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Dr. Norman A. Godman (Greenock and Port Glasgow): In my hon. Friend's discussions with the Home Secretary, did the right hon. and learned Gentleman confirm that, where Scotland is concerned, mentions of "the Secretary of State" in the Bill refer to the Secretary of State for Scotland and not the Home Secretary?
Mr. Straw: I did not discuss that matter with the Secretary of State but, for these purposes, "Secretary of State" means the Home Secretary in England and Wales and the Secretary of State for Scotland in Scotland.
I must say to my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford, West that--as far as I am aware--the current legislation and the Bill contain no power in respect of cyclists. But I note that one of the amendments tabled by my hon. Friends is to extend the stop-and-search powers to cover cyclists. I find that slightly surprising, but no doubt the reason will emerge during our discussions.
Mr. Bennett:
Does my hon. Friend accept that one of the purposes of that amendment was to make sure that the Government got the Bill right? Vehicles are referred to in the Bill, but it is not certain whether that covers cycles. If it does not, it illustrates the way in which one does not always get things right by rushing through legislation. Could I press my hon. Friend on one of the key issues? Does the new power conform to the European convention on human rights? As I understand it, a suspicion is needed to justify a search under the terms of the convention.
Mr. Straw:
I am grateful for my hon. Friend's explanation about the additional powers to stop cyclists,
When the draft Bill was given to us at the end of last week and we had to decide whether it was reasonable to agree to the timetable, one of our main concerns was whether any of the powers contained in clause 1 could conceivably be regarded as a reintroduction of the old sus law. This is a little-known fact, Madam Deputy Speaker, but I used to be one of the world's experts on the sus law. I earned much of my income as a very junior member of the Bar by defending a number of innocent people and--I must say--a number whom I subsequently found out were certainly not innocent against charges of being a suspected person loitering with intent to commit an arrestable offence contrary to section 4 of the Vagrancy Act 1824.
I must tell my hon. Friends that there is no way in which these powers--limited and circumscribed as they are--could conceivably be compared to sus. Let me explain why. Under the 1824 Act, sus created an offence of simply being a suspected person--a person or a suspected thief was the phrase used--loitering with intent to commit an indictable offence. As the police used to say, feeling one car door was not enough, but feeling two was enough to secure a conviction. Moreover, a person's previous convictions were adducible in evidence by the prosecution to prove the offence of intent, even though the arresting officer had not known of those previous convictions when he made the arrest.
The law was a wonderful piece of machinery available to the police basically to pick up anybody whom they did not terribly like. This caused huge concern. I was concerned about it when I was defending many of my clients--whether they turned out to be innocent or not. I managed to secure the acquittal of most of them. But the offence caused great concern and anxiety, especially in the black community. It was entirely right that in 1981, following various reports into the sus law, including a report by the Select Committee on Home Affairs, the House abolished sus and has had nothing to do with it since. There is no way in which the power under section 13A or the power under section 13B could conceivably be compared with sus.
Mr. McNamara:
I am most grateful to my right hon. Friend; I am sorry, I should say my hon. Friend. He will shortly be my right hon. Friend.
Mr. McNamara:
Yes, because we shall win the next election.
The point at issue is this. There will be a designated area and, within that area, a constable in uniform may stop any pedestrian and search him. If a pedestrian refuses to be stopped and searched, he will have committed an
offence. If that person is stopped and refuses to do what the policeman says, it will be an offence per se. That is the concern.
Mr. Straw:
I understand what my hon. Friend is saying, and I will say more in a moment about the important balance between civil liberties and public safety.
First, the search that would be permitted under section 13B would be less onerous than the search that the House requires of any visitor every day of the week. That is a matter of fact. Secondly, if one has a power, one has to have some means of enforcing it. One cannot just say, "By the way, we would like people to submit to searches, but people who happen to be carrying bombs may be let off." Such people could say, "Sorry, officer, we do not like this." There has to be some means of enforcement and that has to be by way of an offence. In this case, it will be an offence at level 5. Moreover, no one can be prosecuted for this offence except with the approval of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
I do not think that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) is pushing the point about a parallel with sus. The sus laws existed in the days before the Crown Prosecution Service and did not require the approval of the Director of Public Prosecutions or even of the chief solicitor for the area. The station inspector laid the charge and would be up the steps to the court the next morning. The chances were that a person would not be represented, not even by someone of my lowly status, as it was then, and would almost certainly be convicted, especially if the stipendiary knew who the person was. That was one of the major differences, and the many safeguards under the Bill make the provision wholly different from the sus law.
The second issue in deciding whether we would support the guillotine motion was our reaction to the original powers contained in section 13A. As some of my hon. Friends have said, when the clause was debated in Committee in February 1994, we probed the matter, as we had a duty to do, but it was made clear by my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Mr. Michael), without any opposition from any member of my party or of any other party, either in Committee or on the Floor of the House, that we supported the inclusion of what became section 13A in the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act.
The third issue we had to weigh up was why the extension of powers was needed now. In making our judgment, we are obviously in the hands of those on whom we impose heavy responsibilities for the safety of the public--the police and the security forces. But we should not substitute their judgment for ours. Instead, we have to make our own judgments on the basis of the best evidence we are given. My hon. Friends and I listened to the advice offered by those concerned and we formed a judgment that we should accept that advice.
Another issue at which we looked in making a judgment on whether we should accept the guillotine motion was what happened on the only previous parallel occasion--the introduction of the initial prevention of terrorism Bill in November 1974. The Bill passed through all its stages in 17 hours. I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Denton and Reddish (Mr. Bennett), who raised the issue, that it is true that there was no guillotine
motion on that day. However, there was--I have the debate here--an agreed business motion which required every stage of the Bill to be completed without the House adjourning. Moreover, my hon. Friend may care to look at the length of the 1974 Bill and the amount of time that was taken. If he looks at the length of this Bill and the total time available now, he may note that there is marginally more time available, clause for clause, on this Bill. The powers in this Bill are far less onerous than the powers in the principal Bill in 1974.
Mr. Beith:
Bearing in mind the precedent of 1974, what is to stop us following that procedure and not adjourning the House until we have given proper consideration to the Bill? Even if the hon. Gentleman cannot bring himself to agree to that, why is he resisting the amendment, under which it is proposed that we should have another three hours so that the House can have sufficient time to deal with the detailed points he mentioned?
Mr. Straw:
I have read the whole of the 1974 debate and I have read the right hon. Gentleman's contribution, in which he fully supported the prevention of terrorism Bill. I think that he may have been slightly confused about what I said from a sedentary position during his speech. He said that there was a difference about something and I said that I had noticed that there was a difference between a principle and a Liberal. I merely put that on the record.
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