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we know from bitter experience, it is easy to get involved in UN commitments and extremely difficult to get out of them.If we believe in delegated financial responsibility, it is quite logical to talk in terms of Departments paying for the troops they use and having a financial incentive to reduce their numbers or to find other ways of paying for them. Many jobs in Northern Ireland, for instance, currently carried out by soldiers could be performed by others. If the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had to pay a per capita sum for his troops, he might look differently at the most economical way, say, to guard the Maze prison--a job that could easily be done by locally recruited Ulstermen, and far more cheaply. That would also reduce unemployment in Northern Ireland.
Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones (Watford) : My right hon. Friend's suggestion is extremely interesting. Does he agree that, if that happened, the strategic needs that Britain faced in the future would be driven as much by the Departments that he has mentioned, among others, as by the Ministry of Defence?
Mr. Hamilton : I am coming to that. The prime job of the Ministry of Defence, a job for which it is well qualified, is the defence of the United Kingdom. I should be very worried if the Foreign Office were given even more input into strategic decisions than it has today--
Mr. Garel-Jones : Surely my right hon. Friend will accept--although no one disputes the ability and commitment of our armed forces to defend the kingdom and its interests--that one of the weaknesses of the past has been that Governments have never had the mechanisms to make strategic decisions about what and whom we are defending ourselves against. Surely my right hon. Friend accepts that not just the Foreign and Commonwealth Office but other political elements in the kingdom could make a valuable input to strategic decisions, which have to be taken before we can decide on troop and equipment requirements.
Mr. Hamilton : I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for raising this interesting topic. We would be in some danger if we had to identify enemies all the time. As an insurance policy, it is wise to keep a wide range of technologies and defence capabilities. We never know where the next threat to our national or overseas interests and the security of these islands might come from. Before the Gulf war, some people might have said that there was no longer any need for so much armour, but in that war we fought the first armoured battles since 1945 defending our interests. We must also look carefully at commitments that overstretch us in areas where our direct interests are not so well served.
Mr. Bill Walker : Does my right hon. Friend recollect that during the Falklands war some people questioned the use of the Harrier aircraft and its function? Does he agree that if we had not had that aircraft we could not have fought the Falklands war?
Mr. Hamilton : That is right, and the Nott review, which took place shortly before that conflict, had ambitions radically to reduce the Navy. If those proposals had been implemented we might not have been able to fight that campaign.
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It is not possible distinctly to analyse future problems and say where the next threat will come from. That is why, in broad terms, it must be right to keep a range of capabilities. I disagree with the Opposition, who say that we should think about specialisation. The broad range that I propose will inevitably narrow under financial pressures, but it is nonsense to talk about a review because that could not predict any clearly identifiable future threat. We must maintain the insurance policy of a defence industry and maintain the technologies that are needed in sophisticated warfare.If we do not look hard at the commitments in which we are becoming engaged, we shall be in danger of having more and more people playing a role in a peacekeeping army, which would be to the detriment of many of our high- technology defence capabilities elsewhere. I wholeheartedly congratulate the Government--and President Clinton--on not being drawn more closely into the conflict in Bosnia. I do not understand reports that President Clinton is blaming the British Government for somehow thwarting his ambitions in Bosnia. He should learn a lesson from what is happening to his troops in Somalia, where the enemy is much less sophisticated and is fighting in less favourable territory than the factions in Bosnia. I am glad to see Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen nodding at that, although they have just said that we should bomb the Serb positions in Bosnia. That would lead to us being drawn into military conflict throughout Bosnia, and in a very short time we should be fighting not just the Serbs but the Croats and the Muslims. The carnage that we would suffer would be nobody's business.
Dr. David Clark : I should like to correct a misunderstanding. I said that there was a time when bombing Serb positions might have been effective. That time is probably past, but the threat of bombing had a major effect on the Serbs and played a large part in getting them to agree to the ceasefire in late July, which lasted until recently.
Mr. Hamilton : I shall follow that through. If we had taken the Opposition's advice about bombing Serbian artillery positions earlier this year, we would have needed a United Nations mandate to carry it out. It is highly likely that, during the time that it took to get the mandate, the Serbs would have removed the artillery. Even if they did not, bombing would not have destroyed it all. Even if all that artillery could have been bombed out of existence--and that would have required a degree of precision bombing that I do not think anyone possesses--what would have happened? The Serbs would have resorted to guerrilla warfare of the type taught by Tito.
Yugoslavia always thought that the main threat was from the Soviet Union, and the Yugoslav national army knew that it had no chance of fighting it out on the plains of Yugoslavia. Therefore, on the day that Yugoslavia was invaded, that army was to take to the mountains and fight a guerrilla war. Bombing would have led to us being drawn into a horrific guerrilla war and, irrespective of the number of troops sent in to try to pacify Bosnia, they would all become bogged down and would suffer appalling casualties.
