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4.55 pm
Mr. Michael Jopling (Westmorland and Lonsdale): I guess that it is probably too much to hope that the Bill will get very much publicity or arouse much interest, but to me the Bill is one of the most vital of this Session. I am sorry that the Under-Secretary is not listening at the minute to what I want to say--now I think that I have his attention. The only comment that I would make about the Bill is that it is better late than never.
I am a member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, as is the hon. Member for East Kilbride (Mr. Ingram). He and I were both signatories to the recommendations of that Committee, which said that the Bill should have been introduced in the last Session. That was my view and it still is. I would have much preferred the Foreign Office to sponsor the Bill rather than the Department of Trade and Industry, and I much regret the delays--which I know have been due to the DTI--in spite of the chivvying that the Select Committee gave the Foreign Office. We always knew that it would be a DTI Bill. Britain should have been at the very forefront of ratifying the convention and bringing such a Bill forward.
I hope that the predictions are true that we will be among the first 65 nations to ratify the convention. If we are not, it would mean, as the Select Committee said:
Chemical and biological weapons are hideous enough when used by military forces, when troops are usually trained in dealing with their hazards. What concerns me even more is the possibility of even more hideous implications if those dreadful weapons get into the hands of terrorists. Strikes could be made against totally unprepared and innocent civilians. There are many thousands of civilians in Iraq and Iran who have learned to their cost and pain the horrible implications of those weapons. Those weapons have rightly been described as poor men's nuclear weapons, and so they are.
We have at last been presented with the Chemical Weapons Bill. I suppose that it could be described as the world community's best effort so far to control chemical weapons. In my view, it should be given our absolutely unequivocal support. I say again, however, that the main problems with the Bill will be in verifying the existence of these weapons and the components that go into manufacturing them.
I have heard it said in the Pentagon, in Washington, that the total control of chemical weapons is impossible to achieve. I believe that that is true. We should recognise, however, that this is the world community's best effort so far to control such devices, and we must be satisfied that it is the best possible compromise to date.
I hope that the Minister will tell us that there will be no complacency about our having got this far. It is essential that efforts continue to be made to tighten those aspects where proper control cannot be achieved, as the Pentagon has said. We must close those loopholes as
quickly as possible. It is vital that intrusive challenge inspections are carried out and are not hindered around the world in order to do our best to have as few of those loopholes as possible.
I am concerned about those delays, and I hope that the Minister will tell us what their effect and that of the consultation will be on industry. I should tell the House that I am a director of a company in the chemical industry. I have never been told that it has been involved in nuclear weapons, but I suspect that what I am now going to say will not be very welcome to the chemical industry as a whole. I hope that in preparing this legislation and in undertaking consultation no short cuts have been taken at all--I do not care who is hurt by that--in getting the best possible level of verification and control of these weapons.
Mr. Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow):
As one who has been interested in chemical weapons issues for three decades, I welcome the Bill, and in particular the degree to which the Department of Trade and Industry has consulted on and reflected the views of those of us who were worried that, above all, it did not have sufficient powers. My judgment is that the Bill can discharge Britain's obligations under the convention, perhaps with the comparatively small exception of the important component of transparency.
What is missing is perhaps a small item, but it is part of a bigger issue--a statutory annual report. I welcome what we could call the change of heart decision to have an annual report, but I must ask the Minister whether it is to be statutory. The Minister and his officials, as well as Members of Parliament, appreciate that it is an important part of the argument. I hope that he will say in his winding-up speech whether it is to be statutory.
How, in fact, is the House of Commons going to hold the authorities to account? If there is an annual report, the truth is that those who might be critical can give it to their expert friends. That in itself is a good discipline. I emphasise, however, that the annual report's nature, statutory or otherwise, is absolutely crucial.
There remains an industry problem, and that is why I intervened during the Minister's speech. The dual uses of chemicals--military and non-military--are intertwined. We should hear more in Committee about the problems of commercial secrecy because it is a rather delicate issue. It is vital that the treaty should keep abreast of scientific and technological change and innovation. One example is the new Russian development of Novichoks, an agent of GP.
I want to be clear about Porton Down. I know that the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key), who may speak later, represents Porton. I hope that he will agree that the
issue of Porton is very important to the nation and has implications beyond his constituency and that he will therefore excuse me for referring to it. Intertwined with the future of chemical warfare disarmament is the future of the Porton Down establishment, which is a most valuable national asset, as my hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride (Mr. Ingram) said.
Britain got rid of its chemical weapons in the 1950s so Porton today is, frankly, protective. It exists to ensure that Britain's defences against chemical and biological weapons keep up with new threats and new opportunities, including ones that stem from scientific discovery and technological development. By that same token, Porton has much to contribute to the well-being of the chemical weapons convention. The Bill does not reflect that as clearly as it could.
