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Question accordingly negatived.New clause 16
Preservation of material evidence
` .--(1) The Secretary of State shall make regulations for the preservation of material evidence following a criminal conviction on indictment in order to ensure its availability to the Commission in undertaking any relevant inquiries.
(2) Any power under this section to make regulations shall be exercisable by statutory instrument.
(3) No statutory instrument to which this section applies shall be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.'.-- [Mr. Michael.]
Brought up, and read the First time.
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Mr. Michael: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss also the following: Government amendments Nos. 32 and 33.
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Amendment No. 8, in clause 16, page 13, line 5, at end insert-- `(2A) The Commission may, where it is reasonable to do so, issue a direction to the person who is the appropriate person in relation to the public body, that the document or other material shall not be destroyed, damaged or altered for as long as is reasonably necessary.'.Amendment No. 9, in page 13, line 8, after `to', insert `or other material of relevance to'.
Amendment No. 11, in clause 19, page 15, line 9, at end insert-- `(2A) Where an investigating officer is appointed it shall be his duty to take all reasonable steps for the purpose of obtaining and preserving evidence relating to the case.'.
Mr. Michael: The aim of the new clause is to ensure that evidence following a criminal conviction on indictment can be preserved so as to be available to the commission when it undertakes any relevant inquiries. It carefully proposes the means to ensure that that power exists and that there is accountability for its exercise, under regulations.
The Government amendments grouped with the new clause follow undertakings given in Committee on behalf of the Government to consider this need to preserve evidence. Indeed, we had a helpful debate in Committee. The Minister considered the amendments that we tabled and undertook to return to the matter on Report. He agreed that we had made serious points in respect of the preservation of evidence, but was not sure that our amendments were strictly necessary.
We have sought to deal with the matter in a constructive new clause that would leave the detail to regulations to be laid by the Home Secretary and considered by the House. We thought that that offered the necessary flexibility.
In Committee, the Minister accepted the necessity of preserving evidence, and the Government amendments demonstrate that too. The question remains whether the Government's amendments go far enough, or whether their phraseology is too limiting. They are of course permissive amendments; I hope that the Minister will clarify exactly how he intends to limit the capability to preserve materials; and that he will tell us why he is confident that the amendments, not the new clause, will deal with all the circumstances for which we have sought to empower the Home Secretary.
It is most important that there should be no gap through which various materials might fall. There may be a time between a growing apprehension that there may have been a miscarriage of justice and the point when formal action begins. During that period, evidence could be removed or lost through no fault of an individual. Such evidence has often mysteriously disappeared as soon as it has become clear that there is likely to be a full investigation.
It is most important that any legal requirement and regulations be effective in ensuring that such things cannot go on--or at least that their incidence is limited.
I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us on these points. I welcome the fact that Ministers have followed through their undertakings in Committee to take seriously the points that we raised there, and the fact that they, like us, have produced suggestions that we can debate on the Floor of the House this evening.
Mr. Maclean: Like the hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael), I recognise the necessity of
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ensuring that investigations made by or on behalf of the commission are not hampered by the destruction or alteration of what may be crucial documents or other material. It is right that the commission should be able to direct that papers, and so forth, should not be destroyed or altered during the course of an investigation by the commission.I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and his hon. Friends for raising the subject in Committee. That gave us the opportunity to look at the wording of the Bill, to ensure that the powers involved were adequate. We thought that clause 16 granted the commission fairly strong powers to ensure that all documents were retained; but following our debate in Committee I agreed to look again at whether the commission could or should be given powers to direct that documents or other material held by a public body should not be damaged, altered or destroyed while the commission was considering the case to which they related.
We concluded that it would be wise to table the amendments in this group. They enable the commission to direct the appropriate person of any public body that the documents or other material held by him in relation to any case should not be damaged, destroyed or altered until the direction is withdrawn.