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We must think carefully before increasing our commitment to Bosnia. The British battalion group there is to be congratulated on its fantastic operation and minimal casualties. It is a miracle that we have not suffered more.I regret that we have been drawn into the war to the extent that we have. What interests do we have in a civil war in Bosnia anyway? Bosnia has been given saturation coverage on television, to the exclusion of many other civil wars. I concede that, the conflict there is much nearer to home than any other, but television seems to include news from there in every bulletin. That is done to the exclusion of the civil war in Angola, about which we hear almost nothing, and where casualties are much higher. We hear almost nothing about Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia or Azerbaijan. If there were more balanced reporting of civil wars in other parts of the world, there would be less of a desire to do something about Bosnia.
Despite the magnificent efforts of our troops, we must face the agonising and difficult issue that, throughout the conflict, we have been feeding the warring factions in Bosnia. United Nations commentators are rather reluctant to accept that massive stores of United Nations foodstuffs in Bosnia are held by the militia. Therefore, we have removed from the people who want to do the fighting in Bosnia the boring logistic problem of feeding their troops, because that has been done with United Nations food. The aid that we have given to Bosnia may have prolonged the conflict and more people may have died than would have done so if we had had nothing whatever to do with it.
Mr. Eric Martlew (Carlisle) : I agree with much of what the right hon. Gentleman says. He was a Minister until recently. Is he suggesting that we withdraw British troops from Bosnia?
Mr. Hamilton : No, I am not. This is not the time to do that, but we must keep the matter under review. The hon. Gentleman pre-empts what I was about to say. I am worried that there is still the possibility that our commitment to Bosnia may increase and additional troops may be drafted in. Even if that is just to police a peace settlement, its effect on our other commitments is a matter of great concern. We could not put in a large force for more than six months without drastically increasing the burden on our already overstretched troops.
The Secretary of State will say that, if that ever happens, he will try to get a guarantee that our troops would not be there for more than six months. As we know from bitter experience, it is easier to send troops in under a United Nations mandate than it is to get them out.
The real difficulty with our troop commitments, especially with the Army and with RAF support helicopters, arises from our commitment in Northern Ireland, where 19,000 troops are tied up in a massive peacekeeping operation. Of course, I fully accept that that is not under the auspices of the United Nations. While I was the responsible Minister, I found no problem with single soldiers being prepared to undertake that task, but it is hard on married soldiers who have done repeated roulement tours in Northern Ireland. We must never forget that we have six Army battalions in Northern Ireland at the moment and that there is a debate about the support needed there. That gives us an idea of the impact on an Army that n Northern Ireland, but I can find no such correlation, so we must think hard about whether the number of troops is absolutely necessary and whether, to give ourselves more flexibility, we should consider a withdrawal programme for some of the roulement battalions. I am talking not about peremptory action but perhaps withdrawing one battalion every six or 12 months. That would give us more flexibility if we wanted to undertake peacekeeping operations elsewhere in the world.
Mr. Ken Maginnis (Fermanagh and South Tyrone) : Does the right hon. Gentleman recognise that it is not just a question of relating the number of terrorist incidents to the number of security forces in Northern Ireland, but of ensuring that more terrorist incidents lack success? It we contemplate withdrawing some of the armed forces from Northern Ireland, we shall place those who remain in greater jeopardy.
Mr. Hamilton : There is no evidence to support the hon. Gentleman's view. The number of casualties among the armed forces in Northern Ireland has reduced recently. When we last withdrew troops from Northern Ireland, after the hunger strikes, there was no evidence of any rise in the number of casualties among the armed forces. As the hon. Gentleman knows, many other factors contribute to incidents of violence in Northern Ireland, not least intelligence and the capability of the security forces to disrupt terrorist action. I suspect that the hon. Gentleman would agree that the talks that have been dragging on for such a long time have created great uncertainty, and the very fact that they are inconclusive makes the position worse. The longer we continue to talk to Dublin, the more we give the IRA the impression that with one more push we will leave altogether. At the same time, we unnerve the extremists among the Protestant paramilitaries, because they think that they are about to be taken over by Dublin. While the indecision in the talks continues, we are feeding terrorism. I would be much happier if the whole process could be brought to a conclusion one way or the other. At least that would remove the uncertainty about the future. As I have said, the number of terrorist incidents in Northern Ireland cannot be attributed solely to troop levels. Many other factors come into play--
Dr. Charles Goodson-Wickes (Wimbledon) : I am interested in many of my right hon. Friend's theories, but I have some difficulty with what I perceive to be contradictory arguments in the context of Northern Ireland. If he is suggesting that there should be a phased withdrawal of British troops from Northern Ireland, what sort of message would give to the IRA and other combatant units? I cannot reconcile that with his suggestion that with one more push the IRA might misinterpret our motives. Will my right hon. Friend clarify his argument?
