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Mr. Freeman: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will listen to my reply to the debate. I have 10 minutes left to me. Non-lethal equipment did not include--[Interruption.] Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will listen to my reply. I have 10 minutes left.
Mr. Quentin Davies: Will my right hon. Friend give way? [Interruption.]
Mr. Freeman: Let me deal with the debate.
Non-lethal equipment did not include dual-use equipment if intelligence was available that there would be military end use.
Mr. Freeman:
I shall give way to my hon. Friend when I come to his contribution. I shall make some progress, and then give way to him when I come to the guidelines.
The guidelines represented, for internal use, how the policy was to be interpreted. They reflected the policies. The guidelines relating to the Iran-Iraq conflict were not,
as Scott said in his report, an exclusive exposition of Government policy on defence exports. For example, when there were clear examples of internal repression both by Iraq and by Iran, the Government interpreted our policies and our guidelines to restrict exports.
We have published today and placed in the Library a second document, entitled "Government Policy on the Control of Exports to Iran and Iraq 1980 to 1990".
Mr. Freeman:
I quote one sentence from it:
Madam Speaker:
Order. The House must come to order, so that we can hear what the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster has to say.
Mr. Freeman:
I shall certainly give way to the hon. and learned Gentleman, but let me just quote this sentence:
As the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney (Mr. Shore) quite rightly said, the guidelines were broad. Ministers were given the responsibility of interpreting those guidelines. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater said, Ministers operated in real time, having to interpret the guidelines against the great pressure of events.
Mr. Menzies Campbell:
If the Government's position was to do their best to ensure that there was no internal repression in Iraq, why, in the immediate aftermath of the use of chemical weapons at Halabja, did the Government extend financial guarantees to Iraq?
Mr. Freeman:
The hon. Gentleman should listen to the answer. Financial guarantees under the Export Credits Guarantee Department were the subject of long preparation. They covered not only defence but civilian use, including the building of power stations and schools. The amount allocated for defence was always limited and capped.
I now come to the issue raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Stamford and Spalding. Let me deal with the points he raised, because he is misguided. [Interruption.] My right hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Mr. Hurd), the former Foreign Secretary, clearly told the House that the guidelines did not change between 1984 and the summer of 1990. That was the evidence he presented to the House. The interpretation changed as circumstances required.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stamford and Spalding argued that there was a change in 1988. He therefore disputes the specific evidence provided by my right hon. Friend. As the right hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Stepney said, it was inconceivable that junior Ministers could have changed those guidelines without the agreement of senior Ministers and my right hon. Friend
the Prime Minister. The interpretation did, and in 1988 and 1989, junior Ministers interpreted the guidelines to reflect the fact that the war had ended.
Mr. Quentin Davies:
I am sure that my right hon. Friend will agree that, if the policy was changed without proper authorisation from senior Ministers, that compounds the offence rather than mitigating it.
Can my right hon. Friend think of a better documented case in the history of this Parliament of the House being misled? If he can, will he name it? Does he not share my fear that, if we do nothing about such a case as a result of tonight's debate, the most fearful constitutional precedent will be created?
Mr. Freeman:
Today the House heard from my right hon. Friend the Member for Witney, who told us that the guidelines did not change, and that, when he and other senior Ministers came to review them in the summer of 1990, they had not changed since 1984.
I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Stamford and Spalding to accept that evidence. I ask him to accept my argument that junior Ministers interpreted the guidelines in the different circumstances of the end of the conflict. The Ministers involved interpreted them impartially,to prevent the conflict from starting again. They interpreted them in a strict fashion. Indeed, in comparison with any other nation, we took immense, thorough trouble to interpret those guidelines.
In 1989 and 1990, this country exported£11 million-worth of non-lethal defence equipment to Iraq. That is less than 1 per cent. of Iraq's total imports of defence equipment in those two years. Let me remind the House what Scott said in paragraph D3.124:
my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary--
The Government have taken positive, clear and constructive action in relation to the recommendations of the Scott report. We very much welcome the commencement of a debate on the parliamentary convention of withholding information on defence sales. The Scott report has completely vindicated my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General. It said that they acted in good faith, and the Government contend that my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary did not mislead.
The charge against the Labour party, and the Opposition as a whole, is clear. First, the hon. Member for Livingston--together with the deputy leader of the Labour party--made the charges that there was a conspiracy to arm Saddam Hussein, and that there was a conspiracy to send innocent men to gaol. Both charges are untrue, and they should withdraw them. They have both refused to withdraw those charges, and Scott has found them to be untrue.
Secondly and finally, in advancing their case, those Opposition Members have taken an irresponsible and naive attitude to Britain's defence industry, and have been unfair to the civil service. They have lacked the courage to balance the need of British industry with the perfectly
legitimate need to be open with Parliament. The Labour party will have to face those issues if it aspires to form the next Government.
Twenty years ago, the then Prime Minister,Mr. Callaghan, said that we could not maintain an independent arms industry unless we were prepared to engage in this trade. I ask for understanding. The Labour party has none. It is not fit to govern.
Mr. Donald Dewar (Glasgow, Garscadden)
rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put.
Question, That the Question be now put, put and agreed to.
Question put accordingly, That this House do now adjourn:--
"Guidelines"--[Interruption.]
"Guidelines on the export of defence equipment to the two countries, Iran and Iraq, were therefore developed to reinforce the Government's policy and to help in its day-to-day application."
"I accept that Mr. Waldegrave"--
"and the other adherents of the 'interpretation' thesis did not . . . have any duplicitous intention and, at the time, regarded the relaxed interpretation, or implementation, of guideline (iii) as being a justifiable use of the flexibility believed to be inherent in the Guidelines."
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