House of Commons Hansard Debates for 31 May 1995

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taking, although it has occurred on a larger scale, as hostages were taken during previous conflicts. There were hideous examples of hostage taking during the Gulf war, as people who watched their televisions and read books will know, and we were bound to reach that point in this conflict. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath) said, it was predictable. It raises question marks about the efficiency of an organisation that allowed hostages to be taken and, at the very least, it requires a fundamental rethink of the situation.

I hope that my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister's appeal, backed by the Leader of the Opposition, that we must show unity in the face of the immediate crisis will be recognised and respected in the House. We must get our hostages out unharmed, and we must prevent a further haemorrhaging of the situation through further hostage taking. In the short term, we must demonstrate that we mean business and that we will not merely retire from the conflict or stand paralysed.

I turn to the medium and longer-term situation, and the reasonable proposition that we should understand how we got into the present difficulties, in order to prevent the situation from worsening further.

I have no doubt that those who propose rethinking the United Nations mandate are right. I am glad to hear that Dr. Boutros-Ghali is rethinking the mandate for the protection force. I understand that the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) believes in rethinking the mandate. We shall come in a moment to whether it should be a tougher mandate or a more prudent and limited one.

I could not quite make out whether the Leader of the Opposition wants the present mandate reinforced, as he said at one stage, or whether he is seeking a different mandate for the troops. Apparently, it is all too easy for some of them to be rounded up as hostages. One thing, however, is clear. It is misleading to describe what the protection forces are doing as a peacekeeping operation, as there is no peace to keep. We recognise--and everyone urged from the start when the British troops were sent in--that there was an important job to do: to protect aid workers, medical supplies and food supplies, and to ensure that men, women and children did not starve and stayed alive. Who could stand against that? We thought that it was the right thing to do--the humanitarian task and the humanitarian role.

What we did not consider at the time--it was not suggested as a likely event, although some of us should have foreseen it--was that the humanitarian role would move from protecting the columns and the aid workers to protecting the troops who were protecting the aid workers, and then to protecting the civilian population in various garrisons and groups, and that ultimately it would become an attempt to maintain neutral ground where there is no neutral ground and to impose peace when it remains absolutely clear that the combatants are not prepared to accept peace.

The Bosnian presidency troops certainly would not accept peace if it meant bisecting their country when the international community had promised to keep Bosnia sacred. Croatia, which is out of the news at the moment, certainly would not accept peace if it meant keeping a quarter of Croatia out of the hands of the Croatian central Government. Those varieties of peace would never be accepted and could not be maintained.

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It is completely unfair to ask our troops, or UNPROFOR troops generally, to keep such a peace or attempt to impose it, particularly when the diplomats have notably failed even to get it accepted around the negotiating table.

Mr. Ashdown: Surely the right hon. Gentleman was not quite right to say that none of the sides would accept peace. The Bosnian Government have committed themselves to what the international community believes would be a just peace--the five-nation contact group plan. The Serbs have not.

Surely considering whether we are prepared to take sides against aggression does not mean going to war, as the right hon. Gentleman suggests. There is broad battlefield parity between Bosnian and Serb forces, but surely, when we assess our attitudes, the fact that the Bosnian Government have accepted what the international community regards as a fair peace, and the Bosnian Serbs have not, needs to colour our attitude.

Mr. Howell: I stand corrected. It is perfectly true that the Bosnian presidency troops--we keep calling them the Bosnian Muslims, but, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, they are not entirely Muslims, or even dedicated Muslims and Islamics in the sense that we see them in parts of the Maghreb--said that they were prepared to accept a settlement which would involve some partition of their country. I find that difficult, and I rather suspect that the small details of that peace proposal would reveal that the Bosnian presidency thought it would not involve partition and that the Bosnian Serbs had every intention it would, so I have little faith that any such peace would stick for a moment.

Most, if not all, of us recognise that, in facing the most hideous choices between the bad and very bad, my right hon. Friends in government have taken a bold and courageous step--the only one open to them in the short term--but in the longer term we have to rethink the situation in which so- called peacekeeping troops are scattered around and vulnerable to precisely the immense dangers into which they have been plunged and which we simply cannot tolerate and allow to continue.

As we have no overall power over what our allies and the United Nations collectively decide, although we have some input, we in the House must suggest what mandate the United Nations should now proceed towards, what objectives we should set ourselves and how to achieve them, and whether military solutions have anything more to add.

