| Previous Section | Home Page |
Mr. Andrew Mackinlay (Thurrock) : Before my hon. Friend moves on from that shameful catalogue of inefficiency by the Secretary of State and his predecessor, will he add to it the case of HMS Victoria which has cost the taxpayer an additional £70 million, is three years behind in delivery and still does not have the defence systems that were intended for it? Will my hon. Friend press the Secretary of State to ensure that before the debate is concluded on Monday evening we have a full and frank disclosure of the circumstances behind the scandalous loss of public money in relation to HMS Victoria, know when the vessel will be completed and have a reassurance that it will have the defence systems for which it was originally designed?
Dr. Clark : I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for the assiduous way in which he has gone about researching and publicising that scandal. Representing a constituency on the River Tyne--perhaps I should say River Teign, which seems to be the Prime Minister's way of describing it--I well remember the problem. It is a sore point. When I, along with my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr. Dixon), have 800 constituents likely to be made redundant by Swan Hunter, it is particularly painful to realise that that order was deliberately turned away from the Tyne and given to Belfast. Therefore, I look forward to the reply to my hon. Friend's question and I hope that the Minister will be forthcoming.
Will the Secretary of State, or the Minister when he replies, confirm that last Friday, as questions were being asked in the House about the future of our troops in Bosnia and whether they should or could be evacuated, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Argos, whose light artillery, the Secretary of State told us when the naval task force was sent to the Adriatic, was critical in aiding the evacuation of our troops, was, almost to the minute, sailing into a military port in the south of England loaded with the very light artillery that the Minister told us was vital if we were to get our troops safely out of Bosnia? That is a serious charge and the Minister owes an explanation not only to the House and the country but to the troops in Bosnia who were told that equipment was available to help. Why was the RFA Argos brought home at that critical time?
The Minister may refer to Sea Harriers, but they cannot provide 24-hour cover. They are dependent on ground guidance, and are unable to reach troops in the split second that is sometimes required. If light artillery were in place, it could provide the cover needed. I hope that the Minister will remedy that serious inadequacy as speedily as possible.
Column 1027
The Government threaten our defence with their incompetence, indecision and inefficiency--but also by their negative approach. Nowhere is that more clearly seen than in the comprehensive test ban treaty. The United States, Russia and France all agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing. Only Britain and China disagreed. It is widely understood that the British Government's position is the hardest of them all, and that threatens the complementary non-proliferation treaty, which is due for review in 1995. It is widely acknowledged that, unless there is progress with a comprehensive test ban treaty, the future of the non- proliferation treaty will be at stake. Why are the Government so obstinate? There is no need for further testing.In a letter to The Independent on 18 February, four former ambassadors and senior civil servants clearly and explicitly made the case against nuclear testing. Many leading scientists in this country and overseas--including Lord Zuckerman, the former MOD chief scientist--take a similar view. The Government know the situation. In a letter to me dated 14 June, the Secretary of State wrote : "At the first meeting of the NPT preparatory committee held last month, some countries made it clear that in deciding their own approach toward the non-proliferation treaty they felt it important to see progress being made towards a CTBT."
The Secretary of State cannot claim that he does not understand the argument. Why does he not act upon it? It is in the interests of Britain and of the whole world that the non-proliferation treaty is signed. Security is a far wider concept than defence. In a world of weapons of mass destruction, security is probably more vital than the narrow concept of defence.
A lack of leadership seems to characterise the Government, who constantly trail behind and are never in the vanguard. That is clear in the case of Bosnia in particular and of the United Nations in general. The Government have always lagged behind what is required in Bosnia, and people have lost their lives because of it.
The Labour party shares the Government's caution, but we have always argued and advocated a policy aimed at protecting non-combatants. Fortunately, we have been able to drag the Government along, but always slowly--and lives were lost in the meantime. If only the Government had acted earlier and with vigour, the consequences would have been much better.
