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Mr. Frank Cook (Stockton, North): While listening to the debate, I have scribbled down some notes to try to structure a reasoned statement, but it has taken a turn that almost compels me to throw them away.
First, I shall establish my credentials for commenting on the situation in Bosnia. I am a member of the Select Committee on Defence, which has visited Bosnia three times in the past two and a half years--the last time about two months ago. The Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the hon. Member for Upminster (Sir N. Bonsor), who I suppose will wind up the debate, knows all about those visits because he led them as Chairman of the Committee. The Committee visited many military units. I must associate myself with the comments of the right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) because my son was in charge of maintaining the armoured personnel vehicles that went in with the Duke of Wellington's regiment when it made a dash from Vitez to Gorazde to lift the first Serb seige. If we had time--and if you would lift the rules on parliamentary language, Mr. Deputy Speaker--I could tell hon. Members exactly what my son thought about the Bosnian situation.
I have also discussed the Bosnian situation with delegates from many nations in my capacity as a member of the North Atlantic Assembly and of the parliamentary assembly of the Organisation for Security and Co- operation in Europe states, so I am as reasonably well versed about the situation as any hon. Member might claim to be. Bearing that in mind, I must comment on some of the observations made by what I would call couch
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commentators who may not have visited Bosnia, who do not know the terrain and who do not understand the complexities of the situation. We tend to sit here judging the situation with the Geneva convention at the back of our minds. It is not like that. The Bosnian forces do not behave in that manner. The lack of chivalry in Bosnia has to be seen to be believed. Unless we are prepared to take that on board and accept what kind of adversaries we are dealing with among all of the combatants, we are spitting against the wind.Two months ago, 400 hostages--many of them manacled to lamp posts and telegraph poles--were used to deter an air strike. I put it to the House that, in Gorazde, the Bosniac--hon. Members will note that I do not say "Muslim"--army has threatened to use the Ukrainians as hostages and as bodyguards against Serbian fire unless the United Nations authorises NATO air strikes against the Serb forces. What can one do in the face of that sort of treachery? It is an absolutely crazy situation.
We talk about insisting on the re-establishment of frontiers and safe havens that were never safe in the first place. The so-called safe havens were never adequately staffed and the staff were never adequately equipped. When those so-called safe havens are infiltrated by Bosniac elements and used as springboards for launching attacks against encircling Serbian troops, how safe can we expect them to be? The whole situation is fraught with such mendacity that we do ourselves a disservice by trying to make sense of it in terms of the standards that we applied previously according to the Geneva convention.
What should we do? I tried to hint at one option in the very limited time for debate following the statement the other day. When the hostages were held last time, the most effective ally we had--pressured by the Russians--
Mr. Cook: Yes, Milosevic; my right hon. Friend is absolutely correct. He dragged Karadzic to the negotiations and when Karadzic left the negotiations, having been forced to climb down, he had a face like a boy with a smacked bottom. Instead of considering Milosevic's reported claim that he will help if we ease the sanctions, we must make the sanctions ever more stringent and tell Milosevic in clear terms what will happen unless he co-operates to the full in bringing the situation to an end.
We have already broken a federation between the Croats and the Bosniacs in central Bosnia, for which we should give the UN credit. I am not talking only about Britain's part, but that played by the other 41 nations. If we could succeed with the Croats and Bosniacs, who were tearing themselves apart two years ago, there is no reason--given the right approach, pressures and sanctions--why we can not do so with the others. Milosevic helped two months ago, and he can help this week.
What sickens me is the amount of criticism that is levelled at the United Nations. Members of both Front Benches have made the valid point that the UN is us. Having visited Bosnia three times during the past two years, I can tell the House that the United Nations is coming of age through this bloody awful mess. Two years ago, it was chaotic. Twelve months ago, huge improvements were to be seen. This year, the UN is a very good organisation. It is not perfect, but it has real determination and high morale. Instead of using the UN--and Britain is a member of the
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Security Council--as some kind of whipping boy to expunge our feelings of guilt and shame, we ought to give it credit for doing a first-class job.The hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell) based much of his argument on three principles learnt in Vietnam. They are a defined objective, sufficient forces equipped more than adequately, and a clearly defined escape route. We have none of those principles operating in Bosnia. Even if we had, they would not have been workable because we have not in the past come into conflict with the standards operating in Bosnia. Until we learn that lesson, we do not have much chance of resolving the problem. I hope that we will learn the lessons by Friday, when the summit is to be held. I wish the Government well; they have the prayers of all of us.
