House of Commons Hansard Debates for 9 May 1995

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Feeling that rather undersold the value of our armed forces, I checked the biblical source and discovered that the words

"Neither shall they learn war any more"

was a reference to a vision of Isiah, not a prediction. I fear that it will remain a vision, for it is no more realistic now than it was then. We need our armed forces, and they are making a massive contribution in the former Yugoslavia.

The second quotation that stuck in my mind comes from the wonderful book "Eastern Approaches", by Fitzroy Maclean. I recommend those hon. Members who have not read it to do so, and I recommend to those hon. Members who have read that book to re-read it, because it is highly relevant now.

Fitzroy Maclean writes about telling Churchill how worried he was that, if Tito were to be aided to power in Yugoslavia, that would lead to a communist state having special links with the Soviet Union, which might be bad for the United Kingdom's broader interests: "The Prime Minister's reply resolved my doubts.

`Do you intend,' he asked, `to make Jugoslavia your home after the war?'

`No, sir,' I replied.

`Neither do I,' he said. `And, that being so, the less you and I worry about the form of government they set up, the better. That is for them to decide'."

I am not sure how far the House can go in deciding the form of government that Yugoslavia should have, or even in distinguishing the different factions. I use that word advisedly, despite the remarks by my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire, South (Sir P. Cormack). Although there is no doubt that the Bosnian Serbs have been the main aggressors, there has been enormous fault on all sides. The Bosnian Serbs have the arms of the former republic of Yugoslavia and therefore the military advantage--but there have been atrocities on all sides, as anyone who has visited that sad country knows. The United Nations' response has been to deploy troops, initially to help to ensure the distribution of humanitarian and medical aid, and to assist the promotion of peace. However, there has been a dichotomy throughout our presence in the former Yugoslavia. The UN's emphasis has been on keeping or promoting the peace whereas NATO, entrusted with the military role, has as its theme the mass application of force, manoeuvre and the destruction of the enemy within a limited time frame.

Over the past three years, our position has continued to be ambiguous, in trying to maintain a peace that does not exist and seeking to impose a peace that does not exist. A couple of years ago, I had the opportunity to ask the Supreme Allied Commander Europe how many soldiers he thought he would realistically need to impose peace in the former Yugoslavia. Being an American, he replied, "Peter, I would need one soldier to sit on the head of every male Bosnian." Hon. Members can work out the numbers for themselves.

Peace enforcement would require massive military force. Peacekeeping, which does not exist, requires less. We have the major problem of seeking to enforce a peace that does not exist. The Ministry of Defence manual on wider peacekeeping states:

"A level of consent is crucial for the success of a peace operation."

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As a contributor to United Nations forces, we must maintain impartiality. However, we also need credibility. If we lay down a rule that is then flouted, we will lose our credibility.

There is an inevitable imbalance between impartiality and credibility. There is a quantitive dimension to that dichotomy, as well as a time frame. From a quantitive point of view, an isolated act of aggression--one shell or a series of shells fired into a safe haven--can be met with a sharp response by the UN through NATO. If there is a continual and deliberate military barrage over a period, and if the UN responded in strength over that period, the risk of that response being perceived as impartial among the three sides would be diminished. The larger the time frame within which that response continued, and the more sustained that it is, the more we would apparently lose impartiality.

Furthermore, none of the three sides has all its forces completely under control. They do not all come completely under the control of the three groups. There are warring factions, and a brigand element. I spoke of the UN's role in humanitarian aid and peace promotion. The latter role has increased and more of it has been nailed to the UN soldier's job description. There were air strikes in 1993 and 1994, and after the Seville meeting, United States Secretary of State Perry said that such strikes would be more decisively made and widespread in the event of Serb aggression or intransigence. Air strikes have the purpose of protecting UN forces and maintaining safe havens created under Security Council resolution 836. Wider air strikes could also have the purpose of destroying the combat capacity of one of the forces.