Mr. Michael Connarty (Falkirk, East): Before moving on to future strategies, would it not be more accurate to explain the mandate fully and to accept that one of the parts of the mandate which has led to this situation is the protection of safe havens, and that the troops were not adequate for the task?

Mr. Howell: The hon. Gentleman is right. The safe havens were not mentioned in the original mandate, but the UN came up with the idea later. In some senses, the safe havens have become garrisons, but they are ineffective garrisons. They may be havens, but they are not safe. We saw that with shells whistling into Tuzla the other day, killing 70 people who were drinking coffee in a cafe. That does not amount to a safe haven.

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It would be too sweeping to say that full withdrawal from the safe haven areas and from the safe haven role would not add to the bloodshed, because it would, but where we are now adds to the bloodshed. That emphasises the agony of the dilemma--there is blood and mayhem if we do not act and blood and mayhem if we do.

Sir Teddy Taylor (Southend, East): Can my right hon. Friend explain what is so special about Bosnia that we have to commit massive amounts of aid in a rather unclear role, when there are so many other parts of the world where there is ethnic cleansing, massive killing and enormous social distress and starvation? What is so special about this situation?

Mr. Howell: The way in which the question was posed suggests that we have power, and have had power all along, to choose what we do there. The difficulty is that we decided three years ago that there was a humanitarian need. The television cameras showed all the terror, and the cry went out, "Send the troops to protect the aid workers." From that, one step has led to another.

If my hon. Friend asks why we took all those steps, we could spend a long time blaming each other and analysing why the policy makers made mistakes. We are where we are. It is not a matter of choice. No one would conceivably choose to be where we are now if we had a free will in the matter--and, of course, we do not have a free will. I want to try to move away from the endless analysis of the past which, although it is not totally a waste of time, will not help the hostages or the present situation. I want to suggest some guidelines that we should think of following while we try to shape the next stage of this horror.

Do we have the will? I would be in favour of a huge military operation, if for one moment the will existed to mount such a thing, which could isolate and crush the Bosnian Serbs. I believe that that would remove this terror and horror, and would rapidly remove the danger of a spread of the conflagration.

However, it is totally unrealistic to talk in that way. We do not have the will power to do that, and I doubt whether we even have the military capability. We are talking about a vast area of very difficult terrain and a very determined enemy, who believe that it is their land and that they have been there for 1,000 years. The idea that we could take them on militarily is completely unrealistic. However, that is the way that we are being dragged now, because they say that the UN and the British are their enemies. We must resist the logical temptation to say that, if they think that we are the enemy, we should treat them as an enemy as well, and mobilise more and more forces to do something against them. That would be fatal, and would be disastrous for the hostages now being held as prisoners of war, so they say, by these people.

So the military course is not open to us. The diplomatic course should be open, because, as a nation concerned with the stability of Europe, we have a role to play in ensuring that the conflagration does not spread. We must continue with our diplomatic efforts.

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Mr. Michael Lord (Suffolk, Central): I would not for one moment want to recommend all-out war, but does not history show us that, with aggressors like these, if we do not stop them sooner, we have to stop them later?

Mr. Howell: That is easy to say; my hon. Friend knows that such phrases trip off the lips. Historical analogies are not good, because history does not necessarily repeat itself. As Mr. Balfour said, historians repeat each other, which is a different thing. We cannot necessarily learn a precise lesson from one era and then apply it to another.

It would be dangerous to assume that, if outside powers declared war on a particular group, conquered them and crushed them, that would solve the problem. It may be that the Bosnian Serbs will be stopped only by force, but if so, we must determine which force. The obvious answer is the people they are fighting.

If there was a military balance on the battlefield, and the Bosnian Muslims had the same heavy weapons as the Bosnian Serbs, the Serbs would think twice before attacking every morning. We would then begin to fulfil the adage in my hon. Friend's question, that the Bosnian Serbs will be stopped only by force--but it would be the proper force.

To date, that has not been possible, because the international community has denied heavy weapons to the Bosnian Muslim troops. They have a few weapons, but they are lightly armed. The precise way that the war in that area has developed shows that the Bosnian Serbs have succeeded in the areas where they have heavy weapons. That has happened every time, which encourages them to attack again. They know that, with heavy weapons, they will succeed.