Mr. Hamilton : I am happy to do that, and I will start from the beginning. Northern Ireland is our biggest peacekeeping operation, and it has led to massive overstretch in the armed forces. It leaves us little flexibility to do anything else, yet the demands to become involved in peacekeeping activities elsewhere are insatiable. Therefore, we must think hard about the area in which our commitments are heaviest--and that is Northern Ireland--if we are to have the flexibility to do anything anywhere else.
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I take my hon. Friend's point that, if we were to withdraw one battalion, IRA propaganda would claim that as a victory. However, when we put two additional battalions into Northern Ireland that did not make the slightest difference--it did not persuade the IRA that our commitment was so total that it should give up its activities. I have doubts about signals and their effects. Anything that is done in Northern Ireland is claimed as a victory by one side or the other. We must be convinced that the troops there are useful, and some correlation between the number of terrorist incidents and the number of troops might help in that process.It could be said that, if we had flooded Ulster with 100,000 British troops a long time ago, that would have sorted out the problem. However, we all know that whether the number of troops is 100,000 or 19,000 there will continue to be terrorist incidents--and there are many reasons for that. We must be quite clear that there is not a free option to continue to increase our commitment to Northern Ireland because that simply reduces our capability to do anything else.
Mr. Maginnis : I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman again, but the message that he should be sending out from this House is that, while contemplating the possibility of reducing the number of armed forces in Northern Ireland, he does not expect that to be done unless there is some compensatory activity. For example, the courts must be more stringent in the way they deal with terrorist crimes. We need to dismantle the command and control structures, and we may have to accept internment to do so. If the right hon. Gentleman makes those points clear, the message going out from this House will be better understood.
Mr. Hamilton : I take the hon. Gentleman's point, but the last time the number of troops in Northern Ireland was radically reduced, after the hunger strikes, none of those commitments was written in as compensation for that reduction. One point that worries me is that, if anything goes dramatically wrong in Northern Ireland--such as riots on the streets and the security position getting out of hand--we increase the number of troops there. That adds to our current difficulties.
We appear to be operating a ratchet system. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware that, when my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgewater (Mr. King) was Defence Secretary in 1987, he sent two battalions to Northern Ireland on a temporary basis. They are still there. Those of us who have observed the position dispassionately have come to realise that it is very easy to put more troops into Northern Ireland, but extremely difficult to get them out again. We must bear in mind the prime objective of defence expenditure, which is to keep a wide range of capabilities to deal with a threat that we cannot clearly identify. It may be a threat to our interests--such as the Gulf war, which demanded the most sophisticated defence equipment and the highest capability that the world could possibly imagine. We do not know where a threat to the security of these islands or to our interests elsewhere will come from, so it is vital that we maintain our capability.
One question that is constantly raised is our continued membership of the permanent five--the United Nations
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Security Council. Indeed, the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) raised it during a radio interview at lunchtime today. It is nonsense to talk about Britain leaving the permanent five. The only way to do so would be to vote ourselves off.The greatest risk we run is that the permanent five will be diluted by becoming the permanent seven or, eventually, even the permanent 10 by the addition of other members. There is no way that we can come off the permanent five unless we ask to do so.
The Foreign Office has gently fed the paranoia that our international standing will deteriorate unless we become involved in endless peacekeeping activities throughout the world. We must nail that complete load of nonsense. From our present involvement in Cyprus and in other places, it is clear that we play a major role in peacekeeping operations. We have nothing to be ashamed of, and I wish that people would stop talking about our membership of the permanent five being under threat if we do not become involved, because that is unutterable nonsense.
Mr. Harry Cohen (Leyton) : The theme of the right hon. Gentleman's speech is that we must inevitably reduce costs. There is a cost--a price tag--attached to being a member of the Security Council's permanent five. Part of that cost is our involvement around the globe. Would it not make sense to cease being a member of the permanent five and to save the cost of our involvement in those operations?
Mr. Hamilton : That is also a load of nonsense. Another member of the permanent five is China, which has never been involved in any peacekeeping operation anywhere in the world, at any time. It is nonsense to say that there is a price to pay, and I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for allowing me to say so, by raising that point in his intervention. If we wanted, we could remain a member of the permanent five and do nothing anywhere in the world other than in the United Kingdom, and remain a member until we voted ourselves off. There is also some suggestion that our membership of NATO might be threatened. I find that particularly remarkable so shortly after the Gulf war, when we defended the interests of many European members of NATO--which were much more directly threatened than our own, in that they all depend on imported oil. Any suggestion that our membership of NATO is under threat is also complete nonsense.
