| Previous Section | Index | Home Page |
Mr. Rifkind: We are about to enter into a negotiation, not a debate, so the Government and I must take account of the fact that, in that negotiation, we must set certain objectives. We are not excluding objectives in that negotiation simply because we might start as the only country expressing certain views. I have not the slightest doubt that we will start by being the only country advocating certain proposals and changes, some of which are referred to in the White Paper, but we cannot sensibly enter a negotiation if we judge that, not only at the beginning but at the end of it, there is unlikely to be any willingness to support our position.
The IGC will deal with one aspect of the work of the European Union. We will argue strongly for matters that are within the relevant competence of the IGC. If we make proposals that we believe are vital to the United Kingdom, we will argue them with all the vehemence at our disposal. We will not stop arguing them simply because there is not a measure of agreement.
Mr. Patrick Nicholls (Teignbridge):
My right hon. and learned Friend's position will be overwhelmingly, although not unanimously, accepted by Conservative Members, but he seems to be saying that there is no sticking point in the negotiation. Are there any sicking points where, if he cannot get his way, he will say to our partners, "We will bring the temple down because this matters to us more than anything else"?
Mr. Rifkind:
The IGC will not be a success unless its conclusions are accepted by all member states. I notice that, only yesterday, one of my French colleagues said that the IGC would fail if certain French interests were not properly taken into account. The same applies to the UK and to other member states.
Mr. Tony Marlow (Northampton, North):
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
Mr. Rifkind:
May I make a bit of progress? I will then happily give way to my hon. Friend.
A further principle with regard to flexibility that I outlined a fortnight ago in my Paris speech is that policies using Community institutions and the Community budget should be undertaken by less than the full membership only when that is agreed by all. Policies agreed by some against the objections of others should not carry the imprimatur of the European Union, or use EU institutions or resources.
Two years ago, the Prime Minister's Leiden speech was considered heresy by some of our European partners. That is not so today. They increasingly accept that the development of the European Union may need to include a degree of flexibility, or, as it is sometimes called, "variable geometry". We welcome that, provided that the concept of flexibility is not misused, for example,to introduce obstacles into the single market or to enable some countries to pursue closer integration among themselves and still expect all member states to foot the bill. We are, however, alive to the risks. As the European Union enlarges, it will have to incorporate more flexibility, which may require some new mechanism in the treaty.
Mr. Nicholas Budgen (Wolverhampton, South-West):
If the Government are in favour of variable geometry, why should that variable geometry not extend to allowing France, Germany and perhaps some countries surrounding Germany to enter a hard-core arrangement? If they think that that is to their advantage and we do not find anything wrong with it, why should they not get on with it?
Mr. Rifkind:
If countries wish, on an intergovernmental basis outside the European Union, to enter into agreements between themselves, we cannot stop them--they do not need our agreement or our permission. That is what happened with the Schengen agreement. That is intergovernmental, was reached outside the European Union and does not require our consent. If, however, countries wish to integrate under the European Union, use its resources and be subject to the work of the European Court and of the European Commission, that requires the consent of all member states. That is a crucial requirement for us.
Mr. Rifkind:
I must make some progress. You said, Madam Speaker, that many hon. Members wish to take part in the debate. I will give way later.
Of course, some variable geometry exists. Not all countries participate in the Schengen agreement on frontiers. The UK has opted out of the social chapter. Britain and Denmark have not committed themselves to joining a single currency. As the Union enlarges, such variable geometry will be increasingly visible. The likelihood that a majority of existing members will not be able to participate in any single currency that might be created in 1999 is widely acknowledged.
One must add to those factors the new market economies of central and eastern Europe, nine of which have applied to join the European Union. It is unavoidable that most of those central and eastern European countries will be unable to join a single European currency possibly for a generation. The EU must get used to the idea that, if the single currency goes ahead, most of its member states will not be a part of it for the foreseeable future.
Sir Terence Higgins (Worthing):
If that position exists, is it not clear that there is a two-speed Europe?
Mr. Rifkind:
No, because a two-speed Europe implies that we are all going to the same destination, but that some may arrive at it later than others. That may be true with regard to some policies and some countries, but it is equally clear that some member states will not wish to move towards some forms of integration, even in the long term. That is why I referred to a multi-track rather than a multi-speed concept of European Union.
Mr. Rifkind:
I must make some progress.
The inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the European Union treaty was a British success at Maastricht. Since then, the principle has been developed further. The European Commission accepts that action at the level of the nation state should be the rule and Community action the exception. Some progress has been made. Since Maastricht, the number of legislative proposals from the Commission has fallen dramatically, but there is scope to do more. We shall seek to entrench subsidiarity further.
In 1992, the Edinburgh European Council adopted guidelines on how subsidiarity should work. We propose that those should be incorporated in a protocol to the treaty. Such a protocol would require that the Commission shall propose the
The Commission would need to explain why Community action was chosen in preference to co-operation between member states. A new measure would have to satisfy the test that it minimises financial or administrative burdens, and leaves the maximum scope for national decision-making.
We shall vigorously defend the pillared structure of the treaty that was introduced at Maastricht. That acknowledges that Community procedures and institutions are inappropriate when it comes to foreign policy, defence policy and questions of home affairs such as policing. Those are issues that need to be handled intergovernmentally, because they go to the heart of national sovereignty.
Once again, France agrees with the United Kingdom. In his speech last week, the French Prime Minister said:
Much can be done in the IGC to improve the operation of the second and third pillars. Britain has already made proposals and we shall have more to make, but there can be no question of abandoning the intergovernmental nature of co-operation--for example, by introducing voting procedures more appropriate to the European Community.
I must confess to some dismay at the prospect of months and months of negotiation about decision-making procedures in common foreign and security policy. There are times when the European Union becomes a triumph of process over product.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Witney(Mr. Hurd) asked in his Churchill memorial lecture in Luxembourg last week whether the European Union was
going to spend the next year discussing majority voting or the real issues confronting us, such as our policy towards Russia. He said:
I hope that we can prove him wrong, for, as he went on to say, it is unreal to imagine that the European Union's contribution to foreign policy would be transformed by different decision-making procedures in CFSP. The more important priorities are for thorough joint analysis, sensible policy proposals and the machinery to implement our ideas quickly and well.
Mr. Marlow:
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way. This House is deeply exercised by the judgment by the Advocate General on the 48-hour week. This House was told, without any doubt, that it retained competence over social policy.If the Advocate General's judgment is sustained by the court as a whole, and if, as is likely, we do not get unanimity in the IGC to reverse that judgment, will my right hon. and learned Friend give the House an undertaking that he will not rule out the possible necessity of passing legislation to overcome that judgment?
"simplest form of action possible".
"The IGC should clearly limit the Commission's field of action to Community matters; the second and third pillars should fall to the exclusive competence of the Member States".
"On present form there is a real danger that Ministers and politicians will spend precious time going to and fro over the arguments about machinery."
| Next Section
| Index | Home Page |