I know that that view puts me out of line with most European Governments and in line with the American Congress, which appears to be going through various extraordinary moods. However, I have always believed that, if we want even-handedness in the area and to achieve a military stalemate, we should seriously consider non-intervention in arms supplies, so that the two main combatants have equal fire power and respect each other. I do not believe that that would necessarily make life much more difficult for the remaining humanitarian protection forces.

There is a question whether those forces should be expanded. The answer is yes in the short term, for the immediate purpose of getting the hostages out, but no in the long term, because we should return to the original mandate, which was humanitarian protection as far as possible. That is happening in many areas that are away from significant conflict--areas of Bosnia about which we never hear--where our troops are doing magnificent work. They should continue to do so.

As my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary said, when we come to regroup and rethink the deployment of various troops in Bosnia, it may be possible to concentrate more on the humanitarian role and prevent them from being dragged into this mythical peacekeeping exercise, which leads nowhere and exposes our troops to unacceptable dangers.

We return to the basic point that everyone who has spoken so far in the debate has recognised--that we cannot stay with the present position, where troops are likely to be taken hostage by people they were talking to over breakfast. By lunchtime, the Bosnian Serbs may say,

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"Come with us: you are hostages." We must ensure that there is a rapid regrouping and reorganisation and, to some extent--although not totally--a withdrawal.

It has been suggested that there has always been conflict in that area, and that the people have always been fighting each other. That is not true-- they have been marrying each other and living with each other in villages and communities throughout the Balkan area. They can do that again.

It would be a great pity if the House divided tonight, and I am sorry that the right hon. Member for Chesterfield wants that. It will send the wrong message. I believe that the situation can be calmed by the judicious use of diplomacy and humanitarian work, but not by clumsy interventions in the name of a peace that does not exist. First, let us work on the diplomacy and put pressure on Milosevic and the Serbian nationalists who began it all, and then gradually try to calm the situation.

4.28 pm

Mr. John Home Robertson (East Lothian): This debate brings back memories of the debates on the deployments to the Falkland Islands in 1982 and to the Gulf in 1990. As a member of the first generation of Scots in the whole of recorded history which has not been required to go to war with somebody or other, I always feel a certain anxiety about voting to send other people to regions of conflict. I have discussed that dilemma with a number of service men in recent years. The consensus among them seems to be that they are glad that we take the issues seriously in the House. However, just as they would not flinch from doing their duty, so they do not want us to flinch from taking the right decisions. I approach the debate in that spirit.

I bring a little experience of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the House this evening, from my two visits there with the Defence Select Committee in February 1993 and March this year, and from the four weeks I spent during the last summer recess driving a truck in an aid convoy run by Edinburgh Direct Aid. I hope to go back in the coming summer recess, but the outlook is rather ominous. Denis Rutovitz, the chairman of Edinburgh Direct Aid, was shot and wounded on the way to Sarajevo with another convoy last month.

We have heard a lot about the failures and difficulties of UNPROFOR, and especially about the shortcomings of the so-called safe areas, which are plainly not safe. The main part of the trouble is that they have never been demilitarised. They are clearly not safe for the civilian populations of those towns, which are subject to regular shelling, sniping, and deprivation of supplies. As we now know to our cost, they are not safe for UN troops either. I will come back to that.

I want to highlight the spectacular successes of UNPROFOR, which are not spoken of enough in the press or anywhere else. First, never let us forget that 3 million people who are, in effect, under siege in central Bosnia-- including half a million people who are literally under siege in Sarajevo-- have been kept supplied, at least with basic materials, for the past three years. That would not have been possible without UNPROFOR.

I can tell the House that it is scary enough to be driving around with supplies on those rough, isolated routes through a civil war zone now; it would be far more

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hazardous without the United Nations patrols that are currently on those roads. I have with me the card that I carried last year that identified me as being under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and asked that everyone should grant me free passage. That card would not be worth much in the absence from those roads of UN warriors and patrols from the UN contingents. It is vital that they should continue in central Bosnia.

The second major success of UNPROFOR is that one lethal part of the three- way civil war has been stopped. The vicious conflict between the Croatian HVO and the Government BiH forces, which claimed hundreds of lives in towns such as Mostar, Gornji Vakuf and other communities, was ended by a United Nations-sponsored truce on 23 February 1994. There is now a peace to be kept in central Bosnia, and that task must continue.

