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Mr. Wilson: I want to pursue that last point, because the Minister attributed to me a view that I do not hold. I am sure that 90 per cent. of flag states control their shipping more effectively than port state control can. However, we both know that there are flag states with disastrous records which have no interest in controlling their shipping, but see it purely as a commercial operation--I refer to the flags of convenience states. By the same token, if there is a possibility that there are countries that register aeroplanes, but do not carry out proper controls, port state controls become much more effective.
Mr. Norris: In all honesty, there is not much between the hon. Gentleman and me on this matter. He makes a fair point. The parallel is that no one has an interest in allowing airlines to operate substandard aircraft from countries whose standards are perhaps not as good as those operated in the United Kingdom, but my point is none the less valid and extremely important. It is necessary, despite its imperfection, to have an international system that requires standards from its members and enforces those standards to whatever degree
possible while ensuring that domestic legislation allows for effective safety monitoring. The parallel between marine and aviation safety is fair, at least on that point.
At present, we fully reflect our ICAO obligations. With the exception of European economic area aircraft performing intra-EEA flights, which do not need a permit, all other aircraft wishing to perform a public transport to or from the UK must obtain a permit from my Department. Before that permit is granted, we must be satisfied on a number of points.
Mr. Olner:
Will the Minister give way?
Mr. Norris:
If the hon. Gentleman will allow me,I would rather make some progress.
The key points are: first, has the airline been approved by its authorities as being competent to operate the type of flight concerned? Secondly, has the aircraft been certified as airworthy by the aeronautical authority of the country of registration? Thirdly, does the airline have adequate insurance? Confirmation of those points is normally obtained by the airline submitting appropriate documentation. If we have any doubts about safety standards, we do not issue a permit until those doubts have been resolved. That may mean that we have to consult the aeronautical authorities in the country concerned, asking the Civil Aviation Authority to conduct a physical inspection of the aircraft or to visit the country concerned and to clarify safety oversight procedures.
For example, in this case, in view of local concern about cargo charter flights operated by foreign airlines, we decided to ask the CAA to inspect any aircraft wishing to perform similar flights from Coventry airport. Aircraft operated by Nigerian and Russian airlines were inspected. In both cases, the CAA identified breaches of ICAO safety standards. As a result, we deferred consideration of the permit applications while we took up the matter with the Nigerian and Russian authorities.
In the event, the Nigerian airline subsequently withdrew its application to operate from Coventry. In the case of the Russian airlines, permits were granted, but only after the faults identified by the CAA had been rectified and the CAA had re-inspected the aircraft to confirm airworthiness standards. During the past year, the CAA has undertaken a number of inspections of foreign aircraft at our request. In two cases, aircraft from Tajikistan and Sweden were detained on safety grounds.
Turning to the circumstances of this unfortunate accident, may I deal first with the unauthorised nature of the flights. Although an application for the flight had been received from Phoenix Aviation, the UK charterer, at the time of the flight, no permit had been issued. We had not been satisfied that all our documentary requirements had been met and were waiting for Phoenix Aviation to provide the outstanding documents on behalf of the airline. In particular, we were seeking to clarify the leasing arrangements.
Although an Air Algerie aircraft was to be used, it was to be wet-leased--Air Algerie would provide both aircraft and flight crew--by a Ghanaian airline known as Race Cargo. That meant that checks had to be made with the Ghanaian authorities to ensure that Race Cargo was certified to use the Air Algerie aircraft and that Air Algerie's insurance arrangements covered the type of
flights concerned. I stress that responsibility for the safety of the aircraft rests with Air Algerie rather than with Phoenix Aviation or any of the other parties involved.
As the operation of flights from Coventry by Air Algerie had not been authorised, any flights operated were in breach of the air navigation order. Therefore, with the assistance of the CAA, we conducted an inquiry into the circumstances of the flights to consider whether any prosecution action should be initiated. However, Phoenix Aviation was placed into voluntary liquidation before any charges could be laid.
