House of Commons Hansard Debates for 8 Jun 1995

Mr. Davis: The orders relate to partnership and co-operation agreements, or PCAs, which the European Union signed with Russia and Ukraine in June 1994. The orders specify the agreements as European treaties under section 1(3) of the European Communities Act 1972. The agreements are mixed. In other words, some of the provisions fall within Community competence, while others fall within the competence of member states. That means that before they come into force, the agreements must first be ratified by all 15 member states of the European Union and by the Parliaments of Russia or Ukraine, as the case may be. The European Parliament must also give its assent to the agreements.

Mr. Christopher Gill (Ludlow): Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Davis: May I press on a little?

Mr. Gill: Will my hon. Friend give way on that specific point?

Mr. Davis: If my hon. Friend insists.

Mr. Gill: Can my hon. Friend confirm that the European Parliament has declined to ratify the agreement between the European Union and the Russian Federation?

Mr. Davis: That is the case at the moment. In the case of the UK, the draft orders need to be approved by both Houses so that we may ratify the agreements. The orders were approved in another place on 18 April. If this House chooses to approve the orders, they will then be submitted to the next meeting of the Privy Council.

I should like to give the House some background to the negotiations of the agreements, to highlight the main points and to place in context our broader relations with Russia and Ukraine. In doing so, I hope to demonstrate to the House how the agreements will make a substantial and practical contribution to the process of reform in Russia and Ukraine. They are therefore good for Russia, good for Ukraine, good for the United Kingdom and good for our objective of spreading prosperity and security across Europe.

Past relations between the European Community and the Soviet Union were governed by a modest trade and co-operation agreement signed in 1989. That agreement provided a basic framework for managing trade relations and for what co-operation existed at that time. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the European

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Community--under the stewardship of the UK's presidency in 1992--decided to intensify its relations with each of the newly emerging independent states.

The new situation called for a new kind of relationship based on partnership and practical co-operation, to help those countries through the difficult process of fundamental political and economic reform. The partnership and co-operation agreements, which are individually tailored to suit the requirements of each state, are designed to provide a practical and workable framework for that co-operation. The first such agreement was signed with Ukraine on 14 June 1994. Ten days later, after two years of negotiation, an agreement with Russia was signed in the margins of the Corfu European Council. President Yeltsin signed for Russia.

Since then, similar agreements have been signed with Moldova and Belarus. Slightly less wide-ranging agreements have been signed with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. We expect to lay draft orders on those agreements later in the year. We hope that it will soon be possible to negotiate partnership and co -operation agreements with the remaining countries of the former Soviet Union. But as I shall explain, the agreements contain important political and economic obligations, and we first need to be satisfied that those countries are in a position to fulfil such obligations.

Ratification of EU agreements can take years, so it is likely to be some time before the partnership and co-operation agreements with Russia and Ukraine enter into force. To bridge that gap, the European Union has negotiated interim agreements with each country. Those agreements will bring into early effect the trade provisions of the wider-ranging PCAs. As the House is aware, signature of the interim agreement with Russia has been delayed for reasons that I shall discuss later.

The partnership and co-operation agreements are explicitly based on respect for democratic principles. They aim to intensify political and economic links between the EU and Russia and Ukraine. That is to be achieved through regular political contacts, increased trading opportunities and wide- ranging economic co-operation. I shall highlight one or two of their most important features.

Mr. Harold Elletson (Blackpool, North): Will my hon. Friend give way?

Mr. Davis: If my hon. Friend does not mind, I do not want to give way to interruptions all the way through my speech.

First, the agreements envisage regular political dialogue at all levels. The PCA sets up a framework for regular consultations including, in the case of Russia, biannual summits between the Presidents of the Council, the Commission and Russia. In the hierarchy of the EU's external relations, that means that the EU will have the same high-level contacts with Russia as with the United States. The agreements also set up co-operation councils in which Ministers will meet once a year to review the agreements and explore ways of building on them.

Secondly, the agreements are an important step in building closer trading links. They provide the Russians and Ukrainians with a route into the world market economy. In particular, they provide for the mutual abolition of quotas on most goods; most-favoured nation treatment on tariffs; and the abolition of discriminatory

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internal taxes. But we do not intend to stop there. The agreements open up the prospect of negotiations--in 1998--about eventual free trade areas.

