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Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendment No. 6.
Mr. Mitchell: Clause 21 provides for the Secretary of State to recover DNA test fees that he has paid in connection with a paternity dispute when the alleged parent either admits paternity or is adjudged to be the father by a court. Lords amendments Nos. 5 and 6 restrict that power so that, when a court has ordered or requested that the test should be taken, the Secretary of State must apply to the court for the fees to be included in costs awarded to him if he is successful in establishing paternity.
The Government introduced the amendments in another place, because we recognised that it would not be right for officials acting for the Secretary of State to be able to recover DNA test fees when a judge also has discretion to award those fees as part of the court costs. Lords amendment No. 5 acknowledges the important principle that officials should not be able to bypass the courts' discretion to award costs, and I commend it to the House.
Mr. Bradley: We welcome the concession made by the Government. Although the Minister said that they introduced the measure in another place, I think that it relied on an amendment that we tabled in Committee to alter the original Bill. Despite his apparent unwillingness to commend the Opposition's approach, however, we welcome the Government's belated recognition that this is a sensible approach to the recovery of fees.
Lords amendment agreed to.
Lords amendment No. 6 agreed to.
Clause 23
Repayment of overpaid child support maintenance
Lords amendment: No. 7, in page 18, line 49, at end insert-- ("(6A) For the purposes of this section any payments made by a person under a maintenance assessment which was not validly made shall be treated as overpayments of child support maintenance made by an absent parent.")
Mr. Andrew Mitchell: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
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Clause 23 makes provision for the Secretary of State to reimburse overpaid maintenance in cases where it is not possible or appropriate to deal with the overpayment by means of a reduction in the current maintenance assessment. It was always the intention that overpayments arising in any circumstances should be covered by the provisions; it became clear, however, that the clause as drafted did not cover cases in which an overpayment arose as a result of an invalid assessment. Invalid assessments can arise in a number of ways. For example, it may be established following a review or appeal that the Child Support Agency has no jurisdiction to make an assessment. Such cases might include those in which the absent parent was not habitually resident in the United Kingdom, there was no qualifying child or there was already a written maintenance agreement made before 5 April 1993. Cases might also arise in which the absent parent accepted paternity at the time the assessment was made, but subsequently disputed it and was found not to be the father.We do not expect many such cases, but it has always been the intention for them to be included within the provisions of the clause. The amendment agreed to in another place ensures that that policy intention is fulfilled. Without it, absent parents who had overpaid because of invalid assessments might find it difficult to recover those payments. I hope that this House, too, will agree that the amendment is needed.
Mr. Bradley: May I seek clarification of one point? Will the Minister confirm that the amendment deals only with cases in which the CSA itself will refund the overpayment, and not circumstances in which maintenance has been paid to the parent with care and there is an expectation that the parent with care will be responsible for repaying the money to the absent parent? If that is so, we shall be happy to accept the amendment.
Mr. Mitchell: I think that I can go a long way towards meeting the hon. Gentleman's concerns. I can confirm that in cases in which an absent parent is reimbursed maintenance overpaid as a result of official error, careful consideration will be given to whether the parent with care should be required to repay that amount. All the facts surrounding the overpayment will be taken into account, and in cases in which it was due wholly to error by the CSA, it is unlikely that the parent with care would be required to repay.
It is, however, right that there should be flexibility to consider all cases. In many instances, for example, a number of different factors may have contributed to the overpayment. We do not therefore believe that it would be appropriate to legislate specifically for official-error repayments.
Lords amendment agreed to.
Clause 30
Short title, commencement, extent etc.
Lords amendment: No. 8, in page 22, line 40, leave out ("paragraph 1") and insert
("paragraphs 1, 15A, 15B and 15C")
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Mr. Andrew Mitchell: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendments Nos. 12 and 14.
Mr. Mitchell: Northern Ireland has its own child support scheme, under separate Northern Ireland legislation, paralleling the Great Britain scheme. Therefore, few provisions of the 1991 Act or of the Bill--which will become the Child Support Act 1995--apply to Northern Ireland. Those that do apply need to be listed in what will become subsection (6)(c) of section 30 of the 1995 Act.
Amendment No. 8 is a technical amendment that will enable the provisions in paragraphs 15A, 15B and 15C--inserted by Lords amendment Nos. 12, 13 and 14 --to extend to Northern Ireland.