As early as 7 August 1992 I called--on behalf of the Labour party--for United Kingdom troops to be sent to Bosnia to escort humanitarian convoys as part of the United Nations effort, but we had to wait until 22 September before the Government decided to act. Why the delay? In December, the shadow Cabinet responded to my suggestion that the United Kingdom should advocate and support in the United Nations a no-fly zone over Bosnia. We had to wait until 1 April before Government support for such a policy was forthcoming. When the House last debated Bosnia, on 29 April, I argued that United Nations safe havens should be protected by United Nations troops, and that if asked, Britain should consider allowing our troops to participate in that humanitarian role. We still await the Government's conversion. The six-nation declaration of 24 May that only United Nations troops will receive protection in safe
Column 1028
havens almost beggars belief. Are not British troops there to protect non-combatants? They must be. That is their purpose. Our defence industries play an integral part in our country's defence effort. We acknowledge that with defence spending cutbacks both here and abroad, there will inevitably be reductions in the numbers employed in those industries. We differ from the Government in that we feel that one simply cannot disregard the years of loyal service given by those employees. It is not sufficient to let the free market decide their fate and to throw them on the dole with the 3 million other unemployed.In the past three years, the national press has logged 81,900 workers in defence-related industries as losing their jobs. That figure excludes thousands more job losses that have not been reported at a national level. Do the Government feel no obligation to those people? Why do they reject calls from this side of the House to assist those workers by establishing a defence diversification agency? The Governments of other countries assist their companies to develop into other markets and products. The dual use of technology may be difficult but it is not impossible. Other countries and other companies are achieving that. In Britain, many local authorities are endeavouring to assist in that way, so why do the Government shirk their responsibility?
This Government, in the words of the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, are more interested in office than power. They are a Government without vision. They are a Government devoid of a leadership instinct. They are a Government for whom ideas seem too much of a burden. That is characteristic of all the Government's activities, but nowhere is it more clearly seen than in the sphere of defence. As a result, the very security of Britain is suffering. 5.36 pm
Sir Jerry Wiggin (Weston-super-Mare) : The hon. Member for South Shields (Dr. Clark) attacked my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Defence for dogma, but I could hear in the hon. Gentleman's words echoes again of the Labour party's anti-nuclear stance. The strength of our nuclear arm was surely one factor in the collapse of the Warsaw pact. We stuck with it through thick and thin, despite criticisms, and with difficulty and expense--but I believe that that was the most sensible, worthwhile and peace-promoting activity that the Government undertook in conjunction with their allies.
I want today to draw attention to our reserves. This afternoon, my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State made some important announcements. The world scene does not give me any feeling of great peace or security. I have not added up the figures, but the other day I was told that there are no fewer than 28 armed conflicts currently raging in the world.
I do not see any great reduction in the threat from the former Warsaw pact. Many of those soldiers have nothing to do and are hungry, and many of the factories are still producing armaments in substantial quantities. Furthermore, the Governments that are supposed to have control of those countries--although they may or may not have control--are themselves insecure and unstable, and those countries are on our borders. Elsewhere in the world, the scene is no happier.
Column 1029
I did not cast my vote in support of "Options for Change", because I believed that it was premature and too much. It must be sensible at a time when we are reducing our regular forces to enhance our reserves. There cannot be a strategist in history who would not acknowledge that as a sensible way to proceed. In fact, regular officers in command of our armed services, who are responsible for deploying their resources with the maximum effect and maximum economy, in their opinion, will always derate the reservist and say, "I would rather have a regular frigate than 10 minesweepers," or, "I would rather have a regular company than 10 Territorial Army battalions." I am afraid that that philosophy has been allowed to prevail again. I understand that the Territorial Army is undergoing yet further inspection, months after "Options for Change".More than 10 years ago, when I was at the Ministry of Defence, I had the welcome and happy task of helping to expand the Territorial Army. We set House before, recruitment was never maintained at the desired level.
When the "Options for Change" figures were published, I had to say that I thought it realistic to set a reasonable and sensible figure, in terms of recruitment and equipment. Now all that has been overturned, and a further examination of possible economies in the TA is being made. Rumour has it that up to 14 units may be involved. Perhaps I should declare an interest-- not a financial one. I have the honour to have been appointed honorary colonel of A squadron of the Royal Mercian and Lancastrian Yeomanry, an amalgamation which--although, thanks to the common sense of the officers, it is proceeding happily--is far from natural.
The other day, I heard an ugly rumour that the MOD was thinking of abolishing honorary colonels ; I sincerely hope that it was but a rumour. Although I well understand that the political power that such a collection of gentlemen can produce is sometimes uncomfortable for those sitting in Whitehall, I believe that they have a role to play, and that their abolition would be outrageous. In any case, I have not yet paid for my mess kit.
I think I heard my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State say that he had no plans to reorganise the Territorial Army associations. They, too, play a political role of a sort : they not only maintain TA buildings, but maintain the liaison between employers, serving TA soldiers and the community in every area. I hope that the Territorial Army volunteer reserve associations can be preserved in their present form.
