House of Commons Hansard Debates for 31 May 1995

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I do not believe that the question is whether we have a responsibility in this area; I believe we do and I also believe that we have a responsibility to explain that to the people whom we represent. The question is not whether we have a responsibility but how we discharge it and what are its limitations.

Dr. Robert Spink (Castle Point): Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Blair: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I will make some progress. I may give way later.

From the beginning, we have ruled out a role as combatants, taking sides to fight the war. I believe that that is right. Indeed, it is an inexorable consequence of the nature of the situation. For example, simply in military terms, if we compare it with Kuwait, the war there was relatively easy to fight on what was effectively a sand table in the desert. Here, the terrain is unremittingly hostile to outside involvement. The roads and supply lines run through valleys surrounded by wooded hills. It is natural guerilla territory. The fighting force needed would be vast.

It is worth bearing it in mind that the United States has no ground troops in Bosnia. The brunt would therefore fall on France and Britain, and there is just no consent to such a commitment. The entire UN mandate would have to be changed from one of limited engagement for humanitarian and diplomatic purposes to active participation on the side of one of the combatants. I do not believe that that is desirable or feasible.

Our responsibility, therefore, is, and should remain, to enforce the current UN mandate in order to increase the possibility of a negotiated settlement without becoming involved in open-ended combat. That is our strategic, diplomatic and military aim. So long as the United Nations presence in Bosnia is conducive to that end, it should remain.

Let us for a moment assess the role of the UN and what it has achieved. Has it made a difference, and can it continue to do so? That is the question that we need to ask to determine whether we remain.

I do not believe that there can be any serious dispute over whether the UN presence has helped: it has. The policy of containment has, by and large, worked: Macedonia is free of fighting; the awful possibility of general conflict in the Balkans has been avoided; humanitarian aid has helped hundreds of thousands to survive; some semblance of normality has returned to central Bosnia. The Croat-Muslim conflict has been halted, for which, I may say, British troops bear much of the credit. It is worth pointing out that they have been instrumental in Bosnia in reconnecting gas, water and electricity and in rebuilding schools like those at Vitez. Anyone who, like those Conservative Members, doubts whether the United Nations presence has made a difference should ask those on the

ground--soldiers or civilians.

Most important, slowly but surely, as a result of this, President Milosevic and Belgrade have been detached from the Bosnian Serbs. This is surely of central importance and it gives the best prospect of pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. That could not have been foreseen or achieved without that United Nations presence; and, of course, the contact group plan for Bosnia has at least gained the acceptance in principle of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia.

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No one doubts, as, indeed, the Prime Minister said earlier, that withdrawal must remain an option if we are advised by our military commanders that their utility is spent or that it is too dangerous for the safety of the men. A definite prospect of some diplomatic movement is essential to prevent there being diminishing returns over time of the UN presence. Without such a prospect, the Bosnian Government have an incentive to try to recapture lost territory and the Bosnian Serbs to pursue their aim of an independent Serbian state. The gains under a UN presence have, I believe, been substantial.

Let us contemplate the impact of a withdrawal now. If we were to announce from the House that we were to going to withdraw, what would be the impact? It would reward the hostage takers. That is a great message, is it not, to send from the international community? It would be terrible to do such a thing. The United Nations would be utterly humiliated for this and future conflicts, the Bosnian Serbs would begin a major offensive and, despite whatever reports there are, the best advice that I can make out is that they might well win in such an offensive. Would Croatia remain stable, or Kosovo or Macedonia? Would Turkey and other Muslim states remain aloof? These are serious considerations and we must weigh them in the balance when we come to our decision.

Sir Russell Johnston (Inverness, Nairn and Lochaber): The right hon. Gentleman mentioned Kosovo. He will know that it is widely reported that there are considerable diplomatic efforts to make Milosevic recognise Bosnia, as a result of which sanctions would be raised. That would still leave the Kosovo problem without our having any leverage. Is not that a real difficulty?

Mr. Blair: I agree that it is a real difficulty but it should not prevent us from increasing the pressure on President Milosevic to recognise Bosnia because of the impact that would have on the conduct of the Bosnian Serbs.