10.22 pm
Mr. Michael Colvin (Romsey and Waterside): It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook). I join him in welcoming my hon. Friend the Minister of State, the Member for Upminster (Sir N. Bonsor), who was previously Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, on which I serve.
The House is right to debate Bosnia today, before it rises for the summer recess and in advance of the Lancaster house summit this Friday. I share the view of my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire, South (Sir P. Cormack) that we may well return during the summer recess for a renewed debate.
Although we are debating Bosnia, the broader issue of the former Yugoslavia is foremost in our minds. The United Nations was first involved in the former Yugoslavia when it established UNPROFOR 1, now renamed UNPRO. There is much unfinished business in Croatia, and it will have to be resolved before the pieces of Bosnia can be reassembled in a way that provides any chance of lasting peace. Large areas of Croatia are still unlawfully occupied by Serbia. The uneasy truce in that country has been broken because Zagreb was shelled by the Serbs. That situation must be resolved before peace can come to the former Yugoslavia.
We supported the establishment of UNPROFOR 2, but its mandate has run its course and requires redefining in light of the current situation. It is easy to say that the United Nations is faced with mission impossible. Without UNPROFOR, however, the situation would have been much worse. Fatalities have fallen from about 130,000 in 1992 to only 2,500 in 1994. That is thanks to the efforts of the UN, the aid agencies, other organisations and many volunteers who deliver humanitarian aid. Nor let us forget the work that is done by the Overseas Development Agency. Humanitarian aid has saved tens of thousands of lives. The so-called safe enclaves may not have succeeded entirely, but there is no doubt that they have substantially reduced ethnic cleansing.
We have been told that the safe enclaves required 36,000 troops to implement them and that only 7,500 were forthcoming from UN members. The first lesson is that it is no use the UN passing resolutions without first agreeing how the proposals are to be executed. It is greatly to the credit of the Government that we fulfilled our responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council by doing our bit so readily.
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The UN is faced with several options. I join those who say that it would be wrong to speculate on which one should be followed. There is no doubt that an all-out NATO offensive is entirely out of the question. That has been forgotten time back. A complete withdrawal is probably wrong. Perhaps moving our troops out of Gorazde is a possibility. I know only that whichever of the options we act upon, reinforcements will be needed quickly.Total withdrawal could well mean all-out war in former Yugoslavia. It would mean bringing Serbia, and probably Croatia, back in on opposite sides. Such a war could spread to Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. An all-out Balkan war would ensue. Even Greece and Turkey might be involved, as might the whole of the eastern Mediterranean. I am sure that the House agrees that, in that way, lies chaos. I hope that the United States Senate has the sense not to pass Senator Bob Dole's resolution with a two-thirds majority that enables it to veto the President.
As the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell) said, it is extremely expensive in terms of manpower to carry out a total withdrawal. It has been estimated that it would take 22 weeks to complete the exercise and that 60,000 more troops would be required. I should be interested to know the current estimates. Besides being morally wrong, total withdrawal would be entirely impracticable.
Whatever the UN, and the Government as a member of it do, some reinforcements are required at once. That will be a real test of how rapidly NATO's rapid reaction force can react. We know that 1,300 additional British troops are already in Bosnia. What about the remaining 4,000 from the 24 Air Mobile Brigade? Why do we have to wait until the end of August for them to arrive? Is the brigade really as air mobile as its name implies? Surely there are heavy lift air transports available on the open market that could be hired to convey these troops. Or are we waiting for a free lift from our American allies? If lives are at stake, which they are, I regret that the troops of the 24 Air Mobile Brigade have not already been flown out to Bosnia to reinforce our troops there.
Members of the Select Committee on Defence met our troops when we visited Bosnia under the distinguished chairmanship of my hon. Friend the Minister earlier this year. On behalf of my colleagues, I put on record our tribute to the British troops deployed in Bosnia and the British UN commander, General Rupert Smith. Their professionalism, courage and ability to cope with ever-changing and dangerous situations are to be admired--as they are by everyone who has seen them operate. Put simply, we have the best troops in the world. Their morale is high and their leadership is second to none.