Amendment No. 12 inserts paragraph 15A in schedule 3, which introduces a provision for help with travelling and other expenses for people who are required to attend child support commissioners' oral hearings. Such a provision already exists in social security legislation, but due to oversight, no similar arrangements were made in the Child Support Act 1991. The proposed new paragraph to be added to schedule 4 to the 1991 Act by means of the amendment to schedule 3 to the Bill, will achieve a consistent approach.
Our colleagues in Northern Ireland propose to introduce legislation along those lines for their own purposes in due course. Therefore, the amendment proposes an amendment to paragraph 8 of schedule 4 to the 1991 Act, to prevent provision for travel and other expenses from applying to Northern Ireland. I am sure that hon. Members will agree that this is a worthwhile amendment, which rectifies an omission in the 1991 Act. When dealing with amendment No. 13, I explained the effect of the minor drafting amendment in paragraph 15B, which also needs to extend to Northern Ireland.
Amendment No. 14 inserts paragraph 15C in schedule 3, which enables issues arising from the child maintenance bonus scheme to be considered by the Social Security Advisory Committee. It was never our intention to exclude the child maintenance bonus scheme from the scrutiny of the committee. The amendment makes sure that issues arising from that scheme, which is set up under clause 10 of the Child Support Bill, can be dealt with by the Social Security Advisory Committee. That is achieved by amending the definition of enactments in section 170(5) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 in relation to which the Social Security Advisory Committee can give advice and assistance, to include section 10 of the 1995 Act. A similar change is made to the definition of the Northern Ireland enactments on which the Social Security Advisory Committee can give advice and assistance, including on any enactment corresponding to section 10 of the 1995 Act.
I commend the amendments to the House.
Mr. Bradley: We welcome the amendments and the fact that travelling expenses will be paid for attendance at oral hearings. That brings such hearings into line with similar hearings under social security legislation. We also welcome the fact that the child maintenance bonus can be referred to the Social Security Advisory Committee for its deliberations and comments. I hope that the valued advice that that committee gives to the Minister about the Child
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Support Agency is accepted more readily than many of the committee's current recommendations on other social security matters.I refer especially to the withdrawal of income support for mortgage interest payments. The committee was clear that the Government should not proceed with that, but despite that advice and a wealth of other information, the Government pig-headedly went ahead. I hope that in this case, they will listen carefully to the committee's advice. With that caveat, we welcome the amendments.
Lords amendment agreed to.
Schedule 3
Minor and consequential amendments
Lords amendment: No. 9, in page 29, line 33, at end insert-- (". In section 33 (liability orders), at the end add--
"(5) If the Secretary of State designates a liability order for the purposes of this subsection it shall be treated as a judgment entered in a county court for the purposes of section 73 of the County Courts Act 1984 (register of judgments and orders).")
The Minister for Social Security and Disabled People (Mr. Alistair Burt): I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
The amendment gives the Secretary of State power to apply for a liability order to be entered in the register of county court judgments. Hon. Members may be aware that when an absent parent fails to pay maintenance liability and arrears have built up, the Child Support Agency will make every effort to reach an agreement to repay. If the absent parent refuses to reach such an agreement or reneges upon it, enforcement action must be considered.
In the majority of cases, the first stage in that process is likely to be a deduction from earnings order. However, when that fails or when it cannot be imposed--for example, when the absent parent is self-employed--the agency will ask a magistrates court to make a liability order. There is always a hearing before such an order is granted. A liability order can lead to distress action or to a garnishee or charging order. The amendment will allow an alternative course of action--the placing of the order on the register of county court judgments.
An entry in the register can lead to difficulties for an individual if he seeks credit for personal or business purposes. Experience in other areas has shown that, for that reason, the threat of an entry in the register is an incentive to debtors to pay their liabilities, especially if they are self-employed.
As I said, liability orders are needed only in cases where the absent parent has refused to pay his legal liability and will not co-operate on the repayment of arrears. Absent parents have it within their own hands to avoid a liability order and entry in the register. I stress that liability orders will not be entered automatically in the register. The absent parent will be given ample opportunity to change his mind and co-operate with the agency before it takes the step of having the liability order entered in the register of county court judgments.