If we say that the case for staying remains, I believe we must examine how we take firm and clear steps radically to improve the United Nations' position and thus that of our forces. First, the UN mandate should be enforced with clarity and consistency. Mixed messages on the use of force are not helpful and, where they are used, the consequences of their use in terms of retaliation should be carefully provided for. If they are not, the impact of those forces becomes significantly diminished.

Secondly, we must surely back up the UN mandate with the men and weapons necessary to achieve it. For example, the safe area resolution of the UN was passed in June 1993. It was thought at the time that a minimum of some 15,000 personnel was necessary to enforce it. Around 7,000 were promised and, a year later, there were barely 6,000. If we are to enforce that mandate and hold to it, we must make sure that the resources are there, available to do the job properly. Thirdly, I think that there is a very strong case for the safe areas to be demilitarised. This has surely been a central weakness until now. It has meant that the Bosnian Government have been able to continue fighting from out of the exclusion zone and has loosened the impression of the UN's even-handedness.

Fourthly, we should consider, as I am sure the Foreign Secretary is, how we tighten sanctions still further. In particular, do we have the necessary monitors along the Serbian border to ensure that weapons and fuel cannot get through?

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Fifthly, the Government should examine carefully the suggestion of my hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary for ways in which we can counter the virulent nationalism of the Bosnian Serb media and others, which has played such a part in stoking up hatred among the various groups. It is a sensible suggestion worthy of examination. Above all, the UN's presence can act only as a platform for a diplomatic peace effort. It is now almost a year since the contact group plan was promulgated. The unity of the contact group is the key to its effectiveness. There has to be a major effort to resolve differences within it, both for Russia and for the United States in the increase of pressure on Belgrade. Any increase in military capacity must be accompanied by new investment in diplomacy. We should see whether out of this fresh crisis a clearer, firmer strategy can be produced with the political will to achieve it. The settlement proposed by the international community in Bosnia has already had its configurations partly determined by battle. We should reflect on what would happen if we allowed the boundaries of Bosnia or any part of former Yugoslavia to be determined solely by force. What message would that send? We must look at the disputes over borders and ethnic groupings just in that region of the world alone; between Turkey and Greece, Greece and Macedonia, Albania and Serbia, Hungary and Romania over Transylvania, and Slovakia and Hungary. If we allowed such force to replace the rules of international law, the reputation of the United Nations would slide into the same abyss into which the League of Nations eventually fell.

Naturally today, the House unites in its support for our troops and its demand that the hostages, so wickedly seized, should be returned. That is our vital national interest and we shall protect it. Britain has always been a country willing to lift its eyes to the far horizon and judge its actions by their immediate impact not only on ourselves but on world events and history. The decisions that we take are of momentous import for the world and its order and stability. Let us ensure that those decisions are the right ones, for we shall live with their consequences.

3.31 pm

Mr. Paddy Ashdown (Yeovil): There are many questions about what has happened over the past three years in Bosnia and about Britain's part in it that we could address in this debate, but with British and other United Nations troops being held hostage and with our forces in Bosnia in an increasingly precarious position, such questions are best left for another day. What is vital is not what has happened, or a review of history, or what mistakes have been made, but what happens now. Our first duty, as the Prime Minister has rightly said, is quite clear. Our first duty at the moment is to those who are in Serb hands. They must be our primary consideration and nothing that we say in this debate should damage their chances of return. There is no point, of course, in pretending that there is an easy solution. There is not. A military answer to the hostage problem is now--probably--increasingly difficult. In the last analysis, decisions have to be left to the commanders on the ground. They are the only ones who know what is possible and what is advisable. They will have their contingency plans and we must have the

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patience to let them take effect. Our job is to back the actions which they take and which they feel it is right to take. As the Prime Minister also rightly said, there may well be times when silence is the best kind of response in the face of what happens over the next few weeks and months.