There is, however, one matter that causes concern. I refer to the rules of engagement. My right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir J. Stanley) dealt with that fully and I support everything that he said.
What about public opinion? Last night, Jeremy Paxman, whom I never thought I would would be complimenting in this place, compered the BBC programme "You Decide--With Paxman". A large
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invited audience, with many experts present, debated whether we should withdraw from Bosnia or stay in support of the United Nations.Before the debate, 30,000 people voted by telephone; 57 per cent. were in favour of pulling out and only 43 per cent. wanted to stay. Following an intensive and well-informed debate lasting nearly an hour, the views of those who had voted changed to 69 per cent. in favour of staying in and only 31 per cent. in favour of pulling out. During the debate, phrases such as, "aggression must not pay", "pulling out would be apocalyptic" and "we must reinforce the principles of the United Nations charter" were used. Those statements all seem to echo the public mood in Britain today. But best of all were the words of a mother of a British soldier serving in Gorazde. She said, "There is no shortage of military courage. What is now needed is political courage." I hope that the House will endorse that view.
10.31 pm
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow): I am always suspicious when people such as the hon. Member for Romsey and Waterside (Mr. Colvin) talk about other people's courage. My Front Bench and some of my other colleagues will forgive me if I offer a dissenting view.
I am older than most people here and, for that reason, did national service and was tank crew. I hold the passionate belief that those of us who have the privilege to sit on green Benches in the House of Commons should not commit our fellow countrymen to hazardous situations unless they are properly protected. The fact is that they are now in a combatant role.
I am not complaining to the Secretary of State for Defence, but he was not here when my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook) said that these people are not abiding by anything like the Queensberry rules. It is a brutal situation. If our fellow countrymen are to be committed to a brutal situation, they really must have covering defence. That means, I suggest to the hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell), some kind of armoured protection.
If further action is to be taken, will there be armoured cover? If so, it is easy to put in forces, but we must be clear about the kind of circumstances in which they will be pulled out. We found that in Northern Ireland and the Russians found it in Afghanistan. Pulling out forces is a delicate, difficult matter.
Once we go into the Bosnian mire--it may be right or it may be wrong, I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms Short)--pulling out will not only be in my lifetime but in the lifetime, if we are not careful, of the youngest among us. That might seem like Cassandra, but I believe that that is the situation. If more forces are put in and their role develops, whether they like it or not, into a combatant one, what is the Government's estimate of how long they will be there--we are talking in terms of decades--and are we sure that the British people have the will to carry on for decades? I do not think so. I was invited to a mess night at Catterick of my old regiment, the Scots Greys, now the Scots Dragoon Guards. Those people are serious soldiers and they would in all circumstances do their duty wherever they were sent, but they and the parachute officers who were there asked me as a politician how much support they would receive if their role became a
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combatant one. After what we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, North, who is to say that it is not now, de facto, a combatant role?My second question involves the speech of the Secretary of State for Defence. I do not want to misquote him--he will interrupt me if I have in any way misinterpreted him or done him an injustice. I understood him to say that the Government were still contemplating the use of air power and that it might well be necessary. Indeed, when in Question Time I asked a direct question on air power, there was no denial. I take it from the Secretary of State's silence that the air option is open.
If the air option were used, what would happen to those of our fellow countrymen in uniform who are pursuing a humanitarian role? As soon as those aircraft began to drop bombs, what would happen to the men in blue berets on the ground? Slit throats? In the circumstances described by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, North, I think that they would meet a possibly brutal end. What would the House of Commons say then? In such situations, one has to look from the other side of the hill to see the dreadful scenarios that might develop. By taking this attitude towards the Serbs--however brutal they may have been--we are risking defying reality. One of the realities was that Tito, during his troubles with Stalin, decided to have a deterrent. It was not a nuclear deterrent; it was training the most formidable, expert, tough guerilla army in the world. That is what had been learnt from the German occupation. In that terrain, how on earth are we ever going to have military success against people who feel that they have great causes? As my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton, North explained, that is true of both sides in the conflict.