Even before an application for a liability order is made to the magistrates court, the absent parent will be advised that if the order is granted, the debt may be entered on the register. When the liability order is granted, he will be given a further warning that registration will be
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considered if arrangements to meet the liability have not been made within a reasonable period. Therefore, the absent parent can easily avoid the consequence of registration by co- operating and meeting his obligations on child maintenance even after a liability order has been obtained.5.45 pm
It is regrettable that there are some obstructive absent parents who deliberately attempt to delay or avoid their responsibility to their children. It is right for us to do all that we can to ensure that parents with care receive promptly the payments to which they are entitled. Our experience of enforcement to date has been such that we think that the extra power would be useful. We took advice from those who regularly deal with such matters, as the House had wished us to do.
I hope that the House agrees that the amendment provides a further effective means of enforcement in cases where absent parents seek to evade their liabilities. I thank all those who have worked so hard in recent years to make what will be the Child Support Act 1995 more workable. That includes Opposition and Government Members, people outside who work on policy developments and people in the agency. I hope that the amendments and the Bill are evidence that the Government have listened to concerns and that they will give the assurance that the Government will continue to listen to representations about problems related to child support. Over the next couple of years, we hope to see improvements built upon the hard work that has been so patiently done by so many.
Mr. Bradley: No one would deny the Minister an opportunity for a reprise on the Child Support Agency. He is already looking 10 years younger than when he was last at the Dispatch Box. I am grateful for his explanation about the introduction of the liability orders. There is a clear need to be even-handed in our approach to the employed and the self- employed and we must ensure that, where possible, there is co-operation on these matters. I am grateful for the assurance that the liability order will not automatically be placed on the register, because the fact that the matter is now in legislation means that there is more likelihood of the self-employed person making his maintenance payments. In that context, we support the amendment. Lords amendment agreed to.
Lords amendment: No. 10, in page 29, line 46, at end insert-- (". In section 46(5) (circumstances in which child support officer may give a reduced benefit direction), after "may" insert ", except in prescribed circumstances,".")
Mr. Andrew Mitchell: I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.
A parent with care who receives or whose partner receives a relevant benefit must give her authority for child maintenance to be sought from the absent parent if she is required to do so by the Secretary of State. If she refuses to give her authority without good cause, section 46 of the Child Support Act 1991 provides that her benefit may be reduced.
The amendment was tabled in another place in response to an Opposition amendment. It would enable the Secretary of State to prescribe the circumstances in which the benefit reduction should not apply, thus adding
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flexibility to the provisions relating to reduced benefit deductions, which already allow for a direction to be suspended. We listened to what was said in another place and are persuaded that where a parent with care or any child living with her is disabled, the benefit reduction may cause particular hardship. Therefore, we intend to introduce regulations as soon as practicable to exempt parents in such circumstances from the reduced benefit direction. The Government have also undertaken to introduce regulations at the same time, to suspend the reduced benefit direction in cases where the parent with care has deductions made from her income support--for example, to repay fuel debts or rent arrears. The benefit reduction is intended to make the parent with care think carefully about her decision not to co-operate, and the Government think that that is right. The amendment will mean that in specific circumstances, where the reduction could cause particular hardship, the reduced benefit direction will not be imposed. I invite hon. Members to accept the amendment.Mr. Bradley: I am grateful for the Minister's explanation of the amendment. Clearly, however, we shall need to see the precise wording of the regulations to be able to determine how they will work in practice and who will be covered by them. Yet again, as we said on several occasions in Committee, we need to see and debate the details of the regulations before we can be certain that they cover the points raised not only in the other place, but in Committee. We are pleased that the Bill is about to complete its passage. We were supportive in the way in which we tabled amendments to the Bill, particularly in terms of the departure direction, and we have facilitated its progress. However, we are still extremely disappointed that the Government have not yet agreed to another fundamental change-- introducing a proper child care disregard to make the legislation truly put children first, by making an additional amount available to the parent with care who so desperately needs the money, rather than having all the money absorbed by the Treasury. There is continuing concern, as shown in the evidence that is being compiled, about the operation of the agency. Recent evidence to the Public Accounts Committee was extremely disturbing in terms of what it showed about the amount being collected and the amount passing from the absent parent to the parent with care.
The Labour party will continue vigorously to monitor the operation of the Act, to ensure that the further amendments that will be required to ensure equity and fairness in the system are brought forward at the earliest opportunity. Although we have facilitated the passage of the Bill, that does not mean that we are satisfied with the operation of the agency or that we are satisfied that the legislation covers all the aspects necessary to ensure that the principle we support--that all parents should take responsibility for the upbringing of their children--is properly defined within legislation.