The inquiry revealed that a number of flights had operated without the Department's knowledge. It was clear, therefore, that existing procedures for monitoring permits should be reviewed. Under the existing system, copies of all the permits issued to foreign airlines are sent to the relevant UK airport to be used by the foreign airline. If an airport authority had doubts about whether an airline had been granted a permit, it was expected that that authority would contact my Department to clarify the position. This case clearly suggested that that system might not be working as effectively as it should. We are therefore consulting the Aerodrome Operators Association, which represents UK airports, to consider whether the existing liaison arrangements between it and the Department can be improved.
It is clear from the findings of the accident report recently published by the air accident investigation branch that this unfortunate accident resulted essentially from human error. In its thorough report, the AAIB has considered all relevant factors, including the condition of the aircraft. In its view, first, the aircraft had been maintained and was serviceable with no significant defects; secondly, there was no evidence to suggest that the aircraft experienced any systems failure or malfunctions that would have caused the collision with the pylon; thirdly, the estimated weight and loading of the aircraft were within normal limits at the time of the accident; and, fourthly, there was sufficient fuel on board to divert if necessary.
There has been some suggestion--it has been mentioned in the debate today--that the aircraft's inability to receive the Coventry instrument landing system may have been a contributory factor to the accident as it meant that the crew were unable to perform what is known as a precision-approach landing. I am advised that the approach performed by the crew--a non-precision approach--was consistent with the approach procedure set out in the aircraft's operating manual.
On whether aircraft in the UK are required to have ILS equipment compatible with the equipment at Coventry airport, the use of the ILS is just one of a number of acceptable methods for landing in conditions of poor visibility. UK aircraft are required to carry varying levels of radio and radio navigation equipment according to the circumstances of the flights that they are undertaking.
In this case, the AAIB report noted that the crew failed to comply with the operating procedures for non-precision approaches set out in the aircraft's manual and that the aircraft was allowed to descend below the normal approach glidepath. The AAIB also considers that the performance of the flight crew was impaired by the effects
of tiredness resulting from the change from day duty to night duty, which was extended to just over 10 hours because of unforeseen circumstances.
There is no international common standard for crew flight time limitations, although the European Joint Aviation Authorities is in the process of agreeing on harmonised FTL requirements. Every state has the option of determining its own standards in this sector. The Algerian FTL for night duties allows for a maximum duty period of seven hours 45 minutes on four sectors. That scheme is more restrictive than that allowed for pilots in the UK.
In this case, the Algerian crew had been on duty for more than two hours in excess of the normal limit laid down by the Algerian authorities, but there is provision in the FTL scheme for duty hours to be exceeded under exceptional circumstances such as a weather diversion. That is in the nature of operating aircraft internationally. The aircraft had been diverted from Coventry because of visibility conditions and landed at East Midlands airport. Once advised of improved weather conditions at Coventry, the aircraft took off from East Midlands and made a second unsuccessful attempt to land at Coventry. It would appear, therefore, that the Algerian crew were operating in accordance with their FTL scheme, although there is no question but that they had been on duty for about 10 hours.
The AAIB makes a number of recommendations.One of them, specifically directed at the Department, calls for a review in permit procedures. My noble Friendthe Minster for Aviation and Shipping announced on10 January that the Department had already acted to amend its procedures for the approval of the operation of wet-leased aircraft by foreign airlines. Those amended procedures now require the provision of a statement from the applicant airline as to which airline's operations and flight manuals will be applicable for the proposed flight. That change will clarify permit responsibilities as regards future applications involving the use of wet-leased aircraft.
On the general issue of safety, my Department has been reviewing how best to monitor the safety standardsof foreign aircraft operating to the United Kingdom.I referred earlier to the ICAO system for establishing international standards. The fact that there has been generally good aviation safety is a tribute to the effectiveness of that system so far, but concerns have rightly been expressed about whether these standards are being uniformly applied. We have therefore decided to introduce a number of new measures designed to increase the safety oversight of safety standards of foreign aircraft operating to the UK. Details of those new measures were announced on 10 January by my noble Friend the Minister for Aviation and Shipping.
The measures will include increased surveillance of foreign aircraft operating to the UK, as the hon. Member for Cunninghame, North suggested. My Department will ask the CAA to undertake more inspections of foreign registered aircraft when there is doubt as to whether international safety standards established by the ICAO are being observed.
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