As to the wider question of whether we need broad regulation-making powers of the sort envisaged in the new clause, I am not persuaded. As I said in Committee, we need a more consistent approach to retention periods than we have now; that goes for all documents in Government and police circles. As many hon. Members already know, work is under way with a view to developing such an approach. Discussions are taking place with the police service, the Forensic Science Service, the CPS and others whose papers and/or other material may be of assistance to the commission and to others in the performance of their respective functions. We hope that those discussions will result in far greater standardisation of retention periods. Legislation may not be needed to achieve that--perhaps a code of practice or a set of guidelines will ultimately suffice. It may turn out that there is a need for legislation, but I doubt it. The Government consider it best to look to the work that I have described to achieve what we all want: greater consistency governing the retention periods for documents and other material. We should not try to legislate separately and in detail. New clause 16 is a genuine attempt to draw attention to a problem. I acknowledge that clause 16 could have been better worded, so we tabled the amendments to plug a loophole. I hope that the hon. Gentleman finds that satisfactory. However, I do not want detailed regulations to cover the commissions's work. We want a wider solution--
Mr. Michael: I acknowledge that the Government amendments deal with the situation once the commission is aware of the possibility that it might need to investigate a case. What I am worried about, however, is that it may become clear that a case will be referred to the commission, but until that case reaches the commission, it will not be in a position to make a relevant order.
We did not seek to set out detailed requirements; we tried to leave it to the Secretary of State to come up with regulations to plug any gap. Does the Minister not feel
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that there may still be some gaps in the necessary powers attaching to the Home Secretary, and that the new clause would allow him to lay the necessary regulations?Mr. Maclean: No. The gap, such as it may be, is in the power of retention generally. The hon. Gentleman says that there might be a case which it becomes clear will go to the commission, but there might be many other cases where no one suspects that there might be an alleged miscarriage of justice and where there is no prospect at an early stage of the case going to the commission.
Unless we have proper rules to keep relevant papers for three, seven, 10 or 20 years, they will automatically or routinely be destroyed in all innocence--by the police after a given period or by the Crown Prosecution Service or someone else--because it could be many years before a miscarriage of justice is alleged. To deal with such cases, we need general and sensible retention rules throughout the whole criminal justice system so that we are not legislating only for those cases in which we can spot a mile away that there might one day be the allegation of a miscarriage of justice. We therefore intend to hold all relevant papers for a sensible period, and I think that the Government's proposals will make for a wider and more sensible solution across all Departments.
For those reasons, I do not accept the detailed new clause. I am, however, grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising the subject in Committee, as that enabled us to have a further look--that is how Committees should work sensitively and constructively--and to table Government amendments Nos. 32 and 33. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his wise words but I hope that he will not press the new clause to a Division.
Mr. Michael: I am grateful to the Minister for the way in which he has spoken to the new clause and the Government amendments. I was pleased to hear more about the intention to introduce requirements for the general retention of papers. I acknowledge that that would deal with the generality of cases, including those which may be caught by the provisions of new clause 16 relating to the potential work of the commission. However, it seems that a small gap is left. New clause 16 would provide a wider power than is relevant to the commission's work, as the Minister rightly said, but the use of that power could be limited to cases that were relevant to the commission's work. If the Government amendments are accepted but the new clause is not, there will still be a slight gap in the Bill's provisions. However, it seems sensible that the Government's amendments should be passed with our support and that the remaining gap should be a matter for further discussion in another place. I hope that the Minister will acknowledge my point that there might be a need for some regulation to allow defence solicitors or the commission to flag up something that has not formally come to their notice but seems likely to do so. In such circumstances, it would be appropriate for the preservation of papers and other evidence to be guaranteed, even in advance of the general powers that the Minister says will be introduced in due course. Perhaps another amendment could fill the gap between us.
I am sure that the Minister accepts that there are difficulties, and I understand that new clause 16 perhaps ranges wider than would be appropriate in a measure that deals specifically with the responsibilities of the
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commission. For that reason, I indicate my support and that of my colleagues for the Government amendments, and beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New clause 17
Leave to appeal: England & Wales
`In section 1 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 (appeal against conviction) after subsection 2 (requirement of leave to appeal or certificate of trial judge) there shall be inserted the following subsection--
"(2A) The Court of Appeal may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interest of justice, grant leave to appeal against conviction notwithstanding that a previous application to appeal has been determined (either by refusal for leave or after a substantive hearing) in respect of the same conviction".'.-- [Mr. Corbyn.] Brought up, and read the First time.