It seems probable that the most likely route to freeing those who are now held is the diplomatic one. If that is the case, the roles of Serbian President Milosevic and the Governments of Russia and Ukraine are absolutely vital. The strong line taken by the Russian envoy Aleksandr Zotov is, in this context, a very welcome sign. A key ingredient to the success of this diplomatic operation will be for the Bosnian Serbs, who have committed this barbarous act of provocation, to hear a single, firm and united response from the international community. In Britain, that united message should come from all parties.

The Government are entitled to expect our support in that situation, and they will get it--although I wish that they had been rather more definite about the role and intention of the new deployment than they appear to have been so far. There is a lack of clarity that gives the impression, rightly or wrongly, of a decision hastily made. That could add to the military muddle on the ground and create misunderstandings in the minds of both the Bosnians and the Bosnian Serbs that might impede that deployment, and perhaps even get in the way of our best efforts to release hostages.

Nevertheless, on Sunday the Prime Minister responded to a request from the commanders on the ground, and he was right to do so. The reinforcements that have been committed to Bosnia will be a signal to the Bosnian Serbs of the seriousness of our intent. Those reinforcements will strengthen the capacity of British and United Nations troops to protect themselves--and, we are told, they provide the necessary cover for a withdrawal should one become unavoidable. For reasons that I shall explain in a moment, I believe that withdrawal should be the last option, because it is the worst option.

I hope that the other major troop-contributing nations will now match Britain's actions. I hope especially that the United States will make the commitment that it has so far failed to make on the ground. No single act would better show the solidarity of the international community or do more to convince the Bosnian Serbs of the seriousness of their position than the commitment of United States ground troops to the operation in Bosnia at this time. The next questions that we must consider are: how are the troops to be deployed, and--this is crucial--under whose command? The technical position is clear: Britain is entitled to take such actions as we think necessary to ensure the protection of our troops, so it would be perfectly in order for us to station troops in Bosnia under sole British command if we wished to do so. But in my judgment to do so would be to misjudge both what has happened and what needs to happen next.

The events of the past few days have irreversibly changed the position of the UN in Bosnia. Any attempt to fudge the consequences of that change will lead only to further humiliations, further risks for troops on the ground, further muddle over the mandate, and the continuing descent of the UN operation in Bosnia into chaos, farce and eventual retreat.

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There are now two routes leading to withdrawal. There is the quick route of a decision to leave today, and there is the long, slow, painful route whereby we would keep on muddling through. In short, we are now being forced by events to take the decisions that we should have taken three or four years ago. There are those who will argue about the benefits of a withdrawal--no doubt we shall hear them later. I am not one of those.

I accept the fact that there may come a time when our commanders on the ground tell us that there is nothing further that we can do without unacceptable risk. Then we shall be forced to go. But we should be absolutely clear about what the consequences would be.

Mr. Denis MacShane (Rotherham): Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Ashdown: Will the hon. Gentleman let me make a little progress?

Withdrawal will be difficult along the best part of 100 miles of dirt track over the Dinaric alps, and it will almost certainly be extremely costly, both in materials and, almost certainly, in lives. However, it is the consequences of withdrawal even more than its difficulties that make it such a dangerous option.

A United Nations withdrawal without assuring the means by which the Bosnians could defend themselves would leave the United Nations-recognised state of Bosnia to be obliterated by the Serbs, aided by the Croats-- probably in short order. It would mean abandoning about 1 million Bosnian Muslims to their fate, with a degree of suffering, visible on our television screens, that would be unacceptable and intolerable to a civilised people.

Withdrawal would almost certainly lead to a wider Balkan war, with incalculable consequences beyond that. It would send a signal to the Muslim world which could be very damaging for world peace in the longer term; and it would be to collude in the death of the United Nations as an organisation capable of contributing to world peace--just as certainly as the failure to confront aggression in Abyssinia marked the end of the League of Nations, with consequences that we know all too well.

What is at risk in this crisis is not just the preservation of the Bosnian state; it is the preservation of the ultimate authority of the UN. Right hon. and hon. Members might like to reflect that there would be consequences closer to home for us in Europe as well, for Europe would have participated in the destruction of the best model it has of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state. And in an age when fascism and destructive nationalism are once again on the march, we would have sent out a signal that, once again, we do not have the will to stop them.

