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quantity of agent transferred ; on what dates this agent was transferred ; why the agent was transferred ; how the agent was transferred ; and what safety precautions were taken ;(10) which United States military establishments and Government agencies took part in the information exchange and collaboration on VX other than those mentioned in his answer of 15 February, Official Report, column 63 ;
(11) how many service volunteers have been used for tests at Porton Down in each year since 1979 ; what is the purpose of these tests ; and which chemical and biological agents have been used in these tests since 1979 ;
(12) which other nerve agents were involved in the research at Nancekuke referred to in his answer of 16 July, Official Report, columns 717-18, to determine whether they presented a hazard to British armed forces ; and when research started and ended on each of the nerve agents involved ;
(13) under which defence agreement VX was transferred from the United Kingdom to the United States of America ; and whether any transfer of VX was made from the United Kingdom to the United States of America other than that referred to in his answer to the hon. Member for Leyton of 29 July, Official Report, column 172 ; (14) when the experiments on B staphylococcal enterotoxin, referred to in his answer to the hon. Member for Brent, East on 16 July, Official Report, columns 718-19, began and ended ; and if his Department has collaborated in experiments on this toxin with any other country ;
(15) what workd Porton Down has done on evaluating tremorine as an incapacitating agent ; when this work was carried out ; how many tests and studies were carried out on animals and service volunteers ; what was the conclusion of these tests and studies ; when the results were shared with the United States of America ; and through which defence agreement this scientific information was exchanged ; (16) what has been the nature of collaboration between Britain, Australia and the United States of America with regard to nerve gases, and CS gas and CR gas ; when this work was started and finished ; where the work was carried out ; and under which defence agreement the work was arranged ;
(17) what information arising from the transesterification study referred to in his answer of 16 July, Official Report, column 712, on QL, was shared with the United States of America, Canada and Australia ; when this information was exchanged ; and under which defence agreement it was exchanged ;
(18) if he will list the dates, participating countries and locations of each of the 15 meetings of sub-group E on chemical and biological defence of the technical co-operation programme mentioned in his answer of 1 December 1992, Official Report, column 163 ; which branches of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence have been attending these meetings ; and if he will make a statement on the achievements of this sub-group ;
(19) when chemical and biological agents and materials have been exchanged between Britain and Australia ; what was the nature of these agents and materials ; in what quantities they were exchanged ; for what purposes they were exchanged and under which defence agreement or memorandum of understanding they were exchanged.
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Mr. Hanley : These are matters for the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment--CBDE--under its framework document. I have asked the chief executive of CBDE to write to the hon. Member.
Letters from Graham Pearson to Mr. Ken Livingstone, dated 11 January 1994 :
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what was the nature of the nerve agent which was transported to Porton, referred to in his Answer to the honourable Member for Leyton on 19th July, Official Report, column 81 ; and why this nerve agent was being transported (Question 27, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces have effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. In order to carry out this work, it is necessary to have available small quantities of the materials which may be used as chemical or biological warfare agents by a potential aggressor.
3. The nerve agent transported to Porton Down in May 1977 were small quantities of the iso-butyl and cyclopentyl analogues of VX. They were transported in order to be retained at CBDE as reference samples.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what was the specific nature of the trials which were observed and participated in by the four United States Army liaison officers stationed at Porton Down from 1963 to 1973 ; and which chemical and biological agents were involved in these trials (Question 28, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. Our records do not provide information about which trials the four US Army liaison officers stationed at Porton Down from 1963 to 1973 are likely to have observed nor about which agents were involved although these are likely to have been mustard and nerve agents. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking in which year Porton Down stopped research on pyrroles ; how many of each species of small animals were used ; and when the United States of America was first informed of this research through the Technical Co-operation Programme (Question 29, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. Several classes of pyrroles were studied in the early 1960s to determine whether or not simple pyrrole derivatives might show pharmacological effects that might be used by an aggressor as an incapacitating agent and this area of research ceased round about 1963. Our records indicate that only rats were used for experimental purposes ; they do not indicate the numbers involved which are likely to have been small.