As to the first, UN forces are lightly armed and have no tanks or heavy artillery, which is important. Possibly of more significance is that UN forces are deployed to assist in the completion of the roles with which they have been tasked. They are not deployed in a way that enables them to engage in military operations against any of the three sides. The reverse is true. They are integrated in the community and are sitting targets in the event of a breakdown of peace, if they become involved in the conflict. It has been possible to deploy our troops in the manner in which they have been deployed only because it is now possible, with the support of good military technology, for forces on the ground to call up air strikes at short notice to assist them. However, the troops on the ground cannot prevent violence

Several hon. Members have implied or specifically stated that, by maintaining forces in the former Yugoslavia, we are able to prevent the spread of conflict, but it does not work that way. Troops were heavily deployed in Gorni Vakuf and the war raged around and through that town. Troops were deployed in Vitez and between the two periods that we were there, a year ago and in March, civil war raged between Muslim and the Croats. Similarly, the terrible events of Novi Travnik took place despite the presence of United Nations forces nearby. If our aim is to stop the war by force, we will need to deploy our troops elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia and with different weapons. We cannot get to where we would need to be to stop the war from where we are now because our troops are in the wrong position to stop the war and have the wrong equipment. If we decide that it is our role to separate the combatants, we will need to start from somewhere else. We cannot get to a peace enforcement role from our current position. We would need to withdraw and redeploy with different weapons.

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I understand the frustration that is rightly felt in the United States at having armed forces that cannot act to stop the war located in the former Yugoslavia. However, the truth is that they cannot stop it, because they do not have the necessary weapons or numbers of troops and they are deployed in the wrong place.

In the past year, there has been a federation of Muslims and Croats, which seemed to be very promising. When I and other members of the Select Committee on Defence were in the former Yugoslavia a year or so ago, we thought that there was a confluence of various factors that seemed to be quite promising.

First, after the horrific bomb that killed 68 people in a Sarajevo market in February, there was revulsion throughout the world and a feeling that something must be done. That led to a strengthening of attitudes, at least in the short term.

Secondly, the Muslim-Croat federation seemed to offer hope. The fact that two of the three sides were no longer fighting each other offered hope of further peace. In addition, rather more than a year ago, there seemed to be a war-weariness on all sides.

The final factor was the courage and determination of United Nations troops and, exceptionally, of British forces, which are widely regarded as being quite outstanding, inspired by the truly remarkable leadership of General Sir Michael Rose. Those factors came together rather more than a year ago. It seemed that peace had a chance; a remote one, but one that needed to be taken.

Now things look quite bleak. The Croats have taken advantage of no longer being in conflict with the Muslims and we have seen a pre-emptive strike by the Croats. The Muslims have taken the chance over the past year, especially during the four months of the ceasefire, to re-equip and rearm. I am told that they are now extremely well equipped and armed. They have all the arms that they need other than heavy equipment such as heavy artillery and tanks. They are well equipped for fighting in mountainous terrain. Where do we go from there? If military skill and courage could find a solution to the problem, it would have been sorted out some time ago, but they are not enough. The troops have been given tasks that are not achievable, and they must not be given further such tasks in future. Tasks that are militarily unachievable should be phased out. The expression "safe havens" carries with it a message of hope, but if that message is not backed up with military force, a safe haven is not safe, merely a pious hope. It would take much greater force than is deployed at present--I believe an unacceptably greater force--to prevent war in the safe havens. To make the safe havens completely militarily safe is not a realistic objective.

I regretfully welcome the decision that the Royal Welch Fusiliers should not be replaced when they leave Gorazde in September. The military situation in which they have been put is almost impossible. We in the United Kingdom should not be sucked further into the Bosnian quagmire. We must resist those people, whose background is normally political rather than military, who say that we should extend air strikes. If the United Nations is perceived as partial, it will forfeit its current status as a promoter of peace.

I conclude that we must hunker down and phase out where we can. This year's statement on defence estimates--the White Paper--says that the

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"safety and security of British troops in Bosnia remains of paramount importance to the British Government."

Our troops are in positions of enormous risk and I know that the French, who have tragically lost 35 soldiers against our sad loss of 13, will certainly be considering withdrawal over the next few weeks. Those losses are a major factor in French thinking.

But how do we get the troops out, if that is the decision that is taken? There was a NATO plan that, apparently, involved some 80,000 troops over six months. The latest figure that I have heard suggest that some 40,000 troops might be involved.

The last thing that commanders on the ground need is more armour. The problem is withdrawing along a narrow mountain road--and only one road is available in the north of the British deployment area. We certainly need helicopters, but we do not need armour. To send more troops would compound the problem.