My right hon. and learned Friend spoke of consultation. I note that each of the documents published this afternoon, concerning RAF and Royal Navy reserves, has "Consultative Documents" in large letters on the front page. To me, however, that has the ring of something produced by the MOD. However many consultations may be proposed, there seems little likelihood of change.
If my right hon. and learned Friend genuinely intends consultation to take place, I hope that he will study carefully the paper that has just been produced by the council of TAVRAs ; it has been sent to some of us in the
Column 1030
past few days. The document, which is extremely well written, calmly argues the fundamental point that a reservist, if trained to carry his personal weapon, to conduct himself in a military manner and to understand the chain of command--in other words, to look after himself--can be useful in any circumstances.The same applies to the seaman. The mine counter-measures training of the Royal Naval Reserve may not be so relevant to today's threat, but the fact remains that--for very little pay, and with very little reward--reservists were able to operate and navigate their ships, to look after themselves and to behave in a seamanlike way. They, too, would have been of asssistance.
I do not think that my right hon. and learned Friend can get away with hoping that he will not be criticised for his announcements about the RNR. The removal of no fewer than nine ships and 11 units, as announced in the document, deals a death blow to the RNR. It is ridiculous to suggest that re-enlisting 500 men in aircraft and submarine maintenance will produce anything like the present-day RNR. The truth is that the regular view has prevailed : "We will keep our regular frigates, and to hell with the reservists." It is a very sad day for the RNR ; I deeply deplore what has happened, and I hope that what I have said will be counted as my contribution to the consultation.
I know that, in the next few months, Ministers' minds will be engaged by the question of the size and role of all the reserves. I emphasise the word "role". The regulars' favourite trick is to argue that there must be a role. Everything must be cut and dried : we must know exactly what this or that soldier will do when we go to war. One of the lessons of history is that almost never does a war obligingly come up to suit the staff college ; wars are always unexpected and happen in the wrong place, the equipment is wrong and the soldiers have been trained in the wrong way. What, then, is wrong with training a reserve force? It must be sensible.
I believe that, last year, the reserve force cost the MOD 2.08 per cent. of its total expenditure. The Ministry cannot have anything cheaper than that. My regiment has 20-year-old vehicles. The standard of training is extremely high, and there is a good deal of enthusiasm ; the pay, however, is minimal. If it were not for the enthusiastic way in which the soldiers are led, the MOD would be getting nothing for its money, but in fact it receives extraordinary good value. I hope that, one day, one of the Ministers will spare the time to visit us so that we can show him at first hand the excellent job that TA soldiers are doing.
I was interested to note that the hon. Member for South Shields mentioned the decision on the nuclear refit at Devonport. Although my constituency is about 100 miles from Devonport, the entire west country considers that decision crucial. There is no longer a justification for two dockyards the size of Rosyth and Devonport ; at some point, hard decisions will have to be made. The sooner it is decided that Devonport shall be the principal dockyard for the south coast, the better : ultimately, that is what will happen, and if we go on dithering we shall simply waste a good deal of money and cause a good deal of ill feeling.
The west country is also affected by the question of the EH101. I have often argued in the House for the provision of proper helicopter support for the British forces. As long as the RAF is responsible for supporting the Army, problems involving the allocation of money will arise--
Column 1031
problems identical to those caused by the conflict between regulars and reserves. In 1987, Lord Younger--then Secretary of State for Defence--promised that the EH101 would be purchased in its utility version to provide medium heavy lift capacity for the British armed forces ; nothing has been heard since.We know that, because the so-called Air Mobile Brigade is about as mobile as the bicycle corps used to be because it has no helicopters, pressure is now building up. Experience of the Gulf and other such theatres--along with the experience of other armies, and the work of analysts--has shown that the British forces need a substantial helicopter enhancement.
The RAF was bemused by the offer of a cheap version of the Chinook, whose design is more than 30 years old. Of course it will pay the Americans to sell the British forces a cheap version of the helicopter : it will put our helicopter producers out of business, and in 10 or 15 years, when it comes to the next round, there will be no British alternative. The EH101 is technically an advanced helicopter, well capable of beating all its rivals. I accept that it is on the expensive side, but, if the RAF does not buy it, what hope have we of selling it anywhere else?