The option I have described may seem not so much craven as that we are not fulfilling our duty, but we have many duties and international obligations. I wonder whether such wealth as we have to devote internationally should not be devoted to the drought in Zambia, which is creating terrible problems, or to the appalling situation that is developing in Malawi and Mozambique. If we are talking about saving lives, there are other places in the world where, instead of becoming involved in a civil war, we may be more effective in relieving great and equal hardship.
10.37 pm
Dr. David Clark (South Shields): As I look around the Chamber this evening, I see many familiar faces and one or two new faces on the Government Front Bench, which I am pleased to see. We listened to the words of the Secretary of State for Defence with great care today, and understood that he spoke with great moderation. I shall perhaps return to one or two of the things he said and question him in a moment or so.
I recognise faces because this is one of the many debates that we have had on the subject of Bosnia--from the days back in 1992, when we were talking about whether troops should be committed and whether we should play a part in UNPROFOR. We were pleased that the Government decided--we felt, rather belatedly--to play their part, and have done so fully.
Every one of the debates has shown the fervour and the passion across both sides of the House. There are those who feel that we should be doing more. If I may say so
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to my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), there are those with more cautious heads who, based on experience, tell us to think twice. They have the experience of being in the military, and know how difficult it is when one takes such action. The Government have to try to put matters in the balance and work out the risks to which we are prepared to expose our troops, our men and women. They must also place in the balance the gains for the world. I know that the House will appreciate that the Opposition have not tried to make political capital out of this matter. There is far too much at stake for that: we are debating the lives of our people. It is right for us to take that view, because, in a sense, we are fighting to try to ensure that the values of the House and of our country can be brought about in the troubled country of Bosnia. Those are the values of tolerance and understanding, of living together free from religious persecution and ethnic intolerance. Therefore, although we have our disagreements and feel strongly about many matters, we should remember that we are fighting for values and to try to get aid through and create a stable society in Bosnia so that those values, which once almost existed, can flourish in a true democracy.Anyone would have to have a hard heart not to be moved by the telling pictures on television of the refugees streaming out of Srebrenica into the airport at Tuzla. Those refugees are wretched, emotionally broken and in utter and complete despair. I am not making a racist point when I say that those people are like most of us--Europeans. They had saved for their houses, washing machines and cars, but suddenly they found themselves with a bundle of clothes--if they were lucky. Everything had gone, and one could not but recognise the dreams that had been shattered.
I hope that our intelligence forces and military personnel in UNPROFOR in the vicinity of Tuzla will collect evidence to make sure that the war criminals who have perpetrated such crimes will ultimately have it used against them. I urge that important point upon the Secretary of State, and hope that such action will be taken.
In a sense, the haunting television pictures showed the need for UNPROFOR. I watched television over the weekend, and saw the despair of people living rough. Then we saw the order of 48 hours later. A tented village around the airport enabled people to at least live under some cover, protected from the night and the midday sun. Only one organisation could provide such help, and that is the UNHCR working with the non-governmental organisations.
I can think of no better reason for being in Bosnia than the fact that the UNHCR provided succour for those refugees, and that UNPROFOR provided cover for the UNHCR. That was brought home to me when I spoke today to the representative of Oxfam. He was speaking to me at midday from a Land Rover at the runway in Tuzla.
I asked him to explain the situation, and he said, "There are thousands of people and hundreds of tents. When I look round, I see one group giving vaccinations and another providing food for mothers." They were keeping people alive, and that representative said, "Please tell the
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House of Commons to keep the British troops in UNPROFOR and in Bosnia, because most of us in the NGOs will have to withdraw if UNPROFOR withdraws."Ms Short: Will my hon. Friend give way?
Dr. Clark: I am short of time, and I hope that my hon. Friend will forgive me if I do not give way. I want to make one or two military points.
It is important to keep UNPROFOR in Bosnia. Perhaps I could develop that. We should remind ourselves of the debt that we and the world owe UNPROFOR. We owe a debt to the men and women of 29 nations who have gone to Bosnia, risked their lives, and, in some cases, lost them--14 of them from our country. I am full of admiration for them. People talk about armchair generals, and I guess that we have some of them, but how can one have anything but admiration for the Bangladeshis who were sent up to Bihac? They had to fight against the rebels and the Serbs. On occasion, they had to resist the BiH, and they had one rifle between four of them. That takes some bravery. Many other ordinary soldiers have had similar experiences. We should remind ourselves that the grief of a family in Bangladesh is just as great as the grief of a family in Wrexham.