Mr. Jeremy Corbyn (Islington, North): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss also new clause 18-- Leave to appeal: Northern Ireland --
`In section 1 of the Criminal Appeal (Northern Ireland) Act 1980 (appeal against conviction) subject to the requirement of leave to appeal or certificate of trial judge) there shall be inserted the following subsection--
"(1A) The Court of Appeal may, if they think it necessary or expedient in the interest of justice, grant leave to appeal against conviction notwithstanding that a previous application to appeal has been determined (either by a refusal for leave or after a substantive hearing) in respect of the same conviction.".'.
Mr. Corbyn: I feel a bit like an intruder in a private conversation, as hon. Members have clearly had many debates in Committee to which I was not privy, although I have access to the Committee Hansard .
New clauses 17 and 18 are designed to give direct access to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal against conviction. My hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael) tabled new clause 4, which was not selected but which would have allowed direct access to the Court of Appeal to appeal against sentence. New clauses 17 and 18 are extensions of that new clause's provisions. It is common sense that a wrongful conviction is a cause of deep concern. Many of us have been involved in campaigns against miscarriages of justice. Clearly, we feel that there should be access directly to the Court of Appeal for people who believe that, despite having lost a previous appeal, their cases should be heard again. In his report into the investigation of the Preece case, the ombudsman said:
"A miscarriage of justice by which a man or woman loses his or her liberty is one of the gravest matters which can occupy the attention of a civilised society. And it seems to me that when an unprecedented pollution of justice at its source is discovered, quite an exceptional effort to identify and remedy its consequences is called for."
Surely, such views are generally held.
I hope that the new clauses will extend the idea behind, and the provisions in, the Bill because the opportunity to put right what has caused the growing concern about miscarriages of justice in England, Wales and Northern Ireland does not often occur. I shall deal later with
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Northern Ireland but I hope that we are well into a peaceful and healing process there. I believe that new clause 18 would assist in that respect.8.15 pm
The proposed reforms to the criminal justice system in England, Wales and Northern Ireland fall a long way short of the changes introduced recently in the Republic of Ireland's Criminal Appeal Act 1993. In particular, a prospective appellant in the Republic who alleges that a new or newly discovered fact shows that there has been a miscarriage of justice now has the statutory right to appeal directly to the Irish Court of Criminal Appeal for an order quashing the conviction.
The rationale behind that new statutory method is simple. If the possibility of a miscarriage of justice is a matter of serious concern in a civilised society, which it is, every prospective appellant should be given a reasonable opportunity to present his case properly. At the moment, he does not necessarily have that right. There are a number of reasons for that.
First, there have been serious problems with the sharing of evidence, as was mentioned in earlier debates. Secondly, until the Bill becomes law, the Home Secretary would be the only route to the Court of Appeal after an appeal had been lost.
In our adversarial system, those in the best position to judge whether prospective appellants have an arguable case to overturn their convictions are their lawyers. That must be borne in mind because lawyers have a duty to defend the best interests of their clients and obviously work to get them released if they have a strong case. The new clause is therefore a means of enabling us to examine the issue further and giving that direct access to the courts. I do not think that any useful purpose is served by the introduction of a quasi-judicial intermediary stage in the process. If the necessary evidence or arguments exist, it would serve only to increase costs and delay proper resolution of the case.
One could cite a large number of large cases involving a miscarriage of justice--I have been involved with some--where the present system of lack of access to the Court of Appeal other than through the Home Secretary or, in future, through the commission, has been found deeply wanting. For example, I recall the case of Sivalingham and Kulasingham, which I took to the Home Office several times. They were wrongly convicted of fire-bombing some property in east London and were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. A death had occurred and the spectre of murder charges haunted them. Eventually, the Home Secretary agreed that the synthesis of argument put forward by myself and others had merit. There was a police investigation, the case was ultimately referred to the Court of Appeal and the people were released. There have been a number of similar cases.