My hon. Friend the Minister may not be aware that the MOD made our aircraft industry a laughing stock in the recent Paris air show by revealing that MOD officials had inquired of the French Ministry whether it had any secondhand Pumas for sale. What on earth are we doing when something such as that happens? The EH101 is a fine aircraft and we want a firm order--we have 40 in mind. Let us go ahead and show the world what we mean. That will be good for United Kingdom Ltd., because we will sell that helicopter around the world.
Mr. Mans : Does my hon. Friend agree that, although the initial purchase of the EH101 may appear to be expensive, if one compares the full life costs of that aircraft with that of the Chinook, it works out considerably cheaper?
Sir Jerry Wiggin : Yes, and it is not only that. The reliability that will be built in--such as the non-vibration factors and so on--will commend that helicopter enormously.
The hon. Member for South Shields was complaining about decisions that had been delayed for months. This decision has been delayed for years, and it is time it was made in favour of the EH101.
5.50 pm
Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East) : It is difficult to escape a sense that some of our deliberations this afternoon may be inconclusive because of the imminence of the publication of the estimates for 1993. For example, looking back at the Defence Committee's response to the 1992 estimates, it is clear that the Committee's observations about the submarine fleet are likely to be overtaken by events. The Government's proposals are likely to be available in a more detailed form in the 1993 estimates than in those for 1992.
In spite of that, a debate of this sort necessarily allows an opportunity for the discussion of a number of long-term issues. It was notable that the hon. Member for South Shields (Dr. Clark)--he is no longer in the Chamber, because he has another obligation--began by
Column 1032
asking for a full-scale defence review. There is never a defence review now that is not accompanied by the adjectives "full" and "scale".A call for such a review was repeated this morning in the Scottish newspapers by Lieutenant-General Sir Peter Graham, the recently retired GOC Scotland. He has gone from that eminent position to lead the campaign to save the Gordon Highlanders. That may to some extent justify the view that, if there were to be a full-scale defence review, at least in the beginning, Mr. Alan Clark was sensible to consider that involving the service chiefs might not be wise. The hon. Member for South Shields considered that the fact that it was thought that they might be the source of leaks was some sort of reflection on them. I should have thought that it was almost inevitable, in circumstances such as those outlined in the "Diaries", that leaks would have occurred, because there would necessarily be some inter- service rivalry. The hon. Member for South Shields was being, if not naive, perhaps a little disingenuous.
There is no doubt that Mr. Alan Clark believed that he was the progenitor of something in the nature of a review. However, it was clear when "Options for Change" was first announced in the House and spoken to by the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King), that he believed that a defence review was not under way.
Tribute was paid earlier in the debate to the right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Mr. Hamilton). I should like to add my congratulations to him on his tenure of office and to thank him for the courtesy that he displayed to me, particularly during the Gulf war. He was at pains on a number of occasions to ensure that I was aware of certain steps that were being taken by the Government so that the fullest information, consistent with security, was available to hon. Members of all parties.
The right hon. Gentleman conducted himself then and on many other occasions with a great deal of charm and courtesy for which I am grateful. I hope that we will hear from him frequently in debates of this sort, because he knows where the bodies are buried. He may be able to bring a perception to some of our debates that we would otherwise lack. If he is ever looking for battle honours, he may be able to claim, with some justification, that he served for a number of years in the Ministry of Defence with Mr. Alan Clark.
My criticisms of "Options for Change" are that there were never any options, there were never any choices and there was never any public discussion of the commitments, or the resources that might be made available to meet those commitments. I must say, particularly to those on the Opposition Front Bench--I do not excuse myself from this criticism-- that it is far too easy to use the notion of a defence review as a shield against taking tough decisions.
There is no doubt that any Government of any political colour operating on the Treasury Bench now would face a series of critical and extremely difficult decisions because of the change in the strategic environment and reduced resources. It is important to realise that a defence review is not a solution. It is a means of identifying questions that will require solutions. I believe that a review is a better means of identifying those questions than any other, but it is important that one does not respond to every change in the defence environment by pretending to people in Harrogate, Rosyth and Devonport that, if there were to be
Column 1033
a full-scale review, the difficult decisions involving their futures would be taken in a way entirely favourable to them. Those of us who argue for a defence review have an obligation to make it clear that a review will be a more effective way of identifying the decisions, but that in the end, against the background of changes in the strategic environment and reduced resources, difficult decisions will have to be taken.Another criticism of "Options for Change" is this. There have been substantial changes in the international security environment since July 1990. It would be surprising should there not be a change of policy to meet those changes. What policy decisions by any Department in July 1990, other than the Ministry of Defence, are still standing unaltered? The changes in the international security environment that I have in mind include Yugoslavia, the break-up of the Soviet Union, instability in the middle east and the extended role of the United Nations.