If we were to withdraw the United Nations force now, that fragile peace would be put in jeopardy. It is more than likely that the confederation would disintegrate, and that the Croat-Muslim civil war would break out again. We would be abandoning those 3 million people to an unimaginable fate. After my personal contacts with the decent and heroic people who are running the hospitals, orphanages and caring services of central Bosnia, I would be horrified if we were to abandon them to the mercy of the ethnic cleansers, murderers and rapists who stand ready to prey on this conflict.

That brings me to the third side of the grim Balkan triangle: the Bosnian Serb army. It is undeniably the worst offender, although I stress that it is not the only one. It is the 30 per cent. of the people of Bosnia that has used military superiority to seize 70 per cent. of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and followed that by savage ethnic cleansing and merciless pressure on Sarajevo and other besieged communities. It has never accepted or respected United Nations resolutions or UNPROFOR, and it is now holding United Nations soldiers, including the 33 Royal Welch Fusiliers, as hostages. It calls them prisoners of war. Peacemakers are being treated as prisoners of war; the Bosnian Serb army is despicable.

Through other channels, such as the Select Committee, I will want to hear explanations of why United Nations military observers and our troops in Gorazde were left in vulnerable positions when the situation was escalating. However, that should probably be addressed in private rather than in the context of this debate. This is just the latest in a long string of outrages perpetrated by these people. They are entirely responsible for the escalation of the conflict that led to the present situation, and the whole world knows it. The Bosnian Serbs are treating the United Nations with contempt. They are cynically exploiting weaknesses and inconsistency in the United Nations' position. I am afraid that it has to be said that the UN deployment in relation to the Bosnian Serb army has been characterised by muddled thinking and undermanning. Whatever happens, the mandate must be clarified, and I believe that the force should be strengthened to ensure maximum effectiveness and minimum risk in future. There has to be a fundamental reappraisal of the deployment. Surely the time has come to reconsider some of the humiliating compromises that have been made with the Bosnian Serb army. I offer just one example. UNPROFOR is co-operating with the BSA to enforce the seige of Sarajevo. The United Nations has been

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manoeuvred into a position in which a Bosnian Serb army liaison officer has absolute control over who and what can go in and out of Sarajevo. He makes the decisions, and the United Nations applies them. Diplomats have been kept off aeroplanes and, recently, 40 pallets of material urgently required by Me decins sans Frontie res were effectively impounded by the United Nations on Serb instructions at Sarajevo airport for three whole months.

Furthermore, the United Nations is channelling the aid convoys into Sarajevo through Serb checkpoints, where the BSA routinely steals up to 50 per cent. of the loads. Worse, the United Nations cannot even return fire when the BSA uses machine guns and mortars against clearly identified aid convoys with official UNHCR number plates, as happened to my friends in Edinburgh Direct Aid when they went to Sarajevo five weeks ago.

The protection of humanitarian aid is the prime objective of UNPROFOR. That responsibility should not have been abdicated, and should be reaffirmed now. I should like to ask whether the United Nations should go on respecting the status of Bosnian Serb liaison officers while United Nations peacekeepers are being held hostage, but I shall leave that one sticking to the wall.

There is much to say, but I shall confine myself to the most important points. First, the international community has a responsibility to the suffering people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, the Bosnian Serb leadership is a serious threat, not only to the people of the Balkans but to the security of Europe. We cannot allow a savage, racist, expansionist force to go on doing its worst on the very doorstep of the European Community and of NATO. It is worth mentioning that Hungary--east of Bosnia- -is probably going to be joining the European Community shortly, and that, as NATO members, we are committed to the security of neighbouring countries such as Italy and Greece.

It would be folly to turn a blind eye to the unbridled savagery that is taking place in the adjacent territories of former Yugoslavia. Apart from anything else, it would be intolerable and unthinkable for the Security Council of the United Nations to be driven into submission by Mr. Radovan Karadzic and his

Administration.

It is clear from today's speeches that some hon. Members regard Bosnia- Herzegovina as what might be described as a faraway place of which we know little, to borrow a phrase from another era of appeasement. We should be learning some lessons from history, perhaps especially in this anniversary year.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is a great deal closer than the Falkland Islands, and closer even than Kuwait. It is only a very short flight away, or three days' drive in a truck. I suggest that protecting the people of Bosnia is a vital humanitarian interest, that the collective security and stability of Europe is a vital national interest for all of us in Europe, that respect for the United Nations is a vital international interest, and that the safety of the 33 Royal Welch Fusiliers and the RAF officer is an immediate and direct national priority. The United Kingdom and France in particular can take special pride in our part in the operation so far. We have not been helped by German diplomacy and, frankly, the

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United States and the Russians have not exactly covered themselves in glory so far. I hope that they are listening; I hope that they are learning.