Thirdly, the agreements make it easier for us to do business. In particular, they set out terms on which our companies can set up in each other's territory; provide a clear regulatory framework for investment; and aim to bring Russian and Ukrainian practice into line with the European Union's in important areas such as the protection of intellectual property. Making it easier for people to do business in Russia and Ukraine is one of the most effective and practical ways in which we can help their economies develop.

Fourthly, the agreements provide for continued economic co-operation under the TACIS programme of technical assistance to help entrench real reform in Russia and Ukraine.

The agreements are an important first step in the process of integrating Russia and Ukraine into the wider framework of European economic co- operation. They set up a regulatory framework for trading and investing in Russia and Ukraine. They will therefore provide a more stable climate in which EU traders and investors can operate. They are an important first step, but they represent the beginning of a process, not the end.

The agreements contain an evolutionary clause, which will allow us to continue developing closer political and economic ties. The objective of a free trade area provides Russia and Ukraine with an incentive to continue the kind of economic reform that we want them to pursue. Helping Russia and Ukraine to develop proper, functioning market economies is the best way in which we can help them achieve greater prosperity. That is in their interests and ours. As well as helping to underpin our security through their prosperity, that process creates new markets, bringing greater opportunities for European exporters.

The agreements offer a practical example of the European Union serving the purposes that we want it to serve: encouraging political and economic reform; promoting more open, liberal trade; and making it easier for our businesses to explore new markets. Those are key UK objectives. Through the agreements, the EU is helping us achieve those objectives.

I shall say a few words about the political context in which we are addressing the agreements. The agreement with Russia was signed amid great optimism about the prospects for Russia's relations with the west. Events in Chechnya have cast a cloud over that relationship. Some people have said that the west should punish the Russians by withdrawing co-operation. We believe that that would be a mistake. The west cannot, and does not, turn a blind eye to what is going on in Chechnya, but we shall not help our powers of influence over the Russian Government by closing off all avenues of co- operation. More specifically, some people say that it is wrong to proceed with the Russia PCA until the situation in Chechnya is resolved. I see the weight of that argument, but it is important to remember that we are in the middle of a long process. The ratification procedures of some other EU member states will take longer than our own. We are not committing ourselves at this stage to bringing the agreement into force on a particular date.

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Once every member state and the European Parliament have ratified the PCA, a separate decision will still be needed to bring it into force, and it will then be right to assess the position in Chechnya before proceeding to take that final step. That will be the most effective moment to use the agreement to influence Russian behaviour--if we judge that to be necessary at the time.

That, however, is still some way off. In the meantime, our overall objective--to underpin political and economic reform in Russia--will remain unchanged. I therefore ask the House to demonstrate its support for that long-term objective by approving the principles behind the partnership and co-operation agreement.

Meanwhile, the interim agreement is now ready for signature. But European Union Foreign Ministers decided that, before they would approve signature of the agreement, progress would be required over Chechnya in four areas: co-operation with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe; discussions leading towards a political settlement; access for humanitarian aid; and moves towards a ceasefire. There has been considerable progress against those criteria: the Russians have allowed the establishment of a permanent OSCE presence in Chechnya; discussions with Chechen representatives are under way; and humanitarian aid is freely flowing into the areas worst affected by the conflict. A permanent ceasefire has not yet been established, but that is not solely within Russia's gift. There have, however, been encouraging moves in that direction.

The Foreign Affairs Council, meeting on 29 May, noted the progress made and hoped that, with further progress over a ceasefire, signature would shortly be possible. We should like that to happen sooner rather than later, as continued delay in signature risks damaging the wider EU-Russia relationship and, with a lengthy guerrilla war in Chechnya now possible, there is little more leverage to be extracted from the interim agreement. As I said, we may wish to return to that question when deciding whether to give final approval to the main agreement. Our decision then will depend on the evolution of events in Chechnya and the extent to which they are controlled by Russia in the meantime.