Mr. Brazier : Surely the logic of my right hon. Friend's excellent points is that we need a strategic review of the possible dangers facing this country because the lack of such a review led to our defence agenda consisting largely of peacekeeping and other peacetime operations.
Mr. Hamilton : If we had undertaken such a review, intelligence could not have told us that, only days after my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State announced "Options for Change", we would be involved in the first major armoured war since 1945, with an armoured division being sent to liberate Kuwait. We were not in a position to forecast that, and we do not know the direction from which the next threat will come. That is why all talk of a review is absolute nonsense. Our intelligence is not good enough to see into a crystal ball and recognise the next threat.
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5.52 pmMr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East) : If popularity were any measure, the merits of a defence review would appear to be unassailable--if not in the mind of the right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Mr. Hamilton). In recent weeks, the notion of a defence review has acquired the support of a phalanx of recently retired generals and of a parcel of Conservative Back Benchers, who produced a pamphlet published in the summer --and such a review has for some time had the support of Opposition parties.
A culture has grown up in which, faced with any difficult defence decision, there is apparently an irresistible urge to call for a defence review. We must place that demand in a proper context. A review will not provide answers to difficult questions. If anything, it will only highlight and identify questions that require to be answered.
The point was made during an intervention in the right hon. Gentleman's speech that a defence review in isolation is meaningless, because defence policies are not a political end in themselves but the means by which political objectives are sought to be achieved. Therefore, any such review must necessarily embrace the foreign policy objectives of the United Kingdom as a medium-ranking power. The proper way to proceed is to establish our political objectives, assess the military resources necessary to meet those objectives and then allocate the financial resources necessary to provide the military means of achieving our political objectives.
The United Kingdom cannot escape a debate on the financial priority that is to be accorded to defence spending. In the aftermath of the cold war, it is right that we should consider how much we are willing to spend on defence. We must do so against the background of a fairly firm understanding of the proper approach.
Defence expenditure cannot be immune from scrutiny in a period of retrenchment in public spending. Nor is it sensible to approach a reduction in defence expenditure according to a mechanistic formula. It is sensible to make maximum use of existing political and military alliances in helping us to reach conclusions.
In that regard, I have considerable sympathy for the notion of common procurement and force specialisation, which we could most easily achieve through NATO. The right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell sets himself against force specialisation, but when he acknowledged that financial pressures will continue, he rather undercut his own position. If one accepts that those pressures will continue, surely a point will be reached at which it will not be possible for us to provide the full range of capability.
We should explore also nuclear co-operation through a much closer political relationship with France. That appears to be occurring, because there are hints from time to time in the technical press of discussions between the British and French Governments. That is a way in which we might achieve a substantial reduction in that large component of defence expenditure accounted for by the provision of an independent nuclear deterrent.
We must use alliances to help us to manage the peace as we intended to use them if we had ever had to go to war. The right hon. Gentleman has done us all a service in recent days by showing a willingness, freed of the shackles of office, to think in radical terms. He has allowed his mind to range widely. I was not present for his lecture at the
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Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, but I am told that the heat was considerable--and that not all of it was generated by the right hon. Gentleman.We all have an obligation to suggest ways in which we believe that it may be possible to achieve a reduction in expenditure without prejudicing the United Kingdom's interests and security. I mentioned the notion of closer nuclear co-operation with France.
We should accept that minimum nuclear deterrence--which is the doctrine that now drives our nuclear provision--can be provided at levels far below those for which the Government have apparently planned. If 192 warheads on Polaris provide an effective minimum deterrent, surely we do not need 512 warheads on the Trident system that is to replace Polaris. There is a substantial opportunity for a reduction in warheads, which must carry through to a reduction in costs.
Mr. Andrew Robathan (Blaby) : The hon. and learned Gentleman makes a good point about co-operating with France, which I am sure would be an excellent way of saving a great deal of expenditure. However, the French might not be so willing to share in that expenditure. After all, they opted out of NATO many years ago and have yet to opt back in to the command structure.
Mr. Campbell : I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman stays closely in touch with such matters, but there have been extremely encouraging signs recently of a willingness on the part of the French once again to become part of the integrated military command. The Minister of State for the Armed Forces, who is in his place on the Treasury Bench, can tell the hon. Gentleman that discussions have begun between the French and British Governments on the possibility of nuclear co-operation.
