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Mr. David Shaw (Dover): Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the Estonia was a totally different design?He said that there were design problems. The bow door of the Estonia opened upwards right into the water.No British ferry that I am aware of has a similar arrangement of the bow doors, and certainly no British ferry sailing out of Dover.
Mr. Flynn: The hon. Gentleman is entirely wrong when he says that the design is totally different. The architecture of the bow door on the Estonia was different from the design of other ferries, which may have had a contributing effect--we do not have the full report on the Estonia yet. Nevertheless, the reason why the ferry went down was not mechanical failure or the different shape of the bow door. The ferry flooded and capsized catastrophically because it had a flat car deck, which, when flooded with water, forces the ship to list, capsize rapidly and sink to the bottom. That is common to every roll on/roll off ferry.
Many other unfortunate events might have affected the Estonia. If there had been a collision, the water would have got in, regardless of the shape of the bow door. The hon. Gentleman is drawing attention to a detail. I shall discuss those matters later.
In the Select Committee, we were all bemused when the Secretary of State told us that he thought that it was plausible that 2,000 passengers could be evacuated from a doomed ferry in 30 minutes.
I pursued that matter with many parliamentary questions, which revealed an even more alarming position. They revealed that no evacuation exercise involving more than 500 people had ever taken place. The Health and Safety Executive said that such an exercise, with 2,000 people, would be "very dangerous".
On the ferry the Pride of Hampshire, 600 passengers were expected to shin down rope ladders to escape.In one exercise that was held, some Wrens--able-bodied and fit--were too frightened to use the dangling ladders
at the side of the boat. What on earth would happen in a real-life emergency? How would a boatload of panic-stricken, frail humanity cope? That is everyone's nightmare.
In the exercises, the evacuations took a couple of hours for 200 people; in real-life emergencies, on the Lakonia and the Achille Lauro, they took several hours. We were told that the International Maritime Organisation is likely to resist attempts to increase the SOLAS 90 evacuation times to 30 minutes even though new, faster ferries can carry up to 2,000 passengers.
The Government's Marine Safety Agency shared our gloom. It said that many of the 145 countries that make up the IMO have
Mr. Tony Banks (Newham, North-West):
Ferries encourage people to drink a large amount of alcohol while they make the trip. Getting as many bevvies down as possible is part of the fun. Many people taking part in an evacuation will therefore be inebriated, making it even more difficult. Perhaps the ferries should be dry.
Mr. Flynn:
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I shall illustrate the difference between the artificial evacuation and a real-life situation, because there are many other problems. The basis of the safety case for those ferries is hopelessly flawed, for the reason that my hon. Friend suggests and for many others.
The shipping industry repeatedly rubbished our report even before it was published. When that unanimous report was circulated, the industry claimed that its vessels complied with international standards--but international standards are deplorably low. The ferry that went down in two minutes off Indonesia complied with international standards.
We suggested that the only way to ensure that customers had knowledge with which to make a choice was for the MSA to inspect every ship and give it a hotel-type star rating, from zero to five, so that if we arrived on the quay or booked a ferry crossing we would know whether the ship was a one-star, two-star or five-star ship. Those stars would be given on the basis of buoyancy, survivability and evacuation procedures.
The MSA said that it was interested in that classification when we suggested it, but it was slightly alarmed when we gave details of the type of rating we meant--because at present, three quarters of ferries operating from British ports would get no star. The rest would have a single star for reaching SOLAS 90 level--the same level as the Estonia. Four stars would be given in future for vessels that would stay upright in the water long enough to evacuate all their passengers and crew in a credible future incident. Five stars would go to those which added sound evacuation techniques to that, but we are many years away from that.
We sounded a loud blast of warning about ro-ro vessels and we accepted comments that our report was frightening in many ways. The reason was that we were genuinely alarmed by the evidence that we heard. I am sure that the relatives of the 1,100 people who died in the Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia disasters would be grateful to
any parliamentarians who sounded a warning before those events, and the people of Milford Haven will be grateful to their Member of Parliament for having sounded loud notes of warning three months ago, when another vessel went aground off St. Ann's head.
The distinguished naval architect, Professor Rawson, said that
With the Government as its willing accomplice,the British shipping industry has proved that it cares more for its profits than for its passengers.
I shall try to clarify my argument for the hon. Member for Dover (Mr. Shaw), because he will try to dismiss it with the usual obfuscation produced by the Government. The cause of the Estonia tragedy was that the bow doors failed structurally, but the reason for the 900 deaths was that the ship capsized and sank so rapidly that very few could be evacuated, and the reason for that was an inherently dangerous vessel. The design was the problem.
The cause of the sinking of the Herald of Free Enterprise was that the open bow doors allowed water to sweep in. The reason why so many people on board died--193--was that the vessel capsized and sank in90 seconds because it had an inherently dangerous design.
The cause of the sinking of the European Gateway was a collision that allowed water on to the vehicle deck. The reason for the loss of crew and cargo was that the vessel capsized and sank rapidly because it had an inherently dangerous design.
I hope that that is clear enough even for the hon. Member for Dover to grasp.
The Government responded to our report, but it was a woeful response. We said that ferries should remain upright long enough for passengers be evacuated and that, if the IMO disagreed, we should act immediately, not wait for the next century. The Government said that they could not guarantee buoyancy but that they would seek IMO agreement, and seek regional agreement if that failed. They were committed to the shortest possible timetable.
I pay a rare tribute to the Government, because they acted with greater speed than they have before, serious efforts are being made and the United Kingdom is in the lead in dragging the other European countries and the world towards safer standards. We are light years from approaching an acceptable safety standard, but the Government are doing something about that and we are grateful that they listened to the Select Committee's recommendations on that subject. Nevertheless we have those pious intentions without any specific commitments.
The Select Committee also asked for a trial evacuation of 1,000 passengers in order to test the Government's absurd belief that 2,000 people could be evacuated from a stricken ship in 30 minutes. The Government agreed in principle to our request, but they repeated the MSA's claim that a trial evacuation was "very dangerous". In the Government's words, the
If a trial evacuation in ideal conditions would be "very dangerous", a real evacuation of 2,000 panicking people in an emergency could involve many deaths. One trial evacuation of 210 people took more than four hours.
Mr. Andrew Mackinlay (Thurrock):
Although television cameras were invited to film the practice
Mr. Flynn:
Committee members were painfully disappointed that they were not invited to Dover that weekend. The Government must be very relieved that we did not witness the exercise, because it proved our point very vividly.
The Select Committee urged the Government to publish the safety surveys carried out by classification societies for the MSA. That is an important recommendation. However, the Government--who espouse free choice and open government--said that they will not publish the information because it is commercially confidential.That is an unnecessary denial of information on a matter of life and death.
Mr. Allen:
Further to the point raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Mr. Mackinlay), is my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn) aware that I sought a meeting with the MSA and to accompany a ships inspector and surveyor in Southampton on 2 April? Such a meeting was perfectly in order according to the head of the agency, Mr. Robin Bradley, but when it was checked with the private office of Lord Goschen, the Minister for Aviation and Shipping, I was told that it would be wholly inappropriate for me to visit the MSA and to accompany a ships inspector.
"different agendas. The flags of convenience countries seem to use their shipping registers as a source of revenue rather than a mechanism for international standards, with a consequent impact on safety standards."
"nothing has really changed since the Herald went down".
"possibility of injury cannot be ignored".
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