In my view, it is no less important that the European Union does everything in its power to help Ukraine achieve stability and prosperity as an independent, sovereign nation, but we cannot do that for it. I am delighted that the Ukrainian Government now appear genuinely committed to establishing real, lasting economic and political reform. The partnership and co-operation agreement will help that process along.

I am pleased that the EU and Ukraine have taken an important step forward by signing the interim agreement in Brussels last week. One important element of our co-operation with Ukraine is on nuclear safety. In that context, I particularly welcome the commitment made by President Kuchma to close down the Chernobyl power station by the year 2000. I am encouraged that that decision has enabled the EU to release substantial amounts of much-needed balance of payments assistance.

It is clearly in all our interests that the process of reform in the former Soviet Union, especially in Russia and Ukraine, should succeed. The success of that process does not lie entirely in our hands. I believe, however, that through those agreements, the European Union will make a significant contribution to help that process along.

I commend the orders to the House.

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5.59 pm

Ms Joyce Quin (Gateshead, East): The Opposition do not seek to divide the House or to oppose formally the orders giving our consent to the partnership agreements with Russia and Ukraine. Having listened carefully to the Minister, and having agreed with many of the things that he said, we none the less wish to express reservations and ask questions, because a great many issues are raised by the orders and we are considering together two countries that are very different economically, politically and socially. As the Minister said, the partnership agreements are wide- ranging, covering many different aspects, but I agree with him that the provisions concerning political dialogue and respect for human rights are especially important. We feel especially worried about those issues when considering the present position in Russia.

Obviously, it is correct, as the Minister said, that we should look to the long term. In the long term, we have the possibility of creating a huge economic free trade area--a huge market which, if it is established in circumstances of economic growth, might be of enormous benefit to the newly democratising countries and to us in the west.

I shall say a few words about each of the agreements in turn, beginning with the one that relates to Ukraine.

I think that there is a general feeling, which I believe was reflected in the discussion about the agreements that took place in another place, that Ukraine has achieved a great deal lately, especially in its efforts to make economic reforms. Certainly, great satisfaction was expressed, which I echo, with the fact that Ukraine has signed and acceded to the nuclear non- proliferation treaty. We very much welcome the agreement that has been reached and, one hopes, will be implemented, concerning the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. Many of us were greatly moved by accounts that have been given recently of the enormous number of children--1 million--who have been maimed and damaged by the effects of fallout from Chernobyl. We know how very widely those effects have spread, not only in Ukraine but throughout the continent of Europe and even further afield. We know too that Ukraine, in its present economic position, finds it difficult to tackle these problems and to make proper provision concerning the closing down of the Chernobyl power station. For that reason, we very much welcome the balance of payments support agreement that was signed in December 1994. Perhaps, if the Minister is replying to the debate, he will say something about the way in which that will work in practice, about what the effects--if any--have been, and about the precise way in which he envisages further economic co- operation between the European Union and Ukraine developing.

As I understand it, agriculture is not part of those partnership and co- operation agreements; perhaps the Minister will give us more information about that. Was agriculture mentioned as a concern by Ukraine in its discussions about the agreement? I ask that especially as Ukraine was traditionally the bread basket of the entire region and, in the right circumstances, obviously might have a very important agricultural role to play. It may be a sector of the Ukrainian economy that can be part of future economic success, although circumstances need to be rather different from now.

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While I have said that we approve of many of the political and economic changes that have taken place in Ukraine recently, I am aware that there are many current difficulties between the President of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Parliament. Perhaps the Minister will give us up-to-date information about that. Certainly it appeared as if the President was going to appeal to the people over the heads of Parliament and the other political institutions, but that move to hold a referendum was, as I understand it, being blocked by Parliament. It would be interesting to know whether there are any further developments on the political front that the Minister feels that he can share with the House in replying to the debate. I shall now turn to the agreement with Russia. Obviously, I agree with the Minister that it is terribly important to do everything that we can to help economic and political reform in Russia, and that we must keep our eyes fixed on the long-term benefits of achieving that. However, the difficulties and obstacles to that reform process are very great, and are not helped by various political actions that have been taken recently by the Russian Government.