What I find depressing is the hit-and-miss approach in examining miscarriages of justice. If one has influential friends or people who are prepared to campaign on one's behalf, there is a possibility of getting the case heard, of getting it before the Home Secretary and, ultimately, into the Court of Appeal. I do not want the new system to end up like the old one, in which getting a case before the
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Court of Appeal depended on the strength and ability of one's campaign. Therefore, I believe that there should be a statutory right of access to the Court of Appeal.Mr. Oliver Heald (Hertfordshire, North): I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Does he agree that one of the difficulties with the system that he proposes is that it would open up the possibility of multiple applications being made to the Court of Appeal, time after time, by appellants who were in person without the advice of lawyers, which could result in the Court of Appeal being clogged up with cases that really have no great merit? Is it not better to have a filter of the sort that the Government suggest?
Mr. Corbyn: Clearly, a number of people would put cases forward repeatedly. I understand that problem and see that particular danger, although I think that it is possibly slightly exaggerated. What I am concerned about is the large number of cases that C3 has dealt with over the years, the delays involved in them, and, as I said earlier, the hit-and -miss approach on how a case gets to the Court of Appeal. Although some cases will not get very far, surely it is better that cases come before the court--they may well be re-examined by the court and dismissed, but new evidence would have to be produced to have the case re-examined, or there would have to be some argument in support of it--than to have a system in which there is a serious danger that there would be a continuation of miscarriages of justice in this country.
The people who were released fairly recently, following miscarriages of justice, are not the only ones, given the quality of legal representation in the first place, the quality of the evidence that was collected, the lack of sharing of that evidence and all the problems that go with it. That cannot be right. My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) has chronicled in the House on a number of occasions, and did so again earlier today, the case of the Bridgewater Three.
New clause 18 gives the same powers to the Appeal Court in Northern Ireland, and would allow it to receive applications and to have access to them. That could be seen very much as part of a healing process and part of a peace process. Those who often have a significant mistrust of the judicial system in Northern Ireland, with the Diplock courts, would at least have direct access to a Court of Appeal to have their cases examined in some detail.
My hon. Friend mentioned the Bridgewater case. I represented evidence to the Minister on 8 June 1993 with the solicitor representing the accused. We were promised a rapid investigation and a rapid answer. It is now 1995. It is coming up to two years since I personally deposited a substantial dossier of 1,100 pages and 100 new items of evidence on his desk. We are on to the eighth police inquiry. That case cannot go on for ever being batted back and forth, with huge amounts of new evidence being produced. Indeed, evidence suggests that there was a lack of disclosure of evidence in the first place. I hope that, in his reply, the Minister will reiterate what he said earlier or at least give me some hope that that case will be referred as soon as possible.
Those essentially are my main points. There is a fundamental weakness in the Bill in that it does not allow direct access to the Court of Appeal. Anyone who has
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been involved in the misery and horrors of long-term campaigning on miscarriages of justice will recognise that the new clause would be an important step forward. It cannot be right that there is limited access to justice, that it is limited to those who can afford it or who have friends who are prepared to campaign for it. That is why I tabled my new clauses, which would strengthen, not weaken, the Bill. I believe that they would strengthen the judicial system and give much greater equality of access to the law for everyone, not just the rich and the famous or those who have such friends. It should be available to everybody. I think that this will be a major step toward.Mr. Donald Anderson (Swansea, East): I wish to give the Labour party's blessing to the new clauses tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) in so far as we understand their purpose, which he outlined, and their effect. If the Government feel that the effects of the new clauses go too far and if they wish to limit them in some way or to protect access to the Court of Appeal, they can, of course, do so by tabling amendments.
Essentially, we agree with my hon. Friend that the Court of Appeal should not shut the door. There is a case for access other than through the section 17 procedure. The history of the cases that form the background to the royal commission and the public concern on the matter only add weight to that. Therefore, we believe that the principle is worthy of support. The Court of Appeal already has its sifting mechanisms and sanctions, which are available. They include a single judge, at which some two thirds of applications fail. If the applications so fail, legal aid will not be available for the case thereafter. There is also the possibility of losing time. We have only one hesitation in principle: what mechanism can one devise to deter repeated applications that are without merit? Having said that, we are inclined to support the principle of my hon. Friend's new clauses. We look forward to the Minister's reply, which we hope will be as forthcoming as that in the previous new clauses.