4. The information arising from these studies was part of the chemical and biological defence programme and would therefore be part of the technical database drawn upon in cooperation with the United States of America during the 1960s under the Technical Cooperation Programme and its predecessors.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking when Porton Down first researched into Q fever (Question 30, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures
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against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.3. Research at Porton Down into coxiella burnetii started in 1989 in work aimed at identification techniques for the organism based on gene probe and antibody technologies.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what was the nature of the information on binary chemical weapons passed between the United States of America and Britain to assist Britain in its evaluation of the potential hazard of binaries, referred to in his Answer to the honourable Member for Leyton on 20th July, Official Report, column 170 ; when this information was passed ; and under which defence agreement this information was passed (Question 31, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. Our records do not indicate the precise nature of the information on binary chemical weapons passed between the United States of America and Britain to assist Britain in its evaluation of the potential hazard to the UK Armed Forces from potential aggressors who may possess binary chemical weapons. The information gained would have been provided during information exchange and collaboration with the United States of America on a continuing basis. This information was exchange under the aegis of the Defence agreements referred to by the Rt Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP, in his reply of 21 May 1992, Official Report, columns 255-256.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what tests and studies the chemical and biological establishment at Porton Down has carried out on the viral disease yellow fever ; when these experiments took place ; whether the experiments involved animals or service volunteers ; what were the conclusions of these studies and tests ; and under which defence agreement these results were exchanged with the United States of America (Question 34, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. Work on yellow fever virus at Porton Down began in the early 1960s. Some work has been carried out to evaluate the vaccine strain as a simulant. Other work has addressed techniques for rapid identification. Some of the early work on antibodies for identification involved the use of mice and rabbits. No work has involved the use of service volunteers.
4. Preliminary conclusions are that appropriate techniques can be developed for rapid identification. The information arising from these studies is part of the chemical and biological defence programme and is part of the technical database drawn on the cooperation with the United States of America under the Technical Cooperation Programme and the Memorandum of Understanding on chemical and biological defence with the US and Canada.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking on what dates quantities of VX were transferred from Nancekuke to Porton ; how the quantities were transported ; what safety precautions were taken ; which safety authorities and local council were warned before the transfer ; and what was the nature of each of the trials in which the transferred VX was used (Question 35, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment. 2. Our records do not provide information on the precise dates when quantities of VX were transferred from Nancekuke to Porton Down nor the nature of each of the trials in which the transferred VX was used but the transfers are likely to have taken place between 1957-1976. The transfers were carried out in accordance with the Report of the Working Party on the Transport of Nerve Agents from Nancekuke to Porton
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(Thompson Committee) published by HMSO in 1970. As indicated in the Report, the relevant police forces would have been notified and appropriate escorts and vehicles provided.1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking how many scientific papers co-authored by scientists from Porton Down and their counterparts in the Australian military have been published since 1963 ; what were the dates of these papers ; and in which scientific journal they were published (Question 36, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment. 2. I regret that our records do not provide this information in a readily accessible form. Nevertheless, I have consulted my senior staff and one scientific paper co-authored by scientists from the then Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down and their counterparts in the Australia has been identified. This paper on heat stress in NBC protective clothing was published in 1987 and appeared in Volume 125, pages 554-556 of Military Medicine.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what was the nature of the chemical agent transferred from Britain to Canada in the early 1970s mentioned in his Answer to the honourable Member for Leyton of 20th July, Official Report, column 173 ; what was the quantity of agent transferred ; on what dates this agent was transferred ; why the agent was transferred ; how the agent was transferred ; and what safety precautions were taken (Question 37, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The nature of the chemical agent transferred from Britain to Canada in the early 1970s was CR gas. Transfers took place in April 1970 (2 kg), August 1971 (10 kg), September 1972 (10 kg) and February 1976 (14.5 kg). Appropriate safety precautions were taken although as stated in the reply of 20th July (Official Report, column 173), our records do not indicate how the agent was used by Canada or on the precise defence agreement involved. The transfer of the agent probably took place under one of the agreements referred to by the Rt. Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP in his reply of 21 May 1992, Official Report, columns 255-6.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking which United States military establishment and government agencies took part in the information exchange and collaboration on VX other than those mentioned in his Answer of 15th February, Official Report, column 63 (Question 40, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. Our records indicate that the only other United States military establishment or government agency that took part in the information exchange and collaboration on VX was the Newport Indiana factory which I referred to in my reply to the honourable member for Leyton of 20 July 1993, Official Report, columns 172-173.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking how many service volunteers have been used for tests at Porton Down in each year since 1979 ; what is the purpose of these tests ; and which chemical and biological agents have been used in these tests since 1979 (Question 41, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces have effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. In order to carry out this work it is necessary to use service volunteers to :
(a) assess the ability of service personnel to function with new equipment and procedures,
(b) develop medical countermeasures to protect Service personnel and,
(c) evaluate the effects of very low and medically safe concentrations of CW agents on the ability of unprotected personnel to operate normally.