Mr. MacShane: Twice the right hon. Gentleman has referred to commanders on the ground taking decisions about air strikes and deciding whether British troops should be withdrawn. I had rather hoped--based on the first two speeches today--that those decisions would be taken by the elected leaders of this country and by this House.

Mr. Ashdown: The hon. Gentleman may not be aware of how military operations are conducted. Politicians set the parameters; military commanders operate within them and take the battlefield decisions. The Prime Minister clearly and rightly set out the conditions in which air

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strikes could be used. Within those conditions, the timing of the air strikes is then set by the commanders on the ground. In the same way, as the leader of the hon. Gentleman's party has just said, it is the commanders on the ground who will make recommendations as to whether the mandate that we set for them can be carried out without unacceptable risk, and if not, as to whether it is then --but not before--time to think about withdrawal. I should have thought that was clear to anyone with an iota of knowledge of these matters.

Mr. Edward Leigh (Gainsborough and Horncastle): Is the right hon. Gentleman's policy, then, that he is prepared to use British troops not just for humanitarian purposes but in a combat role to impose peace on those who will not be pacified and to punish wrongdoing when there has been wrongdoing on both sides? Is he not being rather free with British lives?

Mr. Ashdown: The hon. Gentleman may not realise this, but the second part of the UN resolution under which our troops operate in Bosnia already allows punitive action in the case of aggression. He is clearly unaware that the circumstances he describes are in effect at the moment.

I am aware--perhaps painfully aware--of the price that will have to be paid if the UN stays on in Bosnia. That price would have been far lower if appropriate action had been taken three years ago. I understand very well that there are those who say that we should cut our losses: the cost of staying is far too great. To them I would say that the cost of going is in the long term much greater.

When we make this decision, that is the calculation that we shall have to arrive at. It is clear, however, that we shall not be able to return to the old mandate--the old terms of engagement. They were never tenable in any case, not least because they pointed in two opposite directions at the same time--humanitarian aid and punitive action. One of the major flaws in the whole Bosnian operation is the fact that military action on the ground has seemed consistently to have neither co-ordination nor even connection with diplomatic action being taken in Geneva. All that now has to change.

All that has now changed--whether we like it or not. The Bosnian Serbs are now calling the hostages UN prisoners of war. They have made it clear that they will now treat the UN as an enemy. Even if they had not done so, we could surely never again risk placing UN peacekeepers or observers at their mercy, as we have seen the way in which they have exploited the present mandate to take hostages to prevent international action.

A new mandate, a new set of priorities and clear terms of engagement for the military operation in Bosnia will inevitably now be required. That means being prepared to protect the areas which we have defined as safe areas. It means giving our troops on the ground a free hand to defend themselves when they are subject to threats or aggression from Bosnian Serbs, or anybody else. It means consolidating our position into more defensible locations. There are difficulties involved in that, and I do not underestimate them. But whatever they are, that seems to be the only rational means now open to us. We must reshape the Bosnian operation in a way which gives the UN commanders a clear and achievable aim which is consistent with the UN's diplomatic effort.

Mr. John Townend (Bridlington): The right hon. Gentleman talks about the financial cost and the cost in

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lives. Does he feel that this country has been asked to carry too great a share of the burden? Is not it incredible that the three wealthiest countries in the UN--the United States, Germany and Japan--are not contributing anything, while we are now contributing the most in men and in treasure?

Mr. Ashdown: I take the view that this country has once again had to operate to make something work, and I am rather proud of that. The hon. Gentleman fails to recognise that our membership of the Security Council lays upon us certain duties which would not necessarily be incumbent upon us were we not members. We gain an advantage from our membership, but we also have a responsibility.

I am aware that what I have been saying--

Mr. Roger Gale (Thanet, North): Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Ashdown: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I should like to make some progress.

