House of Commons Hansard Debates for 16 Oct 1995

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indeed, I am sorry to say, by Ministers of the Crown, that we could not use the air power deployed to the Adriatic and in the Bosnian theatre because it would be vulnerable to Serb missiles. When it was pointed out to them that, of course, the obvious preliminary was to take out the Serb missiles, we were further enjoined that that would not be possible because that would be taking sides in the conflict, that it would make the Serbs very angry, and that they might take the hon. Member for East Lothian (Mr. Home Robertson), among others, hostage. That would indeed have been a serious matter.

That none of those predictions was justified was shown when we finally abandoned the futile policy of flying top cover with NATO aircraft. That did precisely nothing for months on end, except burn expensive fuel and waste the time of the air crews. When they were used, it was in singletons or as pairs in a very limited and ineffectual way. When eventually, in recent weeks, air power was used as it should be, it had a powerful and persuasive effect on the Bosnian Serb leadership. Now the surface-to-air missiles have been destroyed and air power has been demonstrated to be an important factor, alongside the deployment of effective artillery around Mount Igman for the protection of Sarajevo. The faint hearts who predicted that the results of such a strong policy would be disastrous have, I am glad to say, been proved wrong.

What a pity that the path of courage and the judicious use of strength was not taken months, even years, ago, at the outset of the conflict. The federalists of Europe might well ponder why it is only since the United States has taken a leading role in the conflict that we have had, as an alliance, the courage to use effective force.

Mr. Menzies Campbell: If the steps that the hon. Gentleman has outlined--I agree with what he has said--had been taken, say, three years earlier, what would have been the likely outcome?

Mr. Churchill: I happen to believe that, had the initial Serb aggression been recognised for what it was--aggression backed by Serbia-- and had a firm policy been adopted of tackling the Serb military installations and command centres, many lives would have been saved and much misery would have been avoided.

My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence has been accused-- not least by the hon. Member for South Shields (Dr. Clark)--of making a controversial speech in a place called Blackpool. It must be admitted that some of my right hon. Friend's statements were deeply shocking to certain individuals. Let me quote some of them. My right hon. Friend said:

"By now I trust no one doubts that Britain, who has the patience to feed the hungry, has the will to confront the aggressor. We taught the Bosnian Serb generals that the slaughter of civilians will not go unpunished."

To some, that will be a shocking message: the idea that we should actually identify the aggressor and go for him, rather than standing ineffectually between the two sides and imposing an equal embargo on the victim of aggression and the aggressor.

My right hon. Friend also announced--this must have shocked those who would like us to be propelled on a federalist course in Europe--

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"to the European Court of Human Rights, who criticised the SAS action in Gibraltar, we send another clear message: don't give comfort to terrorists."

That sentiment will be echoed not only on these Benches, but in the country at large.

As for our partners in the European Union, my right hon. Friend said:

"We will not allow Brussels to control our defence policy." Is the hon. Member for South Shields saying that a Labour Government--if the misery of one were ever to be inflicted on us again--would allow Britain's defences to be controlled by Brussels? I thought that he was at some pains to say that that was not the case. My right hon. Friend said:

"With a Conservative Government, Britain will not join a single European Army . . . the foreign and defence policies of this country will not be dictated to us by a majority vote of a Council of Ministers."

The Labour party's policy is to move towards majority voting--and no one has any confidence that it would resist the introduction of majority voting in the field of foreign policy and defence.

Dr. Reid: First, we are opposed to majority voting on defence. Secondly, we consider this an intergovernmental issue, not an issue for the Commission. Thirdly, we are opposed to a single European army, and will not move in that direction.

Despite the hon. Gentleman's pathetic attempts to defend the vitriolic anti -European speech of the Secretary of State for Defence, none of it has any basis. Everyone is surprised: who in the House of Commons actually wants this European army? The truth is that it was the camouflage for another anti-European speech by the Secretary of State. All that amazes us is the fact that the right hon. Gentleman feels a compulsion to go around the country like a small boy telling adults that he is not frightened of the bogey man, proving to everyone that he is more British than everyone else. Unfortunately, whatever his compulsion, he ends up merely being more anti our allies than anyone else, demeaning his party and bringing the country down in regard to the great issue of our allies in Europe.