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No studies involving volunteers are carried out unless there is a clear military need and a detailed protocol has been reviewed and approved by an independent Ethics Committee in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Royal College of Physicians.3. The number of Service volunteers used for studies in each year since 1979 has been as follows :
|Numbers ------------------------ 1979 |153 1980 |340 1981 |303 1982 |161 1983 |177 1984 |131 1985 |181 1986 |96 1987 |93 1988 |136 1989 |110 1990 |83 1991 |50 1992 |112 1993 |64
4. Only a proportion of these studies have involved the use of a chemical agent ; the only chemical agent used in studies since 1979 has been GB (Sarin).
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking which other nerve agents were involved in the research at Nancekuke referred to in his Answer of 16 July, Official Report, columns 717-8, to determine whether they presented a hazard to British armed forces ; and when research started and ended on each of the nerve agents involved (Question 42, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. The nerve agents involved in the research at Nancekuke and the approximate periods during which the research at Nancekuke was carried out were as follows :
------------------------------------------------------------ a. |GB |1951-1976 b. |GE |1950s c. |GF |1957-1976 d. |GD |1962-1980 e. |VX |1957-1976 f. |Other V series|1957-1980
Research into these nerve agents is also carried out at Porton Down as required by the chemical defence programme.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking under which defence agreement VX was transferred from the United Kingdom to the United States of America ; and whether any transfer of VX was made from the United Kingdom to the United States of America other than that referred to in his Answer to the honourable Member for Leyton of 20th July, Official Report, column 172 (Question 43, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The only transfer of VX from the United Kingdom to the United States of America was the one referred to in my answer to the honourable member for Leyton of 20th July 1993, Official Report, column 172.
3. Our records do not reveal under which defence agreement VX was transferred from the United Kingdom to the United States of America. The transfer was probably under the Tripartite Toxicological Conferences which preceeded the Technical Cooperation Programme.
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1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking when the experiments on staphylococcal enterotoxin B, referred to in his Answer to the honourable Member for Brent East on 16th July, Official Report, columns 718-9, began and ended ; and if his Department has collaborated in experiments on this toxin with any other country (Question 45, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. The Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment has carried out studies on staphylococcal enterotoxin B since 1980 in order to assess the potential hazard to the United Kingdom Armed Forces and to provide appropriate protective measures. Experimental work on this toxin has not been carried out in collaboration with any other country although the results of this work form part of the technical database drawn on in cooperation with the United States, Canada and Australia under the Technical Cooperation Programme, with the United States and Canada under the Memorandum of Understanding on Chemical and Biological Defence and with France under the Anglo-French defence Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Research.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what work Porton Down has done on evaluating tremorine as an incapacitating agent ; when this work was carried out ; how many tests and studies were carried out on animals and service volunteers ; what was the conclusion of these tests and studies ; when the results were shared with the United States of America ; and through which defence agreement this scientific information was exchanged (Question 46, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the United Kingdom Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
3. Work has been carried out at the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment since the early 1960s using oxo-tremorine as a pharmacological tool in order to examine the mechanisms of nerve agent poisoning and thus evaluate new drugs to treat such poisoning. This work has involved the use of small laboratory animals such as rats, mice and guinea pigs. This research is to develop effective therapeutic and pretreatment drugs. No studies or tests were carried out with service volunteers.
4. The information arising from these studies was part of the chemical and biological defence programme and would therefore be part of the technical database drawn upon in cooperation with the United States of America under the Technical Cooperation Programme and its predecessors.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what has been the nature of collaboration between Britain, Australia and the United States of America with regard to nerve gases, and CS gas and CR gas ; when this work was started and finished ; where the work was carried out ; and under which defence agreement the work was arranged (Question 47, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. The role of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment is to carry out research to ensure that the UK Armed Forces are provided with effective protective measures against the threat that chemical or biological weapons may be used against them. As part of this work the potential hazard of possible chemical and biological warfare agents is assessed and the effectiveness of British protective measures evaluated.
