon. Friend will call by its updated consolidation number, the House will want to consider whether the industrial tribunal ruling did in fact change the law from what it was held to be by most employers, all trade unions and people who have been industrial relations and personnel specialists for decades.

Mr. Hunt : I thank my hon. Friend for welcoming me to the Dispatch Box in my new position.

I have thought very long and hard about this aspect of the law. I am convinced that the Government's proposal and the Ullswater amendment in another place are absolutely right, and will do much to make the position as clear as it was before the Court of Appeal judgment. I ask my hon. Friend to reflect for a moment, because I believe that he is referring mainly to what are findings of fact by the tribunal.

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I in no way seek to diminish the tribunal's ability to reach findings of fact and to do so robustly, but I am seeking to return the law to where I believe it was generally believed to be before the Court of Appeal interpreted the law in a way in which I, those in another place, and I hope this House believe brought confusion to a matter which had previously been very clear indeed.

Mr. Derek Enright (Hemsworth) : Does not the right hon. Gentleman recall that the judgment was announced on 30 April but that the Government announced that they were going to introduce amendments before the full transcript was available? In panic, at a very late stage, they subsequently included the amendment, which I do not believe will stand up in court because it is so incoherent. Is it not a fact that the Government's friends were found guilty, and that the price of support for the Prime Minister was to table the amendment?

Mr. Hunt : The hon. Gentleman does nothing to assist his case by fogging the issue with such emotive phraseology. I strongly believe that, if one dispassionately considers the law as it is after the Court of Appeal judgment--it was, of course, necessary for the Government to move swiftly, because the Bill was in another place, and it was the final opportunity to make

Mr. Martlew rose--

Mr. Hunt : May I finish my response?

As it was the final opportunity to make changes, one will see that the law needed clarification. That is what we are putting to the House this afternoon, and what my noble Friend Viscount Ullswater proposed in another place.

Mr. Martlew : Does the Secretary of State think it right that an employer should pay an employee more because the employee decides to give up his trade union rights?

Mr. Hunt : That, as I have explained, is contrary to the law.

Mr. Tim Devlin (Stockton, South) : I am very interested in what my right hon. Friend is saying, but will he clarify one point? Is it his contention that, prior to the three cases being brought, it was legal to discriminate between employees who were in a union and those who were not? What was his understanding of the law before those cases were brought?

Mr. Hunt : As I have already said, it is contrary to section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 for an employer to make it conditional on membership or non-membership of a trade union--trade union membership is the important point, and I am not talking about collective bargaining-- [Interruption.] I understand that the hon. Member for Bolsover believes strongly that, without collective bargaining, it is impossible to have properly effective trade union rights, but that is an individual rule

Mr. Skinner : Then membership means nothing.

Mr. Hunt : And membership means nothing. However, that is his individual view but, as I shall now explain to my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South (Mr.

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Devlin), not the law prior to the two Court of Appeal decisions. The hon. Gentleman knows that, because he has argued against Government proposals many times, saying that they drew the teeth of the trade union movement. It is possible for an employer to derecognise a trade union.

In response to my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, South, I must say that it is perfectly possible for an employer to offer a pay inducement or an additional pay rise to an employee who chooses to make an individual contract with the employer rather than through the collective bargaining processes. To return to the direct point that my hon. Friend made, it is still perfectly possible for that individual member to remain a trade union member and still benefit from that pay rise. The pay rise and the inducement must not be conditional upon membership or non-membership of a trade union. That will do a great deal to reassure my hon. Friend because there has been an enormous amount of distortion outside the House. I hope that we can now return to the debate, which is about trade union membership --that is the subject of the amendment--and collective bargaining, which must be viewed separately.

Mr. Harry Barnes (Derbyshire, North-East) rose --

Mr. Alex Carlile rose --

4.15 pm

Mr. Hunt : May I continue with what I was saying about the two cases? Then I shall, of course, give way again.

On 30 April, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the employment appeal tribunal and ruled that the employers had acted unlawfully in both cases. I have explained that, when the law has become so confused on so fundamental a matter, the case for amending the statute is overwhelmingly persuasive.