Mr. Churchill: It seems to me that the burden of what the hon. Gentleman has tried to say is that he would like to persuade the country that a Blair Government would be as stalwart in fending off the intervention of Brussels in these matters as my right hon. Friend. I do not know why he is complaining about my right hon. Friend's speech; he ought to support it. Certainly, the overwhelming majority of people out there in the country would whole-heartedly endorse my right hon. Friend's sentiments: they would not be in the least shocked by the idea that British soldiers should fight for British interests. It is difficult to envisage the day when British soldiers will die for Brussels--and I do not believe that the House will allow British forces to be sent into battle on the say-so of majority voting in Brussels.

Dr. Reid: Will the hon. Gentleman clarify one point? When British soldiers are fighting for NATO and risking their lives, where are the orders coming from, geographically?

Mr. Churchill: When British soldiers are fighting alongside our NATO counterparts, they are doing so on

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the authority of the sovereignty of this House of Commons. That is the way in which we intend to keep things, for so long as there is a Conservative Government. [Interruption.]

Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Janet Fookes): Order. I think that the House knows my views on seated interventions, particularly from the Front Bench.

Mr. Churchill: Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker.

When "Options for Change" and the cuts involved were implemented, Ministers assured the armed forces and the House that thereafter there would be stability. Since then, we have seen the introduction of "Front Line First". That has a long way to go before its final full implementation. It is causing enormous upheaval and turmoil. Even while those changes are still in the pipeline, the stability of our forces is threatened still further with the Bett report. I strongly share the view of my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier) on what the Secretary of State should do with that report. I recognise that much time and effort has been put into it, and it may be possible to use a few of its recommendations. The broad thrust of the report has no place in the future of Britain's armed forces. I strenuously counsel my right hon. Friend to heed the old adage, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." The regimental system of the British Army, about which I do not need to lecture my kinsman and colleague on the Treasury Bench, is the envy of the world and it would be madness to tinker with it.

I warmly welcome the order for Tomahawk missiles and the earlier order for attack helicopters, but the manning and equipping of our armed forces are disturbing. In The Times of 12 October, Vice-Admiral Sir James Jungius stated:

"Senior officers tell us the fleet is dangerously overstretched. The Army would find it impossible to put a full strength division in the field without robbing the remaining units. The Air Force has no aircraft that are not obsolete and many are long overdue for replacement. Its only fighter aircraft, the Tornado, has significant deficiencies in that role. Reserves are at laughably low levels." A former Parachute Regiment Colonel Commandant, Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Gray recently said:

"The Army is being stretched to breaking point. Units being sent to Bosnia are an amalgamation of various regiments because they don't have enough troops of their own."

That is a serious problem that will not go away and needs to be addressed. No element is more crucial to the stability and strength of the armed forces than the stability of funding. In 1978-79, we spent 4.5 per cent. of GDP on defence. It rose to 5.3 per cent. in 1984-85 and this year it is down to 3 per cent. Two years from now it will be 2.8 per cent. While Government expenditure overall has increased by a staggering 70 per cent. in real terms since 1979, including a 108 per cent. rise in personal social services and an 82 per cent. rise in social security, defence expenditure has fallen in real terms.

It is reliably reported from Blackpool that the Chancellor is on the prowl for major budget cuts, across the board. Any socialistic equality-of-misery doctrine would be wholly inappropriate and unacceptable in the case of defence. There have already been deep cuts in the fabric and strength of our armed forces and I trust that those who hold high office in the Ministry of Defence will not tolerate any further reductions in the defence budget. Cuts will have to be sought elsewhere and I should be obliged if those holding defence portfolios will tell that to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

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7.42 pm

Mr. John McWilliam (Blaydon): I can tell the hon. Member for Davyhulme (Mr. Churchill) that socialists do not believe in equality of misery: they believe in the relief of misery and equality of opportunity, which are entirely different matters. I congratulate the hon. Member for Romsey and Waterside (Mr. Colvin) on his election as Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence. Since his election, he has been doing a splendid job, but he only borrowed my vote and if he continues to be beastly to my old Friend the hon. Member for South Shields (Dr. Clark), who is also my constituent, I might take it back.

