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I have listened to many defence debates over the years. It is quite difficult to speak in defence debates when one is female, but I have picked up as much information as I can and I believe that we have three options in Bosnia. We could opt for massive air attacks. I think that the recent bombing was a disastrous mistake which led to the hostage taking. Ironically, that option is favoured by the United States, which does not have a single soldier on the ground and which said recently that it would never allow a United States soldier to set foot on Bosnian soil.However, in answer to a question at the NAA, the Assistant Secretary Holbrooke said that the United States would contribute half the troops in order to facilitate a withdrawal from Bosnia if it proved necessary. We cannot evacuate our troops on the ground in Bosnia by aircraft carrier, no matter how sophisticated or large it may be. We must ask who we would bomb. I think that air strikes have been exposed as a flawed tactic.
I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) who said that there are blue berets in the air dropping bombs while blue berets on the ground are trying to keep the peace and deliver aid. Those two objectives are incompatible. I believe that air strikes would lead to an increase in hostage taking. It is an impossible strategy and I hope that the Government have enough sense to ignore any advice in its favour.
The second option would be to concentrate all our efforts on trying to isolate the problem and contain it within Bosnia so that it does not spill over into other countries. That containment strategy is being argued tonight, and I have heard it before. It could include withdrawal of peacekeeping if it becomes impossible to deliver aid, although I am not sure how we could manage containment from outside. The third option, and the one that I favour, is to try to maintain the status quo, difficult as that might be. We have to face the truth, uncomfortable as it might be, that the belligerents in the conflict are not yet ready for peace and there still appears to be bloodlust. The rest of us feel helpless and frustrated, especially our troops on the ground.
Experience teaches us that there are limits to external intervention in civil wars. I also believe that we have become involved in a civil war and that making paper threats has helped us lose credibility.
As many of our military commanders have told us, we should ignore those groups that encourage us to take sides. That is always dangerous. One Opposition Member referred to knowing which side to support; I am on the side of peace in the Balkans and that must be paramount. To be sucked into taking sides would be disastrous and would lead us into another Vietnam. That is why the United States does not want to commit any troops on the ground. The Americans have had their fingers burnt and realise that such a move would be disastrous.
I should make a couple of points about the Russians. If we are serious about peace in the Balkans, we cannot exclude them as we did in the bombing. They did not know of the plans to bomb, yet they constantly warned us about the consequences of such action. This weekend, the Russian delegate told us that it was fairly well-established that the recent breakdown of peace in Bosnia was brought about by Bosnian Government forces taking the first pot shot at a French soldier and that was followed by retaliation.
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Obviously, I accept that the greatest brutality has been on the side of the Serbs. They have had the most weapons and have been the most organised militarily, but there have been atrocities on both sides. In civil war, barbarism is the name of the game. It is the most appalling war and it is happening in Bosnia.When my right hon. Friend the Member for Copeland (Dr. Cunningham) was shadow Foreign Secretary, he told us that senior members of the Bosnian Government had made it clear to him that they thought they could win the war. At that time, they were not interested in talking about peace.
The United Nations and NATO should not look for one guilty party and we must not allow the media to persuade us into reckless action. Russia can play an important part in exerting pressure on the Serbs and the Russians must be consulted. We have been absolutely crazy to exclude them.
I end on a point that has already been made. At present, the House has an overriding duty to rescue our troops as we sent them there. I do not want the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for Defence to tell me how they plan to do that. As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition said, we have to be totally united and have a single purpose. We want their safety.
On the wider question of extending our mandate and taking sides in a civil war, we need firmer assurances than we have had so far. I am sure that the Opposition will agree with that because we would never ask the young men and women who volunteer to serve our country in a defensive capacity to be cannon fodder in a Balkan conflict which will be resolved only when the present antagonists want to resolve it. Our role has to be to facilitate peace and to continue trying to provide humanitarian aid.
8.33 pm
Mr. Jacques Arnold (Gravesham): Our right hon. Friends were right to take the difficult and awesome decision to send reinforcements into Bosnia following recent events. They will provide British forces under the United Nations with support and protection in carrying out their role and will empower them to be flexible. We have to choose between maintaining the policy of containment and humanitarian support and withdrawal.
The House should reflect carefully before taking that decision, bearing in mind that we remain a great power and that our actions will have consequences. We are a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, a leading nation in the European Union and NATO and a worldwide player in United Nations peacekeeping. Therefore, what we do is of considerable significance.