Mr. Nicholas Baker: I welcome the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) to the discussions. I certainly respect the reasons that prompted him to table his new clauses. I confess, however, to being slightly puzzled when I first saw them, because they appear to call into question the very purpose for which the commission was created. I think that the hesitation expressed by the hon. Member for Swansea, East (Mr. Anderson) in that respect was entirely understandable and right.
The commission will be tasked with investigating possible miscarriages of justice and given power to refer cases, whether in relation to a conviction or sentence--or both--to the courts for them to consider at the resulting appeal. It will, essentially, be a body of last resort, whose role will begin--save in exceptional circumstances, such as when a court uses the powers introduced by clause 5 to order an investigation--when all other avenues of appeal have been exhausted. I emphasise that anyone may approach the commission, whether on his own behalf or on behalf of another. If the commission believes that the case meets the criteria for reference in the Bill, I know of nothing to suggest that the case will not be referred. That is the commission's role. Therefore, I have to ask what need there is to provide for the Court of Appeal to hear second, third--or more--appeals on the same conviction.
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The hon. Member for Islington, North asked me about the Carl Bridgewater case. I can tell him that the police report is expected very shortly. One reason why the inquiry has been extended has been the need to consider further matters raised by the solicitors on several occasions since June 1993. We shall give a very high priority to considering that report.I can also assure the hon. Gentleman that low-profile cases--which, I know, are the ones that he has in mind--are not ignored. No case is ignored by the Secretary of State. I know of nothing to suggest that any case will be ignored by the commission. The Secretary of State refers cases on their merits, and so will the commission. If any case meets, in the commission's view, the criteria for a reference set out in the Bill, it will be referred.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, North (Mr. Heald) was right. The new clauses would allow those who were tried originally on indictment, who had already exhausted the usual appeal procedures, to bypass the commission and to appeal again to the Court of Appeal in relation to their conviction and, subject to leave being granted, to have their appeal heard.
8.30 pm
Aside from the fact that that is unnecessary in view of the Government's decision to create the new commission, I can see other real difficulties with what the hon. Gentleman proposes. First, the new clauses would remove the concept of finality in criminal proceedings. It is essential that all cases are considered fairly, but it is also important that there is finality. The hon. Gentleman may be aware of the important case of Pinfold, which established the principle that the Court of Appeal may not entertain a second application for leave to appeal in the same case. Providing what would effectively be extended rights of appeal on conviction would breach that principle.
My second concern about the new clauses is that they relate to the need for investigation of alleged miscarriages of justice, and who would be responsible for that? That is a real difficulty. Thirdly, the proposals would be bound to create confusion. Under them, applicants would be able to make representations to the court and to the commission.
We have put in the Bill a strong and effective last resort procedure in place of the powers of the Secretary of State to investigate and refer cases to the courts. A last resort procedure will be precisely that. For those reasons, I regret that I cannot support the new clauses and I invite- -
Mr. Corbyn: I thank the Minister for giving way just before completing his reply. I referred to the anomaly that in the Republic of Ireland there is a wider right of access to the Court of Appeal than there is at the moment in Northern Ireland or would be should the Bill become law. Does the Minister recognise that an obvious lesson will be drawn from that by people in Northern Ireland concerned about miscarriages of justice, possible delays by the commission or the commission not supporting or being willing to refer a case? They would have an unfettered right of access south of the border, but not north of the border.
Mr. Baker: People south of the border in Ireland would not have a commission operating in the same way that this commission will operate, which will be a real advantage for all the reasons that I have given.
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Therefore, I regret again to have to ask my hon. Friends to reject the new clause.Question put and negatived.
Clause 2
Grounds for allowing and dismissing appeals
Mr. Trimble: I beg to move amendment No. 14, in page 2, line 38, at end insert--
`For the purposes of this section "unsafe" means, where in the light of representations made to the court and of all the circumstances, it is not satisfied--
(i) that the appellant is guilty of the offence; or
(ii) that a reasonable jury would have convicted the appellant if the trial had, in all respects, been conducted properly.'.
Madam Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss also amendment No. 15, in line 45, at end insert--
`For the purposes of this section "unsafe" means, where in the light of representations made to the court and of all the circumstances, it is not satisfied--
(i) that the appellant is guilty of the offence; or
(ii) that a reasonable jury would have convicted the appellant if the trial had, in all respects, been conducted properly.'.