I also congratulate in his absence the hon. Member for Upminster (Sir N. Bonsor), who was a superb Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence and a credit to the House. I wish him well in his new appointment and I have written to him privately on those lines. I whole-heartedly appreciate the efforts of the men and women of our front-line defence forces. I again agree with the hon. Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier)--this is becoming boring--because his comments on the Bett report were extremely well founded. I remember being in the fort at Crossmaglen when the discussion document finally got through to the men serving there. They did not like the prospect at all and, what is more, there was no place I could run to from that fort because the helicopter was not due back for two hours and we were not allowed out on to the street. It was only a marginally worse experience than having to tell my wife that I had been to Crossmaglen in the first place. She comes from Northern Ireland and the House should have heard what she had to say about my experience. I should like to comment on the Government's procurement policies and outline my fears for my constituency. It is only just over a year since Gordon Foxley, a defence civil servant, was jailed for widely based corruption. Just one of his scams was that he managed to persuade the Army to stop acquiring artillery fuses from the Royal Ordnance factory at £6 each and to start acquiring from Junghans the DM111A fuses at £14.40 each. He also managed to persuade it to acquire the Borletti fuse from Italy. That fuse did not work in the rain and it could not work under battle conditions. We lost £12.9 million on the Junghans fuse and £15 million on the Borletti fuse. Much more important was the fact that 300 jobs were lost at a Blackburn factory, and those jobs have not been replaced. They were exported by the Government to Germany and Italy at great cost, a cost that does not even take into account the unemployment costs of those men and women who will not get their jobs back. That was all done in the name of efficiency of procurement.

As I was concerned about these matters, I wrote to the Secretary of State for Defence when it was suggested to me that there might be some problems with the contract for the 155 mm extended range bomblet shells. It was known that the Royal Ordnance factory at Birtley in my constituency was bidding but so were Giat of France--a wholly owned French Government company--Rheinmetall and TASS Industries of Israel. TASS Industries was successful in obtaining that order. That does not mean any immediate job losses, but it does mean that, effectively, in two years 14 jobs will be exported from Birtley to Israel. That is what we seem to be exporting these days.

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I have not finished, because Birtley is one of the areas of highest long-term male unemployment in the north of England, which means that it has one of the highest unemployment areas in the country. Those people and their families are unfortunately destined to be a burden on the state for the foreseeable future. That means that you and I will have to pay to export those jobs to Israel when they could have been kept in this country. Birtley has such bad long-term unemployment that, although the employment office there fell under the Department of Employment's directive for office closures, I was able to persuade the then Secretary of State not to close it. My argument was based on the fact that it has such a high rate of adult male unemployment.

I now come to the bit that really worries me. I should like to quote from Jane's Defence Weekly of 2 September. An article by Carol Reed it is states:

"Privately owned RO and state-owned Giat are negotiating a merger of the bulk of their businesses, notably in ammunition, guns and vehicles and small arms, under a 50:50 joint venture."

Why did I spend so many hours on the Standing Committee that examined the Bill to privatise Royal Ordnance when it looks as if half of it is about to be handed over to the French Government for nothing? It will not be done at no cost, because as a result of the merger factories will close.

As early as the middle of last year, a draft letter involving Mr. Chiquet of Giat and Mr. Weston of BAe Royal Ordnance showed that Chorley would be closed at a cost of £7.2 million and that the work would be transferred to Tarbes in France. Faldingworth will close at the cost of £2.2 million and will go to Montpertius in France. Birtley in my constituency will be closed at a cost of £21 million and the work will be transferred to Tarbes and Rennes. In France only two factories will be closed. I pity the poor people of Le Mans, where closure will cost £7.1 million, and of Salbri, where the cost will be £11.9 million. That means a total cost of £33.5 million, but that is only the cost to the Royal Ordnance factories, not the cost to the British taxpayer, because, as I said, Birtley has a very high long-term unemployment rate.

I have some questions for the Government. I think that every hon. Member received a copy of a statement from British Aerospace Royal Ordnance, which states:

"The MOD continues to take the view that ammunition as a commodity can be bought freely on the open market and does not consider the retention of a comprehensive domestic capability as a necessity."