We shall continue to monitor and look carefully at all aspects of the Act, including the way in which it is administered through the agency, to ensure that there is even-handedness and fairness between the parent with care and the absent parent. We also need to ensure at the end of the day that the real beneficiaries of child support legislation are the children who so desperately need the
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income to maintain a proper living standard and that the parents caring for them, especially those on income support, are not kept in poverty because of the Government's failure to recognise a proper child care disregard.Mr. Andrew Mitchell: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for what he said about the Bill. I am sorry that we were unable to persuade him of the superior benefits of the child maintenance bonus. I have, however, heard what he has said--indeed, I heard it throughout the Committee stage when I was the Government Whip responsible for the Bill. I am, therefore, very familiar with his arguments.
The hon. Gentleman emphasises the importance of the administration of the agency getting better and rendering the service to the parent with care, the absent parent and the taxpayer that we all expect. That is a point that is well made and an aspiration with which hon. Members on both sides will agree.
Lords amendment agreed to.
Lords amendment No. 11 agreed to.
Lords amendment No. 12 agreed to [Special Entry].
Lords amendments Nos. 13 and 14 agreed to.
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Criminal Appeal Bill
Lords amendments considered.
New clause
Recommendation in case of life sentence for murder
Lords amendment: No. 1, after clause 2, to insert the following new clause--
Recommendation in case of life sentence for murder
(". After section 11 of the 1968 Act insert--
"Appeal against recommendation
Appeal against recommendation in case of life sentence for murder.
11A.--(1) Where under section 1(2) of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 a court has made a recommendation to the Secretary of State as to the minimum period which should elapse before he orders the release on licence of a person convicted of murder, the person may appeal to the Court of Appeal against the recommendation.
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, an appeal under this section lies only with the leave of the Court of Appeal.
(3) If the court which made the recommendation grants a certificate that the case is fit for appeal under this section, an appeal under this section lies without the leave of the Court of Appeal.
(4) On an appeal under this section the Court of Appeal, if they consider that a different recommendation should be made, may-- (a) quash the recommendation; and
(b) in place of it declare the period which they recommend to the Secretary of State as the minimum period which should elapse before he orders the appellant's release on licence." )
5.54 pm
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Michael Howard): I beg to move, That this House doth disagree with the Lords in the said amendment.
Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Geoffrey Lofthouse): With this, it will be convenient to discuss Lords amendment No. 46 and the Government motion to disagree.
Mr. Howard: The purpose of the motion is to remove a clause added to the Bill in the other place. The new clause was added by a majority of 16 on Report, against the advice of my right hon. Friend the Minister of State.
The new clause relates to the mandatory life sentence imposed on those convicted of murder. As the House knows, in such cases it is open to the trial judge, when passing sentence, to make a recommendation to the Secretary of State about the minimum period of imprisonment to be served. The judge is not obliged to do so and in practice, formal recommendations are made only in a minority of cases. The new clause would provide a right of appeal against a recommendation made in open court.
When the amendment was debated in the other place, those who spoke in its favour argued that it would rectify an anomaly between discretionary and mandatory life sentences. They believed that it would introduce greater openness into the tariff-setting process and they claimed that it would have no bearing on the role of the Secretary of State, whom Parliament has entrusted with the final decision about tariff in mandatory life sentence cases.
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I have considered the arguments with great care, in deference to the noble Lords who spoke in favour of the new clause. However, I remain firmly of the view that the proposed right of appeal is not only unnecessary, but would introduce anomalies of its own into the tariff-setting procedure.I would like to start by explaining exactly how the tariff--which is the minimum period required for retribution and deterrence--is now set in mandatory life sentence cases. The procedures were substantially overhauled in 1993 following the judgment of the House of Lords in the Doody case. I hope that the House agrees that for the prisoner, the current system is anything but secretive--indeed, it is extremely open.
In every case where an offender is convicted of murder, the trial judge completes a detailed report on the background to the case. Whether or not he has made a formal recommendation in open court, the judge sets out his advice on the minimum period that should be served for retribution and deterrence. This report goes first to the Lord Chief Justice, who adds his own comments and then forwards the report to me. All this normally happens within two or three weeks of the conviction.