The British people and others will need to face the serious issues that will be involved if we decide to withdraw. What will happen if women and children try to block the road of withdrawal? My view is clear: we would have to face down such a threat and not yield to it. We could not be blackmailed in that way, and I invite the House to consider what would be the implication of not being blackmailed in that way. We would need to back our troops in a difficult situation, which could be bloody. They deserve our complete support. The United Nations contribution has been worthy, even noble, and United Nations troops must not be put at risk by being held up in such a way. In conclusion, I shall deal with the credibility of the United Nations and NATO. It is often said that we cannot withdraw, because it would mean failure, a loss of face and credibility for the United Nations and NATO. However, they will not retain credibility by compounding an error. The United Nations and NATO have done their best. It is a good best but, at the end of the day, we cannot stop people fighting if that is what they are determined to do. 7.48 pm

Mr. Calum Macdonald (Western Isles): I shall follow the good example of the hon. Member for Staffordshire, South (Sir P. Cormack), who tried, in his excellent speech, to scotch some received myths about the situation in the former Yugoslavia.

In doing so, I fear that I will disagree with a couple of my hon. Friends. They will not be surprised by that, and I should say that I respect both their knowledge of the former Yugoslavia and their knowledge of foreign policy issues in general. In particular, I respect the genuine affection of my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Mr. Wareing) for the old state of Yugoslavia, which has led him to the analysis that he brings to these debates. I believe that that analysis is profoundly mistaken.

I shall take up first the myth that is often put about that early recognition of Croatia, prompted by the German Government, led to war in the former Yugoslavia. That interpretation flies in the face of the facts. Croatia was recognised in January 1992. By that time the war had been going on in Croatia for a full six months. Vukovar was a flattened mess, Dubrovnik had already been shelled and ethnic cleansing had already taken place. An end to the war in Croatia came within a couple of weeks of its being recognised. Therefore, I do not understand how it can be said--it often is--that recognition led to the war or brought about a worsening of it.

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My hon. Friend the Members for West Derby and for Ilford, South (Mr. Gapes) mentioned the role of President Tudjman and the Croatian Government in this whole mess. Obviously, no Opposition Member can feel very much political sympathy for the politics of President Tudjman. He is a right-wing nationalist with an authoritarian personality, if not authoritarian tendencies, and he has undeniably expressed anti- semitic sentiments.

My hon. Friends are sadly mistaken if they think that President Tudjman's shortcomings could possibly justify the campaign of ethnic cleansing and territorial aggression by the Jugoslav national army or the nationalist Serbs in Croatia in 1991. I must point out to my hon. Friends that, sadly, eastern Europe today is full of right-wing nationalist politicians and leaders, and I am sure that some of them harbour all sorts of unpleasant prejudices. As I have said, those shortcomings could not in any way justify the policies pursued by the Serbian regime in Belgrade since 1991.

Mr. Wareing: Does not my hon. Friend see that, because of the way in which the Serbs were being treated inside the newly declared independent state of Croatia, the Serbs who lived in Bosnia, with their memories of what happened during the years 1941-45, were realistically worried about what would happen in a state that might be absorbed by Croatia? There was no doubt that the Croatian regular army was active in Bosnia, certainly in Herzegovina, in the early days of the war there. The Serbs were frightened of being part of a Bosnia that would come under the influence of President Tudjman.

Mr. Macdonald: Before I say anything about the activities of the Croatian army and the Croatian irregulars in Bosnia, I must tell my hon. Friend that the policies of the Tudjman Government in the early and middle part of 1991, insensitive and heavy-handed though they may have been, are nothing like the authoritarian repression that the Serbian Government had been practising since the mid-1980s in places such as Kosovo. Just as I would say that that sort of authoritarian repression would not justify a reaction by the people of Kosovo to the extent of ethnic cleansing and other atrocities, so I say that the far less authoritarian style of the Croatian Government in 1991 could not in any way be used to justify what the nationalist Serbs and the Jugoslav national army have done in Croatia.

I must point out to my hon. Friends that that pattern is not unfamiliar in eastern Europe, where populations are being separated by the creation of new countries, notably in the Baltic states. Sometimes there is insensitive treatment of those populations. For example, some Russians have found themselves marooned in the newly independent states. However, that could not justify a policy by the Russian Government against the Ukraine, the Crimea or the Baltic states that parallelled the policies carried out in Croatia and Bosnia. It is not right to try to claim justification for what the nationalist Serbs have done in the former Yugoslavia on the shortcomings of the Croatian regime in particular.