Does the MOD agree with that?

We are an island nation. I remind the MOD that during the Gulf war Ministers had in a similar act of folly transferred the production of 155 mm ammunition from Birtley to Rheinmetall in Germany, which could not make it and sold the contract on to a Belgian company. The Belgians would not supply our gunners with 155 mm ammunition for political reasons. The Government seem to be aiding and abetting British Aerospace in selling British jobs to France. What is more, they seem to be putting us in a position where we shall not be making bread-and-butter 155 mm ammunition for our guns--that means all our guns since the Abbot has been taken out-- or tank ammunition if Birtley goes.

What contact has there been involving MOD civil servants or Ministers in connection with the proposed Royal Ordnance deal? What is the present status of the proposal? What will be the long-term cost caused by the

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resulting unemployment? Will the Minister assure the House unequivocally that all categories of ammunition used by our armed forces will be obtainable from British manufacturers in the United Kingdom?

If I do not receive a positive answer to the latter question, it will mean that the Secretary of State or one of his Ministers will stand at the Dispatch Box and admit that, despite the jingoistic speech that the Secretary of State made at the party conference last week, he is happy to give away our strategic defence capability. Although it might be an artillery man who fires the shell at the enemy, that artillery man would not have the shell if it were not for the men and women in our factories making the shells or the men and women who transport those shells to the front line.

Mr. Bill Walker: I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman and my sympathies are with him and his constituents. Does he think that he is making an anti-European speech?

Mr. McWilliam: I am not making an anti-European or pro-European speech. It happens that under the Maastricht treaty we are entitled to self -determination in defence matters. My hon. Friend the Member for South Shields made the Labour party's position perfectly plain and I agree with it. My speech is geographical--we are an island nation and, if we are entitled to our own defence capabilities, we must be able to procure our own equipment. If we cannot make it in this country, we cannot guarantee its procurement from somewhere else. The last time a Conservative Government landed us in a position where we had to do so, we could not get it and had to borrow equipment from the Americans.

To judge by the Government's track record, we have a Government who have presided over a Ministry of Defence procurement system which, according to the courts, was corrupt--Mr. Foxley is in gaol. The contract to which I referred is the only one that I have been able to find out about; I do not know what else he was involved in. Ministers did not admit to any job losses, although they were obvious. The system was corrupt and inefficient and was not run in the best interests of the United Kingdom's defence. I am concerned only with defence.

I have no doubt that the Israeli shells were cheaper. It suits the Israeli Government to keep their factories open; it is necessary to do so because of the strategic position. I can understand why the Israeli factories would make a good, keen offer and undercut British jobs. However, I cannot understand a Government who say that it is simply a matter of market forces and inevitable--they are the Government who presided over the market forces which put Gordon Foxley in gaol and which provided the incentive for him to be corrupt in the first place. If procurement had been taking place under the normal procurement systems that preceded the open market--"buy it from anyone and to blazes with British strategic capability"--this would not have happened.

I listened carefully to the hon. Member for Davyhulme, especially when he referred to what my hon. Friend the Member for South Shields had said. I can come to one of two conclusions--either the hon. Member for Davyhulme had written his speech before he heard what my hon. Friend said or someone has fitted the hon. Gentleman with an implant that inverts the sense of everything that anyone

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says. What he said that my hon. Friend said was the exact opposite of what my hon. Friend had in fact said, which is strange. I welcome the part of the Secretary of State's speech that dealt with Northern Ireland. As someone who has family there and who spends a fair bit of time there I know that the change to a more normal society is to be welcomed and encouraged. Anything or anyone who interferes with the peace process deserves the condemnation of every Member of Parliament. However, we are not there yet.

We have to pay tribute to the forces serving in Northern Ireland. Oddly enough, they are serving in worse conditions than before. They are confined to barracks; they are getting some training, and that training is good, but it is not what it used to be and it is a trial to them. To hear the Secretary of State say that the emergency tour interval will again not average 24 months because manpower is not up to it must be dreadfully disappointing.

I stress that people are fed up with the implications of the Bett report, which is nonsense. I remember Sir Michael Bett when he was merely Mike Bett of the British Telecom board and I know some of the stunts that he tried to pull then.