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3. As part of this work it has been necessary to evaluate the potential hazards from nerve gases, CS gas and CR gas. Studies into CR gas were carried out between 1971-1976 and CS gas between 1957-early 1980s. The studies on nerve gases started after World War II and are continuing. These address both the potential hazard as well as research into new and improved medical countermeasures to nerve agent poisoning. The results of this work have formed part of the chemical and biological defence programme and is part of the technical database drawn upon in collaboration with the United States, Australia and Canada under the Technical Cooperation Programme and its predecessors and with the United States and Canada under the Memorandum of Understanding on Chemical and Biological Defence. 1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking what information arising from the transesterfication study referred to his Answer of 16th July, Official Report, column 712, QL, was shared with the United States of America, Canada and Australia ; when this information was exchanged ; and under which defence agreement it was exchanged (Question 48, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.2. Our records do not indicate what information arising from the transesterfication study was shared with the United States of
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America, Canada and Australia. The information gained formed part of the chemical and biological defence programme and is part of the technical database drawn on in information exchange and collaboration with the United States of America, Canada and Australia under the aegis of the defence agreements referred to the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, the Rt. Hon. Archie Hamilton, MP in his reply of 21 May 1992, Official Report, columns 255-256.1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking if he will list the dates, participating countries and locations of each of the 15 meetings of sub-group E on chemical and biological defence of the Technical Co-operation Programme mentioned in his Answer of 1st December 1993, Official Report , column 163 ; which branches of the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence have been attending these meetings ; and if he will make a statement on the achievement of this sub-group (Question 50, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. Our records indicate that the dates, participating countries and locations of each of the meetintgs of Sub-group E on Chemical and Biological Defence of the Technical Co-operation Programme since 1967 have been as follows :
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|Month |Year |Participating |Location |countries ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1 |Aug |67 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|Edgewood USA 2 |Nov |67 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|CDE and MRE UK 3 |May |69 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|Pentagon USA 4 |Mar |73 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|DRE Ottowa Canada 5 |Jan |75 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|CDE UK 6 |Jan |77 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|Edgewood USA 7 |Oct |78 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|DRE Suffield Canada 8 |Apr |80 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|MRL Australia 9 |Oct |81 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|CDE UK 10 |May |83 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|CRDC and Fort McLellan | USA 11 |Oct |84 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|NDHQ and DRE Ottowa | Canada 12 |Apr |86 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|MRL Australia 13 |Apr |88 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|CDE UK 14 |Apr |89 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|CRDC USA 15 |Apr |90 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|DRE Suffield Canada 16 |Apr |91 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|MRL Australia 17 |Jul |92 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|CBDE UK 18 |Jun |93 |UK, USA, Canada and Australia|Washington DC USA
3. The main participant from the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence has been the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment augmented as appropriate by representatives from Ministry of Defence headquarters.
4. The achievement of Sub-group E has been to promote successful collaboration in chemical and biological defence research between the UK, USA, Canada and Australia.
1. Your Parliamentary Question to the Secretary of State for Defence asking when chemical and biological agents and materials have been exchanged between Britain and Australia ; what was the nature of these agents and materials ; in what quantities they were exchanged ; for what purposes they were exchanged and under which defence agreement or memorandum of understanding they were exchanged (Question 54, Order Paper 15 December 1993) has been passed to me to reply as Chief Executive of the Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment.
2. Our records indicate that the quantities of chemical and biological agents and materials provided for defence research collaboration by Britain to Australia are as follows :
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ a. November 1959 |V agent intermediate|12 lbs b. November 1972 |Charcoal cloth |24 m roll c. August 1977 |G agent intermediate|20 lbs |CR | 3 lbs
3. Our records do not include information on how the agent or material was used by Australia or on the precise defence
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agreement involved. The transfer was probably under one of the defence agreements referred to in my reply to you of 16 July 1993, Official Report, column 716.Mr. Livingstone : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many legal actions have been taken against the Ministry of Defence since 1963 by service volunteers who have been tested with chemical and biological agents at the chemical defence establishment at Porton Down ; and how these legal cases were settled.
Mr. Hanley : Our records show no such legal actions.
Mr. Couchman : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what fixed- wing tactical transport capability is required for the British contribution to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps.
Mr. Hanley : We would expect to make maximum use of all of our fixed -wing air transport aircraft--Tristar, VC10 and Hercules--in tactical and strategic roles, supplemented as necessary by civil aircraft, to deploy the British elements of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps.
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Mr. Redmond : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many of the aircraft observed by Skyguard radar since June 1989 were flying at medium level within the meaning of his answer of 14 July, Official Report, column 560.