I do not believe that a middle-ranking power such as the United Kingdom can now maintain every capability, but I believe that an alliance can. Therefore, the significance of NATO and, in due course, the evolution of a common foreign and security policy within the European Community, is the means by which we may be able to provide the necessary range of capabilities. It was an alliance that met the Soviet threat. Alliances are now necessary to ensure access to the range of capabilities that the changing international situation may well require.
We must acknowledge that the driving force of a European security policy is financial as much as political, as is the reduction of United States forces in Europe. It was commonly believed that "Options for Change" was Treasury- driven, although that has been consistently denied by the Government. However, if, as is popularly believed, something such as "Options II" is taking place, with the purpose of taking £4 billion over the next three years out of the Ministry of Defence budget, that can only be at the imperative of the Treasury, and cannot be the product of a strategic overview or some rational analysis of commitments.
Some weeks ago, Sir Richard Vincent, formerly senior commander in the United Kingdom and now a senior commander with NATO, exhorted the polititians to state what the clear political objectives might be in Yugoslavia before consideration of any commitment to further military resources. He was stating a truism but, like many truisms, it frequently has to be repeated. The same applies in defence policy. We must have clear political objectives before we can determine what resources are necessary, but we must acknowledge that we do not start with a blank sheet of paper. Previous decisions of previous Governments have an influence over what we may do now, as do political commitments and historical responsibilities. There will always be a temptation to operate at the margin--to delay a particular procurement programme, or to make reductions in personnel, aircrafts or ships at the margin--because that is the easiest way to manage a reduction in defence spending. It is much easier to do it that way than to make difficult choices between, for example, size and
Column 1034
quality. In the changing environment, I believe it will become more important for us to consider how we do something rather than how many things we do.We must explore the question of force specialisation. I do not underestimate the difficulties of embarking on such a project. There would be opposition from the services and the defence industry and there would be political consequences within existing alliances, all of which would be mirrored in countries with which we sought to have a dialogue about force specialisation. It will, however, be essential to move in that direction because the financial compulsion will be overwhelming.
It would be too simplistic, especially in the light of the two opening speeches, to call for a consensus in the House, but we shall need some kind of general domestic political understanding of the direction in which policy is taking us because some of the decisions made will be irreversible. I cite an example which, as it did not happen in this way, might be thought to be neutral. If the Government had cancelled the European fighter aircraft, as they were under some pressure to do, the project would not have been reinstated. It is, therefore, very important that there should be a general domestic understanding of where policies are leading and what the consequences of certain decisions might be, perhaps not today or next year but in five or 10 years.
One matter in which consensus would be highly desirable is that of nuclear deterrence. I have never had any difficulty with the independent nuclear deterrent. I believe that for the foreseeable future it will be necessary for the United Kingdom to maintain it. I also believe, and have often said, that we need four submarines for that deterrent to be constantly available. However, I can see no justification for the deployment of any more warheads on Trident than on the Polaris system which it is to replace. Trident has twice the range, is much more accurate and is capable of being independently targeted.
I am not saying anything that the Minister has not heard me say before if I state that there is no justification for the tactical air-to-surface missile. We may just have persuaded the Government about that, but it is at least still a live issue. The TASM is the product of the old thinking which NATO has abandoned, the product of the doctrine of flexible response, nuclear war fighting, an effort to find a weapon that could cope with the massed tank formations of the Warsaw pact countries as they streamed across the inner German border.
Mr. Brazier : I am following the hon. and learned Gentleman's argument carefully. On that narrow point, what type of deterrent does he think we could provide to a third world dictator--many, some as near as Libya and Algeria, are close to possessing nuclear weapons--without TASM, because Trident would be very difficult to use in a third world scenario?
Mr. Campbell : I must take issue with the hon. Gentleman from a technical point of view. The evidence given to the Select Committee on that topic was that Trident is capable of being used in a sub-strategic role-- one missile with one warhead. I do not believe that it is a realistic threat, and I shall tell the hon. Gentleman why in a moment, but if he is anxious to maintain a capability against the threat that he outlines, he could have it with the Trident system. In what circumstances does the hon. Gentleman conceive that the United Kingdom, acting
Column 1035
alone without its allies, would consider the independent use of a sub-strategic weapon? I find it difficult to imagine such circumstances. Let me put the question in a slightly different way to reveal the nature of my thinking.What additional increment of deterrence does the United Kingdom need beyond what is already available within the alliances of which we are a member and which would be provided by our own tactical air-to-surface missile? I cannot conceive that the additionality--to use a rather heavy-handed word which is often used in the Community--is justified.