Let us permit the morale of our troops to rise. Let us remove the threat of Bett, give them a period of stability and afford them with the dignity and support that they deserve for their splendid work for this country.

7.57 pm

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith (Wealden): We have heard one whinge after another about defence procurement and the lack of equipment. Following "Options for Change", we began to cut our defence forces, as many other countries also did. We then heard speech after speech saying that it was wrong and wicked, and there was the usual flannel about a defence review. "Options for Change" was a defence review. Dr. David Clark indicated dissent .

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith: Yes, it was, and I shall tell the hon. Gentleman why it was. General Vincent and others master minded that very good review of the needs and strategy of the British armed forces and the tactics that would be required in a period following the end of the cold war. He revealed something vital; that we did not need such large forces-- the country would not stand for it--and needed to reduce the manpower. In so doing, however, we had to end up with a force which was capable of being flexible and providing a rapid response and a force that was much higher tech. That scenario was replicated by the NATO chiefs of staff about a year later. There could not have been a keener or finer analysis of the needs of the armed forces of a democratic power playing a useful and important part in NATO.

We hear much praise of our armed forces' ability to respond, their courage and bravery, their equipment and the way in which they use it. That is not to say that there are no deficiencies. I had not intended to go into great detail about the equipment on order but I do not recall some Opposition Members arguing against the completion of the Vanguard Trident programme; nor did I note that they criticised the 1994 order of type 23 Duke class frigates.

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In 1994, there was a substantial order for 44 Merlin helicopters. There was the order for the Army this year of the Apache helicopter. That was not done on the cheap. We bought it from abroad, but we made very sure--as we always do with procurement--that there was plenty for British manufacturers to contribute. There was also the order for the Army of Challenger tanks. Some of us do not agree that we need that number of tanks and would rather have more helicopters, but the order certainly provided plenty of jobs in Leeds. There is the update of the Tornado aircraft and the mid-life update of 142 support helicopters. There are also the 35 support helicopters ordered in 1994 and, of course, the Eurofighter programme.

On the question of procurement, I do not simply want to know the procurement practices for purely British forces, which are based on our own analysis of what we need out of our own resources--I want to know about procurement that we believe can be done on an international basis, such as the European fighter aircraft. We get into the awful position of the costs being shared between three or four nations, which leads to the sort of inefficiency, over-cost and bad development that there is with the EFA. A squalid row is developing between the Germans and ourselves about who should pay what and how much each should get from the sales of the aircraft when it is finally in production. I hope that the Government will concentrate on that area, rather than on all the other twaddle that we have heard today.

On balance, we have a pretty good record, but that does not mean that there are not some grounds for criticism of some of the impacts of the reduction in defence expenditure. I warmly support many of the courageous comments, made on the basis of detailed knowledge, by my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr. Brazier), which was reflected in the remarks by my hon. Friend the Member for Davyhulme (Mr. Churchill). I strongly support the concerns that they expressed about the impact of overstretch. I have little doubt that that is having a serious and growing effect on morale. That is why today I welcomed enormously my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State's statement that he understands the problem well and that there should be a period of stability to digest the problem. I also support the views expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury about reservists.

The two main themes running through our debate today will have a vital effect on our strategy and on our future defence estimates. By chance, those themes were discussed by NATO parliamentarians at their annual autumn session between 6 and 9 October in Turin. That session attracted delegates from central and eastern Europe and from Russia. The first theme is European membership of NATO and the construction of the European pillar. The second is the enlargement of NATO to involve countries from central and eastern Europe.

There was a time when people questioned whether NATO had a future. However, I am sure that we all agree that since the end of the cold war NATO has proved itself to be remarkably flexible. Of course there have been mistakes, such as cost overruns, but NATO's flexibility is truly amazing. It has a future, but anybody who believes that also knows that national sovereignty is mixed in with that. What sort of loss of national sovereignty would there be? We know that in the changed world that we now face our North American allies will not always wish to be

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involved in what we call non-article 5 military operations in Europe. They concede that there will be activities that European nations will want to conduct on their own--but, we hope, with the support of the supreme command.