I acknowledge that atrocities have been committed by all sides. I acknowledge particularly that there have been atrocities committed by Croatian irregulars in Herzegovina. However, there is a clear difference between isolated atrocities and the sort of systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing and terror carried out by nationalist Serbs and the Jugoslav national army in Croatia and Bosnia.

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That difference has been recognised not just by myself or by journalists but by the investigators from the United Nations who have studied in close detail exactly what happened in all those countries. The head of the UN investigation team, Cherif Bassiouni, made it clear just a couple of months ago that that team's investigations estimated that 90 per cent. of the atrocities had been committed by Serbian forces, and that there was evidence of a systematic and planned campaign to remove wholesale populations from the areas that the nationalist Serbs wished to take over. Those points must be made firmly.

I should like to express my appreciation to those individuals and organisations who helped me on my most recent visit to the former Yugoslavia. During the Easter recess I took the opportunity to go to central Bosnia. I visited Zenica, Mostar and Tuzla. Although I did not accompany UNPROFOR, I saw evidence of the good work that it is doing and of the necessity of its remaining in that region. I also talked to people who work with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and saw evidence of their work. I was impressed by the good work that they were doing.

I also saw evidence of the work of British non-governmental organisations such as Oxford Aid, which is carrying out good work in Mostar helping to resupply a new hospital unit. I must say a special word about those working for the Overseas Development Administration in Bosnia, in Zenica and Tuzla. I saw the immensely valuable work that they were carrying out. They are enormously dedicated people, and I hope that the Government will continue to support and finance the work of the ODA in that area.

It is interesting that many of the people working for the ODA--for example, those driving the lorries in convoys in Zenica--are ex-service men who had previously served in Bosnia with the British Army through UNPROFOR. They were so convinced of the good work that they were doing that, even after being demobbed, they wished to return to continue that work in a civilian guise. That is an eloquent testimony of what has already been said tonight about the high level of morale and commitment among the British forces in the former Yugoslavia.

I compliment my hon. Friend the Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) on an excellent speech, which I hope will be noted by those who take an interest in the issue. He did not engage in inflated rhetoric of the kind that the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence often warn us of, nor did he advocate imposing a political solution by force. He did not even say that we needed new policies as such, and his central message was that the policies that we had needed to be implemented and enforced. He said that we needed consistency, resolution and determination in the prosecution of the existing policies, and that that would begin to bring about radical change in former Yugoslavia.

My hon. Friend also rightly warned us away from the endless fixation with maps, and with drawing lines and dividing up territories in former Yugoslavia. That is particularly correct with regard to the contact group plan, the latest of the peace plans to be advanced. The key issue in the plan is not the internal division of territory, with 49 per cent. going to one side and 51 per cent. to the other. The argument is not whether those figures should be adjusted by one or two percentage points.

The crucial matter is the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent sovereign state within its pre-war borders, with a full, independent and recognised

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international personality. That goal has been repeatedly stated in international declarations and European Community statements, and also by the Government. That goal is clearly insisted upon by the UN Security Council, most notably in resolutions 820 and 836. UN resolution 836 reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the responsibility of the Security Council in that regard. The resolution went on to reaffirm that any taking of territory by force or any practice of ethnic cleansing was lawful and totally unacceptable. I emphasise that particular aspect of the contact group plan, because I feel that the Government are very much resiling from it.

I fear that the Foreign Office is beginning to fudge this key issue. At the beginning of this year, I corresponded with the Minister of State, who has now taken his place on the Front Bench. In a letter to me dated 3 January 1995, the Minister said that any settlement would need to be agreed by all parties and preserve the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its existing borders. That is something with which we could all agree.

The Minister went on to say that the arrangements would have to include some relationship between the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia for them to be acceptable to the Bosnian Serbs. That too is something which would be agreed on both sides of the House. But the Minister went on to say that the demand that the Bosnian Serbs must join the Croat and Muslim federation before they can have a relationship with Serbia was not a realistic basis for negotiations, and would not contribute to securing a peaceful settlement.