What I am saying about a new and clearer mandate carries with it some hard choices. I cannot judge at this moment what the likely options will be, as they will have to be established by the commanders on the ground when they are deciding what they believe to be possible. But whatever the sacrifices involved in changing the posture and the mandate of our troops, they are far less than those involved in withdrawal, or in leaving things as they are, which--in the end--inevitably amounts to the same thing by a longer route. In the meantime, the process of declaring the so-called Republika Serbska an international pariah state should be accelerated. A key element of that would be the early recognition of Bosnia by President Milosevic, and the stationing of UN observers on the Drina and Sava rivers to monitor embargo breaches into Serbian Bosnia. It is my view that if those two matters were satisfactorily concluded, the international sanctions on Serbia proper could be relaxed, or in due course--perhaps consistent with the situation in Kosovo--lifted. There are those who will say that all of that is far too difficult, or that we should just muddle through for a little longer. But muddling through for the past three years has got us here. Muddling through will mean months--perhaps years--of being controlled by events, rather than controlling them. Muddling through means more humiliations, more retreats and more soldiers in the firing line in pursuit of an aim that has never been identified and a mandate that has become impossible to fulfil.

Whatever the difficulties, the only rational response to the events of the past week is to face up to the consequences of those events. We must reshape the Bosnian operation in a way which gives the commanders a clear and achievable aim which is consistent with the diplomatic efforts in Geneva. That is the only way in which the UN will have any hope of pulling success out of this disastrous muddle.

Mr. Gale: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way now?

Mr. Ashdown: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I am reaching the end of my remarks.

This speech amounts to support for the Government's position and for what appears to be the growing NATO consensus. That is the right thing to do when British

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troops are committed to the field. If that position does not work--and I have my suspicions about that--we may in short order be once again faced with the decision that we ducked three years ago, of whether or not we are prepared to take sides against aggression. None of this will make any sense to our commanders on the ground or to our people until we are prepared to face that decision. If the steps now planned succeed in avoiding that choice, well and good. If they do not, we must be clear that it will always be preferable to take sides against aggression than to run away in the face of it.

Several hon. Members rose --

Madam Speaker: Order. Before I call Sir Edward Heath, I must tell the House that because of the great demand from right hon. and hon. Members to contribute to this debate, speeches made between 7 pm and 9 pm must be limited to 10 minutes.

3.50 pm

Sir Edward Heath (Old Bexley and Sidcup): I am sure that the whole House agrees that it was right for the Prime Minister to ask you, Madam Speaker, to recall the House this afternoon, so that we could debate what he rightly described as a serious situation. He explained clearly the thoughts in his mind and emphasised that we started this as a humanitarian act. We have achieved a great deal, working with other countries, and I am certain that work should continue as long as physically possible. The Prime Minister emphasised the protection that we also provided and stated that additional British forces are going to Bosnia to strengthen that protection. That is also justifiable, provided it can be properly undertaken and achieves the results that we require.

When 300 soldiers from different countries were taken hostage, I had to ask myself what was the organisation that allowed that to happen. [ Hon. Members:-- "Hear, hear."] It is astonishing to anyone who has served in the forces, particularly during a war, that those troops could have been exposed in that way, taken and kept. That matter needs urgent attention.

In such a debate, one point always arises. It was dealt with by the Prime Minister when he said that we cannot impose a solution by force--that we cannot do it by going to war. That is critical to the whole of the Government's attitudes and policies. It is critical also in the minds of the people of this country and of the worried parents of the hostages. In that, the Prime Minister is absolutely right. The right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) refused to put it that way. He said that we missed opportunity after opportunity, that we ought to have been stronger and that we should have tackled the situation. That means going to war--there is no other interpretation of that which the right hon. Gentleman has been saying with great force. I cannot accept that; nor will the people of this country accept the position that he described.

Mr. Ashdown: The right hon. Gentleman has great experience of military matters and every other matter, so he will understand that the appropriate thing is to take the right action at the right time. He might care to reflect on the fact that every single action that I commended to the Prime Minister--having first visited Sarajevo in August 1992--was said by him to be impossible. Months later,

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when it was too late for them to have any effect, the Prime Minister took those actions--putting in troops, undertaking and supporting humanitarian operations, and establishing air and weapons exclusion zones. All those actions were said to be impossible, but all were subsequently taken--but too little, too late.