Mr. Andrew Robathan (Blaby) rose --

Mr. Home Robertson: I am just concluding, as I know that many hon. Members want to take part in this debate.

The United Nations operation has reached an absolutely critical stage. We can capitulate to naked aggression and oppression, mainly perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs, or we can continue to stand up for civilisation and international order. I support the Government's decision to reinforce the United Nations presence in Bosnia. I urge the Government to seek similar reinforcement from other contributing countries and I also urge them to press for a stronger and clearer mandate for the UN force.

As a member of the Defence Select Committee, I shall be looking to the Government to ensure that our forces are deployed with the maximum effect and the minimum risk, the first priority being to get the hostages home. Let us stop talking about withdrawal, which means capitulation to sheer tyranny. We must see this thing through. 4.40 pm

Mr. Tom King (Bridgwater): The House will have listened with great respect to the hon. Member for East Lothian (Mr. Home Robertson), who spoke of his personal experiences in Bosnia. I am sure that other hon. Members will join me in hoping that when he returns--if he does--in the summer recess, he will be able to do so under the extra security that the Government's measures will provide.

I cannot help reflecting on the fact that this is the second time in five years that the House has expressed outrage about the use of human shields. We expressed outrage during the Gulf war when Saddam Hussein took such action. I remember the importance that we attached to speaking with the clearest possible voice, so that there was no doubt whatever about where the House, the Government and this country stood in defence of our armed forces and the outrage against any taking of hostages.

The lesson that we learned from the Gulf war is that many audiences watch our debates on television, and not only in this country. Saddam Hussein was an avid listener to the House's proceedings, hoping to detect signs of weakness, disunity and encouragement for his cause. I have no doubt that reports will quickly pass to Pale on whether the United Kingdom stands staunchly behind the Government's actions. I support the Government's action. For very good causes, we have a duty to our forces which are, to use an old phrase, in harm's way. We are clearly concerned to ensure that our hostages, the taking of whom was outrageous, are released immediately and restored to their units.

Despite the few dissenting elements and discordant voices, which echo those expressed in our debates five years ago, when the same war and anti-war parties emerged in the House, I recognise the same spirit among hon. Members that produced the largest majority that I can remember in support of our forces in their time of need. I have no doubt that the same House of Commons

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will strongly support--if it is needed--our armed forces should they face danger overseas. I welcome the speeches in support of the Government's position made by--of course--my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr. Ashdown) on behalf of the Liberal Democrats. I say to those who might encourage alternative action that, even if it were possible, I would be appalled by the idea of an immediate withdrawal. It would send a message that blackmail works and that people only have to take hostages to be successful. What an effect that would have on any future United Nations effort. Any discordant group would know that all that it had to do was grab a few people who were deployed for humanitarian, peacekeeping purposes and the will of the free world would dissolve rapidly like the mist. As we know, that would encourage the taking of yet more hostages.

I have been enormously impressed by what has been achieved. I say no more because I bow to the experience of the hon. Member for East Lothian. The House and this country should be very proud of what we have done and the part that we have played. Of course we could have stood aside, of course we could have said, as some did, that the conflict was nothing to do with us, that it was a long way away and that although we could see people dying on television, other people were dying in places that television could not reach. We did what we could and I have no doubt that hundreds of thousands of people--arguably, an even greater number--are alive because of the efforts that have been made.

I respect what has been achieved and I am desperately keen to ensure that, if possible, such work continues. If we send additional forces, which I support, we must be clear about the basis on which we do so. We owe it to those forces to ensure that their rules of engagement and the mandate-- whatever phrase is used--are clear. The exercise must not become a one-way delivery system of extra equipment to the warring factions. Many envious eyes will be cast on the 105 mm artillery that we are sending. We had better have some very clear rules of engagement to ensure that any valuable or powerful equipment sent out is properly defended.