The Minister of State appeared to say that it is not a requirement of the contact group plan or of a plan for a peaceful settlement that the nationalist Bosnian Serbia should be required to join the federation that had been established between the Bosnian Government and the Croat representatives. I found that a puzzling statement, as it seems to me that real and recognised states come in only three forms. One can have a confederation, a federation or a unitary state. The Minister appears to be suggesting that what is projected for Bosnia-Herzegovina would not fit any of those three forms. If that were true, I fear that Bosnia-Herzegovina would not be a fully independent sovereign state in the sense demanded by the UN Security Council resolutions. That was previously thought to be the goal of the Government's policy. That is why I was particularly alarmed when the Foreign Secretary said that what he envisaged for Bosnia- Herzegovina was a "loose union" between the Muslim and Croat federation and the Bosnian Serb territories. I tried to intervene at that point, but the Foreign Secretary declined.

That does not fit the goal which was widely believed to underpin previous UN Security Council resolutions. It does not fit the goal of re- establishing and recognising Bosnia-Herzegovina as a fully independent and sovereign entity. More importantly, it does not fit the goal of the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The British Government and the Minister of State are deluding themselves if they think that a "loose union" of that kind will be acceptable to the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina or will lead to a lasting settlement. The Secretary of State for Defence will reply to this debate and not the Minister of State, but that point must be clarified in the near future.

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One of the most important factors in the approach of the Foreign Office and the Government is that it simply ignores the existence of vast numbers of Serbs living within Bosnian Government territories at the moment. The hon. Member for Staffordshire, South pointed out that some 150,000, or perhaps 200,000, Serbs live within Bosnian Government territories. It is important to note that Dr. Karadzic rules over what is probably a minority of the pre-war Serb population. Large numbers of Serbs still live within Bosnian Government territories, while large numbers fled abroad or to other parts of former Yugoslavia.

It is vital that the Government begin to address the existence of these pro -Bosnian Government Serbs, who have now formed themselves into a Serb civic council which has held meetings in Belgrade, Montenegro and Sarajevo. It is crucial that the voices of those Serbs--the sane Serbs--who want to see a democratic and plural community and Government in Bosnia are listened to. They should be given equal status to Dr. Karadzic's representatives in any future international discussions about the contact group plan.

It is notable that much the same happened in the areas of Croatia that were taken over by the nationalist Serbs. Not only were the Croat and other non- Serb populations in those areas cleansed, but large numbers of Serbs fled from them because they did not want to be ruled by such extreme nationalists. It is estimated that, of the 500, 000 people living in the UN -protected areas in Croatia before the war began, fewer than 200,000 are left. The majority have gone--they have been cleaned out or have left, so we should be wary about thinking that the people who rule those depleted and depopulated areas command a mandate or popular support.

The main point is that we need, not new policies as such but a firm attachment to and the delivery of existing policies, as my hon. Friend the Member for Livingston said. In particular, we should give the Muslim-Croat federation much greater support. It has problems--notably, the fact that the population of Bosnia cannot merely be divided into Muslims or Croats as there are also people who do not think of themselves in such sectarian terms and they have to be found a place in the federation. Nevertheless, it has re-established relationships between groups that were fighting, and the Government should therefore fully support its success. That is not happening.

During my visit to Mostar, I found it striking that we are re-committing on a smaller scale the errors that we have committed throughout Bosnia on a large scale. The city has nominally been placed under a European Union administration and an EU administrator, whose deputy is a former commander of the Royal Marines. Legally, they have the right to issue decrees and laws, but they have no power to enforce them. They have 150 police, seconded from European Community countries, but they are simply there as advisers and have no role in enforcing the laws and edicts put out by the new administration. There is a huge gap between rhetoric and action in Mostar, which reflects the huge gap between rhetoric and action in Bosnia as a whole.

Secondly, the Government should provide full political support and ensure proper funding for the war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Justice Goldstone is to be admired for the courageous and systematic way in which he has tackled his task, and he should get full, explicit, open and voluble support from the British Government.

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Thirdly, we want robust implementation of the UN mandates that already exist to supply humanitarian aid and protect the safe areas. As has been said, UNPROFOR is not there as a peacekeeping force--there is no peace to keep--but it has a mandate to deliver humanitarian aid and protect the safe areas. It does not require massive intervention to implement that mandate. It does not require 150,000 or 200,000 troops, or the absurd, massive numbers of which the Prime Minister sometimes talks. It does not mean that we fight someone else's war and it does not require any new resolutions. It simply means implementing what we have been saying that we would do for the past three years. From the events of this weekend, when four people were killed in Tuzla and eight in Sarajevo, it is clear that we are still not implementing those humanitarian and safe area mandates, and that has to be done.