Mr. Brazier : I understand what the hon. and learned Gentleman says about specialisation and looking within the alliances and I agree with his general point, but he must face the reality that America may not be here for all time. It is essential that at least one European country--it can only be ourselves or France--has the capability to deal with the third world scenario that we are describing. No one is likely to have the political will to use Trident against a third world threat. Trident is invisible. Whereas an aircraft can hover on the edge of a radar screen as a threat, a third world dictator could conceal Trident from his own people.
Mr. Campbell : I fancy that most third world dictators would conceal from their own people an aircraft hovering on the edge of a radar net--I doubt whether they would take prime time in downtown Baghdad to say that several European fighter aircraft were hovering just outside their airspace with tactical air-to-surface missiles. We must assume--indeed, I am astonished that the hon. Gentleman is not prepared to concede this--that the NATO alliance will continue, and that it will continue as a nuclear alliance. One of the conundrums that we must resolve is the fact that the United States is anxious for Europe to take a greater role in dealing with its own defence but that, whenever it appears that it is more capable of doing so, the United States begins to believe that there may be no justification for remaining on continental Europe. If one is seeking a lock, or a means of binding the United States to Europe, it is more likely to be the nuclear element than anything else.
To proceed as I have outlined, with no more warheads on Trident than on Polaris, would be consistent with our obligations under the non- proliferation treaty and certainly with the NATO doctrine of minimum deterrence or nuclear weapons as weapons of last resort. That is necessarily relevant to the issue of nuclear proliferation, which must surely be the most significant threat to the integrity of the United Kingdom from a nuclear point of view.
I do not believe that the risk is necessarily one of direct attack on the United Kingdom. A nuclear war between two parties in the middle east would have a profound effect on the United Kingdom even if we did not come under direct attack. The non-proliferation treaty must be used to the maximum. We must use diplomatic and economic means, too. I believe that the United Kingdom's good faith would be a potent weapon in the battle against nuclear proliferation. To some extent, the hon. Member for South Shields covered my next point but it is worth repeating. It is the question of the United Kingdom accepting a moratorium on nuclear testing. There are reports today that the Clinton Administration may be about to resume testing in
Column 1036
Nevada. This week, a report from the Clinton Administration is circulating which suggests that there will be nine tests before 1996, of which three are for the United Kingdom.In answer to questions, the right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell has made it clear in the past year that the moratorium had no significance for or application to the Trident system. If the United Kingdom is embarking on further tests, the implication is that they are for another warhead. Reports from Washington suggest that, with the three tests, the United Kingdom is seeking to test a redesigned warhead which would be fitted to a new sub-strategic system, either a free-fall bomb to replace the WE177 or, if the option is kept open, a tactical air-to-surface missile. I do not believe that that is in the interests of non-proliferation. Why should tests for the United Kingdom in Nevada be in the national interests of the United States of America?
As the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) hinted in his intervention, it is time to explore the issue of nuclear co-operation with our allies-- the United States and France--all of whom, at one time, have strategic deterrents at sea. It would be possible to achieve an agreement by which, without giving up an independent deterrent, the alliance could maintain a constantly available strategic system. It would require the co-ordination of patrols and the integration of doctrine and procedures. Those are not insurmountable obstacles if we bear in mind the fact that Polaris is already committed to NATO, and that the Trident system will be similarly committed once it is brought into service.
We will be able to make more realistic observations about procurement when we see the scope of the 1993 estimates. Although I do not agree with the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare (Sir J. Wiggin) about the preference in favour of Devonport--which will hardly surprise him--I certainly agree with him about the EH101. The commitment, as he has rightly pointed out, was several years ago, and it has never been expressly withdrawn. The EH101 seems to fulfil the necessary requirements, and it is a United Kingdom aircraft with great potential for export sales.
There are some principles by which one should determine procurement issues. These are not my original thoughts but the distillation of a recent discussion with other members of the Select Committee on Defence, including the Chairman, the hon. Member for Upminster (Sir N. Bonsor), who is likely to try to catch your eye, Madam Deputy Speaker, later in the debate.