The hon. Gentleman should also bear in mind the fact that, when General Morillon was sent to Yugoslavia, he was supported by the northern army group headquarters of NATO. Although this is only anecdotal evidence, General Morillon was heard going around paying considerable tribute to his NATO headquarters. It would be wrong to minimise the difficulties, but the signs are now more positive. The Secretary of State received a rather less generous welcome than he deserved for his announcement about the tactical air-to-surface missile. The decision that he announced is entirely sensible, and one which has been argued for with considerable force by my colleagues, and also, from time to time, by some Conservatives.
The Secretary of State assisted the debate considerably in confirming that a conventional stand-off capability is to be maintained for the Royal Air Force. Some of us remember the controversy that surrounded the low-level bombing using the Tornado GR1 in the Gulf war. The need for a stand-off capability was acutely identified at that time. The House will largely be relieved to know that the Government have not abandoned something which many of us regard as extremely important.
We must ask ourselves about the political justification for continuing to station in Germany the present number of United Kingdom troops. We fought very hard for the political advantage within NATO of the command of the allied Rapid Reaction Corps, which was thought to be a reflection of the important part played by the United
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Kingdom in NATO. In this period of financial retrenchment, however, can the political advantage that we derive be justified against the expenditure?Like the right hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell, we must ask what is the correct level of deployment in Northern Ireland, without in any way prejudicing overall security. It is surely right to ask what task presently carried out by the military could not just as effectively be carried out by the civilian authorities.
Unlike the right hon. Gentleman, I believe that we should question how many tank regiments the United Kingdom is likely to need in the future.
Only a few weeks ago we finally passed the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1993. I think that it will be not Calais but Maastricht that will be engraved on your heart, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Title V of the Maastricht treaty contains the proposal for a common foreign and security policy. In a period of substantial financial retrenchment, it is right to consider the extent to which acceptance of some of the principles contained in that part of the treaty would assist us to maintain the security of the United Kingdom. What we need, above all, is a rational debate, and the present rather febrile atmosphere is singularly unhelpful. The heated atmosphere of a public expenditure round is hardly the best means of arriving at sensible and systematic decisions about the United Kingdom's long-term defence needs.
As we know, nuclear weapons occupy a substantial proportion of our budget. It is right to question that expenditure, for financial reasons. Does it place an undue burden on the budget? Some people have a superficial attraction to the argument that by renouncing nuclear weapons we could solve the problems of the defence budget at a stroke. I reject that argument, because it takes no account of committed expenditure.
We should also question nuclear weapons for more fundamental reasons. They have no intrinsic merit. The theory of their deterrence is, if I may be forgiven for putting it this way, exploded if they are ever used ; their worth lies only in what they prevent. An independent nuclear deterrent for the United Kingdom is justifiable only as an assurance policy against the possibility of any withdrawal or dilution of the United States' guarantee for Europe. The level of insurance commonly depends on the level of risk. The risk is very much diminished, so minimum deterrence is achievable at lower levels than seemed possible in the past. However, the risk has not been eliminated and, until then--if that time ever comes--we shall need to retain the insurance.
Surely we should also actively endeavour to reduce the risk through support for the non-proliferation treaty, for a comprehensive test ban treaty and even for START 3, involving the five permanent members of the Security Council. In a practical sense, we should perhaps encourage Ukraine to implement START 1 and offer as our contribution to reducing the risk an undertaking not to deploy any more warheads on Trident than those on Polaris, which it is to replace. It is clear that those of us who support the maintenance of the independent deterrent have something of a job on our hands to make a positive and persuasive case for its retention because public opinion is rather different from
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even three, four or five years ago. We shall not win that important argument merely by mouthing the outdated slogans of the cold war. We should take account of the fact that the United States' attitude towards us, at a fairly high level, is not always entirely favourable. In Congress on 28 September, Senator Dale Bumpers, a Democrat from Arkansas, said that he did not think that the United States should keep footing the bill to keep the line open for the D5 missiles, which American does not need, merely in order to accommodate the British. We must acknowledge that the United States' willingness to provide us with such weapons, which goes back to Harold Macmillan's agreement with President Kennedy, may not necessarily continue.I deal now with British forces in United Nations operations. NATO should operate as a subcontractor to the United Nations, so that command and control remain with NATO, using established systems which have been tested by exercises and, as was recently pointed out, in the Gulf.
It is necessary to establish some principles if British forces are to be involved. Clear political objectives must be laid down by the United Nations, and agreed by NATO. There must be clear and appropriate rules of engagement laid down by NATO and agreed by the United Nations, and there must also be unambiguous exit criteria, so that one knows when one has succeeded and when it is time to go, but one also knows when one has failed and it is time to go.
Such operations should command domestic political support, which will depend on the public's perception that the cause is just. I should not like to have to stand here at the moment to try to persuade British domestic opinion that it would be right to send United Kingdom forces to Somalia.
