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Former Yugoslavia
6. Mr. Winnick: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what is the current policy of Her Majesty's Government in respect of the arrest of those held responsible for crimes against humanity in former Yugoslavia. [17262]
Mr. Rifkind: We believe that those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law should be brought to justice. We strongly support the international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
Mr. Winnick: Is it intended that the implementation force should apprehend Karadzic and other criminals wanted by the international tribunal in The Hague? Does the Foreign Secretary agree that bringing such war criminals to justice would be a lesson for other war criminals such as those who are masterminding the terror in Israel against Israeli civilians--men, women and even young children? Perhaps they would be taught that, if they inflict such terror, the time will come when they will appear before the international tribunal at The Hague.
Mr. Rifkind: On the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question, 52 persons have been indicted on a charge of alleged war crimes in Bosnia. If IFOR has the opportunity to arrest of any of those 52 persons, it is under a responsibility to do so. I am sure that it would carry out its responsibilities. I agree that any success in those matters would have a salutary effect in other parts of the world.
Sir Patrick Cormack: Will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that those who have been indicted will, under the terms of the Dayton agreement, be ineligible to stand for any elected office?
Mr. Rifkind: That is indeed the case. It is clear that, under the Dayton accord, an alleged war criminal cannot stand for office in the forthcoming elections.
Mr. Robin Cook: The Foreign Secretary mentioned that more than 50 Serbs and Croats have been indicted before the war crimes tribunal. Does he agree that it is unsatisfactory that only two have so far been arrested? Does he recognise that it is difficult for the public to understand that, with 60,000 troops in Bosnia, it is not possible for IFOR to arrest such high-profile figures as Mr. Karadzic, even when he passes through its checkpoints? Will he urge IFOR to accept that bringing the top war criminals to justice is not a distraction from its work, but central to any hope of restoring peace and reconciliation to Bosnia?
Mr. Rifkind: Yes. I do not think that there is any disagreement about the importance of apprehending alleged war criminals. Of course, there are practical problems that have to be taken into account. People such as Karadzic and Mladic ensure that they are well protected by heavily armed men when they move around. That is a practical consideration that must be borne in mind. I agree that IFOR must use any opportunity that presents itself to achieve their apprehension.
Iraq (Nuclear Weapons)
7. Mr. Flynn: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs on what date Her Majesty's Government first received reports relating to Iraqi nuclear weapons development programmes. [17263]
Mr. Rifkind: Although there had been suspicions for some years that Iraq had a programme for developing nuclear weapons, no evidence was found until the International Atomic Energy Agency's sixth inspection in Iraq in September 1991.
Mr. Flynn: Does the Secretary of State recall that, on 19 April 1990, when Saddam Hussein was known throughout the world to have three nuclear weapons programmes going, in answer to a question of mine to the present Chief Secretary to the Treasury that called for the IAEA to beef up its inspections of the nuclear weapons installations, I was told that inspections by the authority would not be increased and that, as Saddam Hussein had signed the non-proliferation treaty, the British Government had full confidence that he would abide by his international obligations and not develop nuclear weapons? Was that a misleading answer?
Mr. Rifkind: If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I should like to check Hansard to identify the precise words that my right hon. Friend the Chief Secretary used. With regard to evidence about the nuclear weapons aspirations of Iraq, it is to the IAEA that one must look. It had made five previous inspections and been unable to find evidence. Only on its sixth inspection, in September 1991--some time after the exchange to which the hon. Gentleman refers--did it report that it had discovered evidence that supported the claims.
Mr. Duncan Smith: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that a major problem with attempts to discover and confirm whether such programmes existed--although there was plenty of good, hard evidence that they did--was that many of the programmes were farmed out to neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan, which
undertook quite a lot of technology and research that was subsequently transferred to Iraq, and North Korea, which provided the launch technology? Does not that help to confuse the issue and confirm that proliferation is, and has been, taking place?
Mr. Rifkind: My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. For obvious reasons, the Iraqi Government wished to conceal any indication of their true intent. We know that they sought to conceal their efforts in many ways. It is interesting to note that the international community discovered only a few months ago the extent of the Iraqi Government's biological weapons programme, which they concealed for several years--even following the Gulf war. That is an example of the means that the Iraqi Government employed in an attempt to deceive the world.
Mrs. Clwyd: As the United Nations special commission has now given the British Government the names of British companies that supply the components of chemical and biological weapons and that have assisted in the nuclear warfare programme, what action do the Government intend to take against those companies? Such companies have been prosecuted in the United States and in Germany, but no prosecutions have yet occurred in this country. What will the Government do about that situation?
Mr. Rifkind: The hon. Lady will accept that prosecutions can take place only if there is evidence of a company having broken the law. Prosecutions are normally brought if there is such evidence.
Mr. John Marshall: Will my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that Prime Minister Begin deactivated the Basra reactor in 1981? Should he not receive posthumous praise from the Foreign Office to compensate for the condemnation that he suffered then?
Mr. Rifkind: As I said earlier, we were suspicious of Iraq's true intentions for many years. I am not able to speculate about what hard evidence the Israeli Government may have had at that time. It is clear that they also had great suspicions but, if they had hard evidence, they did not share it with the rest of the world. It was inevitable, therefore, that their actions gave rise to criticism then.
Cyprus
8. Mr. O'Hara: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what steps the Government are taking to facilitate a settlement of the Cyprus dispute within the terms of United Nations Security Council resolutions. [17264]
Mr. David Davis: We remain committed to an active search for an overall settlement in Cyprus. The process of UN-led negotiations and discussions with both communities and the relevant decisions of the Security Council are at the heart of that search.
Mr. O'Hara: There is an increasing tendency to view the Dayton model as a possible way of achieving a solution to the Cyprus problem. Does the Minister agree that there is a danger that that would result in a quick fix
that would not produce a lasting solution? Will he give a commitment on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that any future negotiations regarding a solution to the problem--irrespective of whether they are founded on the Dayton model--will be based on existing United Nations resolutions and its set of ideas, with particular reference to one undivided island, one people, one federal Government and undivided sovereignty?
Mr. Davis: The hon. Gentleman will remember that I addressed that issue during the Adjournment debate this morning. We believe that any achievements will be based on the United Nations' set of ideas and the notion of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. The hon. Gentleman made a very good speech in the debate this morning--[Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."]--as did a number of my hon. Friends. The Government are pursuing every possible avenue towards achieving that end.
Sir George Gardiner: Will my hon. Friend tell me what incentive there is for the Greek Cypriot Government to reach an accommodation with the Turkish Cypriot community? As things stand, they benefit from the fiction that they govern the whole of the island, rather than just a part of it, and any international development aid to the island is channelled through them, to the detriment of the Turkish Cypriot community. Are not we more likely to achieve a settlement by adopting a more even-handed approach to the two communities?
Mr. Davis: It is a pity that my hon. Friend did not attend this morning's Adjournment debate, because a number of the virtues of settlement were put by hon. Members who were arguing the Greek Cypriot advantage. Therefore, his original premise does not stand. It is clearly in the interests of the whole island that there is a peaceful and lasting settlement of the problem.
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