The number of troops is not the whole matter. It is interesting to note that we are increasing the number of British troops to the number that the French have, effectively, already deployed. There have been 37 French casualties, and a significant number of the 333 hostages are French. The number of troops sent is no guarantee of security unless people are empowered with the right rules of engagement and the right authority to act to protect their position. The biggest mistake is to imagine that the previous crisis teaches us all the lessons that we need to know about the current crisis, but the clarity of authority was a major factor in the achievement of the rapid and successful completion of the Gulf war. Although that war was certainly under the authority of the United Nations, there was a very clear command structure. We did not engage in endless public ministerial meetings about exactly when, for example, the air campaign would start. We had the authority to proceed and we managed to achieve an element of surprise. We did not have ministerial meetings in public in Brussels, New York,

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Washington or elsewhere to determine whether the left hook would be employed for the land attack to outflank the Iraqi defence. Of course in Bosnia we face a different situation and comparisons cannot be made, but there is no question that such public meetings have put our commanders at a great disadvantage and have made the task on which we have embarked so much more difficult. I therefore hope that, while we will receive considerable advice and persuasion from many countries that are not so involved, the greater responsibility for command and authority will lie with those that are involved, whose troops are present and that are playing their part under the overall authority of the United Nations.

I hope that there is very close co-ordination. I have seen the report that the recapture of the post on the bridge may have been due to a policy change authorised by President Chirac, who ordered that French troops were to cede no more ground and allow no more humiliation. I can understand that reaction in the light of the experiences of the French forces. It is very important that if that is a change of policy--I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Defence will make the position clear in his speech--an absolutely co-ordinated view among the UN forces undertaking this important and valuable role is established. Much has been said already in support of the Prime Minister's decisions, and there is no need to repeat many of the points that have been made, but one lesson that we must learn from the present crisis is the importance of keeping Russia involved. That is crucial, both in the short and long term--in the short term with regard to the immediate position over the hostages and any opportunity that there may be for Russia to play her part in ensuring their release. With regard to the longer term, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary has often illustrated the importance of our role in Bosnia by reminding us how many cemeteries in this country are filled with those who died in a war that arose out of the Balkans. Of course that conflict was partly due to the problems of the Balkans themselves but, in the very nature of a world war, it owed more to the fact that other nations then sought to become involved.

Throughout the cold war it was NATO's great dread that Yugoslavia would collapse when Tito died so that, at a time of maximum tension, that cockpit of the struggle for influence would suddenly present problems. We must be thankful that the crisis that NATO expected did not occur until after the end of the cold war. It is crucial that the improvement in relations that is now possible is maintained, and that we keep the closest possible contacts between ourselves and Russia, so as to ensure that, if things do not work out as we hope, there is no risk of the conflagration ever spreading on the scale that we have seen in the past.

4.51 pm

Mr. Nick Ainger (Pembroke): I represent the constituency in which the Royal Welch Fusiliers' base is now located, at the former RAF base at Brawdy. The families of seven of the 33 hostages live in my constituency. The rest, of course, are scattered throughout Wales. I am sure that other Welsh Members will join me in welcoming the fact that Parliament has been recalled

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today. It shows the seriousness with which the House takes the hostage issue, and I am sure that that alone will give the families some comfort. Obviously they are extremely worried about the present situation. I am grateful for all the sympathetic comments that have been made by Members from both sides of the House about the families. The whole House shares their concern about their 33 loved ones held hostage in Bosnia.

I understand that the Secretary of State for Defence will wind up, and I should like to draw his attention to a specific question asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, East (Mr. Hughes) about the location of eight of the 33 hostages. There appears to be some confusion, so will the right hon. and learned Gentleman make inquiries before he winds up? If the situation has not been clarified and the eight hostages have not been located, the families' concern will increase.

Unlike my hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Mr. Home Robertson), I am no expert on either the immediate circumstances or the long-term background in Yugoslavia--although, having spent two wonderful holidays there, I have a great love for the country. None the less, to me it seems that the description "muddling through" could be applied throughout.

I totally support the Government's position, although many of the families of the hostages are expressing concern and, understandably, may even say that we should withdraw. I appreciate their worries and I understand why they may say that, but withdrawal would be wholly wrong for several reasons.

First, as has been said, withdrawal would give the Bosnian Serbs a signal that such despicable action wins rewards. The safety not only of the other 300-odd Royal Welch Fusiliers but of the other 3,500 British troops and the 7,000 French troops would be put at risk if we decided that such action by the rebel Serbs would be rewarded. If we gave any hint that we were prepared to back down from our current or our proposed position, it would exacerbate the hostages' position. Secondly, in the wider strategic view, the Balkans are extremely unstable at the moment. I remember being told a story in which a Hungarian was asked, "How many countries surround Hungary?" The answer was, "One--Greater Hungary." Throughout the Balkans, given the wrong circumstances, the ethnic, religious and territorial conflicts could explode, and more countries would be sucked into a conflict that all the resources of the British and French armies could not control or contain.