Would we really withdraw our troops from Bosnia? Are we really prepared to face the scenes of panic and mass slaughter which would be shown on our televisions night after night, with Kate Adie drawing attention to all the blood and gore? There would be massive public revulsion and people would ask Parliament, "What do you plan to do about it?". There would be a complete swing in British public opinion were people to see the slaughter that would follow a withdrawal. Matters are not that simple. We and the French may withdraw, but our troops make up not even a quarter of UNPROFOR. Would the Muslim United Nations troops abandon their co-religionists? We have to consider the
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two Pakistani battalions at Vares and Banovici, the Bangladeshi battalion at Bihac, the Malaysian battalion at Konjic and Makarska, the Turkish battalion at Zenica and the Jordanians, who have similar numbers of troops to ours in the former Yugoslavia. It is more likely those Muslim nations' battalions would become partisan combatants rather than withdraw as we would.What pressures would our withdrawal put on the Russian contingent and their pan-orthodox links with the Serbs? We should reflect carefully before we leave a void into which dark forces would race. Iran is already supplying the Bosnian Muslims, and many other Islamic states would become involved.
Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan and the Arab nations, let alone the zealots, not least Libya, would consider themselves under an obligation to their co- religionists. If we were to exacerbate fundamentalism at such a difficult time, we could well reap the results. We should consider the impact on Algeria and other Maghreb countries, and Turkey, which could be dragged backwards from its modern role. All those factors should be taken into account. We should ask ourselves whether we really want Islamic fundamentalism warring in the continent of Europe.
The more likely outcome, however, would be a Serbian short-term victory accompanied by brutality, rape and slaughter, and then what? How long would it be before the Bosnian Serb Republic would merge itself into Greater Serbia? How long would it be before it were joined by the Krajina Serbs from Croatia and what would that do in terms of reigniting the Croatian tinderbox? Would not Belgrade become re-emboldened as the sanctions gripped around her throat were eased, and would not Greater Serbia extrapolate the very lessons that our weakness would reveal?
We have only to examine what is already happening. The two previous autonomous provinces of Yugoslavia and Serbia are already feeling the Serb jackboot. In the Vojvodina, where one quarter of the population is Hungarian, autonomy was scrapped in 1990 and Serbo-Croat was declared the only official language the following year. In Kosovo, where 90 per cent. of the population is Muslim Albanian, autonomy was simultaneously scrapped and repression is increasing.
In the Sandjak on the Serbian-Montenegrin border, which has an 80 per cent. Muslim population, Serb repression is also deepening. Many Muslims from the Sandjak are already fleeing into Bosnia. That is significant. If Bosnia is supposed to be such a dangerous place, what does that say about civil rights and freedoms in the Sandjak? Perhaps Greater Serbia would acquire an enthusiasm to regain the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That country, with its volatile mix of Macedonians, Albanians and Serbs, is also coveted by Bulgaria and Greece.
What would Hungary do? Would it tolerate indefinitely the repression by the Serbs of a third of a million Hungarians in Vojvodina? Would Hungary eventually react? That, in turn, could rekindle the interests of Hungary in the substantial minorities that it has in Slovakia where there are 600,000 ethnic Hungarians or Romania where there are 1.6 million ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania.
As we look at the whole issue, the ethnic ripples that could be ignited in Sarajevo go wider and wider. It is trite to say that one of the big conflicts that the continent of
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ours has suffered this century also started in Sarajevo in 1914. It would be wrong for the House to echo the exasperation of Neville Chamberlain who complained of"a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing."
What we need in the House of Commons are cool heads, a wide perspective and wise counsel based on experience, which is what this country has traditionally provided to the world.
8.41 pm
Mr. Mike Gapes (Ilford, South): Three weeks ago in the House I was fortunate enough to speak in the debate on Bosnia. I concluded my remarks by saying:
"We must recognise that there is a limit to how long we can simply sit ineffectively hoping for something to turn up."--[ Official Report , 9 May 1995; Vol. 259, c. 640.]
Regrettably, I did not expect that something to be the events of the past week.
Why are we in this mess? According to a report by Martin Walker in The Guardian on 27 May there was a serious bout of arm twisting from the Clinton Administration last week. They were going round world capitals putting pressure on for more and more military action against the Bosnian Serbs. At the same time, there was a report in The Independent that Senator Jesse Helms was quite happy with what President Clinton had been doing because it was
"essential in terms of doing something."