The whole of the report, apart from opinions about future risk, is disclosed to the prisoner, together with any other relevant papers, such as details of previous convictions, which will be put to Ministers in due course. This means that in practice, the prisoner sees everything that is relevant to the setting of the tariff. The prisoner is given the opportunity to makeany representations he wishes on the judicial recommendations and the other contents of the report. It is, however, made clear to him that the judicial views are advisory and that the tariff will be set by the Secretary of State. The prisoner's representations, along with the judicial report, are then submitted to Ministers, who make the decision on tariff. This is communicated to the prisoner.
If, after considering the judicial advice and the prisoner's representations, I decide that a tariff higher than that recommended by the trial judge is required for deterrence and retribution, the prisoner is given detailed reasons for that decision and these reasons are, of course, open to scrutiny by the courts by way of judicial review.
To summarise, the prisoner is aware of the judicial view and has the opportunity to make representations. He is then told of the tariff set. If there is any departure from the judicial advice, he is given detailed reasons. Once the prisoner has been informed of the tariff, we are prepared to disclose both the tariff and the judicial recommendation in individual cases to anyone who asks. The process cannot therefore be described as secretive--it could hardly be more open.
The present procedures are fair, open and sensible. They ensure that proper weight is accorded to the advice of the trial judge, who has heard all the evidence, and the Lord Chief Justice, who can bring his wider experience to bear either to confirm the trial judge's advice or to offer a different view. The prisoner has every opportunity to make informed representations before a decision is taken on tariff. The final decision rests with the Secretary of State, who has been entrusted with that responsibility by Parliament as guardian of the public interest. Like my predecessors, I shall always attach great weight to the
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advice of the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice. But I am not bound by it, and in the public interest I can, and do on occasion, take a different view.6 pm
Those arrangements are working well, and appear to command public confidence. They have recently been scrutinised and upheld by the European Court of Human Rights, and fully reflect the Doody judgment, which I mentioned earlier. Against that background, I now turn to examine the new clause and the right of appeal that it proposes. First, it is argued that a right of appeal against recommendations is necessary to rectify an anomaly as between mandatory and discretionary life sentences. But there are differences between the two. In the case of discretionary life sentences, the trial judge is now required by statute to specify the "relevant part" of the sentence in open court. That is the minimum period of detention that the prisoner must serve, and there is a right of appeal against the judge's order as to the relevant part.
In the case of discretionary lifers, however, I have no power to modify the relevant part of the sentence or to substitute a different order. It is therefore entirely right that a judge's a decision should be subject to appeal--otherwise it would be unchallengeable. On the other hand, a formal recommendation in mandatory life sentence cases is just that: a recommendation. It is only one aspect of the tariff-setting process. While I naturally give very careful consideration to any recommendation, and to the views of the Lord Chief Justice, the role of the judiciary in mandatory life sentence cases is purely advisory. The final decision is mine, and my decision is, of course, open to challenge by way of judicial review. As the trial judge's recommendation is only advisory, I see no good reason for building an appeal procedure around it. The recommendation is only one part of the tariff-setting process and it is not binding, unlike the relevant part in discretionary life sentence cases. The perceived anomaly does not therefore exist.
I said earlier that the proposed right of appeal, instead of resolving an anomaly, would introduce anomalies of its own. For example, the proposed right of appeal would be available where a recommendation had been made in open court, which happens only in a minority of cases. That means that some mandatory life sentence prisoners would have a right of appeal against the trial judge's advice on tariff while others would not, depending on whether the judge made his recommendation in open court or in his report to me. I am aware that the Lord Chief Justice has said that, if the amendment became law, he would issue a practice direction to judges advising them to use their discretion to make minimum recommendations in all but the most exceptional cases. But I do not believe that it is necessarily good practice to introduce statutory provisions that depend on a practice direction being issued before they can work sensibly. In any event, such a direction would not be binding on judges.
Even if judges made minimum recommendations in all cases--which is entirely a matter for the judiciary--I am not persuaded that there should be a right of appeal against them. Where there are avenues of appeal against sentence, they are, almost without exception, in cases
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where the court has the final word on the subject--where the Executive has no power to substitute a different order. That is not the position here.A further anomaly is that the Lord Chief Justice has indicated that, if a right of appeal were in place, he would no longer act independently in advising the Home Secretary on tariff lengths. Instead, he would sit in the Court of Appeal in any such case. That would deprive the Home Secretary of a second judicial opinion in cases where there was no appeal by the prisoner against the recommendation. That might be a considerable proportion of cases, and it would certainly include those cases where the judge had erred on the side of an unduly lenient recommendation. That means that, in precisely those cases where it is most necessary for the Secretary of State to consider imposing a longer tariff than that recommended, he would have no second judicial view to help him in reaching a decision.