The policies that I have suggested are limited, modest and eminently achievable. They require not a change of foreign policy but merely its honest implementation. If that were done, the balance of the conflict would quickly turn. The balance--both of the forces on the ground and in a diplomatic and wider sense--is already beginning to turn. The announcement of the investigation of Karadzic and Mladic for war crimes and the fact that they are likely to be indicted before the end of the year, will increasingly isolate the nationalist Serbs, both politically and diplomatically, and exclude them from future discussions as genuine partners. In retrospect, that will be seen as a major turning point in the history of the conflict. At the same time, the war on the ground is moving against the nationalist Serbs, with the reconquest of western Slavonia, the capture of Mount Vlasic in Bosnia and the fact that Croat forces are within shelling distance of the Krajina capital, Knin. In all, the evidence provided by recent events means that the old adage that there cannot be any military solution to the war cannot be sustained. There can be a military solution. It will take time, but the strategic position of the nationalist Serbs is weak. They lack population, are thinly stretched and are slowly being cut off from resources.

Mr. Gapes: Is my hon. Friend saying that he would be happy for the military conflict to continue for perhaps three or five years, with our lightly armed British personnel sitting ducks in the middle? That does not seem to be a helpful solution, or a means of getting a peaceful outcome to the conflict or of saving the lives of British soldiers.

Mr. Macdonald: It is fair to say that threats to UNPROFOR personnel have come from the nationalist Serb forces. The further removed they are, the better it will be. I was pointing out that the balance of force and the reality on the ground are beginning to change and that is not merely my view. In The Guardian on 3 May, General Michael Rose said:

"The Pale leadership clearly has yet to learn that, although the world may not be prepared to fight a war on behalf of the Bosnian government, the Bosnian Serb army is already overstretched, sanctions are hurting, and that to delay a peace settlement might cost them all that they have hitherto gained."

He recognises that their long-term position is weak and unsustainable. We are often lectured about having to pay heed to the reality on the ground, but that reality is changing. Time is on the side of those who want a

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multi-ethnic, multicultural, democratic Bosnia. Why should we and the Bosnian Government settle for anything less than that goal? I am not convinced that the Foreign Office has woken up to that shift in the balance. The days are gone when the nationalist Serbs could reject peace plan after peace plan and the international community would return each time with a fresh compromise. We need a new determination and consistency on the preservation of Bosnia, the prosecution of war crimes, the delivery of humanitarian aid and the protection of safe areas. The Government signed up to those goals and they will be judged by how their actions match their rhetoric. Before I finish, I must tell the House about a couple I met when I was in Tuzla. The wife was a councillor in the local Tuzla administration. I visited the couple at home and had assumed that both partners were Muslims, because the wife was politically active. However, she turned out to be a Croat from Dalmatia, and although her husband was from Tuzla, he was a Serb who had been fighting with the Bosnian Government forces since the beginning of the war. Sadly, his brother had been killed in the front line. They were fighting not for an ethnically pure community--how could they?--or to achieve the removal of any part of the population from that region, but for a multi-ethnic, plural, democratic society in Bosnia.

We not only share those principles, but they underlie all the progress that we have made in Europe since 1945 and which we have been celebrating this weekend. Those are the principles that we should apply in former Yugoslavia.

8.20 pm

Mr. Robert Key (Salisbury): We were right not to pass by on the other side. Among many uncertainties that I have about the Balkans, that is a certainty.

First, I congratulate the service men and women from this country who are either in the Balkans or in a support role in this country--the tail which is so often forgotten in these circumstances. I also congratulate the Overseas Development Administration and its officials and staff, and the non-governmental organisations, which are doing such a tremendous job in the Balkans. I applaud the skill and patience of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary and the determination of my right and learned hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. Both have been outstanding, as I have discovered while searching back over the past two or three years to find a trend in British policy towards the conflict in former Yugoslavia and see where we are going.

It is clear that tens of thousands of lives have been saved because of the United Nations and British intervention, and I for one am proud of that achievement. Whether one calls what the British forces have been doing a "peacekeeping" or "buffer" role is academic: the fact remains that British Army doctrine is leading the world in that area. I gather that a new publication on peacekeeping has attracted sales of tens of thousands--even from the French, despite the fact that it is in English, which is really going it. I therefore congratulate the Ministry of Defence as well.