That is the problem and it is a problem that occurs in some of the things that we have heard in the debate. There are times when doing something can make situations worse than calmly sitting and waiting for a more opportune moment in the future. The French Prime Minister Alain Juppe is quoted as saying:
"Ultimatums and air strikes must be used after reflection and preparation . . . Last Friday's ultimatum and air strikes were not well prepared and exposed the peacekeepers to thoughtless risks. We must not again carry out this type of operation."
Could the Security Council members and the NATO commanders really not have thought through the consequences of their decision for the peacekeepers? If that is so, it is absolutely appalling.
The situation is perhaps a consequence of different views of the world. Those who have participants on the ground view things differently from those who see the conflict on CNN and think that somehow there can be a quick fix intervention to solve the problem so that they can move on to another problem in the afternoon. I regret that it is not just CNN. I was in a debate this afternoon on CNN with an American congressman. He argued that British and French forces in Bosnia were an impediment to a solution and that they were standing in the way of the tough action required. He was completely against any deployment of United States ground forces but he was in favour of lifting the arms embargo and of air strikes. That was an eight -term Republican congressman from New Jersey. It worries me that we have a United States congress dominated by such views. Clearly, they are thinking about the world without taking account of the realities.
There has been mention in the debate that the United States might, perhaps, provide half of the 50,000 troops that might be required should there be a withdrawal. I say, "Don't hold your breath." I do not believe that President
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Clinton is capable of getting that through the American Congress. If they are not prepared to put people in at a time like this, I suspect that they would not be prepared to put them in anything like the numbers required for a withdrawal.I am also conscious of the divisions in the statements that are coming from other quarters. There are clearly differences within the coalition. There are differences between the United States and Europe and there are differences with the Russians. There are potential differences with the Islamic world and we know that if we are to achieve a negotiated settlement, it needs the agreement of the Bosnian Government, the Bosnian Croats, the Bosnian Serbs, and Mr. Abdic's forces as well as the Governments of Croatia and Serbia and, presumably, the other successor states to former Yugoslavia. I have great worries that we are all being used in different ways by people who are very good at pushing their own propaganda and using their own ploys to try to get us in on their side. Mr. Ejup Ganic, the Vice-President of Bosnia, said that there must be massive intervention by the west to solve the problem.
There is a belief in the Bosnian Government that somehow the cavalry will come over the hill. Therefore, the ceasefire that was negotiated by Jimmy Carter was not to be continued. On the other hand, we have this appalling and outrageous behaviour by the Bosnian Serbs.
How do we get out of this mess? First, we must recognise that there is no easy and quick fix. Secondly, we must face up to the fact that there may not be the possibility of any solution in the foreseeable future. Thirdly, we must recognise that if that is the case, we may have to face some harsh realities. There may come a point at which the humanitarian operation becomes impossible.
If that is the case, the three options that we have currently will be reduced to two. I do not want that. I believe in humanitarian intervention by the United Nations and I believe in internationalism and support for people who are suffering from starvation and oppression. However, I do not believe in being used and manipulated to fight somebody else's war, whether it is being done from across the Atlantic or from our own continent. Therefore, we should not allow the justifiable increase in our forces going in to provide protection for our own peacekeepers to become an incremental escalation towards a longer-term, indefinite involvement. I am prepared, with some reservations, to support the actions that have been taken in the past few days. However, I want to make it clear that it is not just Conservative Members who have concerns about this matter. I have my concerns about where this is leading. It is important that the House should express the view that is shared by many people out there. They want to know why this is happening and where it will lead.
We did not get a satisfactory clarification from the Prime Minister and I do not expect to get one from the Secretary of State for Defence. Nevertheless, these questions warrant answers. If we return to this subject in a month's time and are asked to approve the sending of another few thousand troops, those questions will have to be put even more strongly than they have been put today.
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8.50 pmMr. Quentin Davies (Stamford and Spalding): I listened to the hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mr. Gapes) with much interest. I thought that his approach to the problem and his reaction to the unfortunate events of the last few days showed a characteristic Labour party approach--a great deal of visceral anti-Americanism and a considerable lack of decisiveness about what we should do in difficult circumstances.