Time is short, but I wish to mention procurement. The onus of showing why the EH101 utility helicopter should not be purchased for the support role has now passed to the Ministry of Defence. It is six years since Lord Younger announced the intention to buy 25 of them, and the intention has never been withdrawn. It is surely a matter of sadness to the House that the Dutch have recently decided to purchase the Cougar, a decision which, in the minds of some, may have been influenced by our Minstry of Defence's lack of enthusiasm for the EH101.
In relation to the Army in particular, I am left with the strong feeling that the tasks that it is most likely to face will be of low or medium intensity, whereas the balance of arms that we still propose reflects a requirement to fight a high-intensity war. Given the lack of any direct threat to the United Kingdom mainland and our inability to move large numbers of tanks and artillery because of our lack of strategic transport, we must ask whether the balance is justified.
It is clear that the decisions we take now will have irreversible consequences for a long time to come. I doubt very much whether, in defence terms, a watershed quite as acute as that which we are now experiencing has been experienced in the past. If given up now, some capabilities would never be recovered, because the pace of advance in technology is so swift. If we have a reduction here or a postponement there, the coherence of our policy will be destroyed. That is likely to be more damaging than a set of coherent, related decisions about what we believe we require. That is one reason why we need a review of the kind to which I have already referred, but there is another reason.
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We owe it to the men and women of the armed forces--to whom I, along with others, pay my tribute this evening--whose lives are at risk rather more than our own, to see that they have set for them clear political objectives, that they are provided with the means to which to achieve that objectives and that they are not asked to meet commitments for which the resources that they are given prove to be inadequate.Several hon. Members rose --
Mr. Deputy Speaker : Order. I remind hon. Members that Madam Speaker has ruled that speeches hereafter, between 6 pm and 8 pm, should last 10 minutes and no more.
6.9 pm
Sir Geoffrey Pattie (Chertsey and Walton) : I declare an interest as non-executive chairman of GEC-Marconi.
I claim that the present security situation is as dangerous as it has been at any time this century. I say that despite 1914 and 1940, because our country was heading into world wars in those years and, however uncertain the outcome, everyone knew what they had to do and who the enemy was. Now, no one can be sure who the enemy is or will be. We have had the certainty of being opposed for 40 years by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact. With their collapse, we now have uncertainty and new conflicts breaking out.
Before I turn to the United Kingdom and the problems and implications of that situation for us, I will say a word or two about central and eastern Europe. I have had several contacts recently with political leaders in the so-called "Visigrad Four" countries--Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. They are all concerned about their lack of security ; they have no cover. We should all agree that the present vacuum is unsatisfactory. I must ask whether the answer is to extend membership of NATO. I am not so sure. First, the new entrants would have to be clear about and accept the mutual support concept of NATO. Unless that concept was watered down, which would nullify the strength of the alliance, Polish forces, for example, might be called into action because of a NATO-related problem in, for example, Portugal or Norway. There is a tendency to view NATO as a guarantor or as a protector without taking into account the broad mutual nature of the relationship.
Secondly, NATO must consider Russia's attitude. Any action that weakens moderate opinion in Moscow by fanning the anxieties of the military cannot be good news. Perhaps it is better to encourage the Visigrad countries to develop regional security arrangements which can be linked both to NATO and to Russia and which recognise that future conflicts are likely to be ethnically based border squabbles rather than the classic cold war frontal assault. In any event, the Visigrad countries need to rethink their defence doctrine away from their role as junior partners in the Warsaw pact towards an entirely new, perhaps citizen army, philosophy.
I now turn to the United Kingdom. My most fundamental concern is that after 40 years of NATO certainty, with widespread political support, there is an urgent need for the Ministry of Defence to sell the case and to present the arguments that will enable that support to continue. Public regard for the armed forces is higher than that for any comparable institution in our country. Their dedication and professionalism are much admired. That
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has been linked to an acceptance of their role and is reflected in the majority support in the country for the retention of nuclear weapons, for example.Now that the threat to our territorial integrity is less obvious and immediate, it is necessary to emphasise that the threats to our economy and to our way of life could be mounted several thousand miles away and would not necessarily involve assaults by tanks and by aircraft on the United Kingdom. If the challenge is to prepare to make important contributions to UN forces or to NATO out-of-area forces, the challenge must be taken up and answered in full. Our forces must be well enough balanced and trained to be able to contribute to international operations, but they must also be capable of responding in circumstances in which only the United Kingdom is involved. Clearly, such occasions will decrease as we relinquish the remnants of empire. However, I have today the gravest doubts about whether the United Kingdom is capable of mounting such an independent operation. The current overstretch is far too great and there is the usual problem of politicians failing to grasp nettles.