We have a particular and especial responsibility towards Gorazde, and in particular to the Royal Welch Fusiliers stationed there. The right hon. Member for Conwy (Sir W. Roberts) referred to those troops. My right hon. Friend the Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) repeated his grave concern about whether those soldiers have adequate protection, and have been adequately protected. That concern extended to the Government's responsibility towards them.
I spoke to someone only today who came out of Gorazde recently. The Secretary of State for Defence knows how he and an entire group achieved that, but it would not be right and proper to go into details, because we do not telegraph our military operations to the other side. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about that, and I shall not press him on operational matters.
We know that morale of the troops is still high; they are trained professional soldiers, and can cope with the problems they face. Their families in Wales and in other parts of Britain, however, are worried sick. Despite the brave words of brave people, most of the ordinary families of those 200 soldiers are looking to the Government to ensure that those soldiers are either sent reinforcements or relieved of their duties. Whatever the Government can do to ensure their safety and that of the refugees they are there to protect will have our full support.
I have no intention of discussing operational matters. I am more aware than most of the dangers in Gorazde. My hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle (Mr. Martlew) and I spent some time with the Muslims in that safe haven. We know about the configuration of the mountains and the bluffs. We know that the access roads are mined, and that the main access to the town is through tunnels controlled by the Serbs. We know that any helicopter that flies in is a sitting duck for any artillery on the hillsides. We know about all those difficulties, but we must work out ways to get the troops stationed there out or to send others in to protect them.
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Many of us were delighted when the Prime Minister announced on 31 May that a more robust contingent of soldiers would be sent to Bosnia, which would be able to react quickly if our troops or any other UNPROFOR troops were under threat. Some of them went, but for many hon. Members and members of the public, the conundrum is what has happened to 24 Airmobile.We were told that that elite force of 5,000 self-contained personnel from two or all three services would be a rapid reaction force. That was six weeks ago, but we understand that it will be at least another four weeks before that force is operational. We understand the difficulties. We understand that some of the engineers in that force are already in Ploce making the hard stands for helicopters.
Most of us cannot understand why it will take nearly eight weeks for one of our ace elite corps, which has a prime role as a rapid reaction force, to be deployed. Why has that deployment been so slow?
Will the Minister give us some information about, or will he deny, the story that it is now planned not to deploy the full complement? Will he deny that there are plans to deploy only a half or two thirds of 24 Airmobile? The House expects to have an answer to that, without the Minister having to go into any operational difficulties. I think that we have made our view fairly clear. We still believe that our troops and those of the other 28 nations that have personnel in the former Yugoslavia are doing a worthwhile job. We believe that, if at all possible, they should remain there.
We equally believe that, if there is one cardinal lesson that we must learn from Bosnia, it is that we do not issue ultimatums, we do not issue threats, unless we have the capability and the intention to carry them out. We must create a state in which the Bosnian Serbs will go to the table with the Bosnian Government and come to a negotiated settlement. Until they do that, there will not be peace in that country. We believe that the presence of UNPROFOR is helpful in achieving that purpose.
10.50 pm
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Sir Nicholas Bonsor): It is obviously a greatprivilege for me to stand at the Dispatch Box; I only wish that there was a happier occasion on which I could do so. I hope that that will arise in due course.
The matter that we are discussing is obviously of great concern to both sides of the House and to every Member of it. I very much welcome the approach taken by the Opposition Front-Bench spokesmen, the hon. Member for South Shields (Dr. Clark), and the support that they have given the Government's policies. As the hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) said, this is not a proper occasion for party political differences. We must unite as a House to find the solution to this extraordinarily difficult problem.