I want to make several points in the 10 minutes available to me, so I shall try to be as succinct as possible. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spoke today with great resolution and I believe that he will have the overwhelming majority of the country behind him. It is out of the question for this country to yield to threats or to give in to blackmail. We have rarely done so in more than 1,000 years of history. On the rare and shameful occasions that we have, from the Danegeld to Hitler in the 1930s, we have always come to regret it. It is much more expensive to rebuild a country's credibility once it has been damaged than it is to maintain a resolute position in the first place.
But we must not prevaricate. It is no good saying that we will not give in to threats and blackmail, but then saying that in the light of the hostage taking we may have to bring forward a withdrawal from Bosnia or give some assurances about no air strikes. Either of those suggestions immediately offers some reward to the Bosnian Serbs for their bad behaviour. The object of our policy must be the exact reverse--to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs come to regret and to regard as a complete mistake the dastardly action that they have taken against our troops during the past few days.
My second point is that consistent with that overall national objective we must get our hostages out, and by whatever mixture of military means, subterfuge and diplomacy that we can devise. I have every confidence in the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary, although obviously we must not go into any details today about what they may be considering. However, I want to make a point about diplomacy, a word that has been used on many occasions this evening. Diplomacy is a means to an end; it is a mechanism for enabling parties who desire or have a need for an agreement to reach one. But unless the parties have such a desire or need, diplomacy will be a useless weapon. It cannot be used in a vacuum. Sometimes it is necessary to change the facts of the situation--the balance of forces--to generate that need for an agreement.
Thirdly, some tactical lessons need to be learnt from the taking of the hostages. A number of hon. Members, including myself, were perplexed by the fact that our commanders on the spot, who knew that an air strike was in prospect--indeed, they had called for air strikes--and who knew that the Bosnian Serbs had a history of taking hostages, nevertheless did not deploy the forces available to them in defensible numbers in defensible positions. There may be good reasons for that. Perhaps they were hamstrung by instructions from the special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General. In the current position, it would not be helpful to have immediate answers to the obvious questions that arise, but in due course we will need to know exactly why such decisions were taken on deployment. I hope that whatever lessons need to be learnt will be learnt rapidly by those who are responsible for our troops.
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There is a fourth conclusion to be drawn from the experiences of the past week, which is that Great Britain needs now, and will continue to need, professional, effective, flexible defence forces. We never know from where the threat will come. Who could have predicted the taking of hostages a few weeks or months ago? However, the Government have been able rapidly to mobilise 6,000 men--an armoured brigade--and are prepared to deploy them rapidly in the former Yugoslavia.Quite simply, we would not have such a flexible range of responsive capabilities, we would not have those extremely well-trained and mobile troops, if we had adopted the defence policies urged on the Government by the two major Opposition parties over the past 15 years.
A number of hon. Members from those parties have made robust statements in the Chamber today and I welcome that unreservedly. However, I hope that they will have the honesty, at least in their private thoughts if not in their public statements, to acknowledge first, that those robust statements are empty and meaningless unless effective defence forces are at the disposal of the Government, and secondly, that the defence policies that their parties have urged on this House would have proved disastrous and would have deprived us of that necessary capability.
Finally, there is a longer-term strategic conclusion to be drawn. The point has already been made that one of the salient features of the present position is that we have engaged our forces in Bosnia, as have the French, whereas we have not been prepared to engage them in humanitarian, peacekeeping or peacemaking operations further afield. We have rightly not deployed our forces in Somalia, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia or all the other places where human beings have been and are being massacred in deplorable circumstances. The reason for that is quite clear--we have a special interest in and a special responsibility for the maintenance of stability on our continent of Europe and on the frontiers of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance.
We are not the world's policemen. We cannot take upon ourselves responsibility for maintaining order or for supervising the distribution of humanitarian relief across the globe. It is sad, but realistically we cannot do that. However, we can and must take responsibility for stability in our own zone. We and our French allies--and I pay tribute to them--have shouldered that responsibility. We have done so in the Gulf and we are doing so now in Bosnia. We have an interest in doing that. Over the years, the Americans have made it clear that they have a lesser interest because geopolitically they are much further removed from Bosnia. Nevertheless, we must recognise that the interest that we and the French have is fully shared, or ought to be, by our allies in the European Union--the Germans, the Italians, the Spaniards, the Dutch, the Finns and other smaller countries.
