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Mr. Dennis Canavan (Falkirk, West): Who is running Northern Ireland--the Secretary of State or the Chief Constable? So far, the Secretary of State has said no fewer than three times that he has simply taken the Chief Constable's advice. What reasons did the Chief Constable give for refusing to recommend tape-recorded evidence?
Sir Patrick Mayhew: The hon. Gentleman's opening question was rhetorical. I take responsibility for the running of Northern Ireland, and I am accountable to the House of Commons; but, on security matters, I seek the advice of my principal security adviser, who is the Chief Constable.
My right hon. Friend the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office will deal with that aspect more fully when he winds up the debate, but anyone who studies these matters--certainly anyone who has studied the reports to which I have referred--must note the existence of security connotations when an audio recording is made of the words used by anyone making a statement in a holding centre. Those security connotations exist, and must be taken seriously. I am not prepared to put people in Northern Ireland at further risk of death and maiming as a result of terrorism, and in this instance I will accept the Chief Constable's advice.
Silent video recording of interviews in the holding centres would, however, enhance the safeguards already available to those detained under the terrorism provisions. It would also reduce the time taken in criminal trials on the issue of whether confession statements were truly made voluntarily. It reinforces the protection already provided by the independent commissioner for the holding centres, Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, and his deputy, Dr. Norris--who, I remind the House, hold positions introduced for the first time by me. I pay tribute to their excellent work, although I regret that we cannot agree that a legal advice unit in a holding centre would be practical.
Over the past year, Sir Louis and Dr. Norris have paid almost a hundred visits to the holding centres, with the full co-operation of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, and have interviewed nearly 140 detainees. The number of persons now being detained has fallen considerably, and the number of complaints has dropped dramatically.
Let me deal with the detail of the Bill. As I have said, it largely re-enacts the provisions of the existing Act; those are summarised in the explanatory and financial memorandum, so I can make this part of my speech fairly quickly. I propose to outline briefly the main features of the Bill, and to concentrate on changes and other points that the House may find particularly interesting. Before I do that, however, I shall comment on two specific aspects.
As the House will know, the provisions for countering terrorist finance--racketeering--have been removed. It is intended to replace them by measures covering all crime by means of the Proceeds of Crime (Northern Ireland) Order, published on 11 December 1995.
Mr. David Trimble (Upper Bann):
The Secretary of State says that the anti-racketeering provisions are being removed from the emergency provisions legislation. That is appropriate, given their origins in the United States RICO--racketeer-influenced corrupt organisations-- legislation, although they are narrower than that legislation. But will the legislation that the Secretary of State mentioned, which will apply to all crime, retain the same procedures with regard to authorised investigators and the same range of powers?
Sir Patrick Mayhew:
The provisions have proved very effective. The hon. Gentleman's question will be a matter for the reviewer; we--and no doubt others--will make representations in response to his request. I take the hon. Gentleman's point.
Part I contains provisions relating to the scheduled offences. It lists and defines them; makes arrangements for preliminary inquiries in magistrates courts; sets out the conditions for granting bail and for the holding in custody of young persons and their treatment on conviction; and provides for the setting of statutory time limits in scheduled cases. It continues to make special arrangements for the trial of scheduled offences--the continuation of the system of Diplock courts with its many associated safeguards. As I have said, this system has helped to ensure that justice has continued to be done in Northern Ireland. While the risk remains that jurors will be intimidated, we cannot return to trial by jury for cases in which terrorist offences are alleged.
I shall list the changes in part I. Certain offences have been removed from the schedule, and they are those which, in the light of experience, have proven not to be charged in terrorist cases. Other offences have been made capable of being certified out. These include section 8 and section 10 offences under the Theft Act (Northern Ireland) 1969--robbery with violence and aggravated burglary. Mr. Rowe's advice is that often cases involving these offences could safely be tried by jury, as they are often committed without terrorist involvement.
The Government are opposed, as a matter of principle, to the idea of the Attorney-General certifying scheduled offences in a matter on which we are criticised in the Opposition's amendment. On that matter we are supported by Mr. Rowe. It is not for the Attorney-General to specify those cases that should be subjected to special treatment that falls short of the norm to which citizens are entitled. On the contrary, the Attorney-General should, where appropriate, relieve the defendant by certifying out.
New and more flexible provisions are introduced for the setting of time limits on remand proceedings. In the context of custody time limits, the House will know that,
to date, we have not been in a position to implement the provisions of section 8 of the 1991 Act. When accepting the inclusion of its predecessor in the 1987 Act, the Minister said that, before it came into effect, he would have to be confident that any scheme was unlikely to have the effect of procuring the release on bail, or even the discharge, of a person indicted for serious terrorist crime.
Evidence from the scheme of administrative time limits that is in place, which is closely modelled on section 8 and which we have been operating since 1992, has clearly demonstrated that, if a statutory scheme had been introduced, a number of potentially dangerous defendants on serious terrorist charges would have been released on bail. I acknowledge that we must look for improvement, and I shall speak about that in a moment.
Lord Colville, in his 1993 report on the EPA, and his successor, Mr. Rowe, in both his annual and five-yearly EPA reports in 1994, took a similar view of section 8. In the latter report, Mr. Rowe concluded that section 8 should not be re-enacted, as it was
He favoured a new section in a broader form with less detail, permitting regulations to set the time limits and the circumstances in which they could be extended by the court. Clauses 8 and 9 give effect to those recommendations. They are substantially, but not entirely, the same as section 8 of the current Act.
Substantial progress has already been made in reducing the time that is spent in custody on remand by those facing serious charges. Baroness Denton of Wakefield reported in a written answer in another place on 7 December on the first three years of the administrative time limits scheme. She referred to a substantial reduction in the average time that is taken to process cases from first remand to arraignment, and to a particularly impressive fall over the past year in waiting times between arraignment and start of trial.
My noble Friend also announced a further reduction of the remand to arraignment limit from 11 months to 10 months, and she promised that the Northern Ireland Office, in conjunction with the other agencies, would continue to examine further ways in which procedures might be streamlined. There will be no slackening of our efforts further to reduce the time taken to process all cases where the defendant is in custody.
I can deal with part II more quickly. It relates to powers of arrest, search and seizure, and so on. It provides for the specific circumstances in which the police and Army have power under the Bill to enter and search premises, arrest and seize without a warrant, search for ammunition and transmitters, search for and seize explosives, examine documents, stop and question, and requisition and interfere with private property and public highways.
It creates a new offence of failing to stop and be searched when required to do so by a police officer or a member of the armed forces. At present, police officers and soldiers have a power to stop and undertake a search for munitions or transmitters, but anyone failing to stop for a search does not commit an offence under the Act, and the right of arrest under section 17 of the current Act does not apply. This amendment deals with that anomaly of no offence occurring under the Act in those circumstances.
Part III and schedule 2 deal with offences against public security and public order. I can deal quickly with those. Part III continues in force the offence of directing
a terrorist organisation. It lists the proscribed organisations and and it explains the offences relating to membership of or support for such organisations. The provisions make it an offence to dress in paramilitary clothing and forbid possession of any item for terrorist purposes, as well as the collecting or communicating of information likely to be of use to terrorists. They re-enact an offence in relation to training in the making or use of firearms or explosives.
We propose to strengthen the current provision in relation to proof of possession of information likely to be of use to terrorists, with evidence of proximity treated as proof unless proved otherwise. That is consistent with the onus of proof applied in the case of prohibited articles such as explosives, firearms and ammunition.
"too rigid for Northern Ireland".
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