Sir Edward Heath: Even if I cannot say it so forcefully, that does not alter the fact that the right hon. Member for Yeovil refuses to acknowledge that what he is advocating now is that we should be prepared to go to war, and that is something about which he must be honest. The Prime Minister has emphasised this, and quite rightly. As for the internal situation, the Prime Minister emphasised quite rightly that it is now absolutely impossible to decide between the merits and the faults of one group as against another. I know that there are right hon. and hon. Gentlemen who support particular groups in the former Yugoslavia. I respect their decisions, and they know the area--often very intimately--that they are supporting. But if one looks at the whole picture, as we have to today, and as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has done, one will see that it is now impossible to judge and say, "These are the people who ought to be supported for a particular reason." The right hon. Gentleman does not share that view, but that is certainly my view.

Nor can I accept some of the exaggerations. This will not be the end of the United Nations. The United Nations has had to face other great problems as well. It had to face them in Vietnam, the middle east, Africa--

Mr. Dennis Skinner (Bolsover): Somalia.

Sir Edward Heath: Somalia, yes. Because it did not achieve its aims entirely--sometimes not at all in the case of Vietnam--it was not the end of the United Nations. I suggest that we look at this reasonably and not with exaggeration.

Nor do I believe that, if we act sensibly in the present situation, there is any great danger that the conflict will spread over a lot of countries adjacent to or near Yugoslavia. Turkey has its hands full at the moment; it is not going to join in the conflict, and nor will the countries surrounding Yugoslavia. I think that one has to look sensibly and make a balanced judgment about what will happen in that particular part of the world.

Next, we come to the question of a peaceful solution and a negotiated settlement. I do not share the view which has been expressed that we have not been earnest about this matter. Lord Carrington and Lord Owen have worked extraordinarily hard and very earnestly. What we have to face realistically is that this situation is based on decades of conflict and it cannot be solved and resolved overnight. That does not alter the fact that we have to keep up the efforts to the greatest possible extent. It may be that, as we saw earlier with a smaller country helping in the middle east, someone skilled from a smaller country than the powers directly involved would have a better chance of influencing these people in getting a settlement. We do not know, but if it is being reconsidered, it is worth trying. I suggest that that approach might be looked at by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister and his colleagues as well. Then we come to the question of Russia and the help that it could give. It is a practical question. Russia has always objected to the bombing, and it is the bombing

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that has brought about the present situation. We know that many of our commanders were also opposed to the bombing, because they believed that it was dangerous for the civilian population, that it was very difficult to control militarily, and now, as we have seen, it has caused intense antagonism among the Bosnian Serbs. The Prime Minister committed himself strongly to the fact that the hostages cannot be freed by an arrangement over bombing. Very well; that is now on the record. But it does not alter the fact that somebody else might deal with the bombing and then get the hostages out, for everybody concerned, not just ourselves. If another country intervenes and is able to persuade the Bosnian Serbs that bombing will not be resumed in that form, there is a chance that we can get a solution to this particular problem, as well as starting on a political settlement for the whole affair.

We come finally to the Prime Minister's statement that there can be no question of going to war. That is the crux of the matter. The Leader of the Opposition said, "Of course we must stiffen up here; we must be better there; we must be much more courageous there." Yes, but we will always come to the question, "But are you prepared to go to war?" And the answer must be no.

3.59 pm

Mr. Tony Benn (Chesterfield): I welcome the decision to recall the House and I can understand the Government's reasons for doing it. Not only are the hostages held, but they are held following air strikes that the Government supported. I do not say that they authorised them, but they supported them. The Government also have to consider carefully what foreign policy should be followed in such situations and, as the Prime Minister said, this affects the future of Europe and how its security can be assured.

However, nothing that has been said so far has clarified in my mind the objectives behind the decision to send more troops. Is it to release the hostages? If so, how is that to be achieved? Is it to maintain and develop humanitarian aid? If so, how is that to be achieved? Is it to defeat Serbia? The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath) said that if at the back of our mind is the defeat of Serbia, which is clearly what the leader of the Liberal Democrats wants, that can only mean war. Is that one of the objectives? Is one of the objectives to impose a settlement? Is it to cover a withdrawal?