The hon. Member for Ludlow (Mr. Gill), in one of his attempts to intervene on the Minister, drew attention to the fact that the European Parliament has said that it does not wish the partnership agreement with Russia to be ratified until more progress is made in resolving the Chechnya situation and in tackling abuses of human rights and responding to the anxieties very strongly felt in the European Union about that matter.

Opposition Members can sympathise with the opinion of the European Parliament about that, and it was a factor in the decision not to ask for a Division in the House this evening that we know that reservations are being expressed there, and that the ratification procedure is unlikely to be quick in any case. We hope that, during that ratification procedure, some progress may be made, especially regarding Chechnya.

I also understand that the ratification procedure, which, as the Minister explained, is sometimes slower in some other European countries than in ours, has run into difficulties in Denmark. Perhaps the Minister has some information about that, which he can share with us.

In Chechnya, appalling atrocities have been committed, a great many innocent civilians have been killed and large numbers of people have been dispossessed of their homes. The Russian population in Chechnya has suffered appallingly in that conflict, as well as the Chechen population. In spite of what the Minister said about OSCE involvement in Chechnya, which I welcome, there appears to be a marked absence of negotiations between the Russian Government and representatives of the Chechen people. Many of us would like to be assured that there will be negotiations in future and that the appalling military action, which has caused such widespread concern and dismay elsewhere in the world, will not continue.

Obviously, when we deal with Russia, it is important, as my hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary wrote in an interesting article, that we do not put all our eggs in the Yeltsin basket. There has been a tendency in the west to stick with the person in power whom we know, because of fear of change. Yet there is plenty of evidence to show that many political groups and movements in Russia were deeply distressed at events in Chechnya, and opposed the actions of Yeltsin in that part of the world. We need to

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ensure that our links across the democratic board in Russia are as good as possible from now on, and that we do not simply seek to bolster one side without having links with everyone who is interested in democratic and economic reform in that country. The political dialogue envisaged by the partnership agreements is a very important element, but we must use that dialogue to ensure that the reform process is underlined and not undermined.

We discussed the partnership agreements generally in European Standing Committee B on Tuesday 28 February this year and I was a little disappointed by some of the comments of the Minister's colleague, the right hon. and learned Member for Grantham (Mr. Hogg). Members of the Committee asked him about some of the most contentious and difficult aspects of the negotiations and he replied that, as he was not a party to those negotiations, it was difficult for him to identify the controversial matters.

I would welcome the Minister's confirmation of the most difficult and controversial areas. The documents that we have are detailed and technical, but they do not reveal the political feeling or the climate of opinion that surrounded the negotiations. I think that it would be useful for hon. Members to be aware of the flavour of the negotiations and what, if anything, caused particular difficulty. It is interesting that both partnership and co-operation agreements contain articles relating to labour conditions. Article 23 of the partnership and co-operation agreement with Russia states:

"Russian nationals, legally employed in the territory of a Member State shall be free from any discrimination . . . as regards working conditions, remuneration or dismissal, as compared to its own nationals".

I tackled the right hon. and learned Member for Grantham about that issue when we considered it in the European Standing Committee. It seems very ironic that the Government have agreed to that labour clause, of which I approve very much, yet they have done their best to ensure that British nationals who are working in Germany--under what, as a good Geordie, I like to refer to as the "Auf Wiedersehen, Pet" directive--do not enjoy the same good working conditions as German nationals who are employed by the same firms. It seems rather odd that the Government are prepared to see Russian nationals win those concessions but, at the same time, to deny such concessions to our own nationals. Perhaps the Minister will address that issue when he replies to the debate.

I turn to another subject that I have referred to previously in Committee and which I do not apologise for bringing before the House. I am concerned about the relatively low level of trade that the United Kingdom has with the countries of central and eastern Europe, including Russia and Ukraine. The figures supplied to me by the House of Commons Library show that Britain comes behind Germany--which is well in the lead--France, Italy and, in some cases, the Netherlands in our level of trade with Russia and Ukraine. Our trade situation is deplorable in central and eastern Europe generally and we are losing out in terms of both exports and imports.

I am convinced that those countries, such as Germany, Italy and France, which have built up close trading relationships with the countries of central and eastern

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Europe, including Russia and Ukraine, will benefit from that trade in the long term. It is extremely disappointing that we have slipped behind in our trade with those countries--indeed, it has been a consistent slip over four or five years.