European countries need to be better able to act together in peacekeeping, humanitarian aid and crisis management. That is why the Government support the strengthening of the Western European Union operational capability-- something I strongly support--not as a separate organisation, but separable when it wishes to act in the interests of what we perceive to be basically a European problem. That is quite sensible.

Given the obvious limitations of the defence resources of all countries, if we in Europe are to act as the European pillar of NATO--acting on what we believe to be the interests of European countries--it does not make any sense to try to build up an organisation separate from NATO and which replicates the assets available to NATO. No continental western European country, whether or not in NATO--France not being in NATO--would be willing to support the resources that would copy what NATO already has. That is where the problem starts.

Some countries, in seeking a more distinct European identity, envisage a European pillar that would be separate. Some of them see the role of the European pillar drifting, in time, towards a tie-up with the European Union. Some see it as a federal tie-up. From the speeches by hon. Members on both sides of the House, it is clear that no one wants a federal tie-up. Why, then, is there an argument? The French--certainly the Frenchmen I meet --always argue that in the end the extent of any sovereignty they surrender or any military activity in which they become involved must be a matter for France. Of course, in many ways the French want some significant reorganisation of their relationship with the European pillar of NATO. I think that, in the end, they would regard it as moving towards a European pillar of a united European Union.

What about the Germans? They take the view-- perhaps this is why my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State is suspicious--that, although their Defence Minister has said, without America stability never has been and never will be available; and the German commander of the Eurocorps has said:

"There is no intention of building up an autonomous European military structure in parallel with NATO."

The German-American relationship is very strong at the moment. Nevertheless, as their Chancellor Kohl has said, Germany is pressing for a more federal defence structure.

I can understand why those who are suspicious of a move towards a federalist structure should make statements critical of such a move. They do not think that it will work. That is the distinction between those who say we should never discuss these matters in purely sovereignty terms and the impression that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State gives that we want to act unilaterally. There was nothing in his speech to suggest that. He simply implied that there are people in Europe who want to move closer to a European Union that eventually would be dominated by a federal structure, which would be the end of the intergovernmental way that we structure our common defence responsibilities.

Whatever view one may take about the language--and I do not intend to go down that road--we blind ourselves if we think that there are not people in Europe who want to resist that process, just as there are people who want to

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move down that road. Therefore, we must argue the case for our belief that a federal tie-up is the wrong way to go about matters. I do not doubt for one moment that a federal defence system is on the cards in the foreseeable future--perhaps within decades. We would have to go well down the road towards co-operation on a wide range of issues, and probably in a rather different world than we have today, before we could accept that sort of structure--one that was eventually accepted in the United States.

That is especially true as we have the system proposed by NATO, an example of its flexibility, of joint command task forces. As we have seen in Yugoslavia, such a force would enable the allies to work together more successfully--including, I might say, a French general. If one goes to the NATO headquarters near High Wycombe one finds a stalwart commanding presence of a French senior officer. Obviously he does not want to work in the integrated command of NATO, but he is there, he goes through all the simulated exercises, and in due course one hopes that the French will work happily in that direction with us.

If we want to accept a joint command task force, it must be recognised that the ground rules on how to bring them into operation on a European-NATO basis, so that they could help the Western European Union, must be settled. We have to settle the dispute that still reigns and must still be decided about to what extent the supreme allied commander--an American soldier--has the final right of veto. I think that we can solve that problem, but I tell the House that one can talk until the cows come home trying to convince a Frenchman of it. We must overcome their suspicions on that score. We have to solve the problem, because, if it hangs over us for too long, it can only sour NATO and European relationships.

My final point concerns enlargement, which I think is broadly welcomed by hon. Members of all parties, but which also has its own problems. It is absolutely right that we should try to keep up the momentum. I know that the United States wants that. Certainly, as a prerequisite, we must work out an agreement with Russia. However I accept that we are not ready for enlargement. The worst thing that could happen would be to jump into the process too quickly. That is beginning to be appreciated by some of the central European countries which see that the partnership for peace proposals are not a placebo to compensate them for delaying entry.