There is a very anomalous aspect in the present situation because the fact is that Britain and France have been shouldering a substantial burden in the Gulf, and now in Bosnia, not just in the interests of the stability of our zone and of our own countries but equally in the interests of the other European members of the Atlantic alliance and the other members of the European Union. The other members of the European Union, one might say, have been free riding. They have been gaining the full benefit that has been secured by the gallantry, courage and sacrifices of our troops and by the financial costs that
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Britain and France have incurred. That situation is not viable, sensible, or reasonable and it cannot be allowed to continue into the longer term future.It is necessary that the European Union should take seriously the commitment into which it entered in the Maastricht treaty to develop effective common foreign, security and defence policies. That is necessary in the interests of world peace because our influence on events will be much greater if policy is co-ordinated and focused--indeed, we might, arguably, have been able to avoid conflict in Yugoslavia had it been.
And if we need to engage in military action, it is necessary that the costs are spread through the Union as a whole, just as the benefits are. I hope that my right hon. Friends the Secretary of State for Defence and the Foreign Secretary will take advantage of the lessons that can be learned from Bosnia to press forward the implementation of the foreign, security and defence aspects of the Maastricht treaty.
8.59 pm
Mr. Robert N. Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby): There is one issue on which the House is united: the taking of hostages was a wrongful and sinful act by General Mladic and Mr. Karadzic. To say the least, it was very bad public relations on the part of the Bosnian Serbs. We have to ask what led to that action. The answer was given by the Father of the House, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath), when he pointed out that it would not have happened without the air strikes. Without those air strikes, we would not have sat here all afternoon and evening debating the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Although I support sending troops to safeguard our people out there and to restore the hostages to freedom, I think that 6,000 is rather a lot and I do not believe that the action which is being taken now, as with many actions that have involved the use of force in the past, is anything other than short-termism in military terms. There is a complete lack of political strategy.
Some hon. Members have argued about whether this is a civil war. My hon. Friend the Member for Vauxhall (Miss Hoey) argued that it was not a civil war on the ground that there is a Government universally recognised throughout the world in Sarajevo. In 1642, we had a Government who were universally recognised throughout the world; that did not stop us having a civil war. In the United States in 1861, they had a Government who were recognised by everyone; that did not stop them having a civil war.
Civil wars arise when one part of a country refuses to recognise the legitimacy of the Government who are installed at the time. That is precisely what has happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For all sorts of reasons, some of them historical, the Serbs do not recognise the Government in Sarajevo.
We should ask ourselves--surely the question should have been asked before- -what we would do if we were in the position of Serbs living in Bosnia, or Krajina for that matter, when air strikes are launched. Their immediate reaction is that they are not the only ones fighting the civil war. After all, only a few weeks ago, 2,000 Serbs were driven out of their homes in western Slavonia and many Serbs were massacred by Croatian forces. Nobody contemplates sanctions against Croatia, let alone the use of air strikes.
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My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made a very important point, which I hope will be answered, when he suggested that the safe havens should be demilitarised because many of the attacks which have been made, as general after general has said, were launched from inside the safe havens by Muslim forces. Even if the retaliation of the Serbs has sometimes been inordinate, Tuzla and Sarajevo have certainly been used as bases by Muslim forces to break ceasefire after ceasefire. Do we talk about air strikes against the Muslims? Of course we do not.I am not suggesting that air strikes are justified in any event, but I am pointing out that if we talk about being even-handed, as the Prime Minister still does, we must remember that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. To act in any other way while putting an extra 6,000 of our troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina is to ensure the inevitability of their being sucked into a civil war on one side against the other. I do not believe that I could support that approach. It is a purely military strategy and there is a complete lack of political strategy.
Any political strategy must take two further factors into account. First, what will be the impact on Serbia itself? Some people are keen to attack President Milosevic, but they should consider the fact that, if we get embroiled in a civil war, it may not be Milosevic with whom we are dealing but Arkan or Seselj or some more extreme fascist elements.
Secondly, the impact on Russia has been mentioned by several hon. Members. Although it is the Government's policy to try to expand the frontiers of NATO--wrongly, in my view--we are ignoring the Russians in the essential matter of future political action in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Russia, one of the contact group's members, is being wholly ignored when it comes to political or military action. I shall find it very difficult to support the Government; indeed, until I see a political strategy that brings even-handedness back to our approach, I shall not be able to do so.