Mr. Hanley : In my answer of 14 July-- Official Report, column 560-- medium level was intended to refer to aircraft operating at heights above 2,000 ft above ground level. Reports on Skyguard deployments prior to November 1992, during which 1,175 military aircraft were observed, do not distinguish between aircraft operating at low and at medium level. Of the 627 aircraft observed by Skyguard since that time, 243 were operating at medium level.
Mr. Harry Greenway : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what plans he has to change the ownership, administration and use of Knightsbridge barracks now or in the future ; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Hanley : The requirement for barracks in central London is being reviewed. Sites examined will include Knightsbridge barracks.
Mr. Frank Cook : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many (a) retired officers and (b) retired civil servants have been re-employed by his Department (i) directly and (ii) as consultants in each of the past five years ; what are the arrangements for their remuneration and for treatment of their pension ; and if he will make a statement.
Mr. Aitken : The number of retired civil servants directly re- employed and that of ex-service personnel recruited to the civil service as retired officers in each of the past five years is :
|1993|1992|1991|1990|1989 ----------------------------------------------- Civil Servants |282 |288 |415 |550 |552 Retired Officers |250 |205 |187 |189 |160
There are no centrally maintained records for either retired service personnel or civil servants engaged as consultants and this information can be provided only at disproportionate cost. Retired officers and re-employed civil servants are paid in accordance with nationally negotiated and agreed pay scales for the grade to which they are appointed.
In accordance with the principle that civil servants, when re-employed should not receive more, by way of salary and pension together, than was being paid in salary immediately prior to retirement, the civil service pension may be subject to abatement. Pensions received by service personnel under the armed forces pension scheme are not subject to abatement on re- employment, unless retirement was under one of the early release schemes.
The level of remuneration for conslutants is determined either by a set fee for employees of consultancy companies or by the personal worth of an individual consultant. This is constrained, overall, by the sponsors' available funds.
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Mr. Cousins : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence when the British-Jordanian defence exports agreements were terminated ; on what dates each of the agreements were suspended ; and what were the reasons for each suspension and their termination.
Mr. Aitken : I presume that the hon. Member is referring to the memorandum of understanding between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Jordan, signed on 19 September 1985 and supplemented on 9 June 1987. While the line of export credit for Jordan was effectively terminated in 1991, neither of these memoranda has been terminated or suspended.
Mr. Cousins : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence who signed the defence sales agreements with Jordan on 19 September 1985 and 9 December 1987 on behalf of the British Government ; and in what form Parliament was notified of the concluding of each agreement.
Mr. Aitken : Her Majesty's Ambassador to Jordan was the signatory for Her Majesty's Government. Under successive Governments it has not been general practice to inform Parliament of the signature of such memoranda. However, the memorandum of understanding signed on 19 September 1985 was referred to in written answer by the then Minister of State for Defence on 17 February 1986 at column 58.
Mr. Cousins : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if the British-Jordanian defence sales agreements contained a cap on total expenditure ; and on what dates that cap was reached.
Mr. Aitken : The memorandum of understanding concerning the supply of defence equipment to Jordan, signed on 19 September 1985, covered contracts to a total estimated value of £270 million. The supplement signed on 9 June 1987 covered additional contracts to a total estimated value of £40 million. Expenditure did not in fact reach these figures.
Mr. Cousins : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what income was generated by International Military Services in respect of fees on brokerage for administering the British-Jordanian defence sales agreements of 19 September 1985 and 9 June 1987.
Mr. Aitken : International Military Services is a private limited company. The information requested relates to the trading operations of the company and is commercially confidential. IMS publishes its accounts for public scrutiny in accordance with company law.
Mr. Cousins : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence if he will place in the Library the information the Scott inquiry was given as to the quantities of items listed under the 60 projects relating to Jordan in his answer of 3 November, Official Report, column 295-6.
Mr. Aitken : I refer the hon. Gentleman to the answer I gave him on 13 December 1993 at column 528.
Mr. Cousins : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what Government to Government defence exports agreements were made with Jordan since 1979 other than those listed by the Minister on 3 November, Official Report, column 296 ; and what British Government agency was responsible for administering them.
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Mr. Aitken : A memorandum of understanding with Jordan, covering the supply of Khalid main battle tanks, was signed on 28 November 1979. The contract which gave effect to the MOU was held by International Military Services. A further memorandum, covering a modification programme to the tank, was signed on 2 January 1989. This has been administered by my Department. We have no record of any other similar arrangements with Jordan being signed since 1979.
Mr. Cousins : To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether information on the quantities and values of the items in the Jordan arms sales package have been supplied to Lord Justice Scott's inquiry.
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