Before I discuss that in more detail, I want to knock on the head something said by the hon. Member for South Shields. I assure him that there is absolutely no ground for any rumour that he might have heard that we plan to deploy anything less than the full 24 Airmobile Brigade. It is already being deployed. The plan is to deploy all the
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troops that were originally announced, and that will be done as fast as is possible in the rather difficult circumstances that we face.As the House knows, there is no easy answer to the problem. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister told the House yesterday, at present there are only three options. The first is escalation of the conflict, into a war in which we become directly involved. I do not believe that either the House or the British people wish us to take that course.
The danger to our troops and to the humanitarian aid people would be out of all proportion to any impact that we could make in finding a proper solution to the conflict. The second option is that we continue with the United Nations humanitarian and peacekeeping activities to the best of our ability. The third option is that we withdraw our troops.
The Government's preference is clear and unequivocal--we remain convinced that UNPROFOR has a key role to play, and we want it to stay. For as long as we are able, we must do all we can to alleviate suffering by ensuring that humanitarian aid gets through to those who need it. We must pursue vigorously all avenues towards a political settlement. The Government's efforts will be dedicated to that end. In the rather short time remaining, I want to deal with the point that have been raised in the debate. First, however, I want to set out clearly why we believe that we should stay in Bosnia to do what we can.
First, the value of the work being done by our troops and those of our allies in the areas where they are deployed is invaluable. I had the great privilege, as Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, to go to Bosnia on three occasions. As the hon. Member for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook) said, our Committee went there and looked at the problem closely on the ground.
One of the things that struck me most was the value of the work being done, not only by our troops but by the Overseas Development Administration and all the volunteers who are working in that field. We went to several towns where the water and electricity would not have been working were it not for the British input to ensure that it did.
I have no doubt whatsoever that, in the British-controlled area, it is only the presence of our troops that prevents the renewal of the conflict between the Croat and Bosniac sides. Were that conflict to break out again- -which it inevitably would if we were to withdraw--the bloodshed would escalate once again to the kind of levels that my hon. Friend the Member for Romsey and Waterside (Mr. Colvin) mentioned--130,000 dead in 1992, as opposed to 2,500 in 1994. We have a responsibility--the international community and we as a member of the Security Council have a duty--to do everything in our power to prevent such a tragedy from recurring.
The consequences that were also mentioned by the hon. Member for Livingston go beyond our activities in Bosnia. I have no doubt that, if the international troops withdraw, we shall find ourselves with a rapidly worsening problem in Croatia, where the Krajina Serbs are under continuing pressure from the Croatian forces. I believe that that would break out again into a major conflict.
Of course, we all know, and have discussed many times, the real danger of the conflict spreading well beyond the boundaries even of the former Yugoslavia, and
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threatening the whole of the eastern region of NATO. I do not think that that is a likely outcome, but it is one that the House must take into account when deciding what we should do.I also believe that, were we to withdraw, Serb aggression would be greatly encouraged. I have no doubt that the presence of the Dutch, difficult though it was for them, in Srebrenica prevented a much worse massacre than that which I fear may have taken place. I think that our presence around Bosnia prevents not only the Serbs but all participants in the conflict from inflicting horrific injury and torture on each other.
The hon. Member for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook) made a very good point: this is not a one-sided conflict in which there are white hats and black hats at war. It is a conflict in which the depth of bestiality is incomprehensible in a civilised world, and it is not confined wholly to the Serbs.
Having said all that, it may be that we shall have to withdraw from Bosnia because there is a limit to the risk to which it would be right for us to expose our troops. That has been said by hon. Members of all parties, and it is a point which I can assure the House the Government consider seriously when trying to find a route ahead. My right hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Hurd), who until recently was our Foreign Secretary, pointed out that we can operate in this theatre only with the consent of the parties. As the House will know, Mr. Sacirbey has recently indicated that he may wish us to withdraw. Whether that turns out to be a diplomatic manoeuvre or a genuine request, time will tell. Certainly, were we to be requested to withdraw, the Government's position and that of the international troops on the ground would become untenable.
As the hon. Member for Livingston also said, if it becomes too dangerous for whatever reason for our troops to remain in theatre, or especially if the embargo is lifted--meaning that the Bosnians could get an unlimited supply of weapons and thus escalate the conflict--it would not be possible for us to remain in theatre.
I deal now with four specific points that the hon. Member for Livingston raised. First, he asked whether there had been any intelligence report about what was happening in Srebrenica and, if so, why did we not respond to it? I am sure that Opposition Members know and understand that it would be wrong for me to comment from the Dispatch Box on intelligence or other information that we might or might not have received.