9.6 pm
Lady Olga Maitland (Sutton and Cheam): One thing of which I am absolutely certain is that the country will applaud our Prime Minister for his decisiveness, clarity of mind and sense of purpose in making the important decision to send reinforcements to Bosnia. The country was waiting for decisive action and leadership, and they got it. We needed to be given a sober warning that he feared that, if we did not take decisive action and uphold the authority of the United Nations, a major war in Europe could follow. These are worrying moments, and it is right for us to be deeply concerned. It is also appropriate and right that the Prime Minister should make it a priority to get the hostages released. However, we have to go a little further: it is important not only to take firm, decisive action to show that the authority of the United Nations cannot be sneered at or swept aside, but to consider what we can do to bring the Bosnian Serbs to sanity. We have to be firm with them, for I have always felt that Karadzic was a bully, a tyrant and a coward. Only cowards attack innocent citizens as he does.
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It is significant that there is now evidence from a variety of sources that Karadzic is losing support among his own people. My hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire, South (Sir P. Cormack) mentioned a document that shows that only 50 per cent. of his people support Karadzic's endeavours. I, too, have had reports that he is losing backing and that people in his country are seeking peace. It is important to take such divisions into account and to emphasise the importance of diplomacy. Diplomacy must be very carefully balanced. On one hand, we have to be firm militarily; we must not allow the Serbs to get away with their tyranny. On the other hand, if we bunker them too hard into a tight corner, I believe, knowing the Serbian personality as I do, that we will have taken a step backwards. The key to peace lies in Belgrade. At least Milosevic has condemned the taking of those hostages and has accepted the contact group's peace plan. The next stage is to consider how to get him to recognise Bosnia. Recognising Bosnia is a possibility for Milosevic, because it is in his interests. Isolating Karadzic would help Milosevic, bearing in mind that Karadzic has eyes on the presidency in the former Yugoslavia. Therefore we must help Milosevic to facilitate a diplomatic outcome. A face-saving formula may be required, but one thing is for sure: unless we put as much effort into our diplomatic initiatives as we put into our military initiatives, we shall not obtain the peace in Europe that we desperately require.9.10 pm
Dr. David Clark (South Shields): This has been an excellent debate and it has certainly justified the decision of the Government and Madam Speaker to recall Parliament. In all, 35 right hon. and hon. Members will have spoken in the debate, which has been of a very high standard and, naturally, of very high passion. Two sides--indeed, three sides if that is possible--of the argument have been presented. Some hon. Members felt that enough had not been done. My hon. Friends the Members for Vauxhall (Miss Hoey) and for Western Isles (Mr. MacDonald) made that point forcefully. The hon. Member for Staffordshire, South (Sir P. Cormack) shared the same point of view. They have long made their points of view very clear and we all know and appreciate the depth of their feelings on this issue. Equally, members of all parties have said that we should not be involved, we should not take sides and a war-like posture should not be adopted. The Father of the House, the right hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath), and the hon. Member for East Lindsey (Sir P. Tapsell) spelled out very clearly why they felt that. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) expressed very clearly their reasons why they felt that it was not in Britain's interests to become involved.
We heard, too, a wealth of experience. My hon. Friend the Member for East Lothian (Mr. Home Robertson) talked about taking a convoy across the area. The hon. Member for Wealden (Sir G. Johnson Smith) told us of his experience in the North Atlantic Assembly and with European parliamentarians. Other hon. Members merely put their own views. I thought that the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon) was especially balanced, incisive and based on common sense, which we could do with by the bucketful in Bosnia. My
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hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, South (Mr. Gapes) gave an analytical response. My hon. Friends the Members for Feltham and Heston (Mr. Keen), for Liverpool, West Derby (Mr. Wareing) and for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) and, indeed, all hon. Members who have spoken put forward points of view that will be helpful to the Government and to the Secretary of State for Defence in trying to achieve a policy that is acceptable to the House. It is very important--if it is at all possible--that we maintain a consensus across the Chamber.The Prime Minister set out the reasons why he felt that it was necessary to send British reinforcements. He took time to explain them and to try to take the House with him. My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made a comprehensive and perceptive speech. Above all, it was a balanced speech which actually managed to avoid the polarisation to which this issue, I am afraid, all too easily lends itself. His analysis, in a sense, served to emphasise that there is no easy solution to this problem. We all know that that is why we must redouble our efforts to try to bring some peace to Bosnia.
That is why we state without hesitation that we are not looking for the withdrawal of British troops. In fact, the barbaric action of the Bosnian Serbs in seizing hostages has once again reunited the House. Almost every Member has spelt that point out and shared that view. It is because of that barbaric action that the United Nations effort in Bosnia has been brought to crisis point yet again.