One only has to consider the list of activities to promote closer military ties, facilitate transparency and national defence planning and peacekeeping to recognise the importance of partnership for peace. I received a note from the Hungarian embassy this morning. There are at least 23 areas in which the Hungarians have co-operated in the partnership for peace processes which were launched in 1994. The future of the European defence identity and enlargement provide difficult problems for us, and they will be considered very carefully by our American friends. What concerns me more than anything is not the challenge to our statesmanship but the attitude of the new generation of Americans, especially the new arrivals in the Congress who have grown up since the reasons for NATO were established and acted on.

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The American Government, their politicians, economists and business men, who I meet regularly, the guy in the street too, expect Europe to act more positively and to do more--not more as they did in the cold war, by spending more money on arms and putting more troops on the ground, but by doing more to work out our priorities, to prepare plans on crisis management, for peacekeeping and for peace enforcement, and for Europeans to settle their differences. It is a tall order, but so was the alliance in the making.

8.12 pm

Mr. Barry Jones (Alyn and Deeside): Although I am glad to follow the speech of the hon. Member for Wealden (Sir G. Johnson Smith), my speech will concern my constituency.

RAF Sealand in my constituency is now the RAF's only deep avionic repair asset. It supports the majority of the aircraft electronics critical to all three of our armed services, down even to a level as deep as that carried out in industry. During the Falklands and Gulf wars, and today in our operations over Bosnia and Iraq, RAF Sealand has played a crucial part in keeping our aircraft in the air. Time and again, the existence of RAF Sealand has proved crucial to our national interest. Yet it appears that the Government are hellbent on risking all of that by offering Sealand up to industry--possibly to the lowest bidder that comes along.

The debate on the market testing of Sealand has been going on for at least three years to my knowledge, and it will take at least another year to complete. There are clear signs in my constituency that that is causing enormous hardship and great uncertainty among those working there. That is their only reward for loyal, dedicated and very efficient service to the Crown. The uncertainty is also having a major impact on gaining future business from the many foreign manufacturers keen to use Sealand as their repair agency. It is all due to the long, bureaucratic and wasteful market- testing process, which is costing the taxpayer a large amount of money and reaping no obvious benefits at all.

RAF Sealand has a long history of continual improvement. I ask the Minister why such a strategic asset is not being set savings targets, benchmarked against industrial best practice, instead of exposing our armed forces to the risk, and the taxpayer to the expense, of such a flawed market-testing programme. I report that the unease and the anxiety at RAF Sealand is corrosive. There we have the jewel in the crown of the RAF avionic repair assets. We have a world leader in my constituency in Wales--why risk it? Why such an auction? Why risk a strategic national asset on the altar of what appears to be political dogma only? The Government must be faulted in this respect. In our local newspapers over the past weekend, an advertisement was printed which affected the 1,500 uniformed and civilian employees at RAF Sealand. The advertisement said:

"Personnel for Support Contract RAF Sealand".

It was inserted by Brown and Root Services. In effect, it was asking the people who work at RAF Sealand to apply for their own jobs against the decision on market testing which we know shall not be taken until next year. So

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members of the work force, of whatever kind, are angry. The advertisement is scandalous and it has angered everyone at RAF Sealand.

Mr. Peter Hardy (Wentworth): My hon. Friend may recall that, in a debate on the Air Force earlier this year, I suggested to the Minister that the Air Force should keep sufficient capacity to be able to serve as an intelligent customer. Would it not be reasonable to suggest that the one thing which should be retained is Sealand, not least in view of the fact that three years ago I challenged the Minister to visit my hon. Friend's constituency following a visit that I paid to Sealand?

There I met personnel who had managed, in a matter of days, to produce a gadget that allowed our Tornados to fly to the Gulf. The process would have taken at least 15 or 16 weeks in the private sector. If they had come from any other source, each of the gadgets produced by the men at Sealand over one weekend would have caused those Tornados to be delayed for 17 weeks. Is it not utterly irresponsible to take such action with regard to RAF Sealand?

Mr. Jones: My hon. Friend speaks with great authority on RAF matters and I know that the House knows that he is no mean navigator after spending some years alongside the RAF in one of the courses that he undertook. I was glad of his intervention, and his visit to RAF Sealand was well received.