The present arrangements for setting the tariff in mandatory life sentence cases were substantially overhauled following the judgment of the House of Lords in the Doody case and are working well. They are sensible, fair and open; and they offer the prisoner every opportunity to make informed representations before a decision is made on tariff. The present arrangements ensure that proper weight is accorded to judicial recommendations on tariff, but reflect the fact that Parliament has entrusted the final decision to the Secretary of State. For those reasons, they command public confidence in this highly sensitive category of cases.
I hope that the House will agree that it would be wrong to disturb those arrangements by introducing a new right of appeal that touches on only a part--and not the most significant part--of the tariff-setting process, and which would create anomalies rather than remove them.
Mr. John Hutton (Barrow and Furness): Will the Home Secretary give way?
Mr. Howard: I was about to sit down, but I am happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. Hutton: If the present arrangements are as satisfactory as the Home Secretary says they are, would he care to reflect on the fact that seven out of the 10 Law Lords voted for the amendment moved by the Lord Chief Justice and five former Law Lords also supported that amendment? There would therefore seem to be a judicial consensus that the picture is not as rosy as that painted by the Home Secretary.
Mr. Howard: To a large extent, there is a judicial consensus on the proposition that the whole of our arrangements for mandatory life sentences should be changed and that the Secretary of State should no longer have a role in that decision-making process. I understand that that is not the view of the Labour Front Bench. In a television interview not long ago, the hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) expressed his support--
Mr. Jack Straw (Blackburn): A radio interview.
Mr. Howard: I think that I saw him make the same proposition in a television interview as well. Be that as it may, his views on the subject are reasonably clear: like
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me, he disagrees with the Law Lords' view to which the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Hutton) referred. Although, in supporting this amendment in the other place, those Law Lords disclaimed any intention of addressing, in this context and at this opportunity, the arrangements for mandatory life sentences, one must look at their arguments in the context of their opposition to the present arrangements as a whole. I differ from their views on the present arrangements as a whole, as does the hon. Member for Blackburn. That may be the best answer to the point made by the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness.For all the reasons that I gave before I gave way to the hon. Member for Barrow and Furness, I invite the House to reject the amendments proposed in another place.
Mr. Straw: The debate is not about the merits of the discretionary versus the mandatory system of life sentences. The Secretary of State anticipated me by referring to remarks which, according to the evidence that he gave on my behalf to the Select Committee on 29 March, I made on Radio 4's "Today" programme on 10 December last year. There is no reason why I should not have repeated those remarks on the television programme, except that I do not remember doing so. In that interview, I expressed my view about where the balance of advantage lay between mandatory and discretionary sentences, and that remains my view.
We shall look carefully, as I hope the Home Secretary will, at the report of the Select Committee that is currently considering this matter. We need to do that because, in the words of Baroness Blatch, the Minister of State, Home Office, speaking in the other place, there should be no suggestion that
"the current procedures surrounding the setting of tariffs should remain immutable."
Having made a strong argument in the other place in favour of the system of discretionary life sentences, Baroness Blatch went on to say:
"There may, however, be a case for greater transparency within those procedures where the general public is concerned."
May I say in parenthesis to the Secretary of State that I am grateful to him for the fact that he set out his views in a letter to me and the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) on Friday, because that was very helpful?
I approached this issue from the position of supporting in principle the mandatory life sentence system and I therefore considered the arguments that were advanced with some scepticism. Having done so, I am persuaded of the sense of the amendments moved by their Lordships.
On whether the system can be made more transparent, in the other place, the Minister of State accepted that there could be a case for greater transparency. The Secretary of State referred to the changes that have been made for the better since the Doody judgment. He went on to say that it was therefore wrong to categorise or describe the current system as secret, but that was not exactly the word that the learned Lord Chief Justice Lord Taylor used in the other place. There is a subtle difference here. He used, not "secret" but "secretive". He went on to say:
"Justice in our system is administered in public. It is fundamental that proceedings which lead to conviction and sentence should, wherever practicable, be conducted openly and be subject to appeal. The current procedure involves a quite unnecessary and counter-productive deception on the public."--[ Official Report, House of Lords , 8 June 1995; Vol. 564, c. 1478-84.]
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