The present position is the biggest change of scenario since NATO began. Now, if ever, there is an unanswerable case for a review. In response to my right hon. Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Mr. Hamilton), I refer not to a review within the Ministry of Defence, but to an overall review of exactly what the Government's strategic targets are. If such a review had taken place, a different view would have emerged about, for example, ballistic missile defence. We have the curious paradox, that although the Soviet Union is no longer seen, understandably and correctly, as a direct threat to us, there is the possibility--nay, certainty--of the acquisition of such weapons by many extra countries that will not need to deliver them in the numbers or with the accuracy on which the Soviet Union used to call. At the very time that the threat could, in a sense, be said to be increasing, we are deciding to reduce our capability.
Any review would need to take a look at the widespread use that can be made of reserve forces. I am sure that there will be widespread interest in and approval of the announcement today by the Secretary of State about new roles for the reserves and about new legislation to come. However, the underlying position gives cause for serious concern.
There is a real fear that the Army board, to pay for the welcome addback of two Regular battalions, will recommend cutting several Territorial Army battalions. If that is so, it will be a mistake and extremely short- sighted. The volunteer reserves are an outstanding example of a highly motivated and professional group of people. They are extremely cost effective and can and should be used in a variety of home emergency relief roles. For every £1 million spent on defence, the country gets about six and a half times as many trained volunteer reserves as it gets regulars.
The Ministry of Defence still places undue reliance on the ex-regular reservists, many of whom are out of date, unfit, unco-operative and resistant to recall for anything less than world war. In contrast, the volunteer reserve is highly motivated and brings many relevant skills and qualifications from civilian life. To put it into context, savage cuts in the TA would be equivalent to the cost of five or six tanks. We are talking about minute sums in the
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overall context of the defence budget--a tiny proportion. If the signal goes out from the House during this debate or during the next few weeks that volunteers are not welcome, they will drift away and the nation will lose a priceless asset.All armed forces need to be properly equipped and supported if they are to do their job properly. The British armed forces buy a large proportion of their equipment from United Kingdom companies. Equally important are the working relationships and understandings between industry and Government Departments, never better exemplified than in the combined campaign on Eurofighter, the essential project which occurred at this time last year. However, as the budget pressures continue, I urge that the need for co- operation and the level of co-operation are, if anything, intensified.
One other area causes industry great concern--the reduction in military support for export sales. The United Kingdom has 20 per cent. of world markets in military sales, which is very important for the Ministry of Defence and very important in the United Kingdom balance of payments. The breadth and experience of British operations over many years has given our forces a high reputation for excellence and training and has meant that they have tested and operated equipment in a variety of climates.
Logistic support and training packages run by the Government are essential tools to aid in the winning of contracts. They are now in jeopardy because of budget cuts. The availability of military escorts was down at the recent exhibition and the cost of exhibiting was higher. The opportunities to demonstrate British equipment during Royal Naval deployments were reduced by about 70 per cent. last year. The 1992 task group, for example, deployed in the far east, will not be repeated this year or next year. The dedicated Army sales teams have been cut by 30 per cent. in the past two years. Military training places for foreign customers have been reduced and the numbers of service attache s and overseas advisers are being reduced.
The only people who rejoice at that are our competitors. To them will go the contracts, the jobs and the balance of payments advantages. That cannot be right for UK plc. What is needed is a Government-wide directive to the Ministry of Defence to provide for that essential dimension of activity. The Government should make due allowance in the MOD budget to make that possible.
The support and esteem enjoyed by the armed forces in Britain depend on a full understanding and consensus about their mission. The Government must have a full review in the light of the greatest change of circumstances in 40 years. They must consider ballistic missile defence, the correct use of the reserves, full-scale industrial co-operation and support for exports. Above all, if the Government believe that the United Kingdom can no longer sustain a Falklands-type operation on our own, the British people should be told loud and clear.
6.19 pm
Ms Rachel Squire (Dunfermline, West) : I thank right hon. and hon. Members for their good wishes during my illness and on my return. I am pleased to follow the right hon. Member for Chertsey and Walton (Sir G. Pattie) in his call for a review,
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for this is a debate about the defence of the realm, the security of the country, and the men and women who both rely on and provide that security. In the time available, I shall concentrate on arguing that the Government's policy is creating not security but insecurity--the insecurity of a maritime nation with its Navy cut close to the limit, and the insecurity caused by the Government's treatment of service personnel, civilian employees and the half a million people employed in the defence industry.The House will not be surprised to learn that I shall make particular mention of Rosyth naval base and royal dockyard. In his speech to the House on 24 June this year, which, unfortunately, I missed, the Minister of State for Defence Procurement said : "there is no connection between jobs in the royal dockyard and in the naval base at Rosyth."--[ Official Report, 24 June 1993 ; Vol. 227, c. 546.]