There is fighting on both sides in former Yugoslavia just today. Arms are getting through--no one knows exactly how, although there are many suspicions. The tragedy is that 13 British soldiers have already lost their lives and 162 United Nations soldiers are dead. I am sure

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that it is in Britain's interests, first, that we follow the need for humanitarian aid--we have a moral obligation to do that--and, secondly, that we maintain a diplomatic effort. It is clear that there can be no military winners in this conflict, but it is in Britain's interest to ensure that we play a full role in the diplomatic effort in former Yugoslavia, not least because of the danger of the spread of uncertainty and conflict.

Many people in this country forget just how close former Yugoslavia is. As they speed away on their package holiday to Rhodes, they might wonder why their plane is diverted instead of going in a straight line. When they are off to the Greek playgrounds, they might wonder why they cannot take the route that they flew before--or drive there, as I did as a student 30 years ago. They might also wonder why the Italians are so concerned about the conflict--until they look at a map and discover that the shelling of Zagreb takes place only 100 miles from Italy.

We should also remember the sheer scale of the operation for our country. The account that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary gave of the numbers involved was a little conservative. If one includes the Royal Fleet Auxiliary staff, the Royal Marines, the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force people--all 800 of them--in Italy, and all the Army personnel, the figure is nearer 6,500.

Former Yugoslavia has seen a century of remarkable turbulence. Substantial readjustment would always have had to be made following the collapse of the Tito regime and it would be foolish to imagine that we could stop that turbulence in a year or even five years. If one thing is worse than a religious war, it is a tribal war, and in this instance we have both.

Twenty-nine years ago, when I was driving through Yugoslavia as a student, I was stoned in Montenegro. I have often asked myself and many other people why I and my student friends from Cambridge should have been stoned. Was it because we looked like hippies? My hair may have been a shade longer--it was certainly not white with wisdom. I probably looked a little like a German. We were driving on a new road that had just been opened up through the mountains, and it had opened a whole valley to the influence of new people and ideas. There was massive suspicion, prejudice and, of course, ignorance.

Above all, I was simply foreign, and those people were not used to foreigners. In any event, I brought back the stone that dented my little old Sunbeam Rapier. A few miles down the road, we were swept to the side of the road to let a large black limousine with many outriders go past, and were told that that was Marshal Tito. So I remember the Yugoslavia of the 1960s, when there was much hope for that part of Europe, with its glorious environment and countryside. It has been a tragedy to see so much decline.

On British policy, I looked back over the weekend, between celebrations in my constituency of Salisbury, at the debate in the House on 25 September 1992, when my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King) said:

"By any military standards, the situation in the former Yugoslavia is a textbook example of what Britain should not become involved in. It is difficult to imagine a more appallingly difficult situation. There are no clear objectives. There is every prospect of getting sucked into an open- ended commitment, starting with humanitarian aid and the escorting of convoys and released prisoners from the detention camps--all the most worthy and desirable objectives. Yet there is the greatest risk of a spread of the conflict.

In 1964 we went into Cyprus and we are still there."

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He said later:

"I always said there could come a time when we could no longer walk by on the other side."--[ Official Report , 25 September 1992; Vol. 212, c. 143-144.]

I strongly agree.

By 14 January 1993, when my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Defence made a statement to the House on further deployment in Bosnia, he set the tone by saying:

"It is no exaggeration to say that there are many people in Bosnia today who owe their very survival to the presence of British and other United Nations forces . . . our paramount concern was for the safety of British troops. This, of course, is still the case . . .

None of this marks any change in our policy in the area. . . . Our position remains that it is not appropriate to intervene in what is essentially a civil war. Our overriding concern, as always, is to ensure the safety of our forces."--[ Official Report , 14 January 1993; Vol. 216, c. 1057.]

He said:

"Clearly, it is desirable that the project should continue but not `at all costs'."--[ Official Report , 14 January 1993; Vol. 216, c. 1061.]

Following through the thinking in the Ministry of Defence, it is clear that we were facing a difficult situation with the arms embargo and much play was made about the Russians and Americans. It is clear that if the arms embargo were lifted there would then be fighting and UNPROFOR would be caught up in it. If that happened, the UN would withdraw.

