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Mr. Spearing: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Kennedy: Yes, although I was about to end my speech.

Mr. Spearing: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has given way, because my intervention relates to his party. There are sceptics and divisions in both the two main parties, but--with, perhaps, one exception--the hon. Gentleman's party wishes to "move ahead". Given all the troubles and difficulties that we see directly across the channel--and perhaps in other European countries as they try to meet the required terms--why is a single currency so essential? We have had first the common market and then the single market, with all their supposed benefits;

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why must people press ahead, as the hon. Gentleman is, to achieve something that leads to so much trouble, dissent and perhaps disunity?

Mr. Kennedy: I do not want to become involved in a long discussion about the current problems in French politics, but I believe that there is more to those problems than the Maastricht convergence criteria.

Let us consider the credibility difficulties experienced by our Government over the tax issue since the last election, when they had to go back on their promises. Those difficulties pale into insignificance in comparison with the credibility problems of the Gaullist Administration, who promised 18 impossible things before breakfast in the run-up to the election, and have disallowed each and every one of them at a rate of knots since that election. I believe that France's difficulties have much more to do with that than with the perception being peddled in some quarters that the French citizenry have suddenly taken to the streets because of the Maastricht convergence criteria.

Let me also tell the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) that anyone who talks to those involved in business and industry will be left in no doubt that the superficial attractions of competitive devaluation are outweighed by the long-term steadiness of knowing what the exchange rate will be in relation to other currencies. For many a small business, that still makes the difference between boom and bust.

I am not talking about the ICIs and Shells of this world, but about the small business sector. I believe that, in due course, it is that sector that will drive the single currency issue forward. As and when the currency arrives, we should be part of it.

I advocate a positive and constructive role for the IGC, but I am not at all optimistic. I think that, if the IGC does prove to have constitutional implications for the country, we should reconsider the possibility of a referendum to make the debate public, and to marginalise--as we are not managing to do in the House of Commons--that part of the Tory party, in particular, that seems to exert excessive influence on the Government of the day.

6.36 pm

Mr. Michael Colvin (Romsey and Waterside): I must take issue with the hon. Member for Ross, Cromarty and Skye (Mr. Kennedy)--as he would probably expect me to--following his suggestion that the "sceptic" element is now driving our party policy. He knows very well, as, I think, does the whole House, that there is a good streak of scepticism in every hon. Member, just as there is in the country as a whole. Everyone has reservations about aspects of the European Union. It is a question of degree: there is a measure of scepticism in everyone.

I also take issue with my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Sir E. Heath). In discussing the single currency, he used the analogy of the United States and Japan, pointing out that both those great economic areas had a single market and a single currency. They also have one Government, however, and we do not want that in Europe. We are happy to have a single market and to trade as we do; we are happy to have political links. What we do not want is a single currency that could lead rapidly to a single Government. I do not think that the British people would vote for that, although I accept that it is Liberal party policy.

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Much has been said today about the possibility of a White Paper on the future development of the European Union. Hon. Members may recall--certainly, my hon. Friends will--the publication of two documents a long time ago. One was called "The Right Approach"; the other was called "The Right Approach to the Economy". Both were published by the Conservative research department. Those two documents set our party on the road to victory in the late 1970s.

A sequel has now been published, entitled "The Right Approach to Europe". That document, also produced by the Conservative research department, was on the bookstalls before this year's Conservative party conference. It set out clearly the principles on which our party is addressing the European Union's development, and led to the considerable degree of agreement at that conference, when many political opponents were expecting and hoping for a split right down the middle. Today's debate has shown a split over Europe, not in the Conservative party, but clearly in Labour party, whose Front-Bench team seems to be split in two.

Our party conference debates also demonstrated that clear blue water exists between the Conservative party and the other parties on the important issue of the development of European union. The policies that the Conservative party has adopted go much more with the grain of public opinion than those of any other.

The choice before the British people is absolutely clear: if one wants a federal Europe, one votes Liberal Democrat; if one wants a centralised Europe, run out of Brussels, one votes Labour; and if one wants a Europe of nation states, working together when appropriate, but where the major decisions affecting Britain's future are taken in Britain, one votes only Conservative.

I and the country at large will endorse that if it ever comes to a vote, but, before anyone gets too excited, I should say that, when the time comes to visit the hustings, there will not be all that many votes on the question of Europe. If, however, it is one more issue where Conservative Members are more with the grain of public opinion than our opponents, one or two critical marginal constituencies will fall to us rather than to the other two main parties.

Most of today's speeches have concentrated on the politics and economics of the European Union, and some speeches will no doubt touch on foreign policy, too, but I want to concentrate on security--both the architecture for security and the mechanics for it. I hope that hon. Members will note that I use the word "security", not "defence", because common foreign and security policy will be discussed at the intergovernmental conference, and the thing about security is that it stretches beyond merely defence.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary made an interesting suggestion during his speech. In discussing economic development, he referred to the possibility of a European Mediterranean free trade area. That is precisely what I mean.

To give an example on the question of the security of Europe, the Select Committee on Defence has been considering the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and its southern flank. We realise that, in discussing the security of Europe, we must look beyond the boundaries of the European Community and of NATO. If we cannot within the European Union have

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generous and free policies on trade, we will not succeed in meeting the economic needs of developing nations outside our area.

Without that success, we will not be able to avoid the political and economic conditions that can eventually lead to economic breakdown, to civil disobedience, to internal conflict, to terrorist activity, to insurrection and then, as sure as night follows day, to external military adventures. When we discuss security, therefore, we must think in terms of the European Union doing its best to help the developing countries on our borders.