Mr. Trimble: With these amendments, we come to ground on which touched on Second Reading and in Committee, although we did not have the opportunity in Committee to consider this particular measure. However, hon. Members familiar with the debate will recognise the source of the amendments in that they are drawn from the valuable and useful article by Sir John Smith, which was kindly made available to us and relied on not only by me but by members of the Labour Front Bench and the Government at various stages in the debate. It cannot be often that a draft academic article, supplied largely through the hon. and learned Member for Burton (Sir I. Lawrence), is quoted from so copiously in debates.
It was towards the end of Sir John Smith's article that he put forward the suggested definition of the word "unsafe". It will be of value if that definition is included in the legislation. A significant feature of the legislation is that it replaces as the ground for referring cases to the Court of Appeal the simple concept that the conviction may be unsafe.
Justice, in its briefing notes for this stage of the Bill, commenting on this subject, says:
"A great deal will hinge on judicial interpretation of a single word, namely, unsafe."
It goes on:
"The traditional practice already varies between the two jurisdictions of Northern Ireland and England and Wales." That is indeed the case. There is such a variation in practice. Justice argues:
"There are significant differences of interpretation within each of those jurisdictions between different judges, particularly at the critical leave to appeal stage which is decided by a single judge on the papers, particularly on such matters as lawyers' errors. We therefore continue to argue for the legislation to signal clearly that what is required of judges is doubt as to the safety of a conviction, not certainty as to its unsafety."
That is to some extent what the amendments hope to do by inserting into the relevant legislation definitions of that single word "unsafe". At present, everything will hinge on its judicial interpretation.
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There has been, as hon. Members have said, a sea change in the approach of the Court of Appeal, or some members of it in England and Wales. In Committee, the Minister said that it was the intention to consolidate that new broader approach. That is fine if the word "unsafe" is consistently given that broader interpretation. However, there is a danger that that will not happen. It is not safe in the present situation simply to rely on the assurances of some members of the judiciary, no matter how senior they may be, that the word will be given a broad interpretation.We cannot be sure that that will be done in all cases and, speaking as a Member from Northern Ireland, I cannot be sure that the same broad interpretation will be given by the courts in Northern Ireland, particularly when the background is that the courts in Northern Ireland have not seemed to have had as thoroughgoing a sea change as the Court of Appeal in England and Wales.
It is for that reason that it is desirable to spell out in a little more detail the definition of "unsafe". That Sir John Smith did in terms that I am happy to adopt and put forward for the consideration of the House. That will help to send to the courts the clear signal that we are expecting, in the operation of the legislation, to see underwritten and, if necessary extended, the different broader approach which has been adopted in some of the more recent English cases. We hope that it is consolidated and whole- heartedly adopted in Northern Ireland.
Sir Ivan Lawrence (Burton): The Bill's purpose is to provide an effective and speedy system for correcting miscarriages of justice. One limb of the Bill, at clause 2, requires the Court of Appeal to allow an appeal if it thinks that the conviction is unsafe. At the prompting of the eminent academic, Professor Sir John Smith QC, whose reputation in the field is accepted by the Court of Appeal and senior judges, I raised a number of issues on Second Reading which, on the face of it, challenge the use of the word "unsafe". I circulated to hon. Members on both sides of the House, as the hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) said, the professor's draft article, which also raised other issues of possible confusion. The suggested amendment to the Bill proposed by Professor Sir John Smith has formed the amendment now proposed. However, the draft article was written in response to the Runciman royal commission's analysis of the situation, before the publication of the Bill and before our Second Reading debate. As a result of the publication of the Bill and of hearing the Second Reading speeches, Sir John has updated his version of the article and, having seen clause 4, he has added the words "of any fresh evidence" to his suggested definition of "unsafe". It now reads:
"A conviction is unsafe where, in the light of representations made to the Court, of any fresh evidence, and of all the circumstances, it is not satisfied--
(i) that the appellant is guilty of the offence;
(ii) that a reasonable jury would have convicted the appellant if the trial had been properly conducted in all respects."
That addition, however, is but a detail.
What is more than a detail is what Sir John says about the substitution of the words "capable of belief" in clause 4 for "likely to be credible", the purpose of which is
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