That is particularly disappointing because as long ago as 1989 the Select Committee on Trade and Industry detected a tremendous willingness among the countries of central and eastern Europe to trade with the United Kingdom. The Select Committee also pointed out that the English language was being used more widely in the countries of central and eastern Europe to the extent that it was becoming the second language after the countries' native languages. It is extremely disappointing that we have not built up our trade with those countries in the way that we anticipated.

I do not know whether the Government are addressing that problem across all Departments, but they certainly should do so in order to ensure that we can build close trading relationships. I am certain that that will lead in turn to close political relationships, which are sure to be of benefit in the future.

Mr. Tony Banks (Newham, North-West): My hon. Friend makes an interesting point about the widespread use of the English language. Perhaps by allocating more resources to the British Council, which is doing excellent work in Russia at present, we could extend the knowledge of this country overseas. I think that our language is probably our most exportable commodity, but unfortunately we do not seem to recognise that fact.

Ms Quin: I agree with my hon. Friend. I also pay tribute to the work of the British Council, but I believe that its activities could be expanded in the future. The same is also true of the BBC World Service. The BBC is involved in some very innovative and exciting projects, in partnership with organisations in Russia and throughout central and eastern Europe. However, that work is on a fairly small scale and, in view of the status of English as a world language, my hon. Friend makes an extremely valid point.

Investment is obviously also important. I understand that the partnership and co-operation agreements contain incentives for investment in Russia and Ukraine. It would be interesting to learn whether the Government have a strategy for ensuring that those investment opportunities work to our advantage.

In conclusion, I make it clear that, in allowing the partnership agreements to be approved today, we are not approving of everything that is happening in Russia, in particular, or in Ukraine. We wish to encourage those countries to do better and the agreements constitute a mechanism through which dialogue between our countries can continue. I hope that we shall be able to explain our attitudes not only to one or two people in the Governments of those countries, but on a wider basis with the wider democratic forces within the countries.

It is vital to strike up the right relationship with the countries of central and eastern Europe, especially Russia, Ukraine and the newly independent states. The peace, security, prosperity and well-being of our continent--and indeed of the whole world--depend upon it. We must exert ourselves to the utmost to ensure that there is political and economic reform in those countries and that the basis for real long-term stability and prosperity is created.

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6.7 pm

Mr. David Atkinson (Bournemouth, East): As we have heard, the ratification of the partnership agreement with the Russian Federation is being threatened with delay because of its actions in Chechnya. This is the first opportunity that the House has had to debate the situation in Chechnya since the Adjournment debate of my hon. Friend the Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Elletson) a few months ago. It gives us a chance to make clear what we expect of the Russians in order to encourage the European Parliament and the member states of the European Union to ratify the agreement. My hon. Friend the Minister has referred to some of our demands in that regard. I must stress how much I welcome the agreements in principle. The pursuit of greater political and economic co-operation must be in all our interests. The agreement with Russia represents a clear acknowledgement of the progress that that country is making in its commitments to democracy, human rights, a market economy, and security and co-operation in Europe which were enshrined in the Charter of Paris of November 1990, whose signatories included President Gorbachev and my right hon. and noble Friend Baroness Thatcher. That charter, signed by the CSCE summit, symbolically ended the cold war in Europe.

Since then, the Soviet Union has been replaced by its 15 independent republics, most of which are making progress at varying speeds towards our standards of democracy and human rights. For the past four years, it has been my good fortune to have presided over the non-member countries committee of the Council of Europe, which monitors that progress and recommends when applicant countries qualify for membership to our Parliamentary Assembly. I am delighted to see the hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Cummings) in his place. He is a valuable member of the committee. I should also mention the hon. Member for Newham, North-West (Mr. Banks), who is a valuable member of the British delegation on the Council of Europe.

Today, the three Baltic states are members of the Council of Europe and in two weeks' time the Parliamentary Assembly will debate the accession of Moldova. Until its action in Chechnya, Russia had been making good progress towards satisfying our qualifications for membership. It had held free and fair elections to its two parliamentary chambers, the Federal Council and the state Duma. It is evolving a pluralist party system. More than 70 per cent. of its work force is now in the private sector and most, but by no means all, human rights are being respected in Russia today.