The section was intended to prevent employers from victimising individual employees on the ground that they were or were not trade union members. It was not intended to apply where an employer changes arrangements, such as pay negotiating arrangements, for organisational or business purposes. The fact that section 146 has now been interpreted as having a wider meaning shows that the law is unclear, and is no longer achieving the purpose for which it was intended. I have read out in the Chamber the words of Lord Jacques-- Mr. Alex Carlile rose--

Mr. Hunt : Let me finish my point.

If the section is no longer achieving the purpose for which it was intended, it is necessary--indeed, I contend that it is

imperative--that the amendment be made.

The amendment clarifies for the benefit of tribunals and courts the way in which an employer's purpose should be determined in cases such as those that have occurred recently. It provides for the situation in which a case comes to a tribunal and, as happened in the cases in question, the employer and the individual put different arguments about the employer's purpose in taking a particular action. Let me explain to my hon. Friend the Member for Eltham (Mr. Bottomley) what will happen before the tribunal. The tribunal will consider the evidence that both parties bring before it, and will determine whether that evidence is credible. Then it will decide the case on the basis of that evidence. When credible evidence is brought forward, on the one hand that the employer's purpose was

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to bring about a change in the way in which he conducted his relationship with his employees, or with a class of them, and on the other hand that his purpose was one falling within section 146, the tribunal is to take the bargaining purpose as the relevant purpose. That is not to say that any tribunal's hands are to be tied. The tribunal must always have regard to the reasonableness of the action taken. If the action is such as no reasonable employer would take in the circumstances, the tribunal will still be able to decide that the action amounts to action short of dismissal, in the terms of section 146.

Mr. Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston) rose

Mr. Hunt : I shall give way in a moment.

The amendment will restore the proper distinction, drawn in section 146 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, between individual matters and collective matters. Section 146 will continue to give individuals protection against victimisation--that is, action short of dismissal--because of their trade union membership or non-membership, but it will not prevent employers from making and implementing legitimate decisions about how they wish to negotiate with their employees.

Mr. Alex Carlile : Does the Secretary of State take the view that Lord Justice Dillon was stating the law correctly when, in the Wilson case, he said that the employer enters a potential danger area--in other words, he breaks the law--if he offers a douceur to employees for supporting his policy of derecognising a union and making consequential changes in the terms and conditions of employment ? If that is a correct statement of the law, as I certainly believe it to be, is not the Secretary of State now legalising the offering of what Lord Justice Dillon called a douceur to employees who will support his policy ? Is not "douceur" a rather elegant alternative for "bribe" ? How can the right hon. Gentleman justify such a change ?

Mr. Hunt : I thought that I had dealt already with that matter. Having read the judgments of the Court of Appeal in both cases, I believe that the clear distinction that was drawn between individual rights of employees and collective bargaining issues has been confused. Surely that was never the legislature's intention in passing the original provision. I have already referred to Lord Jacques's comment that the provision deals with individual rights of employees, not collective bargaining issues.

It has always been possible for an employer to derecognise a particular trade union. It has always been possible for an employer to offer different rates of pay, to reward those employees who wish to enter into individual contracts rather than participate in collective bargaining. We could have a long argument, but I hope that hon. Members will accept that it is my genuine belief that the confusion between the individual rights of employees and collective bargaining issues has made the need for this amendment as urgent as I am arguing that it is.

Mr. Peter Bottomley : I should like to quote some words of an employer. As it may be for an industrial tribunal to judge whether the employer was being reasonable, or whether any reasonable employer could hold this view, I do not want my right hon. Friend to reply to the point. These are the employer's words :

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"We believe that higher pay for those on personal contracts is essential if individuals are to be treated fairly."

In other words, people doing the same work should be paid at different rates.

The House ought to consider whether a reasonable employer could hold that view. My understanding is that, according to the Ullswater amendment, whatever else might be demonstrated before an industrial tribunal, it will not be possible in such circumstances to demonstrate that an employer has acted unlawfully, as there is a purpose in addition to the purpose of deterring trade union membership.

Mr. Hunt : I am not disagreeing with my hon. Friend. Let him reflect on what I have just said. I have quoted from the speech that the noble Earl Ferrers made in another place in 1982. The noble Earl said that it would not be unfair to have differentiation between rates of pay. It has always been possible for an employer to offer additional money to employees who are prepared to enter into individual contracts. I have been trying to explain to the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery that this amendment is necessary so that we may get back to the situation that existed not just before the Court of Appeal cases but since 1975.