The hon. Gentleman also asked whether the Dutch troops had requested air support. I believe that that is the case; certainly it is essential and well recognised by the Government that we should rapidly review the procedures whereby air support can be called on. While I cannot tell the House the outcome of those discussions, I can assure the House that they are being pursued vigorously, and particularly with the potential need to call it in in support of the British position if necessary.
Mr. Dalyell: Will the Under-Secretary give way?
Sir Nicholas Bonsor: I am afraid that I cannot. I have only four more minutes, and I have a great deal to get through.
The hon. Member for Livingston asked why our troops are in such an exposed position without contingency plans. Again, I have to say to him, and I am sure that he will understand, that I cannot possibly discuss
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contingency plans--which may or may not have been arranged--in detail and in public. I assure the hon. Gentleman, as my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Defence Secretary already have, that the safety of our troops is and will remain of paramount importance to our country, and the Government are deeply aware of our duty to protect our soldiers in the positions in which they find themselves. The hon. Gentleman asked what use the rapid reaction force would have specifically, as it is clearly not there as a fighting force. There are two particular reasons why the rapid reaction force is there: first, to improve the protection of the convoys and the routes along which they travel, and indeed to improve the security of those areas in which our troops are deployed; secondly, to strengthen the position and safety of our own troops. As I said before the hon. Gentleman was able to return to the Chamber, we are deploying the full complement of 24 Airmobile Brigade and all those support troops which were mentioned in the original plan.I turn now to matters raised by some other hon. Members. The right hon. Member for Llanelli (Mr. Davies) raised the question of the safety of the Welch Fusiliers, something on which several other hon. Members commented-- not least the hon. Member for Stockton, North, whose son has served in Gorazde, and who knows it well. I understand that the right hon. Member for Llanelli has been briefed by my hon. Friend the Minister of State for the Armed Services, and I hope that he found what he was told reassuring. I cannot go into the detail, any more than I could before, about the plans being made in that part of the world, but I reiterate the concern of the Government for the safety of those soldiers.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Guildford (Mr. Howell), who has apologised to me for not being able to be in the House at the moment, raised the need for strategic thinking. He is, of course, quite right. The meeting on 21 July is aimed specifically at finding such a strategy, and it is very important that we do so.
The hon. and learned Member for Fife, North-East (Mr. Campbell) made much the same point, when he said that there was a need for clear political objectives, and that we must ensure that the military capability is matched to those objectives. That was undoubtedly a failing of the United Nations plan, and it must not be allowed to recur. I fear that I am running out of time, so I apologise to those hon. Members whose speeches I have not been able to deal with. These are complex and difficult issues, greatly exacerbated by the tragedy and the appalling level of civilian suffering that we watch. We are determined to try to find a way to move matters forward, both on the diplomatic track and with regard to UNPROFOR's mission. It is to that end that we shall be working strenuously with our partners, not only in the meeting on Friday, but thereafter. The ultimate solution must be a diplomatic and not a military one, and the international community, despite all the difficulties, must strive to find it.
Column 1784
There is, however, a limit to what we can do. We have offered the parties to this conflict an opportunity--It being three hours after it was entered upon, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, pursuant to order [17 July].
ROYAL ASSENT
Mr. Deputy Speaker: I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that Her Majesty has signified Her Royal Assent to the following Acts, and a measure:--
Appropriation (Northern Ireland) Order 1995
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1995
Merchant Shipping Act 1995
Shipping and Trading Interests (Protection) Act 1995
Goods Vehicles (Licensing of Operators) Act 1995
Crown Agents Act 1995
Environment Act 1995
Pensions Act 1995
Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1995
Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995
Insurance Companies Reserves Act 1995
Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995
National Health Service (Amendment) Act 1995
Olympic Symbol etc. (Protection) Act 1995
Licensing (Sunday Hours) Act 1995
Child Support Act 1995
Criminal Appeal Act 1995
Children (Scotland) Act 1995
Bell's Bridge Order Confirmation Act 1995
Sheffield Assay Office Act 1995
Birmingham Assay Office Act 1995
Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure
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