Towards the end of last year, it seemed to some of us that the two organs of the Council of Europe--its Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers--would be prepared to turn a blind eye to Russia's constitutional shortcomings and the clear inadequacies in its legal order and invite it into full membership of the Parliamentary Assembly in time, symbolically, for the 50th anniversary of VE day last month.

Russia's action in Chechnya, however, put paid to that, and rightly so. We have now suspended our consideration of Russia's application until we are satisfied with the response to the terms of the resolution that we passed on

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2 February similar to the terms of the resolution passed by the European Parliament, which is holding up the ratification of the agreement before us tonight.

The principal concern behind our resolution was that Russia had demonstrated for all to see, even while it was pressing to join the Council of Europe, that it was prepared to ignore the entire purpose of the Council of Europe's existence--that never again should force be used to resolve our disputes. Moreover, for Russia, the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and all the mechanisms of the Organisation for Security and Co- operation in Europe to avoid conflict and resolve disputes peacefully, counted for nothing. Since then, events in Russia have shown that a great deal of progress remains to be made on constitutional issues. For example, the right checks and balances must be achieved between the executive and the legislature and between the presidency and the Parliament, and there must be some control and accountability of the army before we can seriously consider the accession of Russia to the Council of Europe.

In respect of Chechnya, how do we expect the Russians to respond in order to encourage us to ratify the agreement before us tonight? My hon. Friend the Minister mentioned some of those demands and they are similar to those of the Council of Europe. First, we want an end to the military action. Ceasefires have been announced on a number of occasions, but the use of force continues in Chechnya, with a great deal of bloodshed on both sides.

Secondly, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other international organisations must be able to provide humanitarian assistance to the region without hindrance and interruption. I was glad to hear my hon. Friend the Minister report that that is now taking place. However, it is not yet enough, and I am sure that the organisations will require greater accessibility to the area where their assistance is most needed.

Thirdly, we seek the establishment of a political dialogue to solve the conflict and dispute peacefully using OSCE mediation in consultation with the Council of Europe. Although an OSCE mission is present, there remains hesitation on the part of Moscow in accepting its mediating role. Yet we already know from that mission that a Tartarstan form of autonomy would have been negotiable even before the conflict began, and could still form the basis of a settlement. When the mechanisms of the OSCE are used as in the case of the Baltic states, in Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, it can bring peace and the prospects of a solution acceptable to both sides, and where it has not been used as in Bosnia and, until now in Chechnya, it is war.

Our refusal to ratify this agreement with the Russian Federation, together with the suspension of Russia's application to membership of the Council of Europe is about as much as we can do to convince the Russian leadership that its old habits must die, however hard, if Russia is to be accepted into our common European hope.

Such a stand today is necessary to strengthen the forces of reform and democracy in Russia, as well as reflecting the concerns of the majority of the Russian people about the action in Chechnya. It is as well to make that stand now before the crucial parliamentary elections in December and the equally important presidential elections

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next year. Not to do so would encourage the forces of darkness which are still so prominent in Russia and which would return Russia to its old ways and plunge Europe back into a cold war.

6.16 pm

Mr. Tony Banks (Newham, North-West): I shall be very brief, as I decided to seize the opportunity to speak. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Atkinson) for saying what he did about our work on the Council of Europe. He is a highly respected and prominent member of the Council and does exceedingly good work there. I pay a genuine tribute to him.

I have returned from St. Petersburg, where I was making a programme for the BBC which will be on television next Wednesday evening, 14 June. It is called "The Travel Show" and goes out at about 8 o'clock. It is probably worth seeing for one thing only. We went to a prison in St. Petersburg on the banks of the Neva to see a most amazing sight. It is an absolutely appalling looking place and we could see the prisoners leaning out of windows waving their hands to their relatives and friends, who were standing on the other sides of the road by the river. The prisoners spit darts fashioned in the shape of a funnel and weighted down with a piece of chewed bread. It sounds strange, but the darts are extremely accurate. Those prisoners will do wonderfully well if they want to take up playing darts for real. They spit the darts out of the window to the other side of the road. It is very broad road, almost like a dual carriageway. Their relatives open up the funnels and extract the messages.