The amendment does no more than clarify this aspect of the law. It will apply only in a particular set of circumstances, similar to those that arose in the recent cases that I described. Only when an employer wishes to bring about a change in the way in which he conducts his relationship with his employees and in order to do so takes action that is argued to be in contravention of section 146 will the amendment come into play--and even then only if the action is reasonable in all the circumstances.

It is an important amendment, but it does not amount to a change in the law as it was understood before the Court of Appeal cases. As I have argued, the Government believe that it does no more than to ensure that the law is applied in the way that was originally intended, by clarifying the distinction between bargaining arrangements on the one hand and membership of trade unions on the other.

Mr. Martlew : Is the Minister saying that, if an individual employee for some reason did not wish to join a trade union, it would be legal for the employer to negotiate a contract allowing him to pay that employee less than the members of a trade union?

Mr. Hunt : It is perfectly possible--indeed, it is part of normal practice--for employers to wish to enter into individual arrangements with individual employees and to provide additional rates of pay if that employee decides to move in that direction. It is perfectly possible to have differential rates of pay. That could mean more or it could mean less : it has always been possible to pay less or more in accordance with individual contracts with individual employees. The hon. Member for Bolsover pointed out that, in the UDM-NUM case, the issue was extra pay because of trade union membership. That is why I differentiated as I did.

Mr. Leighton : We seem to be living in an age of macho management. The Minister says that it has always been possible to do this sort of thing. Can he give examples of precedents for employers offering such "douceurs"?

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Mr. Hunt : It is a recognised fact of life : it happens all the time in various industries. I find it extraordinary that, whereas the traditional case made by Opposition Members for trade union membership has been that trade unions force wages up, they now argue that companies all over the United Kingdom will actually pay people more when they renource collective bargaining arrangements. That is a paradox that I find it difficult to accept. Of course I will provide the hon. Gentleman with precedents, but I ask him to take it from me that the amendment merely takes the law back to where it is believed it was before the Court of Appeal cases.

Moreover, I want to make it very clear--because I reckon that we may be treated to some wild assertions by the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson)--that the amendment will not apply solely to cases in which the action taken by the employer is related to his decision to derecognise a trade union. The amendment means that, in any circumstances in which an employer wants to change his negotiating arrangements and takes reasonable action to bring about that change, he will not be acting in contravention of section 146 of the 1992 Act.

Mr. Devlin : I accept what my hon. Friend says about the law always having been this way, but may I go back to the point made much earlier by the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile)? I am not saying that my hon. Friend the Minister is wrong but, if--I emphasise "if"--it were found that the law as it is now being clarified was in breach of the European convention on human rights, would the Government then be prepared to change the law as quickly as possible to bring the clarification within the remit of the convention?

Mr. Hunt : I would not bring forward the amendment if I felt that it would be in breach of international conventions or would affect the right of an individual to belong, or not to belong, to a trade union. I make that clear to the House. Obviously, the law is kept under review. If there is an argument that my hon. Friend can make, I shall look at it, but I present the case to the House on the basis that there is to be a clear distinction between trade union membership on the one hand and collective bargaining rights on the other.

Several hon. Members rose --

4.30 pm

Mr. Hunt : I shall finish dealing with the point before giving way, because I wish to make it clear that the amendment means that, in any situation in which an employer wants to change his negotiating arrangements and takes reasonable action to bring about that change, he will not be acting in contravention of section 146.

I give another example. It means that if an employer wants to introduce a single-union deal--that is, recognition, for collective bargaining purposes, of a single union to represent the work force--he will be able to offer his employees a financial or other incentive to persuade them to agree to such an arrangement.

It will, as I have emphasised, remain unlawful for any employer to take action against any employee on grounds of trade union membership or non- membership. But an employer would not be acting unlawfully if he took action to encourage his employees to be represented in negotiations by a trade union. The employer who judges

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that a single union deal or collective agreement is the best option for his business will be protected by the amendment, just as much as the employer who opts for personal contracts. I hope that the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras will bear that in mind.

Mr. Oliver Heald (Hertfordshire, North) : Will my right hon. Friend confirm that, during the 1980s, there was a trend towards individualised contracts or single-union deals because of the efficiency and competitiveness that resulted from them, and because they allowed terms and conditions of employment to be tailored to the needs of the workplace? Does he agree that many modern businesses that are competing well in Swindon, Sunderland and elsewhere have those arrangements?