We cannot run a procurement policy in which the Ministry of Defence does not accept that it has a responsibility for the
defence-industrial base--a policy in which it is accepted that, while competition is desirable, it should be the subject of intelligent application, not slavish adherence. We should have a procurement policy in which the Government robustly protect the interests of the United Kingdom in joint ventures and, perhaps most significantly, our policy should ensure the best value for money for our troops, not necessarily for the Treasury.
Those are all issues to which we shall return once the 1993 estimates are published when we will be required to focus on all the issues that I have raised and more. I feel that we sometimes deal in abstracts in these debates, whereas the reality is that the defence of the nation and the protection of the United Kingdom's interests requires not only our political contribution on how those interests are
Column 1037
to be preserved and that defence to be maintained, but on the skill, courage and loyalty of all three of our services, which are being shown, even as we have this debate, in a number of places throughout the world. We owe it to those men and increasing number of women to show that we are worthy of their commitment.6.13 pm
Sir Nicholas Bonsor (Upminster) : It must be a matter of regret that, in June 1993, we are discussing the defence estimates for 1992-- almost a year after they were published and less than a month before the defence estimates for 1993. I know that Ministers are conscious of that and I look forward to our returning to a proper timetable. I hope that the 1994 defence estimates will be published next spring and that we shall be able to return to the system whereby they are published every spring and discussed, at the latest, in the summer.
Much has happened since the 1992 defence estimates were published. I should like briefly to remind the House of some of the more significant changes that have occurred. In the autumn statement last year, several hundred million pounds were sliced off the top of the defence budget for this year and the next two years. That has had a significant impact on our flexibility to respond to additional needs that crop up in the defence sphere and has made it extremely difficult for us to retain the defence capability that we need in an increasingly uncertain world.
Two battalions that had been under threat were reprieved, which was most welcome. Much less welcome was the fact that that was not specifically funded, and the danger is that the £80 million that it will cost will be offset in other ways, to which I shall return later. Although the reprieve is welcome, we are looking for more as the increasing demands of Bosnia and other United Nations commitments throw greater strain on our troops. That cannot be achieved under a defence budget that has no flexibility and is limited to what has already been assessed as today's need.
That is overshadowed by what has happened in Bosnia and by the threat of nuclear proliferation, which so far has been understated in the debate. The shadow Secretary of State read out the careful statement from the Labour party manifesto in what he described as words of almost one syllable. He did not reach a word as long as proliferation because nothing in the Labour party manifesto or in its planned statements dealt with the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons. The manifesto listed countries such as China, France and the United States and said that Labour would not remove our nuclear capability until those countries had done so, but what about the other countries that are now known to have nuclear weapons and the ones that are likely to have them in the near future? I think particularly of the Ukraine, Israel and North Korea, which must pose a serious threat to the stability of that part of the world and, therefore, a long-term threat to Britain and to the interests of our NATO allies.
Mr. Corbyn : Does the hon. Gentleman think that the development of the Trident nuclear missile system, with a fourfold increase in nuclear warheads compared with the existing Polaris system, is not itself an enormous proliferation and, indeed, a breach of the United Nations treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons?
Column 1038
Sir Nicholas Bonsor : It will not surprise the hon. Gentleman to learn that I do not agree. There is no doubt that Trident is necessary for our security. We cannot take it for granted that the former Soviet Union, in its break-up-- [Interruption.] If the hon. Gentleman listened instead of interrupting, he might hear.
Mr. Corbyn : Who is the enemy?
Sir Nicholas Bonsor : The enemy could be any country of the former Soviet Union that is still armed with nuclear weapons. We cannot take it for granted that the currently benign leadership of Russia will continue. Anyone who looks at foreign affairs with the remotest degree of intelligence must accept that. The Ukraine is showing increasing reluctance to surrender its substantial nuclear arsenal to Russia, as it previously agreed. There is the danger of North Korea arming itself with nuclear weapons. There is a large number of nuclear weapons in Israel.
Sir Nicholas Bonsor : As my hon. Friend says, there is the threat of Iran and Iraq, which are very close to having nuclear weapons. The hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn), who cannot see that we need a substantial nuclear arsenal to counter the threat of proliferation, is like a camel with its head the only point that I should like to make in rebuttal is that roughly 170 countries--members of the United Nations--manage to live in peace and security without nuclear weapons, and many of them are not members of any alliance. Cannot the hon. Gentleman grow up and understand that nuclear weapons are a danger and that any firing of a nuclear weapon will spark off the most appalling holocaust that will kill all of us?