I raise the matter because it is an appalling abuse of human rights. The messages inside the funnels were in Russian, but I had them translated. I intend to present them to the committee on human rights in Strasbourg. The funnels contained such messages as, "We are not allowed visits. You cannot get a visit from a relative unless you are prepared to pay. We are crowded 13 into a cell. Why do not you bring the film crew into the prison and see what is actually happening?" That would have been interesting, but I doubt whether the Russian authorities would have allowed us to do so.

I say this because it seems a good opportunity to raise the issue and ask the Minister to make some representations to the Russians. We want the Russians to be fully integrated into the Council of Europe. We want good relations with the Russians in terms of the European Union and trading arrangements, but there is a price to pay; it is a basic price that includes human rights. In that one experience, I could see that human rights were being totally flouted and it is right to raise these matters with the Russians and ask them for a proper and adequate explanation.

6.19 pm

Mr. Christopher Gill (Ludlow): I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for calling me so early in this important debate. I am naturally disappointed that the Minister did not allow me to intervene during his introduction to the debate, to seek clarification of why it is considered so important that these agreements be translated ultimately into treaties. Perhaps at the end he will explain that. As for the rest, I admired the picture

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that he painted of motherhood and apple pie, but I hope that the House will forgive me if I do not go down the same route. Next week, a book called "The Perestroika Deception" will be published as a successor volume to a book entitled "New Lies for Old", in which the author, Anatoly Golitsyn, a Russian defector now living in deep cover in the west, predicted with chilling accuracy the nature and intentions of Soviet strategy--a strategy to which these agreements could be said to form a useful addition.

I hope that the House will bear with me if I take the opportunity that the debate affords to express my misgivings about these agreements. As a business man, I question the wisdom of entering into a collective agreement over which one has little or no control. I also question the wisdom of entering into agreements that are open-ended, and agreements with other parties--in this case, the Russian Federation--whose integrity is open to question.

One of the apparent contradictions between the words and actions of Russian leaders is well represented by their military inventory. It may interest the House to hear one or two quotations in this regard. On 10 January this year Lieutenant General James Clapper, United States air force, director of the United States Defence Intelligence Agency, testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as follows:

"we continue to note large investments in their deep underground program".

The highly respected US defence analyst Sven Kraemer wrote in the fall 1994 issue of Strategic Review :

"Russia's network of superhardened deep tunnels and command and control bunkers is designed for nuclear war fighting and survival and remains strategically significant".

I could go on to instance how, next year, the Russian Federation will deploy the intercontinental ballistic missile SS24 known as Topol M, against which the west has no deterrent. According to General Sergeyev, Russia's nuclear commander, interviewed on 22 January 1995, the Russian SS25 ICBMs could be programmed to target the United States in minutes. Four new submarines were delivered in 1993 and another four were launched in 1994. Russia remains a nuclear super-power with at least 9,000 nuclear weapons at its disposal. It retains mobile ICBMs, and possesses the production base to deploy more of them. Neither Britain nor the United States possesses mobile ICBMs.

I am grateful to the Chair for allowing me to stray so far from the topic of this evening's debate, but I thought it important to point out that there is another side to the picture. Much as I commend the Government's efforts to encourage greater trade with eastern Europe and the former USSR, and to encourage friendship with those countries, there are other considerations too.

Whereas I have instanced my feelings as a business man, I now wish to express my opinion as a politician. I question the advisability of entering into an agreement which, among other things,

institutionalises political dialogue. Thirdly, as a Member of the House I am bound to express my extreme disquiet about the procedures that permit so many of the decisions affecting the lives of all the people we represent to be made in the name of the British people but not necessarily by the people whom they elected to represent them.

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Today's debate has its origins in the use or abuse--depending on one's perspective--by the Foreign Office of the royal prerogative. I will go so far as to say that Britain's predicament-- particularly her difficulties over Europe--stems from a much too liberal use of the royal prerogative by the Foreign Office, which routinely enters into agreements with external parties, either bilaterally or collectively, which it then expects Parliament to endorse.