Mr. Hunt : My hon. Friend is absolutely right. A major achievement of Conservative Governments who have introduced legislation in this area since 1979 has been to remove the rigidities which inhibited competitiveness in the British economy. The statistics show that clearly. Opposition Members are always throwing statistics at the Government. I ask them to heed the statistics that show that, between 1974 and 1979, when we last had a Labour Government, the average number of working days lost per 1,000 employees was over 500. We are now down to 20, 30 or 40 working days lost per 1,000 employees. That is the greatest testimony to the success of Conservative industrial relations legislation.

Mr. Barnes : Does the Minister believe that trade unions should be only friendly societies, providing legal services and pension funds for their members, and should not be involved collectively in bargaining to improve the conditions of their members? That seems to be the attitude surrounding the right hon. Gentleman's argument, particularly in relation to Opposition Members.

Mr. Hunt : It is on that point that the hon. Gentleman probably has the biggest problem understanding the situation. It is for employees to decide whether or not they wish-- [Interruption.] I thought that the hon. Gentleman referred to collective negotiation. I am differentiating between collective bargaining and individual trade union membership.

I assure the hon. Member for Derbyshire, North-East (Mr. Barnes) that I have had the benefit of a great deal of experience of trade unions. To describe them as friendly societies--while, at the same time, the only alternative is collective bargaining--is ridiculous. Trade union membership means much more than just membership of a friendly society, even when the members of a trade union decide that they do not wish their trade union membership to be involved in any way in their collective bargaining issues.

Only an employer can determine the negotiating arrangements that best suit his specific business, on the basis of his knowledge of all the relevant circumstances. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, North (Mr. Heald) said, if an employer comes to the conclusion that he wishes to move from collective bargaining to a more flexible pay negotiating system, why should the law prevent him from taking reasonable steps to encourage his work force to agree to his proposals and thus implement that decision? Why should employees who want to benefit

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from moving to personal contracts be prevented from doing so, whether they are trade union members or not? Those are the questions that the House must answer.

Mr. Frank Cook (Stockton, North) : Like other hon. Members, I welcome the Secretary of State to the Dispatch Box in his new position. I first recall him as a more junior Minister for Energy, and he was competent and proficient then. This afternoon, he is trying to make a fist of his job, under the guise of clarification of the law, to make a fairly radical change to it. The law did not need clarification in the first place. At least, if it needed clarification, it would appear to be only for the Secretary of State. He is simply trying to convince the House that many people out there want the change--the clarification--that he is offering.

This afternoon, Cleveland county council faxed to me a clear statement that it is wholly opposed to the proposals, and asked me to bring that opposition to the attention of the Secretary of State. I am sure that he will not be surprised by that, and will tell me that it is because Cleveland county council is Labour-dominated. I want him to know that a unanimous decision was made at a fully attended meeting, so everyone is against his proposal.

Mr. Hunt : I thank the hon. Gentleman for his kind words. I hope that his attempt to destroy my career by heaping me with praise will be unsuccessful.

As far as Cleveland county council is concerned, many outside observers have had considerable concerns aroused by listening to media reports and reading some of the press reports and scare stories about this amendment. I encourage the hon. Gentleman to ensure that a copy of Hansard containing my speech and his intervention goes straight back to the council, and that the council reconsiders its decision in the light of the assurances that I have given. To allow a law that was created for different purposes to impede business decisions of the nature that I have described is wrong. I reiterate that amendment No. 8 will restore the law to the meaning that it was intended to have when it was approved by Parliament in 1975, and I commend it to the House.

Mr. Dobson : I welcome the Secretary of State to his task. He comes to it with a newspaper reputation for liberalism and decency, and we look forward to evidence of that at some stage in the proceedings. I remind the House that, since I first stood for Parliament, I have been sponsored by what is now the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers, formerly the National Union of Railwaymen. The union makes a substantial contribution to my election expenses and the salary of my agent. I am grateful to the union for its help. I am proud to be sponsored by the union of which both my father and grandfather were members. I am proud to be associated with the union that represents thousands of transport workers, especially the railway workers employed atncy. Those facts are well known to my constituents and have always been on the public record--and that is how it should be. Only those who are ashamed of the sources of their funds need to keep them secret.

