Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
Mr. Beith: Am I misunderstanding the new clause or am I right in thinking that it does not have the effect that the hon. Gentleman describes--of giving Select Committees the opportunity to consider the Security Service's work in this area? Is not its effect rather to preclude the Prime Minister from excluding from the published Intelligence and Security Committee report any item that he thinks would be prejudicial to the Security Service's continued effective operation?
Mr. Winnick: Technically, the right hon. Gentleman is right. I have extended the argument. I suggest simply that, after implementing the new clause--I hope that I am in order. I am just concluding my remarks, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I simply suggest that we set up the appropriate Committee to do precisely what I have described. The new clause goes some way towards that. The Prime Minister would not be in a position to delete any relevant references, but that would not apply to the rest of the work undertaken by MI5.
In Committee, I suggested that the appropriate parliamentary Committee should be able to look at the additional work undertaken by MI5 as a result of the Bill. In the past, I and others have put forward arguments that have been dismissed out of hand. Nevertheless, a
parliamentary Committee with limited powers was eventually set up, and I am sure that the time will come when what I am now urging will be realised--it is just a question of when.
Mr. Allason:
New clause 5 assumes a degree of external independence and oversight of the work of the security and intelligence services. Looking at the record to date, I cannot say that I am hugely encouraged. The report directly relevant to this Bill was delayed for six weeks so that it could be published on precisely the same day as the Bill was published--the beginning of the Christmas recess. There was therefore only very limited time for right hon. and hon. Members to examine both documents. If the Committee was truly exercising its independence, perhaps it should have published its document when it was ready, instead of deliberately delaying it so as to be able to publish it on the same day as the Bill.
It is important that there be external scrutiny, because we have heard the Minister of State say today that the objective of the Bill is to allow the Security Service to operate far behind the front line. The "analytical skills" that are apparently to be deployed by the Security Service are, to my mind, a euphemism for running agents. The Security Service has a limited number of powers, skills and technologies. I submit that running agents and handling agents are not far behind the front line: they are right to the fore. This is precisely the interface between the public and the clandestine world which causes so many problems.
Anyone who doubts that there have been problems should take a look at the problem that the Government face tomorrow afternoon. A Security Service informant was supplying information to a handler who may or may not have asked the right questions. That is how the Matrix Churchill affair arose in the first place.
If there is to be agent handling--one of the prime functions of the Security Service and apparently one of its successes--there will have to be external scrutiny of it if the Committee is to have any meaning at all. The Littlejohn brothers believed that they could rob banks because they had the telephone number of a case officer who would get them out of trouble if they were arrested. They went to prison, and rightly so.
Stephen Ward believed that he would be let off the criminal charge that he faced because he had been an agent of the Security Service. Instead, he was left to dangle, and committed suicide. The biggest marijuana dealer in the world managed to wriggle off a charge in this country because he claimed that he had been in touch with the secret intelligence service to supply information about the Provisional IRA.
My point is that the most sensitive and difficult area of Security Service operations is to be found in the very human environment of the relationship between an agent and his handler. This area has created considerable
problems in the past. If Paul Henderson is anything to go by, it looks to me as though there may be one or two problems in the future, too. If agent handling is one of the principal occupations and skills of the Security Service, euphemistically referred to as an analytical skill, I repeat: it is not far behind the front line.
I therefore urge the House not just to agree to the new clause but to ensure that the external body which--uniquely--this House has taken the trouble to create, so as to arrange for parliamentary oversight of the Security Service, is encouraged to exercise a little independence, not to mention the proper powers that this House has, again uniquely, conferred on it.
The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Michael Howard):
I begin by responding to the references to last Friday night's tragedy and its relationship to the provisions before the House. The House was at its most impressive on Monday when, in a spirit of unity, it expressed its outrage at Friday's events. Since then, the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) and the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) have suggested that the Bill should be delayed or not proceeded with as a result of what happened on Friday night.
In common with the Minister of State and the Labour spokesman, I believe that that would be the worst possible signal we could give the Provisional IRA. We have said all along that the work of the Security Service against organised crime would depend on the competing demands and resources of the service. Clearly the service will need to reappraise its position in the light of Friday's bomb, but that is no reason to deny ourselves the opportunity to use its capability against the menace of organised crime, as circumstances permit.
The recollection by my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay (Mr. Allason) of what was said on this matter on Second Reading is seriously mistaken. Neither I nor the Minister of State said that there was excess capacity in the Security Service. Indeed, in answer to thehon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin), I stated:
Towards the end of my speech I added:
In his wind-up speech, my right hon. Friend made similar observations, but not in the sense wrongly recollected by my hon. Friend the Member for Torbay.
I can assure the House that there will be no question of insufficient resources being devoted to the battle against terrorism because of the new function that this legislation will confer on the Security Service. Every effort is being made by the police, with the support of the Security Service and others, to bring to justice those responsible for last Friday night's outrage, and to seek to prevent any
repetition. It is important to be crystal clear about that. Dealing with the terrorist threat must, and will, remain the top priority of the service.
Mr. Winnick:
There may be disagreement about whether, as a result of Friday's tragedy, MI5's resources should be utilised as they presumably are now, before the Bill has become law, but does the Home Secretary accept that those of us who have expressed reservations have not the slightest desire to give in to the IRA and are not panicking because of the IRA attack? We do not know what will happen or whether there will be renewed terrorist threats. Prior to this measure, it was generally assumed that MI5, over the past 25 years, with other security services, had been directing most of its energies to fighting terrorism. I hope that he will not misunderstand the position.
Mr. Howard:
I have not sought, and do not seek, to impugn the motives of those who have expressed that view--neither the hon. Gentleman's motives nor those of the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed. I differ in my assessment of the nature of the signal that would be sent. It would be the wrong signal, a dangerous one and not that which the House would wish to send.
"if it proves to be the case that some spare resources are available in the Security Service, we should avail ourselves of its particular skills and expertise in the fight against organised crime, which is one of the greatest threats we face."
"Initially, the number of officers that the service will be able to deploy in pursuit of the new function will be small. The resources that it will be able to devote to that area of its work in future will depend on external circumstances and on the competing demands on its resources. In particular, much will depend on the continuance of the ceasefires in Northern Ireland."--[Official Report, 10 January 1996; Vol.269, c.218-25.]
Next Section
| Index | Home Page |