The United Nations humanitarian aid programme has been successful but unfortunately, because the media like only the bad and the sensational stories, the work that has been going on day in, day out since November 1992 has gone unreported in the main. Sadly, only the tragedies are reported from Bosnia, not the boring but vital everyday successes of delivering aid, reducing conflict and brokering local ceasefires and deals.

That may be why public opinion, as reflected in certain newspaper polls, is that we should pull out. The success of the British and French armies has not been fully reported and only the tragedies, such as that in Tuzla the other day, suddenly appear on our television screens. Then people say, "What a failure that is. The United

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Nations should be doing more or pulling out." That is understandable if the public's only source of information is our television screens and the other media.

I understand that the position adopted by the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister on the bombing cannot be overstated. However, previous bombings have been ineffective. The targets chosen were not of any great import, and an objective view would be that the previous bombing regime did not achieve the aim intended. Undoubtedly the most recent incident was totally counterproductive.

In the long run we may have to review that policy. I hope that if a different mandate is given to the extra troops going to Bosnia, we can establish a more effective method than the relatively indiscriminate use of air power. But, no, it is unfair to say "indiscriminate". The use has not been indiscriminate, but none the less air power can certainly be construed by the Bosnian Serbs as indiscriminate.

Judging from my research and the information that has recently come out of Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia it seems that the Bosnian Serbs are now becoming increasingly desperate. They have had a number of military set- backs in western Slavonia and in Bosnia. The hostage taking, although undoubtedly related to the bombing, may represent a last desperate throw by the Bosnian Serbs. They certainly want the UN, Britain and France out of Bosnia as quickly as possible, and they hope and pray that British public opinion will persuade the Government and this House to withdraw. That would be wrong for the hostages, and strategically wrong in the longer term for Europe and for the millions of people who depend on the humanitarian aid effort.

I am sure that the Government, with the Russians, are actively trying to persuade President Milosevic to use his best influence to ensure that the 33 British hostages and all the other UN hostages are released. That is the best way forward: diplomatic pressure and a show not just of strength but of resolve by the House that we are not willing to accept this sort of action by the Bosnian Serbs. My priority is to secure the release of the 33 Royal Welch Fusiliers and the RAF officer. I hope that the action on which the Government have embarked will lead to their release as soon as possible, allowing them to come home safely to their families. 5.1 pm

Sir John Stanley (Tonbridge and Malling): Opening the debate, the Prime Minister said that the events of the past few days represented a qualitative change in the situation in Bosnia. That judgment is entirely right. I would go as far as to say that, now that the Bosnian Serbs feel at liberty to engage in mass hostage taking against UN personnel, they have made an undeclared declaration of war against UN personnel in Bosnia. That will necessitate substantial changes in the way UN troops are deployed there and in the resources brought to bear to protect them.

Hostages have been taken on a number of occasions before--civilians and service personnel. Based on my experience of one or two of those incidents I would argue that the families of those taken hostage can be assured that the necessary qualities will be brought to bear on their plight--the qualities of a cool head, a calculating mind and a steely determination to see the matter through,

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however long it takes. I have every confidence that those with the formidable task of dealing with the problem, the Government and their professional advisers in the armed services and the diplomatic corps, will bring every ounce of their professionalism to bear to secure the release of the hostages.

I am also certain that, whatever options or combination of options my right hon. Friends choose to apply, they will have the full support of the House in doing whatever is necessary to secure a successful outcome for the hostages.

As for the UN and its deployment in Bosnia, as we all well know, UN deployments around the world--including hitherto in Bosnia--have always rested on the central assumption that there will be no direct or immediate risk to the safety of the personnel in question. I refer to UN deployments in peacekeeping and humanitarian roles. That is why UN personnel are usually deployed highly visibly and statically, and no attempt is made to conceal their progress along road or air transport routes.