For example, unless the DTI, which is charged with implementing the convention in the United Kingdom, can count on Porton's assistance, it is likely to be ignorant of how new science and technology are or ought to be affecting its work. It will be in no position to push the treaty's international authority into any adaptation made necessary by technical change--amending the lists of the controlled chemicals and introducing novel inspection techniques--which will certainly be necessary. Yet where is the assurance that Porton, which today is one element of a next steps agency, will in future be able to provide such crucial help to protect this whole enterprise from obsolescence? It is in the recollection of the Department of Health that I went on a delegation with some colleagues to discuss the future of Porton last year; I realise that this is a multi-Department problem.
Porton, frankly, does not have a very good image. I am bound to say in parentheses that it is part of my particular history. I got into trouble in a celebrated privilege case back in 1967 for having talked too freely to Mr. Lawrence Marks of The Observer--not that I thought that I was doing anything wrong; I did not realise that the Select Committee report which had been printed had not gone through the sidelining process. I also add parenthetically that I learnt later from the late Sir Harry Legge-Bourke that, in fact, officials at the Ministry of Defence to whom I had been an extreme nuisance on other matters, such as Aldabra atoll and variable geometry aircraft, thought that technically I was in the wrong; there was, therefore, an opportunity to suggest to certain hon. Members that they might raise it as a privilege case. Those events occurred a long time ago. I mention them because I might be considered an automatic critic of Porton Down: on the contrary, I think that it is rather important to the nation.
If one were speculating about the most likely venue for clandestine chemical weapons work in the United Kingdom, Porton Down could hardly fail to be near the top of the list. Its association with implementing the convention might seem to call the work of the implementers into disrepute. That is why we must introduce a transparency mechanism that would display the real beneficial and indispensable nature of Porton Down's involvement.
For that reason also, we must give serious thought to adding certain requirements to the Bill. There must be an obligation on the Secretary of State--possibly aided by an advisory board, as my hon. Friend the Member for East Kilbride suggested--to lay before Parliament each year a
report on the operation of the convention in the United Kingdom, including an account of efforts made to stay abreast of all relevant areas of technical change.
Paragraph 4 of article X of the treaty requires that there be an annual report on programmes related to protected purposes, but I cannot find any such requirement in the Bill. Where are the powers that would enable the Secretary of State to provide that report? It may be easy for the Minister to assure us on that point during his winding-up speech. Like my hon. Friends, I do not want Britain to incur penalties for late accession to the convention. Therefore, I shall be as helpful as I can during the Committee stage, provided that Ministers participate fully in the process.
I have two other concerns. First, when discussing the future of Porton Down, it is necessary to reach some conclusion about international problems--particularly the situation in Iraq. Madam Deputy Speaker, if I stray too far on that subject I am sure that you will remind me that I am to raise the issue of sanctions against Libya and Iraq on the Adjournment on Wednesday night. That is probably the more appropriate time to discuss such matters.
Tonight, I simply refer to the fact that various media circles have recently reported allegations that chemical weapons or materials are present on the vessels that sank during the military operations in January and February 1991 in the Shatt al-Arab and along Iraq's gulf coastline. The Iraqis insist that their vessels which sank at that time carried no chemical weapons or materials. They are ready to co-operate with the United Nations if it wishes to salvage the sunken vessels in order to ascertain their contents, and they are willing to provide the facilities required for such an operation.
I visited Baghdad two years ago--not everyone approved of my trip--and I believe that sanctions should be lifted. But that is by the by. Whatever views we have about Iraq, we must appreciate the importance of a monitoring system--and our monitoring system is Porton Down.
I am also concerned about the unanswered question in the brief from the Royal Society of Chemistry. We have not addressed the impact of the legislation on scientific research. I interrupted the Minister to discuss clauses 19 and 20, but it is not immediately clear from the available data whether research chemists, bio-chemists and associated scientists will suffer seriously as a result of the regime. The requirement to obtain a Government permit before embarking on a particular laboratory synthesis or other study will be strange to many scientists.
The Bill leaves the question of appeals against disallowed licenses to the secondary legislation--or, more particularly, to an order made by statutory instrument, which is subject only to annulment by Parliament. The list of chemicals in schedule 1 to the Bill is not as short as it looks. The list contains only 12 entries, but five of them are generic, not specific, so as to prevent would-be violaters from designing molecules around the chemicals ban. Those five families encompass many thousands of different chemicals.
It is important for Britain to sign the convention as soon as possible. If we are not quick about it--I think that we should probably sign the convention before Christmas-- our scientists, who are among the best qualified on the planet, may be excluded from jobs in this area. That
would be a great pity for Britain and for other countries too, because I suspect that we are as good as, if not better than, anyone else in this field. Secondly, we must be very clear about the Bill's on-going impact on industry.
"few, if any, United Kingdom nationals would be employed as Inspectors or in the Technical Secretariat, at any rate in the first instance".
It is hugely important that whatever is done with regard to the verification is done by the best possible and best-informed officials; therefore, I cannot but stress the urgency of doing everything possible for the world community to control as best we can the existence and the spread of chemical and biological weaponry.
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