Still with RAF Sealand in mind, I would like to refer to the astonishing possibility of our own Ministry of Defence leasing United States F16 aircraft. I hope that in any subsequent winding-up speech there will be some rebuttal of that possibility. None the less, all 1,500 in the work force to which I have referred are very worried that such leasing may take place. If a decision is made to lease American F16 aircraft and withdraw F3 Tornado aircraft from front-line squadrons, there could be a reduction in the work load at RAF Sealand which could lead to dozens of job losses if no replacement work is forthcoming. RAF Sealand could lose Tornado avionic work consisting of the electrical, instrument, radio and radar elements which make up the Tornado avionic package.

Leasing American F16s or other aircraft could be more expensive than the Tornado mid-life update when all contributing cost factors are accounted for. So I would expect a full financial cost analysis and appraisal as well as listing of the unemployment costs of the loss of work and other social costs brought about by the cessation or severe curtailment of the Tornado work load.

Mr. Bill Walker: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Jones: No. Time is of the essence. I shall not give way in this constituency speech.

Britain's European partners in the Tornado project and especially the Italian air force, which is about to take delivery of its first Tornado F3, would not take too kindly to the British withdrawal from continued development of the aircraft. It must further place in doubt the commitment to the EF2000. The loss of the EF2000 would also spell the end of the British aircraft industry as designers and builders of original and indigenous aircraft.

Indirect costs associated with leasing such as pilot and ground crew training, necessary ground and support equipment required to operate the aircraft and spares provision will all need to be taken into account. RAF

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Sealand's particular concern is whether the new aircraft's avionics will be serviced by the RAF to third-line level or, as is more normal with leased equipment, returned to the American manufacturer for servicing work. I urge the Government to make a speedy statement so that my constituents at RAF Sealand may be put out of their misery and anxiety.

The Minister will know that the Ministry of Defence flies some 25 British Aerospace 125s. He may also know that they are made in my constituency. He may not know that the Raytheon jet aircraft workers who make that machine face the loss of their jobs. Two years ago, the then British Aerospace workers who made the 125 were sold lock, stock and fuselage by British Aerospace to Raytheon, an American company. Now we face a desperate struggle to hold on to the remaining jobs at the factory where the 125 was and still is produced.

Instead of producing an aeroplane in the future, we have been asked to plan to be the servicing centre for the 125. Since the Ministry of Defence has more than two dozen 125s in its ownership, I suggest to the Minister most sincerely that the contract for the servicing of those aircraft should come to my constituency. After all, it was the British Government who permitted the sale to an American company of a British company which made a British aircraft. The consequence of that is not only a loss to Britain but the loss of many jobs in my constituency. Those jobs are arguably the most skilled and the best paid in Wales. Certainly, there could be no more loyal, able, co-operative and productive work force in the land.

I believe that I make a reasonable proposition to the Minister. I hope that, at an appropriate time, I can bring a deputation from my constituency to see him. I hope that it may be at the soonest possible time that is mutually convenient. The Minister nods assent. I am grateful to him. Will the Secretary of State for Defence or the Minister of State consider visiting the plant to see this magnificent machine now in production? If they did so, we would be very grateful.

I wish to make a point about the future large aircraft. It may not be known that my constituents are employed to the tune of 2,200 at British Aerospace Broughton, where they make the wings of the airbus. They were utterly disappointed when Her Majesty's Government decided to buy the Hercules rather than the FLA. I want an absolute guarantee from the Government that the FLA will be favoured in the next RAF tranche of transporter purchases. That would be a boost to my airbus workers, who assuredly would make the wings of the FLA, as they now do for the very successful airbus family.

If the Ministry of Defence backed the future large aircraft, my airbus constituents would have a very secure future. I want the Government to say that they will rejoin the FLA programme, without any ifs or buts. I remain anxious about the impression that we give to our French and German partners. They are sceptical about our commitment to the FLA. My fear is that France and Germany might exclude Britain from the FLA programme if we dither further. I hope to hear from Ministers a decision that would be helpful to British airbus workers. After all, it was Britain's Government who decided not to buy the European attack helicopter. That left our European allies somewhat dismayed.

Will the Ministry of Defence keep the British aerospace industry alive? It has the power of life and death over that industry. The industry has more skills and more

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