Let me make it clear that we are utterly opposed to amendment No. 8 passed by the other place. We object to it because it is wrong in principle and certain to be harmful

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in practice. The proposal is a savage attack on the rights of individual employees. It undermines their right to freedom of association and to choose freely who will represent them. We also object to the way in which the amendment was bounced through the other place, without proper consultation or notice. Presented at the last minute, the amendment was an abuse of parliamentary procedure and the Government's powers. It was most ably resisted by Labour and other peers, but the Government used their majority to force it through.

For those reasons, we pressed the Government to devote the rest of today's debate to this important amendment and we are glad that they have agreed. I hope, although I am not hopeful, that by the end of the debate they will accept that their proposal is wrong. By the amendment the Government propose to make it lawful for employers to bribe employees to give up the right to trade union representation. In other words, this corrupt Government want to make corruption part of the law of the land. Until now everyone has accepted that such action by employers was against the law.

The law in question was first passed in 1975. It has remained unamended since then, through all the changing scenes of life at the Department of Employment--untouched by Tebbit or Thatcher and undefiled even by the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard). The Tories have passed five major industrial relations laws since 1979, but until now this law has been left intact. The present law is set out in the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 which was passed as recently as 14 July last year. That Act makes it unlawful for an employer to dismiss an employee for being a union member or for joining in union activities. The Act also makes it unlawful for an employer to take "action short of dismissal" with the purpose of preventing or deterring an employee from joining a union and to penalise an employee for doing so. The Act also makes it unlawful to prevent or deter an employee from or penalise him for taking part in union activities. Such action is, rightly, against the law, yet this amendment would change all that.

If we were to agree to the amendment, it would permit employers to prevent or deter employees from union membership or union activity and to penalise them for it. The amendment would not just permit employers to act in that outrageous way, but would encourage them by giving their action the seal of parliamentary approval.

All this has come about because on 30 April the Court of Appeal made it clear that the law meant what it said : that it was unlawful for an employer to offer bribes or threaten fines to induce employees to give up trade union representation. The Court of Appeal took the common-sense view that bribes and fines meant that employers were out to prevent, deter or penalise trade unionists.

It is worth reminding the House just who had been breaking the law. The two companies in question were Associated Newspapers, owners of the Daily Mail and by appointment principal media supporters of the Tory party, and Associated British Ports, by appointment of this Tory Government owners of Britain's privatised ports. Both companies had long-standing agreements with their employees to recognise trade unions and negotiate with them the terms and conditions of those of their employees who wished to be represented in that way. In the case of the Daily Mail, the agreement dated back to 1912. Under the agreements negotiations were conducted between the

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employers on the one hand and the unions on the other, and the employers and employees each chose who would represent them in the negotiations. Both companies decided that they wanted to put an end to these arrangements and put their employees on individual contracts that ruled out employees being represented by their union. In other words, in future the employer would decide who represented both sides in the negotiations.

Mr. Heald rose --

4.45 pm

Mr. Dobson : Just a minute. I may give way in a moment. In case anyone thinks I am exaggerating, I refer the House to the Court of Appeal judgment which records that at Associated Newspapers the group managing director explained that

"henceforth staff would be represented by their Editors and Heads of Department."

In other words, in future relations between staff and management individual staff would be represented by their boss who would in turn negotiate with his or her boss. The Tories have some strange concepts of representation, but that beggars all description.

In an effort to induce employees to accept this one-sided bargain to give up the right to choose who represented them or the right even to seek such representation in future, both companies offered big pay increases to those employees who were willing under duress to sign away their rights. The companies denied such pay increases to any employees who refused to relinquish trade union representation. As I shall explain, the sums were not trivial.

In the case of Associated Newspapers, Mr. David Wilson, backed up by the National Union of Journalists, challenged this as an unlawful action short of dismissal. Dock workers from Southampton, Mr. Teddy Palmer, Mr. Brian Stedman and Mr. Eddie Wyeth, backed up by the Rail, Maritime and Transport union, made a similar challenge. In both cases the employees were supported by an industrial tribunal. In both cases their arguments were rejected in rather bizarre and certainly non-unanimous judgments of the employment appeal tribunal. In both cases the employees were backed unanimously and clearly by the Court of Appeal.

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