That is probably the most effective way of preventing strife, and will do more to defend Europe's nation states than having just a mass of military weaponry and men under arms. That matter was dealt with on 26 and 27 November during the Barcelona conference of Ministers. I should like to hear what is said about that matter in the winding-up speech.

In discussing the question of security, there is also the matter of the spread of drugs and of mass immigration-- both extremely sensitive matters. North Africa is a region of considerable insecurity. Countries there, in common with many others, have problems of over-population and of shortage of water. In trying to anticipate from where trouble may come, one will find that there is a common denominator in and a close link between shortage of water and over-population, and potential flashpoints for strife.

What do we want to emerge from the intergovernmental conference in relation to security? The first question involves the Western European Union's future development. I regret that we ever changed the name of the European Economic Community to the European Union, because there is a great deal of confusion in people's minds, and they automatically connect the two. The WEU is not new--we should remind ourselves of that. It is based on the Brussels Treaty Organisation of 1948. It was modified in 1954, and it includes a mutual security undertaking, exactly like that involving NATO in article V of the Washington treaty.

Admittedly, the WEU had become a bit moribund, but it was reactivated in 1984 as the European pillar of NATO. The Maastricht treaty gives the WEU a dual role--first, as that NATO pillar, and secondly, as the European Union's defence component. We must decide the extent to which it is complementary to the NATO commitments, or if there is a danger that it will result in the duplication and undermining of NATO.

The types of task that the WEU expects its military capabilities to be employed on were set out in the 1992 Petersburg declaration. Those are crisis management, combat operations, peacekeeping, including embargoes and sanctions enforcement, humanitarian rescue missions and evacuations. Those tasks could effectively be undertaken by European Union member states, either singly or in partnership. They do not need the WEU to provide a co-ordinating authority for those tasks to be done.

It is significant that many of those tasks cannot be undertaken without help from NATO, in particular the United States of America. For some of them to be achieved, one needs intelligence and surveillance. Often, one needs heavy lift, either by air or by sea, and logistical support. My first conclusion, therefore, is that there should be no new WEU full membership without full membership of NATO.

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The WEU has 14 members and four observers-- Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland, which are all already European Union members. Of course, those four countries jealously guard their neutrality. How would they feel if there were a common EU defence policy? They would not be too happy.

What about the nine countries that are associate WEU members--the Visegrad four, the three Baltic countries, Bulgaria, Romania--and, of course, with the United States and Canada, the only two non-WEU NATO members, sitting on the sidelines? It is significant that, if the EU and WEU were merged, as some people advocate--it seems that it is beginning to emerge that the Labour party supports such a merger--and if it were necessary for new WEU members already to be full NATO members, the United States of America would effectively have a veto over additional applications to join the EU, which is totally dotty.

The other thing that must be decided at the IGC is whether the EU and the WEU integrate, or whether there should at least be a subordination of the WEU to the EU. Again, the Labour party seems to be split on that matter. The hon. Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) did not answer the direct question put to him by my right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary. Perhaps we will hear an answer in the winding-up speech.

It is suggested that the United Kingdom stands alone in opposing a merger between the European Union and the WEU. That is not so. There is a great deal of reservation among other member states. When the Select Committee on Defence was in the Iberian peninsula recently, we were interested to hear from our Portuguese friends--Britain's oldest ally--who said:


That sets out the matter clearly--NATO and the WEU already operate by consensus, not by majority voting. It is impractical to have a merger of the WEU and the EU.

The IGC could also help with the clarification of the different security organisations that exist currently, and to establish what their roles should be. We have the WEU. We had the CSCE--the conference on security and co-operation in Europe, which is now the OSCE--the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe-- because it is an operating body. Under NATO, we have the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, the North Atlantic Council and the partnership for peace. It has been suggested that we might have a CSC-Med, which might not be a bad idea. There is scope for a fresh look at the different structures we require for security in the light of the peace dividend and the collapse of the iron curtain.

There could be a little tidying up of some of the force structures. The combined joint task forces were launched at last year's NATO summit for Euro-led missions. There is the EuroCorps, EuroFor, EuroMarFor and FAWEU-- the forces available to the WEU. There are many different structures, and there is a great deal of overlap. There are many different headquarters, and a large number of staff.

One of the problems may be that, although we got rid of a lot of soldiers, sailors and airmen when we rationalised our armed forces across Europe, we are left

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with too many generals, air marshals and admirals. I sometimes feel that they do not have enough to do except sit in headquarters trying to invent new enemies. It is extremely urgent to clarify the European security and defence identity.

The problem with NATO is that it has effectively concluded its mission. It succeeded in keeping the Americans in, as we say, and keeping the Soviet Union out. I am glad that France is now back on many of the NATO committees. That might begin to undermine the argument that the main role of the WEU is to keep the French on side. The time has come to review all those various organisations. NATO in particular needs to think about its future role. It has 60 different headquarters in its area of activity, which cannot be economic. The time has come for a full review.

The best way to prevent war--that is what security is all about--is through trade and economic growth. We should never forget that that has been the principal objective of the European Union from the days of the founding fathers.

My last thought is about the recently announced appointment of Mr. Javier Solana as Secretary-General of NATO. That is as good an example of poacher turned gamekeeper as I have ever known. It probably shows in political terms a greater U-turn than that performed by the right hon. Member for Sedgefield (Mr. Blair). If Mr. Solana can persuade his countrymen to vote to come within the integrated military structure of NATO, he will have earned his place as the Secretary-General of one of the most important defence structures in existence.


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