The Minister of State for the Armed Forces, my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Mr. Soames), who was no doubt wearing a very sober suit at the time, said:

"We judge that lifting the arms embargo would lead to an intensified conflict, with severe risks that UNPROFOR would be caught up in the fighting and lose its impartiality in the eyes of the warring factions. In such circumstances, UNPROFOR could no longer carry out the UN mandate and would have to withdraw."--[ Official Report , 21 November 1994; Vol. 250, c. 57. ]

Last week, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said something very significant. Replying to my right hon. Friend the Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell), he said:

"An arms embargo is currently applied to all sides. Obviously, it has been breached to a certain extent, probably by all sides . . . Removing the arms embargo would mean the certain withdrawal of UNPROFOR."--[ Official Report , 3 May 1995; Vol. 259, c. 329.] That surely can only mean either that it will not make any difference if there is any fighting or that he was so certain that there would be fighting if the arms embargo was lifted that he was prepared to say that there would be withdrawal following the lifting of the arms embargo. In recent days, therefore, there has been a significant shift.

In a letter that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary sent to all Members of the House, he said:

"We do not want to withdraw, but that may become the only option. The planning for what would be a difficult operation is nearly complete.

The next few weeks are important."

Obviously the position is very fluid.

We shall have a difficult time, not least because of what several of my hon. and right hon. Friends and Opposition Members have mentioned--the interest in, and reporting by, the media. The hon. Member for Liverpool, West Derby (Mr. Wareing) referred to something which I also intended to mention. I refer to the remarkable comment by the hon. Member for Motherwell, North (Dr. Reid)--I told the hon. Gentleman that I intended to quote him

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with approbation--who said in the debate on the Army, and it was a pity that there were not more people present for that debate: "The inadequacy of press and media reports was brought home to me. I stood in Gorazde and listened to the BBC World Service, which was saying that, for several days, a major artillery bombardment of Gorazde by the Serbs had been going on. I stood with the Muslim commander and not a shot had been fired for five weeks. Yet the BBC was continually repeating the news that the Serbs were bombarding Gorazde. I merely add a word of caution: a propaganda war is going on, and none of the press reports can be taken at face value to establish the facts."--[ Official Report ,23 February 1995; Vol. 255, c. 527.]

That is a disturbing development in the entire conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The journalists, with the best will in the world, are obviously not in a position to be able to make objective judgments of what is going on. They are under enormous pressure, perhaps from their hosts and guardians of the day. In any event we need to, shall we say, take with a pinch of salt the commentaries which come from that country.

In the aftermath of war, there is always great trouble for the civilian population. I was delighted to hear my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary saying that about 300 mines had already been cleared. One of the factors that has affected my thinking about Yugoslavia is the fact--it is an irony, as we have been celebrating VE day at the weekend--that I am here only by the choice of my electorate and extraordinary good fortune.

On Friday 13 May 1955, a group of us were playing, as 10-year-old schoolboys, on Swanage beach and one of my friends discovered what he thought was a tin of Spam in the sand. I turned away; I was bored. I went down the beach with a friend, Richard Dunstan, now a doctor. There was a blast and I was in the water, and five of my friends were dead as a result of an anti-personnel mine which had not been properly cleared by our side.

That had a pretty profound effect on my political outlook on Europe, but it also taught me that I am very fortunate indeed to be alive. I am especially keen that, whatever else we may do in the former Yugoslavia, we do all we can to ensure the clearance of mine fields, which may wreak so much havoc for so many years for so many people if we do not. Thank goodness that we have organisations such as the Halo trust, with people serving throughout the world.

If the time comes to withdraw from the former Yugoslavia, it will cost an enormous amount. That should not be the main issue, and it will not be. However, I believe that all the estimates that I have heard are underestimates. I do not know what the true figure will be, but I imagine that withdrawal will cost billions of dollars and take months rather than weeks. If we are talking about a mediaeval type of war in which one packs up for a few months when the snow falls, it will be the beginning of next winter before any of the United Nations troops could begin to come out. We need to bear that in mind. My hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Mr. Viggers), whose speech I admired enormously, said that of course our troops cannot stop the war, and that is quite right. He said that they had the wrong weapons; that, too, is true. I believe that they also have the wrong rules of engagement to allow them to perform that duty. One of the big problems--and, I believe, mistakes--in the former Yugoslavia has been the fact that the dual key of the United Nations and the North

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