The new situation will necessitate a fundamental reconsideration of this posture. UN commanders in the field will have to try as far as possible to remove the hostage-taking option from the Bosnian Serbs. This House, like other Parliaments elsewhere, would find it unacceptable if such hostage taking were continuously repeated. In effect, around the clock, seven days a week, the UN will have to have at its disposal, at every location where its personnel are deployed, enough fire power to ensure that hostage taking cannot be repeated. The new situation also calls for a significant concentration of UN personnel. It will inescapably result in a significant reduction in the number of places where those personnel can be deployed, because of the clear need to reduce their exposure and vulnerability. There will necessarily therefore have to be some reduction in the usefulness of the humanitarian work that they can carry out. My right hon. Friends will have the considerable task of judging whether the residual humanitarian role that the UN can perform is viable. Moreover, it will be essential to provide an altogether different order of protection for the remaining UN peacekeepers. I welcome the steps that the Prime Minister announced today to ensure that the British contingent receives infinitely more protection. My right hon. Friends will have the formidable task of judging whether the extent and longevity of the new commitment of personnel will be tolerable in the context of British armed services and financial resources. For as long as hostage taking and the risk of it remain, these major changes in our approach to UN deployment will be called for--they follow inescapably from the position in which we find ourselves. I approach the subject of air strikes from a position different from that of the right hon. Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn). I greatly welcome what the Prime Minister said in response to an intervention--that we shall have no truck whatever with the Serbian attempt to exchange hostages for an undertaking that air strikes will never be used. It would be quite wrong to succumb to that form of blackmail, and I was delighted to hear my right hon. Friend rule it out immediately.

As the House is well aware, the utility or otherwise of air strikes has probably been the most hotly debated issue throughout the conflict and the UN's involvement in it. Some people--particularly on the other side of the Atlantic--have given the impression that if only the air strikers were let off the leash, the whole conflict in Bosnia

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could be rapidly brought to an end. We have taken a different position, and we have constantly advocated caution and care in the use of air strikes.

The pattern of the use of air power in the 50 years since the second world war has demonstrated two things: first, control of the air is indispensable to the protection of ground troops and to the holding and taking of ground; secondly, control of the air alone and the use of air power does not enable one to control the ground unless one is also prepared to make a commitment of ground forces. That commitment has not so far been forthcoming from the international community.

In the context of Bosnia, the limitations of air power are particularly pronounced. Factors such as the terrain, the relative smallness of the targets and the ability to move those targets put considerable constraints on the use of air power. When that is coupled with the vulnerability of UN personnel, the Government's judgment is seen to be entirely right. Air strikes are a blunt weapon which have the undoubted capacity to turn into a boomerang. Following the events of the past 10 days, I hope that our friends on the other side of the Atlantic will make a more realistic assessment of the utility of air strikes.

The House has effectively discussed three options today. In my opinion, only one hon. Member so far has advocated a significant military escalation --the leader of the Liberal Democrats. I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman is not in his place now, because I particularly wanted to refer to his speech. The record will show that the right hon. Gentleman called on UN forces to increase their military fire power and activity to defend the safe havens. The defence of the safe havens effectively means that they are physically and, if necessary, militarily protected. It means securing ground and weapons beyond the safe havens to make them fire-free.

If that is to be done effectively, the UN will have to go to war to defend the safe havens. My right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath) was entirely right to state to the leader of the Liberal Democrats that if it is his policy to safeguard militarily the integrity of the safe havens--apparently it is--he should make it clear what the military implications are of that policy. It would mean taking UN forces into a fighting role.

Sir Patrick Cormack (Staffordshire, South): Surely it should mean something if the UN designates an area a safe haven. Should not the combatants respect that? If they do not, what is the point of the designation?

Sir John Stanley: I am seeking clarity of the position taken by the leader of the Liberal Democrats. If my hon. Friend is asking me, I would say that we have two choices. We can diplomatically declare a safe haven, while recognising that its integrity may be destroyed militarily--that is the option which the UN, the commanders on the ground and the Governments concerned have adopted--or we can go further and say that we are going to defend militarily the integrity of that safe haven. That appears to be the policy of the leader of the Liberal Democrats.

If that is the right hon. Gentleman's policy, he must spell out the military implications and accept the consequences. We would not merely have to prevent Serb soldiers from getting inside the safe havens, but we would have to do everything necessary to prevent incoming fire of any sort from coming into the safe haven. That would

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entail a considerable military commitment. There may be some Members who believe that we should make that commitment, but one cannot say that we must protect the safe havens while pretending that that does not have far-reaching military consequences.

Mr. Menzies Campbell (Fife, North-East): I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman--like all of us--is familiar with UN Security Council resolution 836 of 4 June 1994, which provides for precisely the kind of action to which he has referred. The resolution gives the UN the ability

"to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys."

Paragraph 10 of the resolution authorises

"all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate".

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