I have news for the Minister. If there are no ships, there will be no naval base, no dockyard and no jobs. I give right hon. and hon. Members four examples of the way in which the Government are aparently failing to recognise those connections.
First, the defence estimates show that the number of destroyers and frigates has fallen from 44 in 1990 to "about 35" in current plans. The number of mine counter-measure vessels has fallen from 38 in 1990 to 25 in current plans, with a note saying that it will fall below even that figure for a period. Now we hear rumours of a further £1 billion of defence cuts. It is no wonder that the people of Britain are worried about their security. It is no wonder that the work force of Rosyth dockyard do not believe the promise of allocated surface ship work.
My second example is the work of fisheries protection. In paragraph 318 of the defence estimates, the Ministers stated that the Government had examined the possibility of contracting out fisheries protection, but had decided to continue it with the Royal Navy in 1993-94. That is hardly a secure future for the service personnel and civilians involved in fisheries protection work at Rosyth. What security is there for anyone in a contract which has less than a year to go? As the Select Committee says, the fisheries protection service should remain with the Royal Navy. The estimates say that the training and experience that it provides is invaluable, especially for young commanders.
My third example of the insecurity created by the Government's defence policy is the proposed disbandment of the Royal Naval Auxiliary Reserve. I listened with interest to what the right hon. Member for Chertsey and Walton had to say about the reserves. I recently went out on a training exercise with the Royal Naval Auxiliary Reserve at Rosyth. I was impressed by the skill, enthusiasm and commitment of those men and women volunteers. The Government should foster such qualities in the civilian community, not repay such loyalty with disbandment.
My fourth example of the insecurity which surrounds so much of the Government's defence policy is the announcement today about the complete privatisation of Rosyth and Devonport dockyards. While I welcome the early announcement of the future of the dockyards by the Minister and his assurance that they will not be sold to the same bidder, I certainly do not welcome the decision to privatise rather than to renew the present agency management arrangement. Privatisation will cause more insecurity. It will disrupt the combination of Ministry of
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Defence control and commercial management. Why change it? What benefit will there be to the nation and to the defence of the realm? Privatisation will not bring jobs or value for money. It will not advance opportunities in competition and it will not improve defence or freedom.The privatisation of the dockyards makes it even more important that they are treated equally and that they both receive contractual guarantees of work. For the Government to talk about allocation of ships to Rosyth is not enough, because the only place in the list of forced restructuring where they use the word "about" and create uncertainty is in the references to the number of frigates and destroyers. It is not enough, because, after the broken promises on submarine refitting, neither the Rosyth work force nor the Select Committee believe any promises. It is not enough because, if the Government are serious about healthy competition and avoiding a monopoly, they must give binding guarantees of 12 years' work to Rosyth dockyard to attract commercial interest from bidders. The insecurity of the dockyard is reflected throughout the defence industry. Where there are ships, naval bases and dockyards, there is a concentration of defence industry. So, in Fife, we have 160 companies employing 14,000 people and more than another 7,000 people who are either service personnel or Ministry of Defence civilians. Since the Government's announcement about the dockyards in June, Rosyth and Devonport have lost more jobs between them than the Government said that they would lose by the end of the century. That makes it even more vital that there is a defence diversification policy.
I welcome the commitment which Ministers gave to the trade unions to enter into a dialogue with trade unions, employers and other interested parties and discuss an industrial policy. That is a crucial recognition of the need for such a policy. Again, I cite Rosyth royal dockyard, which previously had the largest training base in Scotland. It trained half of Scotland's manufacturing apprentices. This year, it has taken in a mere 25. That speaks loudly of the need for proper defence diversification, especially in institutions and organisations of which the Ministry of Defence has been the main employer for so long.
I see from the time that, although I wish to say a great deal more, I must conclude. As it is a matter of considerable public concern, I mention the presence of the decommissioned submarines at Rosyth. We want to know just what will be done with those submarines, especially if the yard is to be privatised and have a nuclear facility available. The people of the area feel strongly that, if they are not to receive the nuclear refitting work, they do not wish the decommissioned submarines to remain there.
The people of Fife, of Scotland and of Britain are concerned that the Government's defence policy consists of a ship captained by an insecure Prime Minister, steered by a questionable Chancellor and supported, below decks, by a motley collection of Treasury pen pushers and bean counters. What a crew.
The debate offers the Government the chance to make some decisions--the right ones. Instead of closures, allocations and privatisation, we want guarantees. We need a secure future for the dockyards. Instead of unemployment, we want productive work. We need a planned Navy and a full- scale defence review.
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