It is a very great pity that this debate should take place without some historical background being set against which we can judge what has happened. The only person who came near to providing such a background was the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, who talked about decades-- indeed, centuries--of conflict. The Turks controlled the area. The Austro- Hungarian empire was there. The Germans established a fascist Croatia during the war. Later, the German Government recognised Croatia. The British Government went along with that decision, it is said because of a concession over the social chapter. [Hon. Members:-- "Rubbish."] Whatever the truth is, there was some negotiation that took a reluctant British Government into recognition of Croatia. Those factors have to be taken into account if we are to assess the motivation and strength of feeling of the warring parties in the old Yugoslavia.

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I do not accept for one moment that the only options open are to fight--the Liberal Democrat view is that ultimately we shall have to fight and that we should have done better to fight three years ago--or to withdraw, which is, I understand, the view of some on the Conservative Benches who ask what British interest there is in remaining. My view is straightforward: it is that we should now build policy around the only things that can be done in a civil war--and it is time we got it straight--which are to provide humanitarian aid, mediation, arbitration and negotiation and an arms embargo to ensure that more arms do not get into the area. That is all that we can do. The first thing that one can do is to provide humanitarian aid. I looked up the history of the Red Cross--because the Red Cross never needs air strikes to back up its work. As I learned this morning, it was set up after the slaughter on the battlefield of Solferino in 1861 and, from 1863 to today, no one has ever doubted that the Red Cross is independent and neutral and provides help for all the victims of war. That is all that can be done in a civil war--unless we follow the fight or withdraw options, both of which I reject.

Mr. Andrew Hargreaves (Birmingham, Hall Green): Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Benn: No. I am speaking briefly because I am told that 37 right hon. and hon. Members want to speak and my point can be briefly put.

The second thing that can be done is to provide mediation. In the case of a civil war, we need someone who is prepared to talk to both sides, to listen and to try to bring them together. Whether Lord Owen was the right person--

Ms Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood): Will my right hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Benn: That is what I am saying: the only thing that the international community can do is to mediate.

Ms Short: I was asking my right hon. Friend to give way.

Mr. Benn: I am sorry.

Ms Short: My right hon. Friend keeps talking about civil war. Is not the truth of the matter that there has been aggression and a breach of international law? The attempt to build a Greater Serbia breaches international law. It is the duty of the United Nations to uphold international law, otherwise we have chaos. What is happening is not just a civil war.

Mr. Benn: I know the argument that my hon. Friend advances. The view is widely shared among Opposition Members that this is not a civil war, but an act of aggression by Serbia against the Bosnian Government. But, if the Serbian Government recognise Bosnia, that will not end the war in Bosnia; it will still be a civil war, with the Bosnian Serbs fighting. The suggestion--which that great peacemonger Michael Foot seems to have overlooked--that the present position is a direct parallel with the position of Czechoslovakia in 1938 strikes me as wholly false. The right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup--the former Prime Minister--nods, because he remembers that and remembers the stand that he took against appeasement at the time.

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Mr. Hargreaves: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Benn: I will, but reluctantly.

Mr. Hargreaves: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman, who is seeing fair play.

The right hon. Gentleman mentioned the Red Cross. On a number of occasions, the Red Cross has expressed its concern about its own members being taken hostage in just such circumstances as these.

Mr. Benn: I am not saying that people who exercise a humanitarian function do not get killed; they do. The Red Cross, however, has never corrupted its own purpose or destroyed its credibility by inviting someone to launch air strikes when its workers are killed. I am making an extremely serious point. As others have pointed out, this is not the only civil war in the world. Some we have disregarded altogether, but in the case of the former Yugoslavia we have become very much involved--correctly in the first instance, I believe, through the provision of humanitarian aid. I am saying that the air strikes have caused the problem, and may have destroyed the humanitarian function--unless we now clarify what our purpose is. My third point concerns the arms embargo. I read in a newspaper the other day that the United States supplies 72 per cent. of all the arms that are sold around the world, and provides arms in 45 of the 50 regional conflicts taking place in the world. The President, however, sits in the White House and--because he does not want to send in American troops--authorises and encourages air strikes. Perhaps the Prime Minister cannot say it publicly, but I should be very surprised if he were not warning Washington on the telephone, "Do not do it again or we shall be in deeper trouble." The air strikes were the occasion for the taking of hostages--whom the Serbs now call prisoners of war, because they say that the United Nations has declared war on them--and the air strikes are what now prevent the resumption of the humanitarian role.