Such was the situation on 28 November last, when Parliament was invited to rubber-stamp the decisions made at the Edinburgh summit in November 1992. What the Government should have done at Edinburgh, but--wittingly or unwittingly--omitted to do, was to warn its European partners that in this country decisions affecting the public purse are the prerogative of this place, not of the Crown. Increasingly, however, our country's destiny is being determined by treaty under the royal prerogative and less and less by decisions taken by the House of Commons.

Mr. Oliver Heald (Hertfordshire, North): Is my hon. Friend suggesting some kind of linkage, in the sense that we should agree to partnership agreements of this sort only if Russia abandons a certain quota of its nuclear weapons?

Mr. Gill: No. I was describing the enormity of the Russian arsenal to demonstrate my belief that we should not accept that the only things that matter in this world are friendliness with the Russians and attempts to do business with them. There are also major practical considerations which we ignore at our peril. I hope that the people of this country, listening to or reading the debate, will not gain the impression that all Members of the House are prepared to do whatever appears expedient in terms of trade and friendship while ignoring a huge Russian arsenal for which I can see no justification.

If we could rely on the absolute loyalty and integrity of the Foreign Office, its extensive use of the royal prerogative might be acceptable. But it is well known that the Foreign Office is driven by its own collectivist ideology which gives priority to reaching open-ended, bilateral and collective accords. As a result, this country's freedom of manoeuvre is being ever more tightly restricted as, increasingly, we become prisoners of agreements into which the Foreign Office has entered on the nation's behalf and which Parliament seldom has the opportunity to debate, still less the ability to demur from.

The agreements are collective and have been entered into by a collective organisation, the European Union. Thus, not only does the Foreign Office tie us up in proliferating and ever more complex treaties and agreements, but the collective organisation to which the Foreign Office has committed us does the same thing in parallel. As a matter of principle, I believe that we should be party to as few agreements and treaties as possible-- especially collective agreements that leave us exposed to open-ended and dangerous pressures. But the Foreign Office apparently adopts the opposite view. The more agreements we sign, it appears, the better. That is instrumental nonsense.

Mr. Heald: Surely we want to build links between the west and the Russian Federation to avoid future

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instability. The agreements that we are discussing will have that effect. In a way, the more agreements we can have, the better.

Mr. Gill: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for intervening, because at last we are having a debate. I was disappointed when my hon. Friend the Minister did not give way to me. It seemed that the debate would have been given a better start if it had not begun with a monologue. I shall be pleased to debate these matters with my hon. Friend. As I advance my argument, I think that he will begin to understand what lies behind my introductory remarks. I hope that he will follow the arguments that I shall deploy.

The gist of my main argument is that the agreements that we are being asked to enter into, with the best of motives, may not necessarily be understood and may not necessarily be in the best long-term interests of the United Kingdom or of the interests of peace and prosperity in western Europe.

I am opposed to agreements with the former Soviet Union because I do not share the evident view of the Foreign Office that the leaders of the former Soviet Union can be trusted. On the contrary, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Russians are pursuing a devious strategy that is designed to lock the western powers into complex arrangements and then to dominate them.

The principle that Russia is following was summed up recently by its Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, when he said:

"The more states are intertwined with one another, the more durable will be the net of their relationships."

That is a succinct summary of the Russian strategy, which is to enmesh the western powers in networks that will render them impotent in every sense of the word.

Russia has a strategy, but we do not. Instead, we have only a series of policies. The difference between a policy and a strategy is that a strategy contains within it a secret manoeuvre or dimension, which is by definition withheld from the public domain, while a policy is openly stated.

My objection to proceeding with the draft agreements is that by endorsing them we shall be furthering the implementation of Russia's strategy to enmesh Britain and other western powers in a collective bloc that is intended to stretch from the Atlantic to Vladivostok.

Ms Quin: The hon. Gentleman will be aware that article 90 refers to a co-operation council that will

"monitor the implementation of this Agreement."

Article 107 states:

"If either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Agreement, it may take appropriate measures."

There is not the open-ended commitment that the hon. Gentleman is claiming.

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