That crisis must be used for two primary purposes, one immediate and the other longer term. The first objective, one on which I believe there is complete consensus, is a matter of the greatest urgency--the release of the hostages. Of course we shall not probe the Secretary of State for Defence or the Foreign Secretary on that point; we know that they will be using all their best endeavours to ensure that release.
The Opposition believe that the perpetrators of the outrage must be brought to book and charged with war crimes. We have said that repeatedly, and there is no better time than now to press the demand. The behaviour of the Bosnian Serbs has been unforgivable; they have really crossed the rubicon this time. We all hope and pray that the captives will soon be released unharmed--a point made forcefully by the Members from Wales who have spoken on behalf of their constituents. But of course any response must be calculated and balanced. It must not be based purely on anger or revenge, because those motives will not serve us well.
We support and appreciate the Government's speedy reaction in announcing the reinforcements of further British troops. That action was correct, and we recognise that after such haste any decision will need further working out. Some of the answers may not be readily apparent, and we would not expect the Government to provide us with precise details today. However, 72 hours after the initial decision it is important for the Secretary of State to attempt to end some of the confusion and to clarify the situation.
In particular, if we are to put the lives of our young men and women at risk we have the right to expect the Secretary of State to announce the changed nature of the mission. There seems to have been confusion over the past mandate, and as we look towards a changed mandate it is important that the troops whom we are sending to Bosnia are aware of what the new mission is.
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That is something that the military always ask me. If they are critical at all--and they rarely are in Bosnia--I think that sometimes, in their heart of hearts, they are a little unsure of what their precise mission is. We shall be rather unhappy if the Secretary of State cannot be a little more forthcoming about what he expects of the troops whom we are sending out there. As he knows, the nature of the troops and the armaments that we are sending add a potential for a great escalation of the situation in Bosnia.We, and the whole House, want to be certain that the Government have a clearly worked-out strategy. If there has been an undertone running through the debate among certain Members, it has been the fear that we shall be sucked into a quagmire in Bosnia. That could easily happen, but it does not need to happen. That, however, will depend on the Government adopting a strategic approach. We should certainly like to know how they see this aspect of the problem. I have gone on at some length about this point because I think it is important. It is perhaps worth reflecting on the history of why our troops were first sent to Bosnia and why we have had almost to treble their numbers now. They were, of course, originally sent out to escort the humanitarian convoys--to get the food and medicine through. As time went on, we found that more was needed. The second aspect of their mission then became clear, with the establishment of the safe havens. By definition, safe havens have to be safe. We now know that they are not really safe, because not enough nations were prepared to supply enough troops to make them so.
I was in Gorazde immediately before it was declared a safe area, although in effect it already was one. It was manned, ostensibly, by a Nordic battalion, consisting of a Nordic commander, a Kenyan, a Dutch deputy and seven other ranks--10 soldiers in all to look after an area of250 sq km.
It is worth reminding ourselves when we talk about Europe and NATO that not only western Europe is involved. We should not forget the Bangladeshis, the Kenyans or the New Zealanders serving in Bosnia. Of course our own troops must be our first priority and interest in the context of military action and changing the mandate, but we must not forget that the United Nations has gone to a great deal of expense and spent a great deal of time in ensuring that some of these troops are adequately kitted out. Some time ago, there were reports of Bangladeshi troops in the Bihac enclave with one rifle between four men. That puts the difficult task of changing the mandate in context.
Several of my right hon. and hon. Friends have tried today to draw out the Secretary of State on the point to which I shall come next. Several countries that belonged to the former Warsaw pact have been active, too: Russia, Ukraine, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.A number of their troops have been taken hostage as well, which shows how much conditions have changed.
I wish to press the Secretary of State on the safe havens. There have been well-founded reports to the effect that the whole idea is to be abandoned. There are also well-founded reports that the Secretary-General of the United Nations believes that the three eastern safe havens, Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde, cannot be sustained and may have to be abandoned. That changes the nature of the game, but we understand why the Secretary- General thinks it necessary.