I have always thought the arms trade the most criminal trade in the world. Unlike terrorism and drugs, it is sponsored by Governments. Hon. Members may have read the other day that about a quarter of the arms that we sell abroad are covered by the Export Credits Guarantee Department, and the recipients never pay for them. The British taxpayer pays for the supply of those arms.

I have already put this point to the Prime Minister; let me put it again, as vividly as I can. We cannot have British or French soldiers in blue berets acting as humanitarians, and pilots in blue helmets bombing: that is not a sustainable position. That issue must be clarified.

I am also not happy about NATO's taking over the role of the United Nations. We are about to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the United Nations, which--as the House must know--was set up to secure the peaceful settlement of differences. I was much moved at the time, as I still am when I reflect on the UN's charter. NATO cannot take over the agency responsibility for the UN; if it does, I envisage many other dangers. NATO may, for instance, aspire to play a larger part in what it calls out-of-area functions, as part of the new world order. That is not at all what the United Nations is about.

What can we do in the House? We have absolutely no power in the matter. In sending troops, the Prime Minister used the royal prerogative of war making. We have no vote

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on that, for he is not consulting the House today. This is a prerogative power that successive Prime Ministers have used to commit our forces to what may be conflicts abroad. We can debate the matter, like the media, and at the end a sort of Jeremy Paxman will bring the debate to a conclusion; or we can express a view in the Lobbies. I do not know whether other hon. Members will join me, but tonight I intend to vote against what the Government have done, first, because I think that the Government's policy up to now has endangered the hostages and, secondly, because the uncertainties of our current objectives could put the hostages in greater danger. I do not believe that those of us with no governmental responsibility would be representing the people of the country, including the troops and their families, if we were to give the Government a blank cheque to do what they like with our soldiers in a situation of exceptional danger. Therefore, if the opportunity presents itself, I intend to divide the House for the reasons that I have given.

4.9 pm

Mr. David Howell (Guildford): I am very glad that the Leader of the Opposition recognised in his speech the true origins of the horrific saga whose consequences we are discussing today. As he said, those consequences lie in the vicious dream of greater Serbian expansionism, and with those Serbians and their sinister intellectual backers who dreamed up the idea of smashing the Yugoslav federation and of turning areas of relative peace-- contrary to the general mythology, families and villages had lived in peace for many years--into areas of ethnic hatred and horror. We should never forget that when we try to analyse how on earth we should wind down the spiral of hatred which has been escalated so viciously by those who are bent on ethnic cleansing.

On this occasion, the media, as is their wont because it is more entertaining, have sought to portray the debate as a conflict between those who wish to see an immediate disengagement and withdrawal of the troops--I think that that would be extremely difficult to achieve--and those who believe that we should become involved on a new and larger scale and wage intensive war against the enemy, whoever it may be. Presumably, the enemy is the Bosnian Serbs in this case. As usual, some of the media analysis is too simplistic; the situation is far too complex to lend itself to that sort of simple labelling. I believe that the Government are totally correct in acting forcefully to mobilise and send more troops into Bosnia. They have focused the nation's attention--and I hope that of the whole House, whether or not the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) divides the House--on our determination to see the hostages returned unharmed.

However, it is not merely a question of returning all of the United Nations hostages, including our own soldiers, unharmed--although that is an absolute priority. There is also the question of ensuring that the troops deployed throughout Bosnia--some of whom are scattered in very remote regions from which it would be extremely hard to disengage and escape--are protected from further hostage taking. As the saga continues--and it will, possibly for many years--there can be no doubt that more hostages will be taken. No one should be surprised by the recent hostage

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