Sir Nicholas Bonsor : I find it extremely hard to answer such a fatuous point. The hon. Gentleman must be aware that the NATO alliance has secured peace for western Europe. He says that there is peace throughout the world. I do not know whether he goes-- [Interruption.].
Madam Deputy Speaker : Order. There have been too many sedentary observations.
Sir Nicholas Bonsor : I am grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker. We have had enough of that, and I shall get on with the serious speech that I intended to make.
I shall now deal with some smaller but not insignificant recent events, the first of which is the decision to withdraw from Belize. I believe that that decision is mistaken, not least because, as has been pointed out, Guatemala cannot be considered stable at the moment, and when a country is unstable that must throw doubt on whether any assurances given by the regime of the moment can be relied upon even in the short and medium term.
Our presence in Belize has an enormous value, way beyond the military element. It is welcomed by the Belizeans, by the United States and by the previous Guatemalan Administration--I am waiting to hear what the present Administration feel about it. I believe that, until we decided to withdraw, the United States, the Belizeans and the Guatemalans were all begging us to stay, but now that the Government have decided to withdraw,
Column 1039
all those Governments are obligingly falling into line and announcing that of course they understand and they can perfectly well do without us. However, the troops and RAF personnel in that part of the world, and especially the guard ship stationed there, all play a significant role in anti-drugs operations, in bolstering the British presence in central America and in securing peace in that part of the world.The withdrawal is short-sighted, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Mr. Garel-Jones), who was until recently Minister of State at the Foreign Office, told other hon. Members and myself when we went to see him that it is all for the sake of saving £9 million a year at most. That figure does not take into account any increased aid that we might feel that we have to give to Belize by way of overseas development grants and so on so as to offset what will be lost by the withdrawal of our troop presence.
I welcome the fact that my right hon. Friends have decided not to withdraw altogether but to maintain Belize as a training area. The Select Committee on Defence will go there in December and when we return I shall report to the House what we find.
Sir Jerry Wiggin : My hon. Friend has left out one important factor- -Belize is the only theatre in which British troops receive any training in jungle warfare. This will be the first time since the end of the second world war that no jungle warfare training is available.
Sir Nicholas Bonsor : I did not leave that factor out, because we are not withdrawing from the jungle training element ; there will still be jungle training facilities in Belize. However, I doubt whether we have costed the true cost of sending people out to use those facilities and offset it against what we allegedly save by bringing people back regularly. I suspect that the decision represents a frantic effort by the Government to ease the emergency tour plot gap. Clearly, it will do that to some small degree. The Defence Select Committee was in Cyprus a fortnight ago and I found there, as everywhere else we go, the troops are stretched to the utmost limit. Half our troops stationed at sovereign bases are not at the bases at all, but carrying out emergency tour plot operations in the Falklands. That means that they have had to take their families from this country out to Cyprus, and then promptly abandon them so that they can do a six-month tour in the Falklands, leaving their young wives extremely unsettled in Cyprus, in a strange place in which they do not especially want to be.
That is bad enough, but I am told that at least one unit will have to go away not once but twice during its Cyprus tour. That is an example of the difficulties that our troops face because of the shortage of infantry available to carry out all our tasks in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. My right hon. Friends in Government will have to tackle those problems.
The Select Committee on Defence will keep a close eye on developments in that sphere, and I shall not rest until the emergency tour plot gap is back to the 24 months that is supposed to be the minimum, rather than the 17 months that is the present average and the 10 or 11-month gap that can sometimes occur.
Mr. Wolfson : My hon. Friend was talking about families being abandoned for periods in Cyprus and other places. Does he agree that that has a deleterious effect on morale, and therefore affects a person's decision whether
Column 1040
to remain in the services or to get out? Does that not represent a cost to the services to be offset against possible savings?Sir Nicholas Bonsor : My hon. Friend is right, of course. There is a distinct danger that morale will sink to the point at which we can no longer sustain the kind of troop forces that we need. That is especially important among those with specific skills, such as senior non-commissioned officers. People of that age and rank tend to have young wives and children, and substantial family commitments. When we were in Northern Ireland, we saw evidence of the fact that if too great a stress is put on family life by removing too regularly the man of the house for six months at a time, it is the wife who finally puts her foot down and says, "I cannot put up with this any longer. You must leave the Army and find a better job so that you can be at home." One reason why service men are not leaving in greater numbers is the recession, so I fear that as we come out of recession we shall find it harder to keep troops with the necessary expertise, unless we can put that problem to bed.
| Next Section
| Home Page |