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When the safe havens were created in 1993, the Secretary-General asked the Security Council for 34,000 additional troops. In the end, he had to be satisfied with 7,500, and not even all of them were delivered. So he has had an impossible task. As the Secretary of State for Defence knows, the Royal Welch Fusiliers in Gorazde were not having an easy time of it even before the kidnappings. They have been short of water and supplies and their lives have been pretty intolerable. We want to know what efforts the Government are making at the United Nations--we are, after all, a permanent member of the Security Council--to deal with that problem. Before I leave the subject of safe havens, I wish to press a point that Labour Members have made for two years. When will the safe havens be demilitarised? It is unacceptable for safe havens to be used for military bases, as it upsets the military balance. Action must be taken if the safe havens are to be meaningful.The change of policy and responsibility in Bosnia has been gradual. The problems of containment have been put at the top of the Ministry of Defence briefing notes, but they were not made explicit previously. I do not quibble with the present policy, because we must try to stop the flames spreading to the rest of the Balkans. But the pre-emptive stationing of troops in Macedonia--for which we have argued for a long time--means that an extra responsibility is placed on the troops.
We must ensure that the troops have a clear mandate and a clear mission, and that they have the facilities that they need to carry out their duties with the minimum of risk to their lives. We may well be adding to the mandate, and it is important that the Secretary of State for Defence brings the House more into his confidence on this issue without supplying any details that might put at risk our troops or make their tasks more difficult.
The other point which concerns us is the issue of command and control. Clearly, the UN has learnt a great deal, and obviously its experience in Bosnia has been unique. We are all learning as we go on. Things have been better since NATO took on a large part of the command structure, but there are basic problems.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield made it clear that it is difficult to have an effective system of unified command and control where the soldiers on the ground who wear the blue helmets are neutral, while at the same time and under an associated command the forces in the air--which are also under the remit of those wearing the blue helmet--are carrying out offensive actions. That problem must be addressed, as it has exacerbated the situation and is certainly responsible for the current hostage situation.
Sir Patrick Cormack: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
Dr. David Clark: I apologise, but I am short of time. I want to give the Secretary of State time to answer my questions.
That point must be clarified in relation to the deployment of the extra troops we are sending. As I understand it, the first two tranches of new troops will be working in BRITFOR under Brigadier Pringle in the south-west section. That is fairly clear. But will they be used for any other purpose other than supplementing
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British troops? Will they be used as a rapid reaction force to go to other parts of Bosnia to relieve and help out other troops under UN command?Has the Secretary of State clarified the status under which the 24 Air Mobile Brigade group will be operating? The brigade is the largest contingent of our troops. We have seen reports that they will not go under the UN flag or wear the blue helmets, but will be attached to the British contingent. Does that mean that General Smith will have dual command? Will he be a double-hatted general? From where will 24 Air Mobile take its orders? Will it be from the UN in New York, or from the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall? I hope that I am not being too specific, but it is important that the House is aware of the problems.
Dr. Spink: The hon. Gentleman asks for too much detail.
Dr. Clark: Perhaps, but I am sure that the Secretary of State for Defence can deal with my questions.
Hon. Members on both sides of the House referred to the Russian position. Earlier this week, the hon. Member for Wealden and I visited Budapest to talk to politicians from the east and from the west. We know of the deep concern felt by the Russians, and we are aware of the intricacies and detail of command and control. We appreciate the complications of NATO- delivered air cover in conjunction with the UN, which becomes doubly difficult when other nations are not part of the NATO command structure.
We know the intricacies, details and routine of the command structure, but when it comes to a country that is a member of the contact group and is a major player--Russia--it makes no sense to cause offence by not at least keeping that country informed when air strikes are to take place. Leaders of the Duma whom I met in Budapest felt aggrieved and were reluctant to help--and we may need Russia's help when it comes to relieving the hostages and perhaps in other respects. Britain must be more sophisticated in developing that part of her policy.
The Labour party has made it clear that talk of withdrawal is not on the table. We would not be prepared to give in to blackmailers and terrorism. That is not an option. However, we came to play a role in Bosnia--in delivering humanitarian aid and dousing the flames--at the request of the UN. Our troops have done that well and honourably. However, as the Secretary of State for Defence knows, the scenario has changed. As Britain has a permanent seat in the Security Council, we wonder whether the Government will return and address the original problem and policy. It was envisaged that when troops were sent to Bosnia, they would not remain there permanently. There is a roulement of British troops every six months. The Government have said that they are not prepared to allow British troops to enter Gorazde once the Royal Welch Fusiliers leave. The Dutch troops have the same problem in Srebrenica; they took over from the Canadians and nobody will relieve them.
If policy is to be effective, we must be able to reassure the public that Bosnia is not--to use a phrase bandied around today--another Vietnam or Afghanistan.
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